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INTRODUCTION 
 
Our contemporary society can be considered not only as a communication and information 
society, but also as a risk society. The current risk society does not only include ‘old risks’ 
such as natural disasters, it is also characterized by the emergence of the so called ‘new 
risks’, risks that are the consequence of a new post-industrial and technological society. We 
are confronted with new risks that are a result of the technological progress, such as hazards 
associated with nuclear energy, radiation of cell-phones, hazards related to genetically 
modified food etc. Other new risks, such as terrorism, have a more political or social nature. 
This contemporary risk society is also characterized by a commercialization of risks. We can 
actually label this mechanism as the ‘risk of the risk society’. Increasingly more companies 
focus on the core business to sell certainty and threat-reducing or should we say perception 
reducing, products and services. There have never been as many risks before, or at least that 
is what a great portion of the population thinks. Risk perceptions are very often much more 
important than the risks as such, as these perceptions will influence the actual behaviour of 
people, and eventually have their impact on social, economical and political domains in the 
entire society. This introduction was written during the rise of the H1N1 virus, or the so 
called ‘Mexican flu’. This case is a perfect example to introduce the readers to the concept of 
risk perception, risk communication and the ripple effects that are induced by various media. 
On March 18th, the competent authority (Interministriële Commisaris Influenza) announced 
the first victim of the H1N1 virus in Mexico. The virus was first labeled as the ‘swine flu’ but 
later renamed as Mexican flu referring to the geographical origin of the first casualties. The 
threat of this new virus did not lie within its mortal nature but especially within its high 
degree of contagiousness and the fact that the virus was resistant to all existing vaccines and 
anti viral medication (Tamiflu) were not fully effective. The worldwide attention and 
international concern with governments, combined with a fast and global media coverage 
induced general arousal. To illustrate: when the first contaminated person was confirmed in 
Belgium on 13th May 2009, the national press and television stations put a lot of attention to 
it, inviting experts and providing general guidelines to civilians through various media 
channels. Of course it is absolutely necessary to create a mental safety net to attenuate the 
communal fear and panic reactions. On 11th June 2009, the World Health Organization 
announced phase 6 of the general pandemic alert and announced the pandemic status of 
the H1N1 influenza virus. On 30th July, a twenty nine year old women had deceased after 
being infected with the virus, and on 14th October, a five year old passed away because of 
the complications that accompanied the H1N1 virus. These casualties might have caused 
even greater arousal and even fear with certain groups within the population. The 
government has communicated intensively on the evolution of the virus and the number of 
contaminations.  
The weekly report for the period between 12th October and 18th October of the Belgian 
Institute for Public Health integrated the subjoined figures (ISP/WIV, 2009). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of ILI incidence (ISP/WIV, 2009 p.4) 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of IRA incidence (ISP/WIV, 2009 p.5) 
 
 
The evolution of the Influenza like illnesses (ILI) indicates that the number of people infected 
with influenza like illness has exceeded the epidemic threshold since week 39 (last week of 
September 2009). Also amount of people with an Acute Respiratory Infection has never been 
as high in the past three years from week 41 (second week of October 2009) on. The Belgian 
Influenza Directorate base themselves on a solid methodology, developed by the Scientific 
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Institute for Public Health, that allows them to extrapolate the sample figures that they 
receive from the sentinel network of general practitioners. Although the epidemic threshold 
has only been exceeded since week 39, we have already perceived major ‘ripple effects’ on 
various levels and in various domains since the outbreak of the virus in the first semester of 
2009. A newspaper article in ‘De Standaard’, that was published on 14th August 2009, 
summarizes the general economical trends that could be directly related to the Mexican flu 
(De Rijck, 2009). While the arousal and fear for the Mexican flue is spreading globally and 
probably at an equal pace, governments are replenishing their stocks of antiviral medicines 
and pharmaceutical organizations have commenced the race to be the first to develop and 
commercialize a vaccine. The major pharmaceutical companies, such as Roche and Glaxo 
Smith Kline (GSK), can hardly keep up with the production of these antiviral medicines, such 
as Tamiflu. Especially in the period after 11th June, when the WHO announced phase 6 of the 
pandemic alert, the figures of sale rose sharply (De Rijck, 2009). Although the national 
influenza director is very careful and proposes the relativity of the threat of the Mexican flu 
by comparing it with a regular seasonal flu, many industries and companies benefit from the 
general culture of arousal. The newspaper article closely examined some concrete facts and 
figures of some key pharmaceutical companies. The sale of Tamiflu, the antiviral medicine 
developed and commercialized by Roche, has tripled in the first semester of 2009 compared 
to the same period in 2008. Glaxo Smith Klein, the largest competitor, has sold 9 times more 
Relenza (similar anti viral medicine that has to be inhaled) in the same period. Besides the 
effect on the sale figures of the pharmaceutical industry, the Mexican flu has also induced 
effects in other sectors. According to an article in the Financial Times (Birchall, 2009), 
Kimberly-Clark, the major company that also manufactures Huggies (diapers) and Kleenex 
tissues announced an increase of their health division of 14%, from which half can be 
attributed to the sale of facial masks. Also 3M announced an increase in their sales figures. 
Companies, like Reckitt-Benckiser, that produce cleaning products and disinfectants like 
Clorox Dettol or Lysol also notice a strong increase in their sales figures (Birchall, 2009). 
Some of these companies explicitly promote their products as a means to ‘fight’ the H1N1 
virus. Dettol has developed a website: www.swinefluheal.com, which provides information 
and news about the H1N1 virus. We have included a print screen of this website. The 
website provides general information about the H1N1 virus) and it integrates a H1N1 
protection guide. Naturally, they also advise to use the appropriate cleaning products and 
disinfectants, products that can be provided by the company.  
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Figure 3: Print Screen of www.swinefluheal.com/informations/2009/09/17/dettol-germ-
protection-guide-h1n1-flu-guide.html 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Print Screen of the protective guidelines on www.swinefluheal.com 
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We have found similar websites that explicitly focus on the H1N1 flu. One example is the 
commercial website www.tegenh1n1.be. The website offers various products ‘to optimally 
protect oneself against the H1N1 virus’.  
 
 
Figure 5: Print Screen of the website http://tegenh1n1.be 
 
 
The pricelist of this company even mentions that “the offered products are promoted by Dr. 
Marc Van Ranst, virologist and inter ministerial director for the prevention of influenza in his 
campaign to prevent the Mexican flu”.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Print Screen of a pricelist for products ‘against h1n1’, integrating expert endorsement 
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The sale of these products by the company is completely legal, as well as the marketing 
techniques that are used to promote the products (expert endorsement). However, there 
are also examples of illegal practices, abusing the credulity of many people. In the US, the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration is enforcing the laws that protect consumers from illegal 
products marketed through the Internet that claim to diagnose, prevent, mitigate, treat or 
cure the 2009 H1N1 flu virus (FDA, 2009). They have already identified various examples of 
unapproved, uncleared, or unauthorized products: 
- a shampoo that claimed to protect against the H1N1 flu virus; 
- a dietary supplement that claimed to protect infants and young children from 
contracting the H1N1 flu virus; 
- a “new” supplement that claimed to cure H1N1 flu infection within four to eight hours; 
- a spray that claimed to leave a layer of ionic silver on one’s hands that kills the virus; 
- several tests that have not been approved to detect the H1N1 flu virus and 
- an electronic instrument costing thousands of dollars that claimed to utilize ‘photobiotic 
energy’ and ‘deeply penetrating mega-frequency life-force energy waves’ to strengthen 
the immune system and prevent symptoms associated with H1N1 viral infection. 
The flu has also become a very popular marketing tool. The next photo shows how a bottle 
of antibacterial gel accompanies a copy of a popular lifestyle and health magazine in 
Flanders (Vitaya, 2009). The cover mentions “Free disinfecting handgel. Do not give flu a 
chance”. 
 
 
Figure 7: The Vitatya magazine, including a free bottle of disinfecting gel 
 
 
The key questions we ask ourselves are related to how the risk perceptions of people are 
constructed and what the implications of these perceptions are on their personal beliefs, 
attitudes, trust in governmental institutions, information seeking behaviour and preventive 
behaviour. The risk is amplified by various intermediary factors, such as media coverage.  
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How do people react to the vast amount of information about the ‘risk’ of the Mexican flu? 
How are their perceptions constructed and influenced? Some will be easily aroused and will 
show increased protective behaviours, some will be more critical, like the woman who 
responded to the newspaper article on the website of the newspaper:  
(translated from Dutch in English): 
“I am certainly not an adept of conspiracy theories, but I do think that, in the middle of one of 
the worst financial crises of the last decades, a similar global panic reaction is useful. I notice 
that I invest more in more expensive paper handkerchiefs with anti bacterial characteristics, 
in Dettol sprays and cleaning products etc. I also buy Knorr Vie (drink on the basis of 
vegetables) to make sure that me and my family get extra vitamins and every morning, we 
drink Actimel because it boosts the natural resistance of my body. I also consume more 
washing powder because everything gets washed more easily and toothbrushes are replaced 
more frequently. Am I afraid for the flu? Maybe I am, but Halleluja for my stock options in 
Unilever, Henkel, Merck etc.”(Gwosdz, 2009) 
The H1N1 virus was first labeled as ‘Swine flu’ but later renamed as ‘Mexican flu’ referring to 
its geographical origin. We could assume that the Swine flu label would have had its impact 
on e.g. the food industry. Belgium had to cope with several food-related crises in the last 
decade (e.g. BSE and dioxin crisis), crises that had a strong impact on the consumption of 
e.g. meat and eggs. Since travelers were insured, the cost of annulations of trips to Mexico 
was probably lower than the potential cost of the ripple effect of a ‘Swine flu’ on the food 
industry. However, we cannot provide empirical data for this statement. Anyway, we see 
that the H1N1 label is used in combination with the more popularized ‘Mexican flu’ label. 
This is a nice example of the reconciliation between the scientific positivism approach and 
the public oriented approach, taking into account the ‘lay’ perspective on the risk issue.   
 
We have used the example of the H1N1 virus to introduce the readers to the importance of 
risk perception and to briefly illustrate the social and media amplification of risks and the 
accompanied ripple effects on e.g. the economy.  Communicating about risks is very complex 
since it requires in a way risk perception management as well. We consider risk 
communication research very relevant and contemporary as our present and future society 
will always be confronted with risks of various natures.  
 
Key objectives and structure of the dissertation 
 
A dissertation in communication sciences has to be profoundly supported by theoretical 
frameworks as the research objects, involving human interaction and communication, are 
very often quite abstract and difficult to measure with exact and reliable measurement 
tools. That is why the key objective of the first part, the theoretical body, is to provide the 
reader with an extensive and in-depth literature review. The literature review will try to 
reconcile various theoretical frameworks on the three core levels of analysis that have to be 
related to risk communication research: the individual level (psychological frameworks), the 
interpersonal level (socio-psychological frameworks) and the (meta) social level (sociological 
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frameworks). The theoretical body will cover four large chapters. In the first chapter, we will 
try to define the scope of our research topic and to provide a clear definition of ‘risk’ and the 
‘new risk society’. We will use Beck’s perspectives on the new risk society as one of the 
theoretical cornerstones that underlie our approach to the key concept of ‘risk’. One of the 
other key frameworks that will be extensively discussed is the Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework. Both the concept of the new risk society as the SARF will be illustrated by means 
the concrete case of terrorism as a ‘new risk’. The second chapter will confront and reconcile 
both theoretical frameworks as more practically inspired and applied models about risk 
communication and risk management. It will also point out the overlaps and differences 
between crisis and risk communication, as our perspectives on risk communication should 
be clearly defined. We will close the chapter by discussing some key barriers for effective risk 
communication and offering some concrete best practices to cope with these problems. As 
trust, credibility and stakeholder participation in risk communication are three of the main 
ingredients to construe effective and efficient risk communication strategies, our third 
chapter will discuss these key issues more thoroughly on various levels of analysis. These 
issues will also be considered especially in the light of governmental risk communication as 
this is also one of the main research topics of this dissertation. The three first chapters will 
include elements and ideas that support and advocate a public oriented risk communication 
policy. The plea for public oriented risk communication policies will be supported by means 
of the frameworks that will be discussed in chapter four. The fourth chapter is the most 
extensive one. It will provide arguments that sustain the idea that risk communication is a 
multidisciplinary and multilevel process. As we will scrutinize the concept of risk from the 
viewpoint of a communication scientist, we will have to integrate a broad palette of 
theoretical approaches with psychological, social psychological and sociological roots. We 
will also have to pay special attention to the concept of opinion leadership in general and 
more specifically in the context of risk communication as this concept will be one of the key 
research topics in our empirical body. Eventually, in our theoretical body, we will try to come 
to a more holistic approach that combines elements of the three levels of analysis. The final 
aim of the theoretical body is to provide a clear and solid foundation for the empirical 
studies that will try to scrutinize the core concepts that were presented and discussed in the 
theoretical body. Our empirical body will exist of two parts: a public oriented part and a 
message oriented part. The public oriented research will include three research reports, 
covering six empirical studies. The empirical studies are quantitative research studies. The 
key research objective is to create and validate a methodology that can offer us a solid 
measurement tool to perform a reliable audit of risk perception levels and all the concepts 
that are related (mental distance, risk information behaviour, protective behaviour, trust in 
the government as a risk regulator and risk communicator etc.) and it will allow us to identify 
crucial elements for improvement. Moreover, the methodology should be applicable in most 
risk contexts, that is why we opted to validate our methodology in three risk contexts: 
terrorism, the bird flu (or H5N1 virus) and the financial and economical crisis. We will also 
validate an information seeker’s segmentation tool. This tool will allow us to identify and 
profile our key communication target groups for our risk communication strategies 
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(especially the opinion leaders will play the leading part in this perspective). The final 
objective of this empirical part is to scrutinize the multivariate relationships between the key 
concepts and to confirm the relationship between risk communication and risk regulation by 
means of concrete and statistically significant results that were retrieved in all three risk 
contexts. The second part of the empirical body will include two experiments that scrutinize 
the relationship between message specificities and credibility.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE NEW RISK SOCIETY 
1. Introduction: defining the core concept of risk 
Before elaborating on the abstract levels of the risk concept and discussing the traits of the 
‘new’ risk society, we will provide an introduction to the core concept of risk.  
As Penning-Rowsell and Handmer state, the definition of risk is very complex. They devided 
the definitions of risk into three categories (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990 p.6): 
- Risk as a statistical concept, so exclusively related to the occurrence probability of 
the damaging effects; 
- Risk as the product of the event probability and the severity of the impact, by which 
they refer to the classical and most used definition of risk; 
- Risk placed in a context in which the emphasis is put on the distribution of power and 
control, resulting in a distribution of costs and benefits. 
Wiegman and Gutteling stated that environmental hazards can be assessed both objectively 
and subjectively. We consider this dual mode of assessment to be applicable on all types of 
risks. Objective assessment of risks involves mostly quantitative risk analyses, integrating 
probability numbers and in most cases also a numerical and scientific expression of the 
potential consequences. Subjective risk assessment is at least as complex as the objective 
assessment, integrating processes and viewpoints from various disciplines. Subjective risks 
are perceived, estimated or rated by ‘the public’ (Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995 p.227). As we 
will discuss further on, ‘the public’ in the research domain of risk communication is a very 
broad label that is used to summarize the whole of various stakeholders that are involved in 
the risk management process. We consider the public to consist of individuals or groups of 
people who can be considered to vary from active and highly involved to rather passive and 
not involved with specific risk contexts. We include the passive or low involved subgroups as 
they can also be considered to be exposed to the risks as such or the communication about 
risks. Risk communication is often omnipresent and unavoidable, certainly when the risk 
contains high news value and induces large media coverage. Risks can be attenuated or 
amplified and may infiltrate in the personally constructed risk realities of people that are not 
even directly confronted with the risks or their consequences. We will discuss the 
amplification and attenuation processes of risks further in this chapter (6). 
This doctoral dissertation will combine elements of risk management studies from the scope 
of the social scientist, combining concepts and ideas from psychological, socio – 
psychological and sociological theories and frameworks. We can state that we will mainly 
use risk as a concept in the context of the third category of definitions, as defined by 
Handmer and Penning-Rowsell (1990). We have the impression that the distribution of 
power and control has mostly been formulated from the viewpoint that the one who 
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controls the probability information and the power to control the risk as such has the power, 
introducing the key question: ‘who bears and who imposes the risk?’. Beck already indicated 
that, since the 1970’s,  the ‘wealth distributing society’ is accompanied by a ‘risk distributing 
society’ (Beck, 1992). We will discuss the new risk society perspective of Beck in section 3. 
Our studies will mainly focus on the ‘new’ and untransparent risks or as Ulrich Beck 
formulates it the modernization risks, but we will put strong emphasis on the ‘risk bearer’, 
the individual that is confronted with risk information (probability, impact, etc.). The risk 
bearer does not necessarily have to be the passive element in the power distribution 
process, especially in the context of risks that are mainly socially and medially constructed. 
As we will discuss in section 6, risks can be socially and medially amplified or attenuated by 
various processes on a multiple levels (individual, communal,etc.). Behavioural intentions 
and concrete behaviour of individuals as elements of a society is driven by their individual 
and social perceptions of the risks. Eventually, the impact on the society on an economical, 
political and social level is the outcome of the combinations the processes that underlie the 
process of risk perception. So in a way, we can state that the power can be transferred partly 
or even completely to the risk bearers. We will try to provide valid theoretical and empirical 
evidence to corroborate our statement that it is vital to scrutinize, indentify and even 
actively involve the ‘public’ in risk communication and risk management processes.  
2. A taxonomy for disasters and risks 
Wilkins and Patterson have proposed a taxonomy that includes three types of disasters and 
risks: transparent, translucent and opaque risks. The following overview provides more 
information about the nature and specificities that are associated with the types of risks 
(Wilkins & Patterson, 1990 p.87).  
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 Transparent risks Translucent risks Opaque risks 
SCIENCE 
Familiar scenario Yes Usually  Rarely 
Familiar cause Yes Sometimes Rarely 
Triggered by Random natural 
forces 
Unknown 
forces/human error 
Interactive processes 
Risk quantifiable Yes Yes Rough estimates 
NEWS 
Major new question What, where? Why How 
Interpretable Yes Rarely No 
Fundamental 
attribution error 
Present and 
appropriate 
Present but requires 
added analysis 
Inappropriately 
dominates new stories 
POLITICS 
Solution proposed Reconstruction Regulations Prohibitions or 
regulations 
Role of politics Prepare Mitigate Obfuscate/mobilize 
Role if individual vs 
role of state 
Individual action 
effective: state 
supports 
Individual ineffective 
without state 
Transnational action 
necessary 
Central political 
question 
How affective is 
government 
How expensive is safe How fair is safe 
Table 1: A taxonomy for disasters and risks (Wilkins & Patterson, 1990 p.87) 
 
The ‘opaque’ risks are most interesting in our point of view. Opaque risks or disasters are 
neither familiar nor observable. They are mostly low probability events. Reports and media 
attention concerning such disasters and risks is strongly characterized by the fundamental 
error of attribution. It is a theory describing cognitive tendency to predominantly over-value 
dispositional explanations (i.e., attributions or interpretations) for the observed behaviours 
of others, thus under-valuing or failing to acknowledge the potentiality of situational 
attributions or situational explanations for the behavioural motives of others (L. Ross, 1977). 
The error especially arises when risk situations are ‘new’, so the analysis does not comprise 
the entire system and the language that is used to express potential risks is not precise 
(Wilkins & Patterson, 1990 p.84). Wilkins has also proposed some suggestions to improve 
media risk communication about opaque risks and disasters:  
“Since public understanding of obviously complex issues is both simplistic and contradictory, 
reports about opaque risks should be couched not in numerical statements but in a cultural 
and political context which frames hazard impact in terms of the structural inequities in 
society” (Wilkins & Patterson, 1990 p.92). 
Grounding ourselves on the classification of Wilkins and Patterson, we can state that opaque 
risks are largely defined by their political and social connotations. We find very strong 
similarities in the specific traits of opaque risks with the ‘new risks’ as defined by Ulrich Beck 
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in his new risk society perspective. We will now discuss the vision of Beck on the new risk 
society and his definition of ‘new’ risks (Beck, 1986, 1992). 
3. The new risk society 
The German sociologist Ulrich Beck is considered as one of the most prominent 
contemporary scholars who focus on the societal issues that are related to the modern risk 
society (Beck, Schwartz, Hajer, & van der Aart, 1997).  Throughout his works, Beck takes into 
account all facets of the society and describes how risks increasingly infiltrate our daily lives. 
In one of his first books, ‘Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne’ (1986) he 
introduced the concept of alteration of the industrial or first modernity to a second, new 
modernity: the risk society (Beck, 1986).  In this new risk society, mankind is encountered 
with several new and self-made destructive risks. His new macro sociological view on the 
world was globally spread by the translated copy ‘Risk Society: Towards a new modernity’ 
(Beck, 1992). 
Beck describes two societal transitions. A first transition resulted in the industrial society and 
was characterized by the scarcity of goods, resulting in a general focus on the distribution of 
goods. However, because of the rapid innovation processes and the establishment of the 
welfare state in western societies, a ‘wealth distributing society’ was established. Inevitable, 
this wealth distributing society is accompanied by a ‘risk distributing society’, which 
integrates the rise of new risks such as global heating, aids, BSE, and terrorism. As Beck 
states, it is very hard to control some of these new risks nationally as they are the result of 
global processes. So the risk control processes demand international collaboration between 
governments, industrial groups, cultural and social groups, and other potential stakeholders.  
The dynamism of the modern, industrial society leads to a strong de – traditionalization of 
the roots and structures of the industrial society. We must come to a redefinition of some 
classical concepts such as family, social classes, corporations, and the whole of techno-
economical evolutions. Together with these strong redefinitions and changes, Beck 
introduces the concept of self-destruction that hypothetically could accompany these radical 
changes. So the outcome of the industrial revolution might result in the self-destruction of 
the society that results from this (r)evolution. With this hypothesis, the idea of a reflexive 
modernity enters the play. Beck puts emphasis on the fact that the successes (and not the 
failures) of capitalism are the causes of the destabilization of the industrial society’s 
fundamental bricks (Beck, 1992 p.153; Beck, 1994 p.1-13; 1999 p.79-81). The transition to 
the reflexive modernity is accompanied with the development of a ‘new’ risk society. The 
industrial society produced risks and threats, but they were not integrated on the political or 
public agenda. These self produced, ‘residual’ risks had latent side effects that were 
legitimized within the concept of the ideal of economical and societal prosperity. So this 
residual risk society tolerates the new, self produced risks and threats. The rapid and 
dynamic processes have lead to the fact that many of these risks and threats have taken 
serious proportions and as these risks are characterized by their global, uncontrollable, 
untransparant nature. However, they are gradually incorporated in the social, medial and 
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political agendas. The public, political and private discourse is dominated by the debates and 
conflicts about these new risks. What used to be functional and rational, is now a threat to 
our lives. The concept of ‘reflexivity’ expresses this process in a very accurate way. According 
to Beck, public and political institutions have to be reflexive in terms of confronting 
themselves and criticize themselves in order to solve the problems and the consequences of 
the risk society. The new risks cannot be solved according to the traditional industrial 
methods. Self reflection and self criticism bring along the consciousness, capabilities and 
knowledge that might decrease the automated risk production and introduce the societal 
self transformation. Beck points out the difference between the concept of “reflection” 
(according to Giddens and Lash this is the knowledge about the fundamental issues, the 
problems and consequences of the modernization process) and reflexivity. With reflexivity, 
Beck refers to the self confrontation and self reflexivity about the unknown consequences 
and about the impossibility of knowing these consequences and their solutions. Beck states 
that reflexive modernization succeeds modernity, but he dissociates himself from the 
concept of a post-modernity as suggested by Lyotard and Baudrillard (Fredriksson, 2009).  
“Beck, in line with Giddens, does not describe modernity’s transformation as a start that 
contrasts with an end, but rather as a transformation where the qualities of an epoch are 
rationalized by its own processes”(Fredriksson, 2009 p.23). 
The idea that people in late modernity are subject to dominant and omnipresent 
uncertainties and risks and that modernity no longer simply brings along human progress is 
also advocated by Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1991, 1997). The fact that people in late 
modernity have gained more knowledge about risks as well also leads to much more 
perceived uncertainties. People subsequently turn to alternative expertise and knowledge 
claims. As Lupton and Tulloch state:  
“Both theorists agree, therefore, that `risk' is closely linked to reflexivity, accountability and 
responsibility. Risk is thus a central feature of a society that has come to reflect upon itself, to 
critique itself.”(Lupton & Tulloch, 2001). 
Fredriksson states that the concept of reflexive modernization does not include a 
replacement, it is rather a radicalization of modernity and its principal formations 
(structures, actions, conceptualizations). He also adds two aspects that could be considered 
as being even more vital: the self-confrontation of modernity’s self-produced and 
manufactured risks and the deinstitutionalization of political practice taking form as 
subpolitics (Fredriksson, 2009 p.23).  
As mentioned before, public, social and political institutions will need to cooperate on a 
global level. The nature of the new risks creates a communal sense of fear. Beck pones that 
these feelings of fear can be used to unite people. Surely fear can provoke solidarity, but the 
question raises how cohesive and powerful this fear induced solidarity society could be. Beck 
uses the 9/11 attacks as an example of this process. The attacks induced international 
cooperation and unity and fear has had a unifying power (Beck, 2002). Feelings of 
uncertainty and fear may unite people within a certain community, however, we do 
advocate the need to refine the general premise of Beck which states that all new risks 
create communal senses of fear. To conclude this section, we want to draw parallels 
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between the opaque risks, as defined previously by Wilkins and Patterson (1990) and the 
‘new risks’, as defined by Ulrich Beck. Both concepts integrate various traits that are specific 
for these new types of risks: untransparency and uncontrollability of the cause and scenario, 
the risk probabilities are hard to estimate and not quantifiable, they are triggered by 
interactive processes and very often, transnational cooperation and action is necessary to 
construct and implement solutions to counter the risks. 
4. New risks within the transitional processes 
Increasingly more, the concept of ‘new risks’ or ‘new societal risks’ are used to describe the 
challenges facing contemporary society. New risks are distinguished from the ‘old’ risks of 
the industrial society that could be tackled by strategies that were developed and 
successfully implemented by authorities and industries in the industrial epoch. The new risks 
are being introduced in the contemporary society on various levels. 
On the economical level, we could use the example of exploitation of the risk concept in a 
commercial sense through the creation of new markets. Beck mentions the example that 
various solutions for new risks are being proposed and commercialized, but the causes of the 
risks are not tackled. He uses the example of air purifying systems that are promoted and 
sold on a large scale while the causes of pollution are not treated. When we take a look at 
risks that are mainly socially and medially constructed, we could give the example of the 
coca cola hoaxes, set up to destabilize the trust in the brand and affect the image of the 
company. On the political level, various (new) political actions are legitimized, judicial 
initiatives (exceptions on the privacy laws) are approved etc. to cope with the new risks. 
Even with no conclusive evidence of risk, as often is the case with the new risks, 
governments consider themselves entitled to use and install precautionary measures (Beck, 
1998; O'Malley, 2004) On a medial level, the media as a fourth power will play a very 
important role in the life cycle of a ‘new’ risk. Especially in the introduction phase, the media 
can have an important agenda setting role. The media may also amplify or attenuate risks 
and cause strong ripple effects on various levels: from the individual level to the entire 
society, from effects on economical levels to political levels. We will discuss these 
mechanisms in section 6. 
The transitional processes take place on two key levels: the economical (Beck, 1999) and the 
political level (Beck, 1994, 1998). The economical transition includes that, together with the 
evolution of risks and risk societies, there is a shift from ‘relations of production’, as defined 
by Marx to ‘relations of definitions’. These relations are defined by the harmfulness, the 
knowledge about the causes, actors and dimensions of the risk. These definition relations 
decide upon data, knowledge, evidence and compensations. The question that arises is 
whether it is the actual knowledge that allocates power to the involved parties or whether it 
is the perceived risk regulating potential of the stakeholder. Political transition includes that 
the transformation of the political constructions can be defined in a two way direction. 
Contemporary politics expand to decentralized systems of bottom-up subpolitics. 
Increasingly more institutions such as unions, the academic world, social movements, etc. 
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claim their democratic rights and participate in the constitution of the society. So bottom-up 
or cross participation of either individuals or groups is becoming more and more apparent. 
Next to this bottom-up input, Beck also confirms the transition of the global risk politics. The 
result is a gradual implementation of an institutionalized cosmopolitanism, which exists of  
the UN, NATO, civil networks, international cooperatives and other international 
organizations. This cosmopolitanism leads to a post-international political climate: global 
subpolitics. Beck’s concept of subpolitics describes the transformation and expansion of 
general politics in a reflexive modernity. Subpolitics is also about the structure of living 
conditions and concerns the traditional structures of a society. Supplementary to 
institutionalized politics, where the focus is on legislation, regulation, legitimization and 
administration (Fredriksson, 2009). One of the problems that arises in the political sphere is 
that in reflexive modernity, the cornerstones for political legitimacy are unstable and 
questioned as the new risks of the reflexive modernity, created by modernity as a process, 
become apparent:  
“It is to a high degree a question of responsibility in a situation where the systems of 
institutional politics and the welfare state can’t offer the security searched for” (Fredriksson, 
2009 p.25).  
This might be an explanation for the decrease in general trust and confidence in 
governments as legitimate risk regulators en especially in governments as legitimate risk 
communicators as they are not perceived as knowledgeable about the ‘new’ risks. We will 
discuss the concepts of trust, confidence and credibility in chapter three. 
Beck also explicitly relates the risk society to “(…) a science, media and information 
society”(Beck, 1992 p.46). In the post-industrial risk society, knowledge has become the key 
product that is traded. Information is becoming increasingly important in a social, 
economical and political context. The creation and classification of knowledge is primarily in 
the hands of science and research. Information dissemination is assumed to be one of the 
primary roles of the media, however increasingly more political players realize that 
knowledge and information flow control is very important. This especially accounts for the 
new risks as the knowledge about the modern and untransparant risks is a powerful tool to 
control the perceptions that come along with this uncontrollability. This results in what we 
could call a delicate struggle for information acquisition and control between the three main 
players: scientists, media and political agents. Beck allocates a great deal of this power to the 
media (Beck, 1990). 
The main critiques on Beck include issues concerning the lack of empirical foundations for 
his conclusions about the detraditionalization of the key structures of the modern society.  
“(…) while the notion of the risk society is a potentially useful and interesting one, much of 
the debate over the extent to which it adequately describes the ontology of contemporary life 
has taken place at the level of what Beck calls 'bold theories' rather than being explored 
empirically”(Lupton & Tulloch, 2001).  
According to Lupton and Tulloch, people are still shaped by family, work and other 
traditional structures of modernity. Besides, the risks of the new ‘risk’ society are less 
present than expected (Lupton & Tulloch, 2001 p.1; 2002). We agree with the critique that 
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Beck’s theoretical viewpoints do not have strong empirical roots. Nevertheless, his 
sociological perspective on the ‘new’ risk society is very valuable and has created new 
looking glasses that can be used to scrutinize risk perceptions on all levels of analysis: 
cognitive, socio-psychological and sociological. We cannot accept the statement that new 
risks are less present than expected. Firstly, we have doubts about the empirical foundations 
of this claim. The authors do not mention any methodologies used to identify risks or classify 
them into ‘traditional’ versus ‘new’ risks, related to the new risk society. Secondly, new risks 
are not always directly observable with the current methodologies for risk identification and 
risk analysis, often created for traditional risk assessment and management by scientists and 
risk experts. Tools to integrate risk perceptions, that may identify the ‘new risks’ that are 
socially and medially constructed, are rarely available nor are they used in risk management 
strategies. That is why we will strongly support the development of risk management 
strategies that use stakeholder participation methods and interactive two-way risk 
communication throughout the entire risk assessment and risk management process. 
Lupton and Tulloch continue by stating that very little theoretical and empirical research has 
been established about the ways in which notions, narratives and knowledge about risks, 
and certainly the ‘new’ risks are developed, understood and embedded in the social 
environments of people or “the different meanings it has for those using the term ‘risk’” 
(Lupton & Tulloch, 2001 p.1). We do think that there are many disciplines that scrutinize 
these issues, but they are all fragmented over several academic disciplines. We should come 
to a holistic approach, integrating cognitive perspectives on risk information processing and 
heuristics for risk perceptions, risk information seeking and information sufficiency, socio 
psychological perspectives about how the risk perceptions are not only constructed 
individually, but also socially. One of the primary aims of this PhD is to set up a new 
methodology, inspired by the combination and clash of the perspectives of these theories 
and confronting them with Beck’s perspectives on the ‘new’ risk society. The subjoined table 
integrates the most important theories and perspectives that will be integrated in the 
theoretical body of this dissertation.  
The empirical body will develop and validate a methodology that incorporates the general 
concepts that are originated from these key perspectives. The methodology will be validated 
in three different risk contexts: terrorism, avian flu and the financial economical crisis. We 
perceive terrorism and the financial and economical crisis as modernity risks that are rather 
untransparent and related to the modern society. 
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Discipline / theory Examples of theories and authors 
Heuristics for risk perceptions (Lee Ross & Nisbett, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973, 1974) 
Experiential risk perception (Sloman, 1996; Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, 
Ellen Peters, & Donald G. MacGregor, 2004) 
Heuristic systematic information processing 
model 
(Chaiken, 1980; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) 
Information behaviour 
Risk information behaviour 
Risk information seeking 
Risk information needs 
‘New’ risk information needs 
(C. Wilson, 1990) 
(Baker, 1996; Turner, Rimal, Morrison, & Kim, 
2006) 
(E. Ter Huurne & Gutteling, 2008) 
(Albrecht, 1988; Driskill & Goldstein, 1986; Lion, 
Meertens, & Bot, 2002) 
Social network contagion theory of risk 
perception  
 
(Scherer & Cho, 2003) 
Table 2: Multidisciplinary character of the dissertation. Integrated theories and perspectives 
 
A last critique on Beck’s perspective may be that “the properties of risks haven’t changed as 
dramatically as Beck suggests” (Fredriksson, 2009 p.27). While pre-industrial and industrial 
societies were confronted with the plague or syphilis, our ‘modern’ society has both threats 
that are assumed to be partly or completely due to industrialization, like BSE or the bird flu 
or even by ‘accidents’ like the AIDS virus. We do not entirely agree as the examples that are 
offered have deep roots in the industrialization process, but there are many other examples 
of risks that are less transparent or tangible and that are mainly socially or medially 
constructed such as terrorism. Also risks that are, in our opinion, less impactful or harmful 
are amplified by the media, governments and even the industries that benefits from these 
risks such as the H1N1 virus also called the Mexican flu or the swine flu. The Belgian 
government wisely suggested not to use the label swine flu since Belgium already had to 
deal with the negative connotations of the BSE crisis in 1996 and the dioxin crisis in 1999. 
These crises affected the consumption of certain products (meat, eggs, milk etc.) so by 
labeling the new influenza virus as the ‘swine flu’, even though there was no direct link with 
the consumption of pork, the related industries could be affected. 
Naturally, Beck’s work has to be read critically, but the added value of the paradigm as a 
perspective rather than as an empirical analysis is not to be underestimated. We conclude 
with the words of Fredriksson: “From this reading we can get relevant insights not offered by 
other theorists into the everyday life of individuals and the functioning of institution” 
(Fredriksson, 2009 p.27). 
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4.1. New risks: uncertain odds and consequences 
If we use Beck’s viewpoint on the raise of the new, industrial or so called ‘manufactured’ 
risks, we can characterize these risks as follows: 
 
 Pre-industrial risks Industrial risks Modernity risks 
Cause Natural Natural and industrial Natural because of 
industrial impact, 
manmade risks 
Proximity Personal  Personal environment Global 
Coverage Individual Hierarchical Democratic 
Confrontation ratio Calculable Calculable Incalculable 
Consequences Limited damage Regional 
destructiveness but 
consequences on 
larger scale 
Unlimited, longer term, 
larger scale 
Perceived control High, control is in the 
hands of experts, 
scientists 
Medium, control is in 
the hands of experts 
but information 
provision is necessary 
Low in case of lack of 
knowledge 
Information flow No flow, limited top-
down 
Top-down info flow Two way interactive 
information flow 
Risk perception Individually constructed Individually 
constructed  
Individually, socially and 
medially constructed 
Risk perception Depends on risk itself Depends on 
knowledge of risk 
causers 
Depends on knowledge of 
complex information 
exchange processes 
Nature of risk policy 
and risk 
communication 
Dominance, no 
consultation, no 
participation 
Hidden dominance: 
information provision, 
limited consultation 
but no participation 
Stakeholder consultation 
and participation 
Table 3: Comparison pre-industrial, industrial and modernity risks 
 
 
For modernity risks, we make the distinction between first order modernity risks as the 
direct results of the industrialization processes and second order modernity risks as indirect 
consequences of the industrialization processes. 
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First order risks 
Direct consequence of industrialization 
Global warming, nuclear threat, BSE, AIDS etc. 
Second order risks 
Indirect consequence of industrialization 
Terrorism (biological, nuclear, etc.) 
Mainly unintentional  Intentional 
Unintentional targets Intentional targets 
Mainly tangible consequences: measurable, 
rather predictable 
Intangible aims: terrorizing minds, unpredictable 
effect of ripple 
Untangible risks Untangible risks 
Table 4: Comparison first order and second order risks 
 
4.2. The second enlightenment  
Beck states that all political, public or private stakeholders should become conscious of the 
actions and consequences of the new risk society and its characterizing issues. They should 
realize that it is impossible to control these risks, as they are untransparant and 
unpredictable (even scientifically). He also pones that we should strive to an establishment 
of open minded governments, corporations with a social conscience and better informed 
civilians (Beck, 1999 p.108). The democratic processes that are initiated by these transitions 
could ideally lead to a global democratic change and as Beck and Willms mention: a second 
enlightenment that could be labelled as an ecological enlightenment that accompanies the 
second societal transition (Beck.U., Willms, & Pollak, 2004). The concept of second 
enlightenment is extremely important for academics as this could provide an answer to 
many questions of the new time. The first enlightenment emphasized the power of the 
mind. This revolution lead to the establishment of a culture of rights and contradictory, of 
individualism. We need a new transition to a culture of consciousness. The contemporary 
society is characterized by risks, the threat of individual, ecological and societal destructive 
processes. That is why we need to create a communal consciousness. The first 
enlightenment brought to us the power of reason and thought us how to use our rational 
capabilities. Now it is time to dig into the deep and create a deeper level of consciousness: 
the collective consciousness. The industrial transition has lead to secularization and 
liberation from the doctrines of church etc. But it has also lead to individualism and 
consumerism. As Beck states, not only goods can be sold, but also thoughts and intangible 
items such as risks. The individualism and consumerism results in a climate of egocentrism. 
Also the electronic social networking tools (internet, spaces etc.) stimulate this climate of 
‘together alone’.  
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4.3. Neoliberal governmentality in the risk society 
The paradigm of neoliberal governmentality was constructed by several authors (Dean, 
1999; O'Malley, 2004). Deborah Lupton summarizes this paradigm in her contribution in 
Mythen and Walklates ‘Beyond the Risk Society’ (2006) in a very applied language (Lupton, 
2006). She points out that for the ‘good citizen’, risk avoidance has become a moral 
enterprise relating to issues of self-control, self-knowledge and self-improvement. A lot of 
the authors use Foucault’s conceptualization of moderns of modern power to construct the 
idea of governmentality through the sum of the self-governing and self-assessing capacities 
of citizens (Burchell, 1991). New governmentality is characterized by a set of diverse tactics 
and strategies: “governmentality gains its meaning and purpose from no single source, no 
unified sovereign subject. Rather, the tactics characteristic of governmentality operate 
diffusely, to dispose and order populations, and to produce and reproduce subjects, and their 
beliefs” (Butler, 2004 p.52). By passing responsibility and rendering perceived control into 
the hand of civilians, governments are trying to induce perceived readiness and 
preparedness and to create a false feeling of control and power over the risk. 
5. A systematic classification of risk perspectives 
As Ortwin Renn states, “classification defines the conceptual tools necessary to select and 
order the phenomena a researcher attempts to study” (Renn, 1992b p.55). There are various 
classification of risk research: classifications based on hazard types (Hohenemser, Kates, & 
Slovic, 1983), on the definition of the risk concept (Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984; Vlek & 
Stallen, 1980), or on risk characteristics (Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein, 1981; 
Starr, 1969). Renn mentions that a classification should not be limited to one denominator, 
but it should be capable of offering a framework for comparison and analysis of all possible 
risk concepts. Eventually, communalities and distinctions between various risk concepts can 
be determined. Based on his previous work, Renn defines seven approaches to risk 
conception and assessment (Renn, 1992a p.56): 
- the actuarial approach ( using statistical predictions) 
- the toxicological and epidemiological approach (including eco-toxicology) 
- the engineering approach (including probabilistic risk assessment or PRA) 
- the economic approach  (including risk-benefit comparisons) 
- the psychological approach (including psychometric analysis) 
- social theories of risk 
- cultural theory of risk (using grid-group analysis) 
The approaches vary in the underlying base (research) unit (operational definition), their 
methodological choices, the complexity of risk measures, and the instrumental and social 
function of the risk perspective. We could summarize the first four approaches as the 
objective risk estimates approaches, as discussed previously and referring to Wiegman and 
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Gutteling (1995). The last three approaches could be classified as subjective approaches. 
Renn integrated the seven approaches into one schematic representation. 
The approach of this dissertation is a combination of the psychological perspective with 
social theories of risk and the cultural theory of risk.  From the psychological approach, we 
will use psychometric perspectives (Chaiken, 1980; Slovic et al., 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), combined with other cognitive theories that explain risk information behaviour, risk 
information seeking and information needs (Krikelas, 1983; C. C. Kuhlthau, 1991; T. D. 
Wilson, 1997; T.D. Wilson, 2000) and the concept of self-efficacy (Wiegman & Gutteling, 
1995). For both our theoretical foundations as for our empirical body, our base units include 
both elements of subjectively expected utility (psychology) as shared values (cultural 
theory). Our predominant methods combine psychometrics (psychology) and survey 
analyses (social theory). The scope of our risk concept includes individual perceptions 
(psychology)  as social interests (social theory), as cultural clusters (cultural theory) on an 
aggregated level (clustering analysis). Our basic problem areas include areas of social 
relevance (psychology) and the empirical validity of our methodology and segmentation 
(cultural theory). Our major application area primarily involves constructing solid and 
effective risk communication strategies but also policy making and regulation (stakeholder 
participation in risk decision processes). The instrumental function of our approach mainly 
involves individual assessment but also touches political acceptance issues and even cultural 
theory issues. Our main goal is to unveil the risk perception mechanisms for potential risk 
reduction (perceived risk reduction) and to offer solutions how to cope with uncertainty by 
communication about (new) risks more effectively. The latter can be achieved by integrating 
the two main cornerstones that will be the outcome of our studies: public oriented, two way 
interactive risk communication and stakeholder participation in risk decision processes. 
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Figure 8: A systematic classification of risk perspectives (Renn, 1992b p.55) 
 
Renn also mentions a vital theory that integrates various elements of the seven approaches 
that are summarized in the table: the social amplification and attenuation or risks 
perspective, as developed by Kasperson et al. (R. E. Kasperson et al., 1988). 
6. Social amplification en attenuation of risks  
The theoretical foundations of the social amplification and attenuation of risk theory (SARF) 
are developed in five main publications (Burns et al., 1993; R. E. Kasperson, 1992; R. E. 
Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; R. E. Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn, 1991). Kasperson and 
Kasperson analyze the phenomenon of social amplification and attenuation of risk from a 
sociological point of view (R. E. Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996), but they do emphasize the 
multidisciplinary nature of their framework. Jeanne Kasperson, Roger Kasperson, Pidgeon 
and Slovic mention the motive for the development of the framework themselves as follows:  
“The idea arose out of an attempt to overcome the fragmented nature of risk perception and 
risk communication research by developing an integrative theoretical framework capable of 
accounting for findings from a wide range of studies, including: from media research, from 
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the psychometric and cultural schools of risk perception research, and form studies of 
organizational responses to risk.”(J. X. Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic, 2003 p.13). 
As we can conclude from this statement, their primary motivation is to create an integrative 
framework that reconciles various perspectives and approaches from diverse disciplines, as 
the study of risk perception and risk communication requires a similar approach. In the 
previous section we have also emphasized the multidisciplinary and multi methodological 
approach of this dissertation. The social amplification of risk framework reflects our holistic 
approach to risk perception and risk communication. Especially in the light of the opaque 
risks, that are mostly socially and medially constructed and amplified or attenuated, the 
framework offers a potential theoretical ground.  
The authors (Burns et al., 1993; R. E. Kasperson, 1992; R. E. Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; R. 
E. Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn, 1991) stress the interdependency of physical attributes and 
the social dimension of risk as a complex phenomenon. The framework focuses mainly on 
the dynamic cognitive and social processes that underlie the perceptions of risks and the 
responses to these risks in terms of concrete individual behaviour (micro level), social 
responses (meso level) and effects or impacts on the entire community (macro level) and the 
structures that make part of it such as the economy, political structures, communal cohesion 
etc. In particular, as Kasperson et al. mention, the SARF will prosper in processes by which 
certain risk situations and uncertainties that are objectively judged as rather harmless by 
experts, because of their low impact consequences, small-scaled impacts, low probability 
levels etc., but that have gained unreasonably much attention and can become a particular 
focus of concern and socio-political activity within a society. On the other end of the 
continuum are the risks that are objectively and scientifically labelled as potentially harmful, 
but that receive comparatively less attention from the society. This is called risk attenuation 
(J. X. Kasperson et al., 2003). The first thing we want to add to this is that we assume that 
some risks cannot be objectively estimated anymore, so the process of defining harmful and 
harmless risks should be reviewed. We think that risks should always be assessed based on 
the perceptions that they evoke and the estimation of the potential consequences of these 
individual and communal risk perceptions. Naturally, this should be combined with the 
traditional risk assessment and analyses that are available and still offer a grounded base for 
prediction in many cases. As Kasperson et al. mention themselves:  
“What is amplified or attenuated are both the signals to society about the seriousness and 
manageability and, ultimately, the consequences of the risk through the generation, or 
constraining, of ripple effects.” (J. X. Kasperson et al., 2003 p.37). So both the technical 
information, if available, as the socially constructed perceptions are key components of the 
ripple effect. The second remark is that the amplification processes are much more likely to 
occur than attenuation processes because of the specific traits of the current (risk) 
information society. This risk information society is characterized by public content creation 
(personal information websites, user sites, bottom-up journalism etc.), disclosure, large 
accessibility but also low source and information credibility levels due to the overload of 
information and the fact that everybody is able to diffuse their own information about the 
risks. Fortunately, the fact that attenuation of risks by e.g. governments is not always 
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possible anymore has obliged them to reconsider the governmental risk management and 
risk communication policies and strategies. As we will discuss in chapter three, in order to 
create long-term trust and confidence that are essential cornerstones of policy support, 
governments and organizations will have to integrate a new approach to risk management. 
The new approach is more public-oriented and will even have to integrate practices of 
stakeholder participation.  
We will now briefly summarize the social amplification and attenuation of risk framework. 
The input from social institutions and structures, such as governments, has an impact on the 
public construction of risk perceptions, as part of general information processing 
mechanisms. The starting point is the general assumption that risk events, unless they 
actually take place and turn into crises, are not really relevant unless people or institutes 
observe them and communicate them (or a subjectively transformed reflection) to other 
members of their community. The experience of the risk is therefore not always the physical 
confrontation and experience with the risk, unless people are personally confronted with the 
risk. The main focus is on the individual and social perceptions that are the result of various 
processes on various levels (cognitive, social). Besides the personally constructed risk reality 
of the individual, the risks can be amplified through various information channels (individual 
senses, information social networks or professional information brokers) and social stations 
of amplification. There are diverse channels through which these institutions communicate, 
both directly as indirectly. This diversity contributes to the complexity of the development 
process of effective risk communication strategies. The concept of the social amplification 
and attenuation of risks seeks to advance this search for more comprehensive and 
integrative approaches. Their conceptual model is depicted in the subjoined figure. 
 
 
Figure 9: The Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk Framework (SARF) 
(Pidgeon, Kasperson, & Slovic, 2003 p.14) 
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Kasperson and Kasperson stress the fact that the majority of the civil population acquire 
information more often through information systems (mediated, indirect experiences) than 
through interpersonal, direct experiences (R. E. Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996). Certain risk 
communicators, especially the mass media, are large information agents that can amplify or 
attenuate risk. The construction of risk perceptions is influenced by the quantity of media-
attention, the volume of information, the discourse, symbolism and the framing of 
information etc. Besides informal social networks and personal resources as information 
exchange platforms, Kasperson and Kasperson mention the importance of professional 
information brokers. Mass media can be considered very important within this category of 
information brokers. Mass media can act as watchdogs, gatekeepers and agenda – setters. 
Among social stations we can find opinion leaders as important informants in one’s personal 
social environment. But as we will discuss in chapter four, the importance and effects of 
interpersonal communication should not be underestimated, especially in times 
characterized by information overload and low source and information credibility levels, as 
mentioned previously. The framework strongly recognizes that the development of social 
risk perceptions is always likely to be the product of various interactive processes among the 
various stakeholders in the risk communication process (J. X. Kasperson et al., 2003 p.39). 
We specifically wanted to focus on the role of opinion leaders as influential social stations 
within the personal environments of the individual, both physically (e.g. neighbour, family, 
friends) as electronically (e.g. opinion leaders on blogs, internet forums). Our empirical 
studies will validate the methodology to identify these opinion leaders and their specific 
profiles within various risk contexts.  
Furthermore, individual attributes of the receiver play a very important role in risk 
processing. People reduce the complexity of problems by means of cognitive heuristics, but 
they are influenced very strongly as well by their social environment in the risk evaluation 
and interpretation process. We will take a closer look at these approaches in chapter four. 
Last but not least, institutional and organizational behaviour can influence the amplification 
or attenuation of risks significantly. When collective consciousness or even concern and the 
social debate about a certain risk is notably present, the consequences can reach further 
than the persons which are directly involved. This is called the ripple effect. Examples of 
such secondary or tertiary effects are long-term mental perceptions and attitudes, influence 
on local or regional economics, erosion of public trust in governments, social conflicts etc. 
The conceptually conceived ripple effect opens the debate concerning the confrontation of 
risk concrete assessment strategies with broader, societal consequences. 
May authors have used the model to indicate the role of both the media as interpersonal 
communication in this process of social amplification and attenuation of risks (Wilkins & 
Patterson, 1990). Paul Slovic has postulated that the media play an important role in the 
social, or should we say ‘medial’ amplification of risks, where a variety of cues exaggerate 
certain risks (especially low probability risks) and create some sorts of ‘ghost threats’ (Slovic, 
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1986). Nimmo and Combs have performed studies in the context of political communication 
and came to findings that support this viewpoint as well (J. Combs & Nimmo, 1990).  
We could state that it is probably wisely to state that the media do play an important role 
and have a responsibility to inform and warn the public about impending threats and risks, 
but so has governmental institutions that will have to ‘use’ these  media as information 
channels. We will now extensively discuss the threat of terrorism as a new and primarily 
socially and medially constructed risk.    
7. Case: terrorism as a new and untransparant risk 
7.1. Introduction: defining terrorism  
Since the attacks of 9/11 2001 on the Twin Towers, the Madrid bombings on 11th March 
2004 and the London bombings on 7th July 2005, the communal sense of vulnerability has 
increased tremendously and  ‘terrorism’ has become a risk that affects the minds and hearts 
of people all over the world (Gearson, 2002). The public perception and the psychological 
impact of terrorist attacks has increased as well (Krewski et al., 2006). As we will see further 
in this dissertation, perceptions of a threat, like terrorism, can lead to adverse effects on 
psychological well-being, inter-group relations or even the economy (Slovic, 2002). 
Under the Bush administration, the ‘War on Terrorism’ or ‘Global War on Terror’ strongly 
dominated the national (U.S.A.) and international political agendas. Other scholars also 
agree that since 9/11, terrorism has settled itself high up the national and international 
political agendas (Curtis, 2004; Furedi, 2005; Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004). The definition of 
‘terrorism’ has become far more complex and abstract after the 9/11 attacks as the dreadful 
events have not only cost more than 3.000 human lives, but they have also induced a global 
shock wave and even induced arousal and even fear within certain communities. 
Depending on the perspective that is used, Picard makes a distinction between legal, 
political, psychological and moral definitions of terrorism (Picard, 1993). Picard mentions 
that there are increasingly more authors that construct and use broader definitions of 
terrorism, combining various approaches. His definition of terrorism is a nice example of a 
similar ‘broad’ definition:  
 “violence or threat of violence, designed to induce fear, as a strategy for achieving some 
goal” (Picard, 1993 p.4).  
In addition, Picard distinguishes several modes of terrorism: pathological terrorism, criminal 
terrorism and political – social terrorism. The last category, the political-social terrorism, is 
the key concern in his book. According to Picard, terrorism involves three types of actors: the 
terrorists as principal actors, the authorities and the media. Naturally, terrorism also involves 
a fourth group: the victims and their relatives. However, Picard considers this last group of 
people not as actors, but rather as instrumental elements that are used by the previously 
mentioned actors. 
Combs defines terrorism as “a synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatization of the most 
proscribed kind of violence -that which is perpetrated on innocent victims-played before an 
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audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes”  (C. C. Combs, 1997 
p.8).  
Combs proposes five vital elements to describe terrorism: violence, an audience, the 
dissemination of fear, innocent victims and political objectives. 
Coolsaet has described the following elements of terrorism (R.  Coolsaet, 2005; R. Coolsaet & 
Van de Voorde, 2004): terrorism involves groups that are not bound to state that want to 
achieve political aims by pursuing these aims in a way that is non conventional to the 
existing norms of political action. Their primary aim is to evoke and induce fear and a shock 
wave among communities and even entire societies, rather than eliminating their direct 
opponents physically. Very often, symbols of power (e.g. the Twin Towers as symbols of the 
economical power) are their primary targets. Coolsaet also provides some other specific 
traits of contemporary international terrorism. A first trait is the international and global 
character. A second trait includes the fact that the ‘enemy’ is omnipresent and elusive. 
Contemporary terrorism is also characterized by a revolutionary philosophy: it legitimates 
itself as being revolutionary, transcending all local boundaries. A last trait is the general 
conviction that it is absolutely necessary to cooperate internationally to ‘defeat’ 
international terrorism. 
Schmid and de Graaf also contribute to our perspective on the definition of terrorism. They 
use the terms ‘insurgent terrorism’, to indicate the nature of terrorism (Schmid & de Graaf, 
1982).  They specify insurgent terrorism as “social-revolutionary, separatist and single issue 
terrorism aiming at the top of society”(Schmid & de Graaf, 1982 p.1). This implies that the 
violence that accompanies terrorism in this sense is primarily committed because of the 
effects that are induced within the entire community.  Schmid and Paletz also mention that 
insurgent terrorism does not necessarily have to bring along many victims or material 
damage. Insurgent terrorism primarily prospers when the acts gain large visibility through 
various media (Schmid & Paletz, 1992). Naturally, these definitions of insurgent terrorism 
were developed before the attacks of 9/11 so the specific definition of Schmid and de Graaf, 
using separatism and the single issue character of terrorism, is not always valid anymore in 
contemporary terrorist actions. We can state that most of the actions that are defined as 
‘terrorist’ actions in the post 9/11 age can mainly be labelled as more abstract, taking place 
on the psychological level with a high degree of insurgence. Contemporary terrorism is very 
much likely to be socially and medially constructed and amplified. It does not always have to 
be present to be efficient in its intended effects. Besides scrutinizing the real threat of 
terrorism, governments and academics should also focus on the imagined or personally 
perceived threat of terrorism (Archetti & Taylor, 2003). This is one of the reasons why 
contemporary terrorism can be labelled as a ‘new’ risk or should we state that ‘new 
terrorism’ has become a new risk (Mythen & Walklate, 2006).  
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7.2. Terrorism as a ‘new’ risk 
Beck’s perspective on the “new risk” has been used to define new risks as risks that can no 
longer be perceived with the human senses through direct perception. He formulates some 
characteristics of the new risks: the presence of the new risk is mostly ascertained by 
experts, the consequences are irreversible, the risks are no longer bound to time or location 
and the possible damage of the new risks is so large, that previous responds such as 
insurance and responsibility are deficient.  De Vroom, Bal & Van der Velden add a fifth trait: 
the fact that scientific judgements are no longer collectively trusted and accepted (J. 
Gutteling, Havenaar, Merkx, van Dijck, & Rip, 2004). Contemporary terrorism can be 
considered as a new risk because of its amorphous and non transparent nature, which 
implies that the risk of terrorism is not bound to time or location, the possible consequences 
are irreversible and can cause great damage and responsibility cannot always be allocated to 
one particular person or group. So the terrorist threat can not only be perceived as a new 
risk, but also as a ‘ghost’ threat. The unpredictability, incalculability and uncertainty in both 
the likelihood of occurrence as well as the extent of its consequences of terrorist attacks 
(Kunreuther, 2002) indicate that risk assessment and risk management processes in the 
context of these ‘new risks’ are limited (Ericson & Doyle, 2004). For the public, the risk of a 
terrorist attack indicates the illusion of a fully managed risk and reminds us of the 
uncertainty of the future. Knowing this, we can state that communicating about terrorism is 
a very complex assignment. The risk is constructed in the hearts and minds of people, who 
base themselves on information that is either actively or passively retrieved from the media, 
government communications, opinion leaders or other information brokers. These individual 
perceptions influence people’s behaviour. The SARF posits that the media function as 
transmitters of risk information that was retrieved from various sources, such as scientists, 
agencies, eyewitnesses and governments. It integrates the general public as risk information 
receivers and adds a feedback loop through which public response can influence the future 
communication activities of the sources. In the context of terror we can integrate the 
following question: ‘to what extend do the media, as elements of cultural and social factors 
in general, play a role in the social attenuation or amplification of risk perception concerning 
terrorist threats?’  When collective consciousness or even concern and the social debate 
about a certain risk are notably present, the consequences can reach further than the 
persons which are directly involved. This is called a ripple effect. Examples of such secondary 
or tertiary effects are long-term mental perceptions and attitudes, influence on local or 
regional economics, erosion of public trust in governments, social conflicts etc. The 
conceptually conceived ripple effect opens the debate concerning the confrontation of risk 
concrete assessment strategies with broader, societal consequences.  
7.3. The medial amplification of terrorism as a risk 
Various scholars have mentioned that the promotion and amplification of certain risk issues 
by the media can help set the agenda on a certain issue and hence amplify or attenuate the 
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risk perception and sense of danger (R. E. Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Philo, 1999; 
Schlesinger, Tumber, & Murdock, 1991; Wray, Kreuter, Jacobsen, Clements, & Evans, 2004). 
Terrorism distinguishes itself from other criminal practices by the intensity and 
extensiveness of its consequences. The destructive consequences of a terrorist attack reach 
much further than the primarily targeted victims. Besides the effects on the first level 
(victims, structural damages etc.) a strong ripple effect may be induced on various levels and 
structures of the society. Moreover, the mere threat and the risk that is launched are 
sufficient to cause certain ripple effects. This social induction of a culture of fear is the 
cornerstone of a number of ripple effects. Within this lies the importance of scrutinizing 
both processes of individual risk perception as social risk perceptions. How are they 
constructed? Who are the key social stations and information agents in these ripple effect 
processes? The public’s reliance on the media as information sources about the risk of 
terrorism stresses the need for reform in the dissemination of information about such risks 
by the media. Since the media, and in particular mass media, are very convenient because of 
their availability and accessibility, they are very likely to play a vital role in the provision of 
information on terrorism to the public (Krewski et al., 2006).  
7.4. From the risk society to the war on terror 
In “Risk and the war on terror” (Amoore & Goede, 2008) the authors depart substantially 
from Beck’s thesis about the feigning of control over the uncontrollable (Beck, 2002). They 
claim that it is the feigning of control that has induced and dominated the rise in risk 
discourses in the war on terror. In fact, it is the appearance and the collective perception of 
the sustainability of securability and manageability. Several critical risk studies  (Adam & 
Loon, 2000; O'Malley, 2000), point out that risks cannot be isolated as tangible, controllable 
events. The risk of terrorism is constructed medially, socially or institutionally.  
“The variable modalities of meaning that attend terrorism are the products of socially 
constructed realities”(Greisman, 1977 p.304). 
Amoore and De Goede (2008) state that considering risk as the dominant technology of the 
war on terror includes the engagement in practices and policies that are enacted on behalf 
of managing risk and uncertainty. They connect the proliferation of risk techniques to a 
particular mode of governing, “(…) a means of making an uncertain and unknowable future 
amenable to intervention and management.” (Amoore & Goede, 2008 p.9)  
7.5. The gap between reality and perceived reality as induced by facts and figures 
In 2001, Larry Johnson, a former counterterrorism specialist in the U.S. Department of State 
made a critical assessment in the New York times, claiming that, based on empirical data, 
the threat of international terrorism was blown out of proportion by several information 
agents (Nacos, 2002). These information agents comprise firstly the media, who are mostly 
in search of drama and sensational items with high news value. Secondly we can appoint 
various pseudo-scientists, who claim expertise and communicate without hard data and 
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thirdly we include politicians, who use the terrorist threat as a ghost threat that can only be 
controlled by them, legitimizing their expenditures for redundant and questionable 
counterterrorist measures. Very often, the perceptions about terrorism are distorted 
because of a miscommunication of facts and figures that are generally emphasized too 
strongly. Many authors claim that there is a strong discrepancy between the objective 
numbers of casualties of terrorist attacks and the medial and political attention that has 
been attached to the ‘terrorist threat’. Pillar used raw data to prove this discrepancy in an 
American context (Pillar, 2001). 
Walter Laqueur also tried to scrutinize facts and figures about international terrorism in an 
objective manner. He concluded that there were not more civilians killed in terrorist attacks 
in 1984 than in 1974 and he rejects the these that the number of . He ends by stating that 
“there is a tendency to magnify the importance of terrorism in modern society” (Laqueur, 
1986 p.100). 
Coolsaet and Van de Voorde analyzed the figures of the “Patterns of Global Terrorism”. This 
annual report is drafted by the State Department in assignment of the United States Code 
(Title 22, Section 2656f(a)) and it contains facts and figures concerning the large-scaled 
terrorist incidents all over the world and much additional information. Based on the MIPT 
Knowledge Database (combination of the RAND Terrorism Chronology and the Terrorism 
incident database), the statistical analysis of the amount and scale of international terror 
attacks indicates a strong structural decrease in the amount of attacks. On the contrary the 
amount of victims involved in the attacks has increased. Of course, the horrible and bloody 
attacks on 9-11 2001 boost the mean amount of victims as thousands of people were killed 
in one single attack. 
They conclude that, during the period of 1977-2003, terrorism as political instrument has 
lost its importance and effectiveness. Because of the decrease of the number of countries 
who consistently support international terrorism, the probability that terrorist groups will 
use weapons of mass destruction has decreased. There has been allocated a disproportional 
amount of attention to the ‘worst case scenario’s’ that predict the use of chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons and an immense quantity of victims.   
Coolsaet and Van de Voorde conclude their paper with the statement that there is a wide 
gap between perception and reality. The dominant short term perspective prevents that the 
fundamental causes of terrorism can be scrutinized using objective approaches (R. Coolsaet, 
2004 p.9). 
We cite Nacos to conclude this paragraph: 
“The events of September 11, 2001, changed the mindsets of Americans-including those in 
the mainstream media. As a result, the news reflected and reinforced the views and policy 
preferences of the administration, the political elite and the vast majority of the public” 
(Nacos, 2002 p.160).  
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7.6. The media and terrorism 
In their article, ‘Violence as communication : insurgent terrorism and the western news 
media’, Schmid and de Graaf advocate that terrorist violence is a type of language that has 
to be considered as a communicative act as such (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). Picard does not 
entirely agree with this. As terrorist acts are meant to induce a change in attitudes and to 
promote certain behaviour, Picard thinks we should consider terrorist violence as a form of 
persuasive communication (Picard, 1993). Moreover, he considers terrorism as a 
communicative act, as only one of the vital elements in a more extensive strategy.  
There are various approaches to the role of the media in this process. Picard states that the 
most important element in the communication efforts about terrorism is not the event as 
such, but it are the connotations and the meanings that are assigned to these events by the 
governments, the media and the general population that play the lead role (Picard, 1993). 
Since the media largely cover terrorist events and the media coverage in the aftermath of 
the events may last for weeks, months and even years, a very broad audience is reached. 
Combs mentions that the effects of the events are strongly amplified by the media (C. C. 
Combs, 1997). The tendency of sensationalism in media coverage combined with terrorist 
groupings that (ab)use this media attention has introduced an important discussion about 
the complicity of the media to contemporary terrorism. Combs summarizes different 
perspectives of various scholars in this discussion. He refers to Hacker, who states that “if 
the mass media did not exist, terrorists would have to invent them. In turn, the mass media 
hanker after terrorist acts because they fit into their programming needs: namely, sudden 
acts of great excitement that are susceptible, presumably of quick solution. So there’s a 
mutual dependenc.” (Hacker, 1979 in Combs 1997 p. 143-144). Laqueur states that “The 
media are a terrorist‘s best friend…terrorists are the superentertainers of our time“ (Laqueur, 
1987 in Combs 1997 p.144). Combs also cites Tanter: “Since the terror is aimed at the media 
and not at the victim, success is defined in terms of media coverage. And there is no way in 
the West that you could not have media coverage because you’re dealing in a free society” 
(C. C. Combs, 1997 p.144).  
These perspectives are all very critical about the negative perceptions of the role of the 
media. Picard does not entirely agree with these negative critiques. The idea that the media 
play a pathological role in the media coverage of terrorist events has to be more 
differentiated. Terrorism is a dramatic and symbolic tool to express power. The mass media 
possess the possibility to magnify and disseminate this message worldwide. According to 
Picard, the media do not cause terrorism, but they can amplify and aggravate the effects of 
terrorism by providing bad media coverage that prefers to sensationalize rather than inform 
and allow people to have a better understanding of the issues. Wiegman and Gutteling also 
agree that the media’s preoccupation with the sensational, exceptional and negative aspects 
of risk events has been deemed responsible for the public’s elevated concern over certain 
risk issues (Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995).  
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Picard pones that the critiques on the media coverage of terrorist events are based on 
certain assumptions that are not correct (Picard, 1993). Certain critics, like Hacker, argue 
that media coverage is an essential element in the existence and survival of terrorism. The 
simplistic argument that terrorism occurs exactly because of the fact that it is covered 
extensively by the media is evidently unfounded in Picard’s opinion. He enervates the 
statement by mentioning that terrorism has always existed, even before the mass media 
(audiovisual and printed media) arose. The only necessity is the condition of communication, 
and communication is not necessarily dependent on the media. This point of view is clarified 
by the fact that terrorism also exists in totalitarian societies where the government strongly 
controls and censors the media. Moreover, in countries where the media are less 
dominantly present, the consciousness of the violence brought by terrorism is not less. 
However, he states that, although the existence of (mass) media are not necessarily a 
condition for the existence of terrorism, the media can be used as effective and efficient 
tools for terrorists to amplify the effects of their actions and  to induce and disseminate 
arousal and anxiety. On the other hand, the media can also play a positive role by providing 
their public with information about terrorism and the underlying issues. Imposing 
restrictions to the media is not a solution at all since non-communication and 
miscommunication may lead to misunderstandings and aggravate fear levels because the 
people’s need for information is not satisfied and the culture of distrust is stimulated. Risk 
perceptions are not lowered by withholding information, on the contrary, fear levels will 
raise when people are less knowledgeable and they feel that they are not in control of the 
information. Information insufficiency lowers the levels of perceived control and may even 
induce fear and arousal. The discussion about the role of the media in the context of 
terrorism is still very alive and many questions are still unanswered. Probably because of the 
multifaceted and ever evolving nature of the risk of terrorism and more importantly, of the 
evolving information tools that can be used in the contemporary mental warfare. The idea 
that terrorists use media as weapons to dominate hearts and minds of people is acceptable. 
It would be very ironical however that one of the most important, fundamental liberties of a 
‘free’ and democratic society, namely the free press, would become an instrument for its 
own destruction (C. C. Combs, 1997). We agree that the media are important tools that are 
precisely manipulated by terrorist groups. On the other hand, we are convinced that the 
enemy should be confronted with similar armory. The mass media can be useful tools for 
governments to increase communal resilience and defeat the mental blackmail by providing 
trustworthy, relevant and objective information that proves that the governments, as risk 
regulators, are prepared to counter terrorist actions.  
7.7. The relationship between the media and the government in the context of 
terrorism 
The relationship between the media and the government is of great importance for studying 
terrorism as a socially and medially constructed risk. Governments very often criticize the 
style of media coverage. They agree that, by emphasizing the threat and the violence, 
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anxiety and arousal is evoked. This is exactly what terrorists aim at. They often criticize the 
sensationalist approach of reporting certain news facts and point out the lack of context, 
historical notions and comprehension of the more complex social and political issues that 
are involved. This induces a miscomprehension with the public of what terrorism is. 
According to Picard, the risk of terrorism is overestimated. As mentioned in 7.5., many 
scholars agree and base themselves on objective facts and figures about terrorism to 
illustrate the gap between the objective reality and the perceived reality, as induced and 
stimulated by the media.  Picard also mentions that fear is not only induced through the 
media, the governments may also function as important information agents that diffuse 
information which feeds communal arousal and anxiety (Picard, 1993). So it will be vital for 
governments to create a good risk communication policy in the context of terrorism, 
focusing on increasing preparedness (Wray et al., 2004) and resilience by providing 
objective, useful information about terrorism. Instead of non-communication and 
miscommunication, a more open information policy should be implemented. If the trust in 
the government as a risk communicator is stimulated the general trust in the government as 
a risk regulator will increase as well (Mythen & Walklate, 2006). 
So knowledge is the key to resilience. Unfortunately, knowledge is distorted by patterns of 
media coverage on the one hand and by manipulation of terrorists and governments on the 
other hand. We will conclude by citing Lemyre et al., who state that “improving relationships 
between the media and government and engaging the media as explicit stakeholders in the 
risk management process may prove a very efficient vector of preparedness” (Krewski et al., 
2006 p.770). 
7.8. Governmental risk communication in the context of terrorism as a new risk 
For governments, communicating about terrorism is a very delicate assignment as they have 
to find the balance between creating awareness and avoiding the induction of a culture of 
fear (Altheide, 2006; Mythen & Walklate, 2006), taking into account the growing 
consciousness of the public of their “right to know” about the risks they face in order to 
improve societal decision making. We integrated one of the most appropriate examples of 
risk communication about terrorism that would rather induce a culture of fear or 
contradictory erode general trust and confidence in the government. The subjoined figure is 
the well-know color coded Homeland Security Threat Level Advisory System, developed by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2002. 
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Figure 10: Figure: Color coded Threat Level Advisory System (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security 2002) 
 
There was a lot of criticism on this system, especially because the threat level has entered 
the blue or green zone (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009 p.12). According to the 
Task Force of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, this was due to “A reluctance of the 
government to b ring down color alert status after it has been elevated, leading to public 
cynicism about the color status” (p. 5). Even the Homeland Security Advisory Council had to 
admit that the system missed its key objective and that “there is currently indifference to the 
Homeland Security Advisory System and, at worst, there is a disturbing lack of public 
confidence in the system” (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009 p.2). 
In a governmental report of September 2009 (appendix), the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council unanimously concluded that constructive measures should be taken to increase the 
general public confidence as “The system’s ability to communicate useful information in a 
credible manner to the public is poor. Significant rethinking of how to communicate to this 
audience is warranted” (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2009 p.1).  
The Task force provides several advises to restore public confidence and raise the credibility 
in the advisory system for instance by targeting communications, providing more specific 
information on new threats, accompanying new alerts with actionable steps the public can 
take, provide information about the level of credibility and confidence in the threat 
information, redirecting people to additional sources of information and to guarantee fullest 
transparency. These guidelines strongly reflect the traits of public oriented risk 
communication strategies. We will extensively discuss the specific characteristics of this 
approach to risk communication in the next chapters. 
Naturally, taking into account the growing consciousness of the public in societal decision 
taking requires a strong reflection of policy makers on the balance between the “right to 
know” versus the need for security. At a meeting, hosted by Vanderbilt Centre for 
Environmental Management Studies, strong emphasis has been put on the research needs 
to understand the trade-off between the public’s right to know versus homeland security 
and civil security (M. A Cohen, 2002). Cohen mentions that a vast amount of web pages and 
documents that were available for public reading have been withdrawn since the attacks of 
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9/11. He states that “the concern for homeland security has led to a wholesale reatreat from 
the transparency trends of the past decade” (M. A Cohen, 2002 p.369). 
The key question of the panel discussion that is reported in his paper was whether “reducing 
the amount of information available to the public increase or decrease the risk to 
communities or emergency responders” (M. A Cohen, 2002 p.368). 
Information disclosure programs, implemented by governments, have been proven both 
theoretically and empirically to induce effective improvements in environmental quality and 
emergency preparedness (M. A Cohen, 2002; M. A. Cohen & Santhakumar, 2007; Konar & 
Cohen, 1997; Maxwell, Lyon, & Hackett, 2000). 
We emphasize that the notion of ‘information’ is not specific enough. Not all information is 
potentially harmful for national security. Non-communication is even worse because a lack 
of information induces uncertainty and will affect the personal and social resilience.  
Transparency can contribute to increase general confidence in the governments as risk 
regulators and increase credibility of the information that is provided. The fact of 
consultation of the government as information source about terrorism (Krewski et al., 2006) 
relates to the issues of trust and confidence. Also the involvement and engagement of the 
public in the  risk communication process will improve trust in the government (Jones, 
Woolven, DurodiÃ©, & Wessely, 2006). We will discuss these issues of trust and confidence 
and necessity of stakeholder participation in the risk communication processes more 
extensively in chapter three. Lemyre also mentions the importance of friends and relatives 
as risk information sources and personal support in the terrorism context (Rubin, Brewin, 
Greenberg, Simpson, & Wessely, 2005; Schuster et al., 2001) and as potential contributors 
for public engagement in terrorism risk management processes (Krewski et al., 2006). We 
will specify this by incorporating the concept of opinion leadership. The importance of 
interpersonal communication in risk contexts and the role of opinion leaders as credible and 
reliable information sources will comprehensively be discussed in chapter four. 
Governmental risk communication is about finding the balance between stimulating 
preparedness by creating a risk consciousness and the induction of a culture of fear. 
As Smith and McClosky state, it is crucial to avoid moral panics and inducing cultures of fear 
in the context of certain risks but then again governmental officials should disclose a 
sufficient amount of information to ensure that the people can make well-informed 
judgments and choices, amongst others concerning the acceptability of the risk (Smith & 
McCloskey, 1998).  The way in which risk issues develop and become framed is a very 
important issue in the risk debate. Risk issues may escalate beyond levels justified by the 
available (scientific) evidence because of the ripple effects resulting from the social and 
medial amplification process. Some authors have referred to the emergence of distorted risk 
perceptions as ‘moral panics’ (S. Cohen, 1972; Young, 1971). In the process of moral panic 
creation, the media, publics and the risk regulators (authorities) are perceived to be crucial 
players in the escalation of concerns and the amplification of the threats. Besides these 
players, politicians and action or pressure groups are also perceived to have an incredible 
influence on the emergence of such panics (Smith & McCloskey, 1998). Initially, Cohen and 
Young focused on the issue of moral panics in the context of deviant behaviour. Goode and 
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Ben-Yehuda however have applied the approach to explain the social amplification of risk 
processes (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). 
Mythen and Walklate (2006) have used the example of the UK governmental risk 
communication strategy as an example of good an transparent risk communication in the 
context of terrorism. In response to the general trust deficit, the UK government has 
developed specific risk communication strategies that are aimed at communicating 
transparently, effectively and regaining trust and confidence. The Strategy Unit Report “Risk: 
Improving government’s capability to handle risk and uncertainty” (Strategy Unit Report, 
2002) is a document that was written by the Cabinet’s Office in 2002. The document is a 
response the general call for openness and transparency about risk issues. It advocates the 
stakeholder participation model in risk communication. It refers to 9/11 as the key starting 
point for governments to make open and honest information practices a key priority. 
Naturally, the depth and range of the information that is provided to the general public will 
depend on security concerns. The Cabinet Office clearly states in this report that there is a 
substantial need for governments to be open, especially in times of uncertainty, and that the 
government also has a vital role to play as trustworthy and reliable information broker or 
risk communicator. Taking a glance at the documents that are publically accessible and at 
the websites of other UK governmental institutes and offices, we noticed that these 
websites offer many opportunities to consult various governmental documents and they 
actively provide much information about emergency preparedness and institutional security 
strategies. We briefly assessed the websites of the UK Resilience Center (Cabinet Office, 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience), MI5 (security services, 
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/) and MI6 (Secret Intelligence Services, 
http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/sis-home-welcome.html). Obviously, in order to drawn 
empirically supported conclusions about the nature of the information that is offered and 
about the discourse that is used, we should design a customized research design, for 
instance the combination of a qualitative and quantitative content analysis. It is not the 
scope of this dissertation to perform content analyses on governmental risk communication 
efforts, however, we strongly agree that the outcome of similar empirical studies would 
have great added value. 
8. Conclusion 
From the ‘taxonomy of disasters and risks’, developed by Wilkins and Patterson (1990), we 
could distillate that the core definition of risks in our approach to the matter, is closely 
related to concept of ‘opaque’ risks. We can state that opaque risks are largely defined by 
their political and social connotations. We find very strong similarities in the specific traits of 
opaque risks with the ‘new risks’ as defined by Ulrich Beck in his new risk society 
perspective. That is why we used Beck’s perspectives on the new risk society as one of the 
theoretical cornerstones that underlie our approach to the key concept of ‘risk’. His 
sociological perspective on the ‘new’ risk society is very valuable and has created new 
looking glasses that can be used to scrutinize risk perceptions on all levels of analysis: 
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cognitive, socio-psychological and sociological. However we did agree with the main critique 
that his theoretical perspectives lack empirical foundations. Lupton and Tulloch mentioned 
that very little theoretical and empirical research has been established about the ways in 
which notions, narratives and knowledge about risks, and certainly the ‘new’ risks are 
developed, understood and embedded in the social environments of people (Lupton & 
Tulloch, 2001). As a response, we concluded that there are many disciplines that scrutinize 
these issues, but they are all fragmented over several academic disciplines. We should come 
to a holistic approach, integrating cognitive perspectives. We developed a brief overview of 
the central theories and perspectives that will be integrated in the theoretical body of this 
dissertation.  
The empirical body will develop and validate a methodology that incorporates the general 
concepts that are originated from these key perspectives. The methodology will be validated 
in three different risk contexts: terrorism, avian flu and the financial economical crisis. We 
also added an attempt of a categorization of new risks with their specific traits. Because risk 
research comprises a very extensive and multidisciplinary offer of approaches, we 
incorporated and discussed the overview and classification of Renn (1992) and pointed out 
the fields that are incorporated within the scope of our dissertation. We concluded that the 
social amplification and attenuation of risk framework (SARF), as developed by Kasperson et 
al. (1996), is the perfect framework that can serve as a cornerstone for our theoretical and 
empirical objectives. We concluded this chapter by applying the main concepts of the new 
risk society and the social amplification of risk in the context of terrorism as a risk. As 
‘contemporary’ or ‘new’ terrorism is primarily socially and medially constructed, it is a very 
nice example of a ‘new’ risk, as defined by Beck. We discussed the gap between the reality 
and the perceived reality, based on concrete facts and figures that illustrate that the ‘real’ 
threat of terrorism is overestimated. However, we do think that the effects of terrorism may 
be stronger when it comes to the ripple effects that are induced and amplified by various 
information agents and social stations, as defined by the SARF. The media are responsible 
for sensationalizing and amplifying the risk of terrorism. Some even discuss the possibility 
that the media and even governments are inducing and harnessing a culture of fear. Proper 
communication on terrorism, together with a demonstration of safety and emergency 
scenarios should actually lower the feelings of fear and potential risk – thus enhancing 
resilience – while inadequate communication has proven to undermine public trust – thus 
decreasing resilience. The well-known dilemma for governments is ‘informing but not 
alarming’ and the problem arises when the public is left in an information vacuum and media 
start to speculate (Archetti & Taylor, 2003; Durodié & Wessely, 2002) or in the most negative 
scenarios when the government lies, misleads or gives too alarming, incomplete or complex 
information for frightened citizens to respond to in an appropriate manner (Speckhard, 
2005). This chapter already provided some general introductions to the main topics that will 
shape both the theoretical as the empirical bodies of doctoral dissertation. The next 
chapters will extensively discuss the concepts of risk management and risk communication, 
risk perception and public oriented risk communication and trust and reliability as drivers for 
effective governmental risk communication. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
RISK COMMUNICATION 
1. Risk communication in risk management processes 
This second chapter will commence with a review of literature on risk communication as a 
vital element in risk management processes. We will discuss various risk management 
models and indicate the position and the function of effective risk communication within 
these models.  
1.1. Miscommunication and non communication as indicators of mismanagement 
One of the first academic works that has been published about risk communication is ‘Risk 
Communication’ in 1987 by Davies, Covello and Allen. The book contains the proceedings of 
the National Conference on Risk Communication held in Washington, D.C. in 1986. Clarence 
Davies, one of the editors, reflects very accurately a fundamental problem statement that is 
characterizing for the process of risk communication.   
 "(…) the risk communication process is very often unsatisfactory for everybody 
involved. Those who send messages often feel that their messages have not been received, 
and the recipients often feel that their questions have not been answered. In short, both 
miscommunication and non communication occur in the risk communication process" 
(Davies, Covello, & Allen, 1987b p.2). 
Non communication is somewhat the worst scenario in a risk and crisis situation. There can 
be various reasons for non communication. Authorities are afraid to communicate about the 
risk as they do not know what the consequences can be of diffusing certain information into 
the society. Of course, authorities are always confronted with the duality of creating a 
certain level of preparedness on the one hand and inducing a culture of fear on the other 
hand. In order to avoid the induction of climate of arousal and even fear, governments will 
sometimes opt for non communication rather than taking the risk of inducing concern and 
even panic. A second reason for non communication, which is also related to the first one, is 
that there are often no lucid and well-considered risk communication strategies at hand. 
Instead of improvising a short term risk communication strategy, authorities sometimes 
prefer non communication to avoid miscommunication with negative effects. Naturally, the 
lack of a risk communication strategy mostly results from a lack of a risk management 
strategy or an underestimation of the vital role of risk communication in the risk 
management process. 
Miscommunication can in our perception be even worse than non communication, 
depending of the risk context of course. The nature of the information that should be 
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diffused depends completely on the risk or crisis context, the objectives of the authorities 
and the risk information desires of the public. In order to avoid miscommunication, one 
should take into account these three elements when constructing risk communication 
programs. Making communication programs public oriented will be a crucial element in their 
effectiveness and will avoid miscommunication. 
So avoiding both miscommunication as non communication can be considered as 
fundamental drivers for the development of well-considered, audience targeted risk 
communication programs that are the most vital elements in the entire risk management 
process. Let us first discuss the academic views on the processes of risk assessment and risk 
management in which risk communication will be embedded. 
1.2. Risk assessment and risk management 
Risk management can be defined in as many statements as there are risks. In general, we 
could put out front three main purposes of risk management (Grima, 1989). The 
management process should allow us to control and reduce risks to acceptable levels, it 
should reduce uncertainty and doubt in risk decision processes and it should have the aim to 
increase public confidence. All three objectives involve information flows between various 
stakeholders: risk experts, decisions makers, mass media, and the public. 
Leiss (1989) mentions several national and international organizations, including the 
National Research Council (°1983, U.S.), the Royal Society Study Group (°1983, U.K.), the 
Interdepartmental Working Group on Risk-Benefit Analysis (°1984, Canada) and the World 
Health Organization (°1985). These organizations have developed several models and tools 
to scrutinize and summarize the key elements in risk management processes. The Working 
Group on Risk Assessment and Risk Management developed a basic framework for risk 
assessment and risk management (Leiss, 1989b). The dual nature of the model (risk 
assessment and risk management) suggests that the working group considers assessment as 
a separate process that precedes the actual risk management process. The risk assessment 
process includes an analytical phase, in which the hazards are identified and probability 
figures are delivered, and an option evaluation phase, in which the concrete options are 
developed and analyzed. The output of this phase will feed the decision taking stage, the 
first step in the actual risk management process. Within this process, the actual selected 
strategy will be implemented, monitored, evaluated and reviewed.  
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Figure 11: The risk management process (Leiss, 1989b p.92) 
 
 
The following critiques on the model can be formulated: 
- The first critique questions the division of risk assessment and risk management. Risk 
management is perceived as a consequent phase of the risk assessment stage. We would 
consider risk assessment as a fundamental phase within the risk management process 
and classify the execution and evaluation phase under a different label: e.g. the strategy 
implementation phase. 
- Secondly, the model is very linear and does not allow any cross-connections that allow, 
for example, input of stakeholders in the hazard identification or option development 
phases. As we will confirm further in this chapter, stakeholder participation in all phases 
of the risk assessment and risk management processes is a crucial and significant index 
to increase the effectiveness of these management processes.  
- The third critique is that communication comes in only at the second phase of the risk 
management process. Since the transfer and especially the exchange of information of 
the various stakeholders with the risk management bodies is crucial in the option 
development and option analysis phases as well, communication should be considered 
as an overall lubricant in the entire assessment and management process. 
- The last critique addresses the evaluation and monitoring phase. Both monitoring as 
evaluating are essential throughout the entire process. Since we advocate the 
involvement of various stakeholders throughout the entire process, the evaluation and 
monitoring of the output of the reconciliation of these information flows is absolutely 
necessary. 
We advocate that the entire process of risk assessment and risk management has to be 
considered as a holistic and more integrated process which is very complex and allows many 
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cross-connections between the various stages. Secondly, we believe that risk information 
transfer is a crucial ingredient in all phases of the risk management process (analysis, 
assessment, solving, etc.). It is often stated that the complexity of developing solid risk 
communication strategies is closely linked to the complexity of the risk management and the 
risk decision process itself (Grima, 1989; Keeney & Vonwinterfeldt, 1986; Leiss, 1989b). 
O’Riordan has visualized the functions in environmental risk management by means of the 
subjoined scheme (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990 p.10). It involves four main phases: 
risk identification, estimation, evaluation and control. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Schematic visualization of the functions in environmental risk management (Handmer & 
Penning-Rowsell, 1990 p.10) 
 
 
With this schematic overview, O’Riordan proposes that communication enters after the risk 
evaluation phase, involving political judgments. He classifies the communication process 
under the risk control phase. He defines risk communication as the sharing of risk 
information from those who have that information to those who are presumed to be 
without it. Our evaluation of the model is again rather critical. We think that the model can 
be applied to calculable and transparent risks. For the new, more socially and medially 
constructed risks, the flows between the four phases are not unidirectional nor 
consequently succeeding each other. The viewpoint is rather top-down oriented, assuming 
that the public is a passive audience that is not directly involved. Again, we can apply the 
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main critiques that we formulated on the risk management model of the Working Group on 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management. Fortunately, O’Riordan has also described the 
process of risk communication more specifically in a comprehensive and schematic figure, 
that will be discussed in section 3.4.1 of this chapter.  
We can conclude that communication is a vital element that has a functional nature 
throughout the entire risk assessment and risk management process. Naturally, the nature 
of the communication will vary according to its function, objectives, involved stakeholders 
etc.  
The UK Cabinet Office has developed a framework that integrates both four steps in the risk 
management process as the role of communication flows (one-way bottom-up and top-
down, two-way) during this process (GICS, p.25). The communication flows have a different 
purpose and focus during each of the four stages. We should bear in mind that this model is 
applied in the context of governmental risk communication. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: The risk management process as developed by the UK Resilience Center (GICS, p.25) 
 
 
The model strongly emphasizes the function of bottom-up and interactive communication 
flows. Risk managers that developed the framework are convinced that understanding how 
people perceive risks is often as important as understanding the risk itself. That is why the 
information retrieval about the risk contexts with the specific sections of the population is 
considered as one of the most important information flows throughout the entire risk 
management process. The subjoined table specifies the stages of the risk management 
process and integrates the practical implications. 
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Stage Practice 
Stage 1 - Identifying risks Public information retrieval about perceived potential 
risks and concernedness within specific sections  
 Information retrieval from public (from various 
groups) 
 Techniques: attitude surveys, focus groups, 
continuous stakeholder consultation 
Stage 2 - Assessing risks Cooperative strategy development (acceptability risks, 
actions needed for risk mitigation) 
 Information exchange and brokering discussions 
between different stakeholders 
Stage 3 - Addressing risks Strategy implementation and info diffusing 
 Information provision to the public about the 
various roles of the government : advisory role, 
protective role, redistributive role 
Stage 4 – Reviewing and reporting risks Risk management evaluation by public involvement in 
assessment process 
 Information retrieval about risk management 
evaluation and risk control; similar techniques as in 
stage 1 
Table 5: Four stages in risk management (GICS, p.25) 
 
The risk management cycle is very similar to the previous overviews of risk management 
processes. It incorporates a risk identification, risk assessment, risk addressing and reviewing 
stage. The added value of the model can be appointed to the fact that risk communication 
and information flows play a very important role in all stages of the process. In the 
identification stage, information is retrieved with the public about perceived potential 
threats and people are interrogated about their specific concerns about risk issues. The 
strategy advocates active information retrieval and even proposes some concrete 
information gathering tools. In the risk assessment stage, strategies ideally are cooperatively 
developed, based on interactive information exchange processes between the various 
stakeholders. The specific implementation of the risk management strategy also involves 
information provision to the public. Risk communication is labeled as a very important factor 
for the successful implementation of the risk management strategies and the offered 
solutions. In the last stage, including reviewing and reporting, information will be retrieved 
with the public about the evaluation of the implemented strategy. We can consider this last 
stage as a crucial stage for retrieving feedback, which offers a valuable input for strategy 
optimalization. Again, communication between the main stakeholders will play a crucial role 
in this stage. The final aim of risk management strategies is to avoid crises or when crises do 
occur to minimize the consequences by stimulating preparedness both on the operational 
level as on the level of people management. People management naturally includes 
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preparing first responders but also preparing all possible stakeholders that may be affected 
by the crisis or contribute to the crisis management process. The nature and objectives of 
the communication flows vary strongly in both risk communication as crisis communication 
processes. In the next section, we will elaborate on the differences between crisis 
communication and risk communication and discuss their interrelationships. 
2. Crisis communication versus risk communication management 
2.1. The difference between crisis communication and risk communication  
Risk communication can be considered as a part of crisis communication but crisis 
communication can also be considered as a basic element in risk communication strategies.  
Peter Sandman uses the last approach. He divides risk communication into three categories 
and indicates that crisis communication is one of them: 
 
“When people are appropriately concerned about a serious hazard, the task is to help them 
bear it and to guide them through it. This is the true paradigm of crisis communication. In a 
crisis, people are genuinely endangered and rightly upset.” (P. M. Sandman, 2006 p.257) 
 
Reynolds and Seeger formulated a similar purpose of crisis communication. However, they 
focus on harm-reducing information diffusion to affected communities, which implies 
communication that has to occur in an actual or post-crisis situation. 
 
“Crisis communication seeks to explain the specific event, identify likely consequences and 
outcomes, and provide specific harm-reducing information to affected communities in an 
honest, candid, prompt, accurate, and complete manner.” (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005 p.46) 
 
We will now try to point out the differences between the two concepts of risk and crisis 
communication. According to Sellnow et al. (2008), a first fundamental difference can be 
retrieved in their purpose: risk communication has to avoid crises, whereas crisis 
communication has the general target to provide operational information during a crisis 
situation in order to limit the negative consequences of that crisis. A second difference is 
that crisis communication has an immediate character and reacts very specifically on each 
specific crisis situation. Risk communication can be much more structured and controlled 
and it has a more general character because it is a situation that transcends the 
characteristic traits of a specific crisis communication. (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 
2008). 
 
Risks are perceived potential threats that can physically and psychologically harm people in a 
direct or indirect way.  Risk consists of two components: a physical, more tangible and 
quantifiable component and a mentally constructed component, or as some others stated: 
risk as a physical attribute and risk as a social construct (Bradbury, 1989; Rayner & Cantor, 
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1987). Depending on the type of risk, the share of each of the two components will vary. 
Within this lies the difference with ‘crisis’ as a concept: the share of the physical component 
is much larger in a crisis situation because the perception of risk, regardless of whether it has 
been confirmed or vitiated, has become reality.  The role of the risk - and crisis 
communication processes can be defined differently: in crisis situations we can say that 
communication has an instrumental, coordinating role, where information has to reach the 
specific target groups through the most appropriate communication channels and in the 
most efficient way in order to meet the operational and psychosocial needs of people 
involved in a crisis situation. Risk communication focuses on the manipulation of perceptions 
of specific risks so that the eventual potential consequences of risks that have become crises 
may to a certain extent be controlled and guided in a specific direction, or as Littlefield et al. 
state: “the ultimate goals of risk communication is to avoid crisis” (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & 
Littlefield, 2009 p.4). Crisis communication on the other hand focuses on the communication 
during the crisis and in the post-crisis stage. The central focus is on containment, prevention 
of further expansion of the crisis and recovery from a crisis situation: dangerous event, 
avoided catastrophes etc. The focus is mainly on the physical component of the situation 
and less on the more abstract dimension of the situation.  
Littlefield et al. used the overview table of Seeger et al. (2003) to point out the distinguishing 
features of risk and crisis communication (Sellnow et al., 2009 p.4). It integrates differences 
in the central object (risk versus crisis event), the nature of the message, the knowledge, the 
terms, the key players, the scope, the central media channels and the specific nature of the 
processes. 
 
 
Risk Communication  Crisis communication 
Risk centred: protection about some harm 
occurring at some future date 
Event-centred: specific incident that has 
occurred and produced harm 
Messages regarding known probabilities of 
negative consequences and how they may be 
reduced 
Messages regarding current state or conditions: 
magnitude, immediacy, duration, 
control/remediation, cause,  blame, 
consequences 
Based on what is currently known Based on what is known and what is not known 
Long-term (pre-crisis stage) message preparation 
(i.e. campaigns) 
Short term (crisis stage), less preparation (i.e. 
responsive) 
Technical experts, scientists Authority figure emergency managers, technical 
experts 
Personal scope Community or regional scope 
Mediated: commercials, ads, brochures, 
pamphlets 
Mediated: press conferences, press releases, 
speeches, websites 
Controlled and structured Spontaneous and reactive 
Table 6: Distinguishing features of risk and crisis communication (Sellnow et al., 2008 p.4) 
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The principal differences lie within the execution phase of the risk and crisis communication 
strategies and more specifically within the message specificities. Where risk communications 
are more informative, have a long term preparation and even implementation stage, use 
other communication channels and can be managed and structured more accurately, crisis 
communication is more directive and reactive to the specific situation and can only limitedly 
be prepared beforehand, other official spokesmen are used (depending on the involvement 
of responsible authorities) and the media channels are mass media that can diffuse crucial 
information immediately and on large scale to a large and even entire population. 
The table provides a nice overview of the key differences, but its starting point is the concept 
of risk in its most basic and transparent sense. The features that are presented in the column 
about risk communication are correct but limited to the concept of transparent and 
translucent risks as defined in the first chapter by Wilkins and Patterson. The concept of 
opaque risks, that are most interesting because of their high unpredictability, unfamiliar 
scenarios and causes because of their low probabilities and their low transparency (Wilkins 
& Patterson, 1990), are overlooked. That is why we will attempt to create a similar table, 
comparing both types of risk communication. 
 
 
Opaque risk communication  Transparent and translucent risk 
communication 
Risk centred: informing and explaining the risk 
and possible consequences 
Risk centred: protection about some harm 
occurring at some future date 
Messages regarding the nature of the risk, 
possible consequences and what is being done 
to prevent the risks 
Messages regarding known probabilities of 
negative consequences and how they may be 
reduced 
Based on what is known of similar risks, on what 
is not known 
Based on what is currently known 
Long-term message preparation and especially 
long term and continuous communication 
Long-term (pre-crisis stage) message preparation 
(i.e. campaigns) 
Experts, but taking into account the role of 
interpersonal communication and opinion 
leaders 
Technical experts, scientists 
Personal and communal scope, trespassing 
physical and geographical borders and 
introducing cyber communication 
Personal scope 
Mediated: primarily two-way interaction 
platforms (forums, web 2.0) 
Mediated: commercials, ads, brochures, 
pamphlets 
Semi-controlled and semi-structured as message 
creation and information diffusing lie both in the 
hands of the authorities as the public (opinion 
leaders) 
Controlled and structured 
Table 7: Distinguishing features of risk communication about opaque en transparent risks 
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Naturally, the features are not always that clearly distinguishable. The interactivity aspect is 
a feature that has to be implemented in all risk management and risk communication 
strategies. Other traits may also overlap, and so may the border between translucent and 
opaque risks. It is not always clear how a certain risk should be categorized. To conclude, we 
want to emphasize the interactivity aspect of risk communication as the most important 
disparity with crisis communication. The interactivity aspect in crisis communication has a 
purely operational nature: exchanging concrete information to reduce and avoid further 
harm. In risk communication strategies, the interactivity aspect has a long-term nature and is 
an essential building block for public-oriented risk communication strategies. The nature of 
the exchanged information in risk communication flows will probably have a more political 
and abstract nature. Crisis communication as we perceive it could be better labelled as 
disaster warning and emergency information. 
2.2. Crisis communication in its purest sense: warnings and emergency information 
Covello et al. categorized disaster warnings and emergency information as a type of risk 
communication (V. T. Covello, Von Winterfeldt, & Slovic, 1986). We defined a clear 
borderline between risk communication, crisis communication and pre-crisis communication 
or process risk information. The authors also describe a variety of problems and barriers that 
complicate the task of providing disaster warnings and emergency information. 
- The macro objectives of government officials, such as minimizing loss of life and property 
damage, often conflict with the micro objectives of local residents who assign highest 
priority to protecting their own surroundings (property, possessions, friends, family 
members, etc.); 
- Most emergency situations are accompanied by very sharp time pressures which do not 
allow communication experts to extract much time for the development of customized 
and specific communication efforts. That is why pre-development of customized 
communication strategies (including clearly defined messages, communication channels, 
time schedules, target group profiles…) is absolutely necessary; 
- Communication coordination between the various stakeholders (authorities, emergency 
workers, industry) is often very difficult, resulting in general confusion about 
responsibilities and the establishment of multiple and competing communication flows 
by various sources; 
- Communication channels also break down very often, that is why a very extended 
communication plan should be written; 
- Warning systems are not infallible: false alarms can confuse people, create mistrust and 
desensitize people to future warnings; 
- In case of a crisis or disaster, public response is often delayed by disbelief, reluctance, 
mistrust in the alarm system and denial. The communication efforts must capture public 
interest and attention immediately. 
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Crisis communicators can take into account the following recommendations when drafting 
crisis communication plans: 
- The public must be provided with concrete and clear information and guidelines about 
specific actions that can be taken at the time of emergency. 
- The coordination of crisis communication flows is probably the most important aspect of 
a solid crisis communication strategy. Official communications should happen through a 
single, reliable and highly credible spokesperson, which should be chosen based on the 
specific crisis situation traits. In this way, people will not be overloaded with 
contradictory information. 
- One coherent and clear message is important, however this message can be diffused 
through various communication channels in order to avoid non information because of a 
channel failure. 
- Establish possibilities for personal communication to come up to the information needs 
of the public: : hotlines, websites, forums, blogs, chat sessions with officials etc. 
- Specific risk perceptions and fears should be identified so that specific communication 
provision can be established.  
- Sometimes, local citizens or opinion leaders can be enlisted to communicate with their 
peers. The power of interpersonal communication in case of emergency is probably even 
stronger than the power of ‘anonymous’ sources and media. 
- Pre-crisis communication (guidelines, where to find information, what to do, etc.) is of 
course one of the key success factors for an effective implementation of crisis 
management strategies during the event. 
 
As mentioned before, some authors consider pre-crisis communication as risk 
communication. The next paragraph will discuss the CERC, a framework that integrates the 
information and communication flow from the pre-crisis to the post crisis stage.  
2.2.1. The crisis and emergency risk communication model (CERC) 
The crisis and emergency risk communication model is a framework that has been 
developed by Reynolds and Seeger and it is an effort to develop a comprehensive and 
integrated framework that integrates communication efforts from the pre-crisis risk 
communication to the post-crisis communication (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). It claims to be 
integrative, so it tries to coordinate strategies of risk and crisis communication. The authors 
state that their model meets the needs to be ‘strategic, broad based, responsive and highly 
contingent’ (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005 p.49). The model is based on an extensive review of 
crisis planning and risk communication literature on the one hand and on practical 
experiences and research conducted by the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) on the other 
hand. Its inclusive nature allows the model to be applied in various risk contexts where 
public safety is involved.  
The model strongly emphasizes the function of risk communication as an element in the 
crisis communication process. The traditional risk communication practices that are advised 
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to be implemented in the pre-crisis stage involve educating the public about risks and 
appropriate responses to avoid risks such as changing attitudes and behaviours so that risks 
can be reduced. This perspective is again a linear one-way top-down perspective on risk 
communication as they presuppose that the public is a passive audience that needs to be 
informed and even educated about certain risk situations. There is no room for interactivity. 
We only notice the remark that in the first stage, messages should be constructed and tested 
in order to optimize them. We do not find any referral to the active involvement of the 
audience nor an invitation for active participation in the risk debate of the general public, or 
any other specific target groups. That is why we do not label this tool as being an audience-
centered framework for risk communication. It could be a very useful tool to be used in crisis 
communication and risk communication in the context of risks that may eventually emerge 
in a crisis.  
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I.  Pre-crisis (Risk Messages; Warnings; Preparations) 
Communication and education campaigns targeted to both the public and the response community to facilitate:  
- Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks 
- General public understanding of risk 
- Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event 
- Changes in behaviour to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy) 
- Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat 
- Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups 
- Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders 
- Message development and testing for subsequent stages  
II.  Initial Event (Uncertainty Reduction; Self-efficacy; Reassurance) 
Rapid communication to the general public and to affected groups seeking to establish:  
- Empathy, reassurance, and reduction in emotional turmoil 
- Designated crisis=agency spokespersons and formal channels and methods of communication 
- General and broad-based understanding of the crisis circumstances, consequences, and anticipated 
outcomes based on available information 
- Reduction of crisis-related uncertainty 
- Specific understanding of emergency management and medical community responses 
- Understanding of self-efficacy and personal response activities (how and where to get more information) 
III.  Maintenance (Ongoing Uncertainty Reduction; Self-efficacy; Reassurance) 
Communication to the general public and to affected groups seeking to facilitate:  
- More accurate public understandings of ongoing risks 
- Understanding of background factors and issues 
- Broad-based support and cooperation with response and recovery efforts 
- Feedback from affected publics and correction of any misunderstandings and rumors 
- Ongoing explanation and reiteration of self-efficacy and personal response activities (how=where to get 
more information) begun in Stage II. 
- Informed decision making by the public based on understanding of risks and benefits   
IV.   Resolution (Updates Regarding Resolution; Discussions about Cause and New Risks/New Understandings) 
Public communication and campaigns directed toward the general public and affected groups seeking to:  
- Inform and persuade about ongoing clean-up, remediation, recovery, and rebuilding efforts 
- Facilitate broad-based, honest, and open discussion and resolution of issues regarding cause, blame, 
responsibility, and adequacy of response. 
- Improve/create public understanding of new risks and new understandings of risk as well as new risk 
avoidance behaviours and response procedures 
- Promote the activities and capabilities of agencies and organizations to reinforce positive corporate identity 
and image 
V.   Evaluation (Discussions of Adequacy of Response; Consensus About Lessons and New Understandings) 
Communication directed toward agencies and the response community to: 
- Evaluate and assess responses, including communication effectiveness 
- Document, formalize, and communicate lessons learned 
- Determine specific actions to improve crisis communication and crisis response capability 
- Create linkages to pre-crisis activities (Stage I) 
Table 8: Crisis and emergency risk communication model (Sellnow et al., 2008 p.171) 
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2.2.2. The general risk and crisis management model 
Based on the differences between risk and crisis communication and the idea of risk 
communication as a kind of pre-crisis communication, we developed the following 
conceptual model.  
 
 
Figure 14: The general risk and crisis management model 
 
 
The model integrates both the similarities as the differences between risk and crisis 
management and the nature of the risk information that is involved in the information 
management processes. Both risk as crisis management have a regulation and a 
communication dimension. Communication has previously been defined as a lubricant 
throughout the entire risk management process, so we cannot separate communication 
from regulation. The two processes do not stand next to each other, but they interrelate. 
The risk and crisis regulation components involve risk analysis and crisis analysis. This phase 
involves the analysis of the information and data that is available. The second component of 
risk/crisis regulation is risk/crisis control, where strategies to deal with the specific risk or 
crisis are constructed and implemented. So the risk and crisis regulation phases are 
structurally quite similar, but content wise they can differ very strongly because of the 
differences in the nature of risks and crises. Also the available resources in terms of time and 
materials are different. Besides risk regulation, the risk information management stages in 
risk and crisis communication look similar at first glance. In crisis information management, 
the main ingredients are functional information (how, who, what, where, etc.), general crisis 
information (mainly external communication to press and other stakeholders) and post-crisis 
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communication. Risk information management is less obvious because the risk situation is 
often very uncertain and untransparent. Naturally, information diffusion about probabilities 
is one option. But since there are many uncertain and opaque risks, for which no concrete 
probability information is available, it is often not possible to communicate concrete facts 
and figures or other functional information. The second type of risk information is general 
risk information, about possible causes and consequences, who is responsible etc. The last 
type of information is actually pre-crisis or pre-emergency information. This type of 
information involves concrete guidelines about what to do when the risk turns into a crisis 
(emergency services, practical guidelines, crisis centre information, etc.). Pre-crisis 
information is of course the most useful in terms of increasing the general preparedness of a 
community and it can deliver a great contribution in the crisis control process. But again, not 
all risks can be predicted in terms of their consequences or how to avoid them by taking 
specific safety measurements. Some risks are too vague and uncertain to be anticipated. 
Within this lies the main problem with risk communication: how should the information 
management strategy look like when authorities are confronted with these new, uncertain 
and unpredictable risks and how can communities efficiently be informed to increase their 
preparedness. We could state that the risk management process can be extended with a risk 
perception management dimension. Risk perceptions are mainly individually and socially 
constructed. Chapter four will elucidate the main frameworks within this field of interest. Is 
risk perception actually linked to risk control in the sense that, when we can control the 
communal perceptions of the risk, we can control the triggers or consequences? We can 
state that risk perception management involves intensive risk information exchanges 
between the various stakeholders. It is a very complex process since the balance between 
creating awareness and inducing a culture of fear is very fragile, especially when authorities 
are confronted with uncertain threats of which not much information is available. We can 
conclude this section by stating that efficient risk communication can be an important link to 
preparedness and crisis communication. It is beneficiary in terms of the reduction of side 
effects such as fear, panic, chaos and the costs that are related to the crisis management 
process. The general mental and physical preparedness of both individuals as the community 
can function as a buffer for the diverse negative implications and social reactions of the 
crisis. Policymakers and crisis managers can take advantage from accurate and efficient risk 
and crisis communication management by taking into account all possible and known factors 
and preparing themselves and the community for as many negative factors that can 
influence the whole crisis management process. This doctoral dissertation will mainly focus 
on the process of the more complex and abstract process of risk communication.   
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3. Risk communication 
3.1. Informing people about risk 
As Slovic et al. (1981) stated in their article “Perceived Risk: Psychological Factors and Social 
Implications” people cultivate a growing awareness of risks that are present but not always 
visible in their near environments as they are confronted with increasing amounts of 
information about these risks through various media channels. This growing awareness 
induces an increasing pressure on hazard producers and regulators, such as the governments 
to inform people about the risks they face (Slovic et al., 1981). As these authors state, and 
the idea is supported by policy makers and communication experts, creating effective risk 
communication programs is a very complex and difficult assignment: 
 
“Doing an adequate job means finding cogent ways of presenting complex technical material 
that is clouded by uncertainty and may be distorted by the listeners’ preconceptions (and 
perhaps misconceptions) about the hazard and its consequences” (Slovic et al., 1981 p.29). 
 
The authors also express the need for extensive empirical research on the problems of risk 
communication since the perceptual space surrounding risks, and especially unknown or 
untransparent risks, can easily be influenced by both the information sender as the receiver.  
Besides the need for academic input, both in terms of empirical as theoretical and 
conceptual contributions, Slovic et al. also pose some very essential questions, that, in our 
point of view, touch the fundamental principle of good risk communication practices: 
democracy and public participation. 
“What kind of political institutions are needed to preserve democratic freedoms and ensure 
public participation for problems involving technical complexity, catastrophic risks and great 
uncertainty? If public debates and communications from experts do little to allay fears and, 
indeed, may exacerbate them, how should we structure public participation?” 
(Slovic et al., 1981 p.33) 
 
Risk communication is a very complex and abstract concept since it can be approached by 
several viewpoints. Therefore, it is very important to define the concept accurately and as 
unambiguously as possible. 
3.2. Defining risk communication 
The importance of risk communication is not limited to the discipline of communication 
sciences. It is a multidisciplinary practice that has found entrance in various academic and 
applied orientations such as actuarial approaches utilizing statistical predictions, toxological 
and epidemiological approaches, an engineering approach including probabilistic risk 
assessments, and cultural and social theories of risk (Renn, 1992b), political sciences etc. 
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Heath et al. stated that the risk communication discipline is a reconciliation of  risk 
perception and risk management studies (R. L. Heath & Palenchar, 2000 p.134). Within the 
broader field of general risk research, we can also identify several institutes that mainly 
focus on risk communication. Two pioneer centers are the Center for Risk Communication1, 
founded by Vincent Covello and the Environmental Communication Research Program2 
(later Center for Environmental Communication), founded by Peter Sandman. Also general 
risk research institutes such as the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA)3 and the European Safety 
and Reliability Association (ESREL)4 established specialty groups about risk communication 
practices that have gained increasingly more interest and attracted more members with 
various backgrounds over the past years. As the Risk Communication Specialty Group of SRA 
stated themselves: “Members' interest areas include the perception of risk, public 
participation, mass media coverage of risk, trust and credibility, social influence, and 
evaluation related to risk communication activities.”(www.sra.org) 
 
Renn mentions three separate research traditions in which risk communication plays a 
central role: scientific positivism, constructivism and the dialogue perspective. Most risk 
communication definitions can be classified in one of these three traditions (Renn, 1992b). 
Scientific positivism uses data and methodologies of scientists to dominate community 
efforts to ascertain the degree of risk and subsequent communications about the risk on 
behalf of the community.  
Hampel states: “(Risk) Communication means to inform the public about the risk as it was 
defined by scientists” (Hampel, 2006 p.8). Hampel uses the definition of risk communication 
in the authentic scientific positivism tradition. In this view, the public is assigned a passive 
role. 
Constructivism/relativism uses the power of collective opinion creation. We will base 
ourselves partly on this perspective as one of our main focuses lies within the social and 
medial construction of risks. 
The dialogue perspective integrates scientific and academic opinions in public policies 
(collaborative decision-making). Fearn-Banks defines risk communication in this tradition as 
follows:  
“an ongoing program of informing, and educating various publics (usually external publics) 
about issues that can affect, negatively or positively, an organization’s success. The program 
                                                     
1 The Center for Risk Communication was raised in 1998 by Cincent T. Covello. The Center claims to be “a pioneer in the 
development and use of advanced communication methods based on decades of university-level behavioural-science research 
and practice. Research and experience clearly prove that one of the most important keys to communication success is an 
organization's ability to establish, maintain, and increase trust and credibility with key stakeholders, including employees, 
regulatory agencies, citizen groups, the public and the media.”. www.centerforriskcommunication.com.  
2Peter Sandman founded the Environmental Communication Research Program (ECRP) at Rutgers University (USA)  in 
1986, and was its director until 1992. The center’s name was changed into Center for Environmental Communication. 
3 The Society for Risk Analysis is a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, scholarly, international society that unites various 
stakeholders that are involved in risk analysis which is broadly defined to include risk assessment, risk characterization, risk 
communication, risk management, and policy relating to risk, in the context of risks of concern to individuals, to public and 
private sector organizations, and to society at a local, regional, national, or global level. www.sra.org  
 
4 ESREL is concerned with the problems of creation and assurance of safety and reliability in the human-technology-
environment interactions. Their activities (conferences etc.) cover safety, reliability and risk-based methods as well as their 
application in a wide range of industrial and governmental sectors. 
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builds solid relationships between an organization and its key publics, the publics on which 
an organization’s survival depends. These relationships must be established prior to a crisis. It 
is too late after a crisis erupts” (Fearn-Banks, 2007 p.58).  
Covello et al. (1986) also defined risk communication in the dialogue perspective. They state 
that risk communication is “any purposeful exchange of information between interested 
parties about levels of health or environmental risks, the significance or meaning of health or 
environmental risks or decisions, action or policies aimed at managing or controlling health 
or environmental risks.” (V. T. Covello et al., 1986 p.172) 
Leiss also focuses on the two-way information flow and defines risk communication as “the 
flow of information and risk evaluations back and forth between academic experts, 
regulatory practitioners, interest groups, and the general public” (Leiss, 1996 p.86). He also 
mentions that disagreements over approaches, principles, decisions about risk information 
disclosures between the various constituencies and stakeholders may strongly influence the 
risk management process. This is mostly due to a failure to carefully consider each other’s 
position. This statement illustrates the nature of the dialogue perspective on risk 
communication. 
Also Sellnow et al. (2009) have stressed that the public information model of communication 
that stresses the one-way dissemination of information is a linear view that fails to solicit 
public feedback and even refers to a potential for abuse or discrimination. (Sellnow et al., 
2009). 
It was the National Research Council (NRC) that stressed in their report “Risk Assessment in 
the Federal Government: Managing the Process” the importance of risk communication as a 
vital element in the risk assessment and management process. They also published one of 
the basic books on risk communication: “Improving Risk Communication” (N.R.C., 1989). The 
N.R.C provided us with one of the basic definitions of risk communication that integrated the 
‘democratic dialogue’ concept (Sellnow et al., 2009 p.5): 
“Risk communication is an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among 
individuals, groups and institutions. It involves multiple messages about the nature of the risk 
and other messages, not strictly about risk, that express concerns, opinions or reactions on 
risk messages or to legal or institutional arrangements for risk management. (N.R.C., 1989 
p.21)  
This definition reflects the involvement of the risk perceptions of diverse actors, receivers 
and senders, who are involved in the communication process. Policy makers can integrate 
the information gained from the perceptions and needs of different stakeholders into their 
crisis-and disaster management and crisis communication strategies. By mapping the various 
public risk perceptions, risk - and crisis managers will be able to create in tune risk and crisis 
communication strategies that deliver target based messages to specific audiences. As we 
will discover further in this chapter it is very important to create customized messages 
through the most appropriate channels. This will increase the perceived information 
reliability and source credibility. Risk communication involves more than just creating and 
sending press releases, organizing press conferences or launching public campaigns, it is 
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about gaining trust, changing or inducing attitudes and behaviours and stimulating the public 
willingness to react and help each other and following the crisis guidelines in times of crisis. 
We will use risk communication definitions in the tradition of the dialogue perspective as a 
starting point for this PhD. 
3.3. Goals of risk communication 
As mentioned in the introduction, risk communication has different goals varying from 
general provision of information about risks to influencing behaviour and increasing 
awareness and preparedness. Several authors (Aakko, 2004; Renn & Levine, 1991; K. E. 
Rowan, 1991), have formulated various functions of risk communication. Risk 
communication can fulfill the following aims: 
- to improve risk understanding among target groups and to educate: the 
enlightenment role; 
- to inform or disclose information to people who may be exposed to certain risks: 
coming up to the right-to-know about certain risks; 
- to legitimize risk management decision, to enhance the acceptance of a certain risk 
source: attitude modification role; 
- to reach agreements, motivate actions and to explain and legitimize general risk 
management decisions and routines for the enhancement of trust in the competence 
of the risk management processes and the risk regulators: legitimating role; 
- to enhance public protection through the provision of information regarding 
individual risk reduction measures: risk reduction role; 
- to raise awareness; 
- to encourage protective behaviour or to induce supportive behaviour towards the 
risk regulators and communicators: behavioural change role. This role is also the 
main starting point for the goal-oriented definition of risk communication by 
Sandman et al.: “risk communication to mobilize people” (P. M. Sandman, Weinstein, 
& Klotz, 1987 p.93); 
- to reduce uncertainty (Wardman, 2008). 
 
The multiplicity of risk communication purposes and measures of success makes the process 
of needs assessment centrally important before actually undertaking a risk communication 
effort (Bier, 2001). That is why we will spend a great deal of attention to the identification of 
risk information needs in order to develop coherent and specific risk communication 
strategies. 
A lot of experts consider risk communication as an interactive process of opinion- and 
information exchange that takes part between individuals, groups and institutions. Covello 
(1986) formulates the objectives of risk communication as follows: providing information 
and education, specific and preventive behavioural changes of all stakeholders, warning and 
informing about disasters and emergency situations but most of all, constructing collective 
problem solving and conflict handling strategies. Covello et al. also proposed a typology of 
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risk communication tasks in terms of their objectives or intended effect (V. T. Covello et al., 
1986). We summarized the typology in the subjoined scheme. 
 
Typology of Risk Communication Objectives  
Type I  
Information and Education 
Informing and educating the public about risks 
and risk assessment in general 
 nondirective activity (oneway) 
Type II  
Behaviour Change and Protective Action 
Encouraging personal risk reduction behaviour 
(motivating to pursue behavioural actions) 
 directive activity (oneway) 
Type III  
Disaster Warnings and Emergency Information 
Providing direction and behavioural guidance in 
disasters and emergencies 
 directive activity (oneway) 
Type IV 
Joint Problem Solving and Conflict Resolution 
Involving the public in risk management decision 
making and in resolving health, safety and 
environmental controversies 
 cooperative action (two-way) 
Table 9: Typology of risk communication objectives (V. T. Covello et al., 1986) 
 
 
The first three types of risk communication objectives are strongly linked to the concept of 
risk communication as pre-crisis communication. Type II, behaviour change and protective 
action, and type III, disaster warning and emergency information are objectives that 
contribute to pre-crisis management strategies. This type of pre-crisis information diffusion 
will have the objective to increase individual and communal preparedness and mental 
resilience. High preparedness, even when it is primarily a perceived preparedness by 
increasing mental resilience, will contribute to effective and efficient crisis control 
management. Type IV, joint problem solving and conflict resolution, has a cooperative 
nature and includes a two-way communication flow. This type of risk communication may 
contribute to crisis management when it occurs during the crisis. But we suppose it is 
actually meant to take place in pre-crisis stages. Besides the risk management decision 
making processes in the context of known risks, it will also be applied in decision making 
processes about unknown and opaque risks. Since these kinds of risks are primarily 
characterized by a low level of knowledge about the risk as such and its consequences, the 
perceptions and responses of the public to these types of risks are key issues as both 
perceptions and responses will largely determine behavioural intentions and concrete 
behaviour. That is why the input of all stakeholders involved with ‘new’ risks is crucial in the 
risk management, policy construction and decision making processes. 
Type I is also involved in pre-crisis type of communication strategy when the objective is to 
educate and inform the people about what to do in the crisis situation and how to deal with 
the risk.  On the other hand, it is also important to inform people about transparent and 
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untransparent risks in the context of risk perception management, again with the final aim 
to increase the perceived preparedness levels and resilience. The concept of resilience is of 
significant importance to the dynamics involved with public responsiveness on sudden and 
unexpected events. Resilience can prevent collective psychosis of panic or fear. When 
confronted with fear or panic, the need for accurate information about the hazard is crucial 
to the individual since it is the only way to predict his own probabilities of involvement or 
exposure. Uncertainty can be reduced by acquiring the personally desired information. In 
this way, the individual will have the feeling that he is in control of the situation. When 
people are confronted with uncertainty in risk situations, and there is no or bad 
communication from familiar and trusted institutes such as the governments or the media, it 
will be very hard for them to cope with the perceived threat and the emotions it induces. 
This will influence behavioural intentions or concrete behaviour. The importance of 
communication when a community is being confronted (through the media or other sources) 
with an uncertain and untransparent risk should not be underestimated.  
The following section will present some risk communication models that have been 
developed over the last couple of decades. 
3.4. Risk communication models 
Several models have been developed for risk communication processes. We will commence 
with the model of risk communication as developed by O’Riordan, as mentioned by 
Handmer et al. (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990 p.10) 
3.4.1. O’Riordan’s risk communication model 
 
 
Figure 15: O’Riordan’s risk communication model, used by Handmer and Penning-Rowsell (1990, 
p.10) 
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The starting point of this model is risk awareness and evaluation. These phases serve as an 
input for the design of a risk communication program. The (implicit or explicit) design 
process involves the construction of an objectively oriented message, the integration of a 
communication medium and a mode of delivery. Besides the objective information and the 
rather mechanical application of rules, it is also very important to take into account 
judgments of ethical, legal, political and economical issues. He puts special emphasis on the 
definition and identification of the specific profiles and needs of the target groups so that 
messages can be tailored to their needs. His attention for the audience as vital elements in 
the success of risk communication efforts will strengthen our vision and framework of a 
public oriented risk communication strategy. Subsequent to the message receipt, complex 
processes of information comprehension and filtering will influence a possible attitudinal 
change, behavioural intentions or even induce concrete behaviour, e.g. information seeking 
behaviour, protective behaviour etc. 
One of the constructive aspects of the model is that it incorporates elements that are vital to 
the risk communication process from both the micro as the macro level. Besides focusing on 
the psychology of individual information processing, the model takes into account the fact 
that risk perception and risk management takes place within a social, political and 
economical context.  Naturally, O’Riordan also integrated the potential for error and 
misunderstanding, but also for communication improvement and feedback on the various 
levels of the model. The feedback process will induce a continuous cycle of improvement 
and adjustment of the risk communication design. However, the model solely incorporates 
the possibility of feedback as an interactive element in the entire process, while other 
models in the dialogue perspective would incorporate the active involvement of certain 
stakeholders from the beginning of the process. Specific target groups may be involved in 
the process from the stage of risk awareness and evaluation and especially in the phase 
where risk communication strategies are designed. We would incorporate this public 
involvement conceptually from the first phase on. 
The next three models describe the nature of the risk communication process (Leiss, 1989b). 
We will now discuss the information flow or institutional model, the message transmission 
model and the communications processes model. 
3.4.2. The information flow model 
The information flow model focuses on the risk information flow among the main 
institutional actors that are involved in the risk information flows: the media, agencies, 
independent researchers, the industries and other interested parties or the general public. 
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Figure 16: The information flow model of risk communication (Leiss, 1989b p.95) 
 
 
The roots of this model lie within a legal framework in which responsibilities and liability can 
be assigned to the institutional and individual actors, on the basis of the risk information 
which they transmit to each other (Baram, 1984, 1986; Leiss, 1989b). The model has several 
limitations: 
- It can only be effective when there is a possibility and potential to stimulate an adequate 
level of information flow through frequent resort to legal action.  
- The media are represented by simplistic transmission mechanisms. Instead, we have 
already mentioned that the media are active players in the risk communication process, 
not only in the transmission process, but in the content creation process as well. Some 
additional arrows should be integrated as well: one from the public to the media as the 
public is gradually more involved in the creation of the media contents, not only by mass 
media but also by personal message transmission media (e.g. internet, forums, etc.). 
- The interested parties and general public is represented as a passive, receptive audience. 
As mentioned in point two, the public may also deliver valuable risk information that can 
be integrated in the risk information flows. The model fails by neglecting the importance 
of public risk perception and the need for participative risk decision making processes in 
which the public plays an essential role. 
3.4.3. The message transmission model 
Covello et al. used this model for a comprehensive review of risk communication and 
formulated the four basic dimensions in which risk communication problems may arise (T. C. 
Covello, 1987a, 1989a; V. T. Covello et al., 1986). However, we added two additional 
elements that make part of the Basic Communication Model of Laswell: the possibility of an 
effect on the receiver and of feedback that introduces a two-way nature of the risk 
communication (Wood, 1983 p.12). 
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Figure 17: Message transmission model combined with Laswell’s general communication model 
 
- The most important critical comment on the original message transmission model of 
Covello et al. is that the model portrays the risk communication process as a one-way 
transmission process (Leiss, 1989b). By adding the additional dimensions, extracted from 
Laswell’s basic model of communication, we have added a new dimension of a two-way 
flow in order to come up to this remark. 
- Another remark is the reduced role of the media. The media are categorized under the 
‘channel’ block, which initially refers only to the basic, technological channel that 
transmits the message from sender to receiver. We would suggest to split the ‘media ‘ 
concept into two entities: the media as information transmitters (technological and 
tangible nature) and the media as content creators and independent actors in social 
communication processes. 
- The last remark includes the fact that Covello did not take into account the possible gap 
between the encoded information, which is the basis of the message created by the 
source, and the decoded information which includes the information that is processed in 
a certain way and integrated into the mental map of the receiver. The gap between 
encoded en decoded information is reflected in the gap between the original risk 
information message, offering neutral information about a risk setting, and the received 
risk information, which is retrieved, processed and integrated in the mental maps and 
the risk perceptions of the receivers. One encoded information block may be decoded in 
as many ways as there are individuals receiving the risk message. 
3.4.4. The Communications Processes Model 
The Communications Processes Model incorporates the most important elements of the 
previous two models and adds some additional concepts (Leiss, 1989b). The model reflects 
the interplay between the technical and the perceived risk, both can be allocated to an 
‘expert’ sphere and a ‘public’ sphere (Davies et al., 1987b).  
On the expert side, risk assessment and risk management has a strong technical and 
probabilistic nature, using highly sophisticated analytical tools and methods. It requires a lot 
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of technical expertise, which is also reflected in the general language that is used to 
communicate information. 
On the public sphere side, the main focus is on the construction of the public risk 
perceptions. The eventual outcome in terms of societal risk perception should be factored 
into risk management decision making processes to increase public acceptance of risk policy 
decisions and to increase the social trust in the regulatory institutions. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: The communication processes model of risk communication (Leiss, 1989b p.100) 
 
The five actors of Baram’s information flow model (as discussed in 3.4.2) are placed in the 
area of expert sphere on the one hand (industry and independent researchers) and in the 
public sphere on the other hand (mass media and general public or special interest groups) 
according to the language they use to communicate about the risk contexts. The 
governmental institutes however are located in the middle as they can be compared with a 
bridge between the two spheres, they have to speak both languages and they have to pass 
trough information from one side to another. There are two information flows: one between 
the context of the technical risk and the public’s perceived risk and another one within each 
sphere. This model acknowledges the possible obstacles that may arise in the process of risk 
communication as put in the forefront by Covello (1987) in the message transmission model 
of risk communication. However, on top of the four main categories (source, message, 
channel and receiver related problems) this model adds the potential problems that may 
arise when the boundaries between the expert sphere and the public sphere are crossed. 
Leiss (1989) includes conflicting or deviating risk messages because of the different nature of 
the languages and mindsets that are used in the specific spheres. We also want to relate the 
encoding-decoding principle that we added at the message transmission model as well. 
Sources from the expert sphere may encode information into a certain message, whereas 
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this message may be decoded differently by the receivers in the public sphere. These 
tensions between the domains of technical and perceived risk are also reflected in the 
modes in which the information is encoded and decoded: technical sources will use rather 
technical and rational approaches to the risk information (both in assessing as in 
communicating information) and the public will base themselves on a rather experiential 
mental mode to process risk information. The gap between the ‘instinctive’ experiential 
system and the ‘new, industrialized’ rational system could be proposed as an explanation for 
the differing risk information processing and diffusion processes of the public and the 
experts (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Paul Slovic et al., 2004). We will 
elaborate more on the general risk information processing mechanisms from a cognitive 
point of view in chapter four (2). We will however describe four specific risk information 
processing models in the following paragraphs. 
3.5. Specific risk information processing models 
Covello elaborates on three more models that describe how risk information is processed, 
how risk perceptions are formed and how risk decisions are made (T. C. Covello, 1998a; V. 
Covello & Sandman, 2001a; V. T. Covello, Peters, Wojtecki, & Hyde, 2001b), more specifically 
in high-concern risk situations. 
3.5.1. The mental noise model 
This model stresses the information processing mechanisms of people under stress and how 
these changes in information processing affect their communication. When people become 
aware of a certain hazard that threats their personal environment and valuable possessions, 
they will be in a higher state of concern. This will eventually lead to a less effective and 
efficient ability to process risk information, related to the specific threat, (Baron, Hershey, & 
Kunreuther, 2000; N.R.C., 1989). However, the aroused state that people are in is often 
accompanied by strong emotions such as fear and anger. This emotional arousal and mental 
agitation can create ‘mental noise’. If people are exposed to risks that have negative 
psychological traits (e.g. risks that include some outrage factors that induce higher risk 
perception, such as involuntary, uncontrollable and unfair risks), there may arise some 
severe mental noise (Maslow, 1987; Neuwirth, Dunwoody, & Griffin, 2000) that will bias 
rational risk information processing. 
3.5.2. The negative dominance model 
Some outrage factors are closely related to the negative dominance model. This model 
describes the mental processing of positive and negative information in high-concern 
situations (V. T. Covello et al., 2001b). There is a general conflicting relationship between 
negative and positive information. Negative information generally gets a significantly larger 
weight in the processing of risk information. Maslow developed the theorem that people put 
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greater value on negative outcomes than on positive outcomes. Negative information has 
substantially greater impact than positive information in high-concern situations. The 
practical implications of this theoretical finding are that negative messages should be 
offered together with a substantial amount of positive or solution-oriented messages (T. C. 
Covello, 1998a; V. T. Covello et al., 2001b). A second remark is that non-verbal cues are 
interpreted negatively, so risk communicators should try to avoid non-verbal cues that may 
have strong potential negative connotations. Governmental risk communication efforts 
towards several stakeholders should be carefully planned and executed in order to create a 
positive image, with trust and a positive public attitude towards the government as basic 
building blocks. In general, risk communication will be more effective when the positive and 
problem-solving characteristics are stressed. 
3.5.3. The trust determination theory 
Continuing on the previous paragraph which mentions trust as a vital building block for 
successful risk communication, the trust determination theory also proclaims that proactive 
handling is essential in establishing trust. Trust is a necessary condition for the success of 
several risk communication objectives, such as education, information sharing, increasing 
preparedness and awareness, etc. (T. C. Covello, 1998a; V. Covello & Sandman, 2001a; Earle, 
2009; Earle & Siegrist, 2008; Jan Gutteling, Hanssen, van der Veer, & Seydel, 2006; R. Peters, 
Covello, & McCallum, 1997a; M. Siegrist, 2008). Chapter three will extensively discuss the 
concepts of trust and credibility in governmental risk communication. However, we would 
already like to lift a tip of the veil. Covello mentions the principle of credibility transference 
(T. C. Covello, 1998a). This theorem pones that lower credibility sources take on the 
credibility of the highest credible source that agrees with its position on a (risk) issue. 
Surveys, mentioned by Covello, have indicated several organizations and individuals that 
have relatively medium to high credibility on various risk issues: health professionals, 
(doctors, pharmacists, …), educators, professional scientific and engineering organizations, 
non-management employees, non-profit organizations, environmental activist groups (often 
citizens), the media and local citizens who are respected, neutral and informed. We would 
like to stress the latter two groups: the media and the local citizens with specific traits that 
allow us to label them as ‘opinion leaders’. 
The first remark we want to make relates to the media. ‘The media’ is a label that contains 
many mass media such as television, radio, but also internet. The internet creates 
possibilities and interaction platforms that allow interpersonal communication as well as 
communication to larger groups. Just think about the various forums, blogs, facebook, etc. 
that allow people to create contents and disperse this content to many users. 
The second remark is with regard to these individuals that are respected, neutral and 
informed. These characteristics are some of the traits that we allocate to opinion leaders, 
which we will describe in detail in chapter four (3.7). We will put great emphasis on the 
importance of interpersonal communication and the effect of opinion leaders in the social 
construction of communal risk perceptions. The fact that Covello also indicates these 
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individuals as credible sources of information that may increase general trust and credibility 
is a confirmation of our opinion leadership concept. 
In the end, a good coordination, collaboration and two-way dialogue between all of these 
important groups, that include both organizations as individuals, will substantially deliver 
contributions to the enhancement of trust and credibility throughout all stages of the risk 
communication process. 
3.6. Stages in the risk communication process 
The Carnegie Mellon approach to develop effective and creative risk communication 
strategies includes three steps (Slavin, Tucker, & Ferson, 2008). The first step is the creation 
of an expert model. The second step is the definition and characterization of the target 
groups of the risk communication efforts, especially in terms of the mental models 
concerning the risk perception that are at play. The last step is the creation and 
implementation of the communication output, the communication material that will have to 
influence risk perceptions and provide normatively accurate information (Slavin et al., 2008). 
Naturally, this three step approach is a conceptual strategy. It is necessary to construct a 
more specific and detailed overview of the risk communication process in order to make it 
more practically implementable.  
The UK Resilience Center has integrated a very specific toolkit for creating risk 
communication strategies (GICS). The seven steps are formulated very explicitly in the 
document and will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. The strategic toolkit is 
primarily meant for risk (communication) managers that need to construct governmental 
risk communication strategies. Our primary objective of this PhD is to create a tool for 
governmental public-oriented risk communication strategies. This is the reasons why the 
toolkit of the UK Contingency Secretariat is one of the key guidelines as it has already 
implemented and evaluated. 
(http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132679/communicatingrisk.pdf) 
 
 
7 stages in risk communication strategies 
1-Establish a team/network 
2-Decide what you want to achieve 
3-Get to know who the stakeholders are 
4-Decide what form of consultation to use 
5-Engage and involve your stakeholders 
6-Monitoring and evaluating your strategy 
7-Maintaining the policy communication strategy 
Table 10: The seven stages in risk communication strategies (GICS, p.28) 
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3.6.1. Step one: establish a team/network 
The first step in a risk communication process is the establishment of a network of specialists 
from policy section, information specialists, special advisers, risk improvement or business 
continuity specialists etc. The gaining of relevant knowledge is based on idea-sharing, 
discussion and debate. This will help the risk manager to 
- understand internal departmental cultures and structures to discover blind spots in 
thinking, caused by custom, institutional remit etc.; 
- understand the relationships with the media and the specific role(s) of the media with 
the risks 
- understand the history, context and evolution of the risk. We assume that this 
information will mostly be provided by specialists in the specific risk domain. These 
specialists could later also take up the role as ‘experts’ and communicate with the public 
through the (mass) media. 
The cooperation within this team will lead to shared ideas, knowledge, experience, 
understanding and also shared responsibility. 
3.6.2. Step two: decide what you want to achieve 
Setting aims and objectives is probably the most crucial step in the entire process. It involves 
the formulation of a sense of direction, of setting an agenda with action points. Before all 
policy suggestions can be extensively formulated, the risk manager should assess the policy’s 
communication needs. The communication audit could be considered as an integral part of 
the risk analysis phase. The output of the audit will help the risk manager to identify the 
overall information needs, clarify the objectives of the risk communication, support the 
upcoming route, spot critical issues and focus actions.  
The most important focal points relate to  
- The issue: is it a controversial risk issue, are there uncertainties, is there a confidence 
issue, what are the specific risk traits etc. 
- The public perception: is there disinterest or arousal and fear with the public, are there 
past experiences with similar risks that will be used as a ‘template’ for behaviour, what 
may be the emotional impact of new information, how many people will feel involved 
etc.  
- The role of communication: what is the general aim of the communication strategy, who 
are the stakeholders and how will they be affected and involved, what are the concerns 
and interest of these stakeholders, how should the public perceptions (and mood) be 
monitored, what can be learned from passed experiences, what crisis communication 
strategy should be addressed and implemented when the risk turns into a crisis (pre-
crisis planning) 
The toolkit also offers a checklist of potential objectives: 
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- Maintaining public confidence, protection of the public or helping them to protect 
themselves. Accurate risk identification and public risk perceptions are the key elements 
to take sound risk management decisions. 
- Intelligence: additional information input concerning the risks. 
- Knowledge: creating a better understanding of the various stakeholders’ risk 
perceptions. 
- Sharing ownership: involving various stakeholders in the risk decision managing 
processes. 
- Openness: stimulating debate and discussion. 
- Choice: Providing information so that stakeholders may gain sufficient resources to 
control their own risk exposure or judge the implemented governmental initiatives. 
- Public information: related strongly to the previous objective, but could also have an 
important input in emergency communication efforts (e.g. giving advice and 
information). 
- Requirements: to set out legal requirements that involve preventive or protective 
actions. 
- Changing: trying to change attitudes, beliefs, behavioural intentions e.g. AIDS 
prevention, anti-smoking campaigns etc. 
- Persuasion: stimulate people to take concrete actions to tackle risks that affect the 
entire community e.g. vaccination programs. 
- Reassurance: replacing fear or anxiety with knowledge and understanding. This will be 
very hard in the context of untransparent risks, of which very little is known. 
- Justification: to defend and justify the government’s position, decisions and initiatives. 
- Credibility: related strongly to the previous objective. It involves building trust and 
increasing confidence in the government and the legitimacy of their decisions. 
After having set the key objectives, the focus will have to be put on the definition and 
description of the various stakeholders and target groups. 
3.6.3.  Step three: get to know who the stakeholders are 
It is essential to identify the various stakeholders in the risk communication process, identify 
their concerns and interests and find out their specific risk information needs. Naturally, it is 
almost impossible to reconcile all stakeholders’ concerns and needs because some will be 
mutually conflicting. An additional assignment is to set up priorities based on a profits and 
losses analysis. Potential stakeholders could be the own department, other governmental 
departments, the public sector, the private sector (including professional associations), 
nongovernmental associations, pressure groups, victims groups, charities, international 
stakeholders and last but not least, the general public. The general public is of course a very 
broad concept as the public will be fragmented into specific communication target groups. 
The stakeholders can be categorized into four groups along two axes. The first dimension is 
interest (how much they are involved and affected), the second axe is influence (how much 
that stakeholder can affect the situation). 
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Figure 19:  Two dimensional diagram (influence vs. interest) and the implications on stakeholder 
involvement (GICS, p.35) 
 
 
The most important group of stakeholders is the group that has high influence potential and 
is highly involved (interested). As the toolkit states, the stakeholders’ position may change 
during the development of the situation. The diagram should constantly be reviewed and 
monitored. 
3.6.4.  Step four: decide what form of consultation to use 
Within this stage, the risk manager should first decide what the primary objectives of the 
consultation of the stakeholders should be. The form of the consultation will strongly 
depend on these concrete objectives. Some examples of objectives are: defining problems, 
establishing the complexity of a risk issue, testing out proposals, building a consensus, 
identifying and understanding the risk perceptions and the emotional and cognitive 
responses, assuring the stakeholders of their active contribution to the policy making 
process, gaining acceptance by sharing information, etc. The next step after the formulation 
of the objectives, is managing expectations. Depending on the objectives, clear expectations 
and guidelines should be provided to the stakeholders that will be involved. Information 
about what is expected from them in terms of contributions, what they will gain from taking 
part and last but not least also to which extend their input will influence the decision making 
process.  
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3.6.5.  Step five: engage and involve your stakeholders 
The form of stakeholder involvement will depend on the particular circumstances and 
objectives. The toolkit advices to integrate multiple approaches and tools to gain or 
exchange information and to discuss with stakeholders. Both face to face (workshops) as e-
consultation tools (such as internet discussion forums) can be used. Public involvement 
methods can be categorized in two main forms:  
- Consultation: includes a two-way relationship in which the feedback on policy proposals 
is demanded from stakeholders (e.g. citizens).  
- Participation: includes a more active relationship between the various stakeholders. The 
stakeholders (e.g. citizens) are perceived as partners that actively participate in defining 
the process and developing the policy. 
Several involvement methods can be implemented. The subjoined scheme provides an 
overview of the most common methods, mentioning their aims, advantages and 
disadvantages. The toolkit also offers various examples of electronic methods of 
consultation such as electronic letterboxes, e-mail distribution lists, internet based forums, 
online live chat events, online chat events and interactive games and scenario planning. One 
of the most important things to remember when consulting stakeholders is that the 
provision of feedback is essential. Feedback consists of sharing the outcome of the exercise 
and any resulting decisions. Providing feedback can enhance the legitimacy of the final policy 
by showing that it was subject to a public involvement process.  
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Objective Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Seeking input and feedback 
Written consultations 
Mostly quantitative research* 
Questionnaires 
Surveys 
- Paper based 
- By telephone / face to face 
- Online 
+ Getting views on detailed and 
potentially more complex 
proposals 
+ Reaching large numbers/getting a 
representative sample 
+ Reaching a large audience quickly 
(especially online tools) 
+ Getting behind statistics 
- Limited space for in depth 
feedback 
- Opinion rather than judgment 
- Dependent on good response 
rate 
- Selection bias (only highly 
involved people will respond)* 
Exploring attitudes and ideas 
Qualitative research 
Focus groups 
Reconverted focus groups or panel 
research 
(In depth) Interviews  
+ Detailed discussions 
+ Ideas generated 
+ Exploring attitudes 
+ Creativity 
+ Delivering beneath the surface 
Beliefs, values, attitudes 
- Discussion, qualitative but not 
quantification 
- Might want to support with 
quantitative data 
- Smaller numbers 
- Non-representative 
Involving people in decision making 
Not just finding out views 
Giving people time to get to grips 
with an issue and being part of 
developing solutions 
 
 
* own adjustments 
Citizens’ juries 
Workshops 
Consensus conferences 
+ Developing informed opinion 
+ Conveying complex decision-
making 
+ Building consensus 
+ Linking to real change 
- Needs to be well-thought 
through 
- Must be taken seriously, can’t be 
an empty exercise 
- Difficult to select appropriate 
participants (criteria? 
Involvement? Interests?)* 
Table 11: Overview of the most common approaches and tools to gain or exchange information and to discuss with stakeholders (GICS, p.37-39)
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3.6.6.  Step six: monitoring and evaluating your strategy 
Monitoring and evaluating the strategy in terms of measuring progress and achievements is 
important for the following reasons: to make sure that the objectives are being realized, to 
identify and solve potential problems that have occurred during the entire process and to 
update the knowledge about risk perceptions, monitor the stakeholders’ mood and identify 
new potential risks. Public involvement exercises should also be evaluated to assess the 
general advantages and disadvantages, successes and failures of the exercise, to assess 
whether it was a cost effective effort (in terms of staff and resources) and to decide whether 
involving the public actually contributed to improved decision making. 
3.6.7.  Step seven: maintaining the policy communication strategy 
The last step includes a continuous review and maintenance of the communication strategy. 
This is important for four reasons: 
- it could serve as an early warning system, developments in the risk situation and raise of 
new risks could be identified more early; 
- it keeps the managers up to date in terms of new developments, technologies, business 
practices etc.; 
- it keeps the risk managers in close touch with the various stakeholders, allowing them to 
identify shifts in influential or new groups of stakeholders and to identify changes in 
attitudes or beliefs.; 
- it helps risk mangers to develop or adjust policies, be creative and flexible. 
 
We can conclude this seven step program by mentioning that there are numerous other 
guidelines for good risk communication practices, developed by several governmental and 
non-governmental institutions such as the UK Resilience Center (Contingency Secretariat), 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the US Department for Health and Human 
Services, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Public Health Agency of Canada, the 
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koningsrelaties, the Inter-Departmental Liaison Group 
on Risk Assessment (ILGRA), the Government Office for Science etc. We have added some of 
these handbooks in the electronic appendices (cd-rom). We have opted for the toolkit of the 
UK Resilience Center because of its accurateness, its practical value, its comprehensiveness 
and the fact that it has already been implemented in various risk contexts. The next 
paragraph will look into possible problems in risk communication. 
3.7. Problems in risk communication  
As some authors state, risk communication and risk communication planning takes place in a 
dynamic, socio-political context which is not controllable nor does this nature of the context 
forms a substantial problem for the development of solid risk communication strategies 
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(Gregory, 1989; Leiss, 1989b). As long as risk managers bear in mind that there is probably 
no way to anticipate all the external factors that may arise during the course of a risk 
communication development process, especially when the process is inspired by the 
constructive dialogue viewpoint, integrating the public as valuable partners in the risk 
management route (Gregory, 1989). Besides the complex environmental issues that can 
form barriers for effective risk communication, we can also formulate some more concrete 
reasons why risk communication often fails. 
Scanlon formulates five general reasons: the hazard is not identified, the warning comes too 
late, the warning system fails for technical reasons, it is not clear what should be done or 
there is a human failure (Scanlon, 1990 p.233). We immediately mention the fact that these 
barriers are rather related to crisis communication than to risk communication, indicating 
that it is sometimes very hard to tell the difference between risk and crisis communication. 
That is why we clearly defined the difference between both concepts in 2.1. However, it is 
important to mention these potential problems as they indicate that the problems can be 
source, message, channel and receiver related. The following authors have clearly defined 
these four categories of problems in the context of risk communication. 
Covello, Von Winterfeldt & Slovic defined these four main categories that can be used to 
classify problems in risk communication: message, source, channel and receiver problems (V. 
T. Covello et al., 1986). Handmer et al. (1990) also use these categories. The following table 
provides us with an overview of these categories with the specific nature of the problems. 
We also integrated authors that came to the same limitations and problems (Leiss, 1989, 
1989b; F. Rowan, 1996; Slovic, 1987). The subjoined scheme provides us with an overview. 
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Origin  Nature of the problem 
 
Message 
problems 
 
- High level of scientific complexity of data, models and methods 
 Uncertainties in data and risk estimates 
 Discrepancy in definitions of the risk by laypeople and experts 
 Difficult to communicate intelligible messages to public: how to use comprehensible 
language to express complex issues 
- Risk information can trigger fear and anxiety instead of alleviating concern 
- The issue of multiple messages: competing parties in risk situations often confuse the lay 
public with competing scientific conclusions and risk information and information that 
portrays ‘the same situation from different symbolic realities’ (Michael J. Palenchar & 
Heath, 2002 p.136) 
- Weigman and Gutteling used the findings of Johnson and Petcovic, who posed in their 
presentation at the annual meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis in 1986 that 60% of 
professionals that work in the field of risk analysis base themselves on statistical and 
technical-scientific data to create logical and rational messages. However, 75% of the public 
missed the key meaning of the message because they did not understand the message. Only 
a small minority (20%) of the professionals met the specific needs of the public and 
customized their messages to these needs using a comprehensible language (Wiegman & 
Gutteling, 1995) 
 
 
Source 
problems 
 
- Limitations of risk communicators and risk assessment experts, lack of credibility experts (F. 
Rowan, 1996) 
- Limitations in authority and resources for addressing risk problems 
- Lack of correct information about individual and communal risk perceptions, fears, 
priorities, information preferences 
- Lack of institutional trust and credibility 
- Sources use too complex, technical language 
 
Channel 
problems 
 
- Selective and biased reporting, oversimplification or exaggerated info leading to 
misinformation and disproportional risk perceptions (B. Combs & Slovic, 1979; T. C. Covello, 
1989a), the issue of ‘balance’ (Einsiedel, 1989) 
- Focus on sensational and dramatic aspects that induce higher news value (F. Rowan, 1996) 
- Premature disclosure of (uncertain) scientific information 
- Inaccurate and distorted information diffusion 
 
Receiver 
problems 
 
- Inaccurate perceptions of risks compared to the actual risk traits (T. C. Covello, 1989a; 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980a) 
- Difficulty to interpret and internalize probabilistic information (T. C. Covello, 1989a; L. 
Sjoberg, 1979) 
- Motivation issues 
 Lack of interest, unmotivated and uninvolved 
 Interest in unusual, dramatic and sensational aspects of risk information 
 People ignore evidence and information that contradicts their current perceptions (T. C. 
Covello, 1989a) 
- Wrong priorities in risk perceptions 
- Unrealistic demands for scientific certainties and a marked aversion for uncertainty in risk 
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information (Slovic, 1987) 
- Reluctance to make trade-offs 
- Overconfidence in the ability to avoid harm, ‘optimism bias’ especially with risks that can be 
individually controlled (T. C. Covello, 1989a) 
- Resistance to change in perceptions, attitudes and behaviour 
 Strong beliefs: difficult to change, weaker beliefs: easier to convince with differing 
presentation of risk information 
 Rationalization of this resistance 
 Feeling that personal life is being intruded by governmental obligations and guidelines 
- Intangible, abstract and remote gains replace tangible and immediate losses for the people 
that have to change attitudes and behaviours 
- Emotional response to risks are tending to overpower the rational way of dealing with risks 
(Grima, 1989; Slovic, 1997; Paul Slovic et al., 2004) 
Additional 
problems 
Joint problem solving and conflict resolution 
- A lot of public scepticism and distrust arises as the public is often only involved when 
important decisions are already taken. Some might also perceive the involvement of 
the public in decision making processes as an attempt by governments to abdicate 
its legal duties and obligations. 
- Joint problem solving attempts by involving the public mostly characterizes distrust 
and confrontation rather than openness and cooperation because of the 
discrepancy in interests, benefits and losses. It is hard to start cooperating instead of 
negotiating in an open and communicative climate. It is mostly hard to accept trade-
offs as the personal losses are mostly well-defined and known and the benefits are 
unsecure and intangible. 
- Sometimes it is very difficult to select the appropriate communication strategy in the 
context of a certain risk issue. Informing and educating the public by providing 
comprehensible data en information can only be efficient and effective when these 
educational information programs are really needed to increase preparedness and 
risk consciousness (e.g. especially in the context of bird flu, Mexican flu, risks that 
can be reduced by concrete protective behaviour). When the risk is untransparent or 
the conflict situation is about the equity of risk/benefit distributions or about basic 
values and ideological issues, educational programs are not suited to achieve the 
goals of e.g. changing attitudes or trust levels. 
- The media play a very important role in the attenuation or amplification of risk 
perceptions and the aura of emotions that surrounds this social risk perception. In 
most of the cases, the media focus on the most dramatic and sensational aspects of 
the risk, picking out one isolated and sometimes non-representative fact that is 
extensively treated by one medium, followed by a snowball effect of media 
coverage. In this way, the conflict situation is emphasized rather than creating an 
open culture of agreement and joint problem solving. 
 
Table 12: Overview of problems in risk communication
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Besides relating the problems that may occur in risk communication to the four basic 
elements of the basic communication process (source, message, channel and receiver), 
other categorizations are proposed. Handmer et al. have proposed four types of risk 
communications, based on their primary objectives: information and education, behaviour 
change and protective action, disaster warnings and emergency information and joint 
problem solving and conflict resolution (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990). The problems 
may also be categorized into these four categories, depending on the initial objectives of the 
communication efforts. For every type of problem, related to the four types of risk 
communication, we will provide some general solutions and guidelines, based on some basic 
works on risk communication (Burton, 1989; T. C. Covello, 1989a; Einsiedel, 1989; Gregory, 
1989; Marks, 1990).  
 
Origin of the problem Solutions and guidelines 
Type I  
Information and Education 
- Use of simple, graphic and concrete material, like a multi-modal 
presentation including verbal and pictoral information (Marks, 1990) 
- Avoid technical and specialized language, communicate on a personal 
level with customized communication styles, recognize the importance 
of ‘Format and Context’ (Einsiedel, 1989; Marks, 1990) 
- The development of protocols and standardized methods for the 
evaluation of risk communication efforts may contribute a valuable 
input in the continuous process of improving risk communication 
strategies. Some exemplary questions that might be answered are: is 
the message understood? When is the message complete and 
effective? (Gregory, 1989) 
- When using specific and technical risk measurements and assessments 
in communication, stress strengths and limitations of these tools 
- Identify, acknowledge and explain uncertainties in risk estimates 
- Define context according to target group, identify interests and 
relevancy specific information 
- Consider the (individual or public) involvement of broader 
considerations related to the risk: political, ideological, cultural, etc. 
- Understand and recognize qualitative concerns: dread, equity, 
catastrophical potential 
Type II  
Behaviour Change and 
Protective Action 
- Customized communication programs to specific target audiences that 
have been carefully identified and described in terms of their specific 
risk information profiles (needs, attitudes, trust level, media use etc.),  
 Generate involvement 
- Try to generate involvement by stressing personal benefits and using 
credible, customized messages 
- Use multiple channels to diffuse information: doctors, schools, various 
media (tv, radio, magazines) 
- Present recommendations for behavioural actions by describing the 
strengths and weaknesses, disadvantages and benefits of the 
suggested guidelines, provide objective arguments to let the public 
convince themselves 
- Build on expertise, trust and credibility, use appropriate spokesmen 
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(experts, government officials, ministers) that are respected and 
perceived to be knowledgeable, unbiased and truthful 
Type III  
Disaster Warnings and 
Emergency Information 
(pre crisis communication) 
We have discussed concrete guidelines for crisis communication in 2.2, 
a.o. by means of the CERC model as discussed by Sellnow et al. (2008) 
 
Type IV 
Joint Problem Solving and 
Conflict Resolution 
- The public should be involved as early as possible in the decision 
making process (T. C. Covello, 1989a; Liston, 1989a). Public 
involvement should primarily be an element of risk communication 
strategies rather than crisis communication strategies. Crisis situations 
are characterized by a scarcity of resources (time, communication 
channels overload, etc.) which does not stimulate an open 
communication and cooperative climate, as priorities may vary 
- The public should be invited to ‘participative activity’ rather than 
passivity (Marks, 1990 p.24) 
- The objectives of efforts to involve the public must be clearly defined. 
Risk communication efforts should be planned carefully and they 
should be evaluated in order to improve future initiatives (T. C. 
Covello, 1989a) 
- Communicate with the public in their own language, creating a forum 
for the exchange of comprehensible, simple, unambiguous 
information without focussing too much on statistics and data. 
- There should not be one single source of risk communication. 
Moreover, one source of risk communication should certainly be 
located within the society as the public will perceive this source as 
being one of them, which will increase its credibility and make 
communication efforts more effective (O'Riordan, 1990).  All possible 
risk information agents should collaborate closely with all actors and 
stakeholders in the risk communication cycle.  
- In order to identify the true nature of the risk context, it is very 
important to discover the risk perceptions and distinguish between 
factual risk situations and more ideological and complex conflicts. 
- Customized communication strategies should be developed for 
specific types of conflicts and disagreements. 
Table 13: Overview of solutions and guidelines 
 
The table incorporates guidelines and proposals for solutions to deal with the problems that 
may arise in the four types of risk communication. In the next section, we will take a closer 
look at the evolution of risk communication research and the shifts in the research focuses.
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3.8. The evolution of risk communication research 
3.8.1.  Three phases of risk communication research 
Classical risk communication research before 1960 was focused especially on technical, 
scientific risk analysis. These studies were aimed at the quantification of risks and related 
potential effects, what Rip would call probabilistic risk analysis (Rip, 1986). Classical risk 
communication research includes studies about environmental and health risks (nuclear 
energy, chemical industry, technological industrial complexes). These studies can be related 
to risk assessment strategies. In the late sixties and at the beginning of the seventies, 
researchers put more emphasis on social scientific aspects of risks. Chauncy Starr uses a 
behavioural scientific approach to risk analysis (Starr, 1969). One of his most important 
findings is that the acceptability of risks strongly relates to existing social behaviour. He 
emphasizes the fact that voluntary risks are much more accepted by the population than 
involuntary risks, leading to the conclusion that perceived control is an important factor in 
the acceptability process of risks. This conclusion introduced a new tradition of risk 
communication research, where the focus shifts from scientific and probabilistic risk analysis 
to the study of risk perceptions. The evolution of risk communication research has also 
become an important research topic for some scholars. 
William Leiss has extensively scrutinized the evolution of risk communication research. In 
“Challenges in Risk Assessment and Risk Management” (Leiss, 1996), Leiss describes three 
phases in the evolution or risk communication research, starting from 1975.  
 
First phase (1975-1984) 
 
In this first period, risk communication research was mainly focussing on quantitative risk 
analysis. Risk communications are developed according to comparative quantitative risk 
estimates. The purpose of this assessment of risk information and quantification is the 
development of a reliable and comprehensive risk management strategy. 
 
Second phase (1985-1994) 
 
According to Leiss, the radical shift between the first and the second phase can be assigned 
to the fact that risk communication manifestations are ranged under persuasive 
communication. In addition, he emphasizes the interaction effect with modern 
communication strategies. These strategies take into account two main factors: the profile 
of the receiver(s) and the intrinsic legitimation of the public perception of the subject. Also 
the creation of the message is a vital aspect in constructing an efficient risk communication 
strategy. Various authors have focussed on the realisation of concrete guidelines for 
communicating efficiently to diverse target groups. ‘Risk Communication. Practice and 
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Theory’ offers a review of research regarding source reliability, effective communication 
channels, content related aspects of the message etc (J. Gutteling et al., 2004). ‘Effective Risk 
Communication: the role and responsibility of Government and Nongovernment 
Organizations” (T. C. Covello, McCallum, & Pavlova, 1989b) and “Communicating Risks to the 
Public’ (R. E. Kasperson & Stallen, 1991) are also referred to as fundamental literature for the 
conception of a good communication strategy. Next to content related guidelines, the 
concepts of trust and source reliability are very important aspects, especially in the context 
of persuasive communications. As a matter of course, translating the message into the 
languages of the target communication groups and making the message fit to the various 
risk perceptions are probably the most important phases in the risk communication process. 
As Leiss emphasizes: 
 
 ‘(…) there is an obligation on the part of major institutional actors in society to 
communicate effectively about risks, not by simply touting the superiority of 
their own technical risk assessments but, rather, by making an honest effort to 
understand the bases of public risk perceptions and by experimenting with ways 
of constructing a reasoned dialogue around different stakeholder assessments 
of risk situations.’ (Leiss, 1996 p.90) 
 
Third phase (1995 -…) 
 
According to Leiss, the contemporary risk communication strategy is characterized by the 
integration of social contexts and social proportions in which risk judgements and risk 
conflicts take place. The trust issue is very important as well within this context. Relating to 
this matter, Leiss proposes the following working hypothesis: the trust in institutional risk 
actors (governments and industries) can be accumulated by the devotion of these institutes 
to communicate responsibly about risks. In this way, this “can put pressure on all players in 
risk management to act responsibly” (Leiss, 1996 p.91). Continuity and a consistent long 
term communication strategy are basic conditions to communicate efficiently about risks. 
Turner and Wynne (stated in J. Gutteling et al., 2004) mention that the creation or recovery 
of the public trust by means of persuasive communication techniques evokes a 
contradiction: intentional cultivation of trust can be interpreted as manipulation. The 
perception of manipulation can impair the image of the institute as a reliable risk actor. 
 
Leiss concludes as follows (Leiss, 1996 p.94): 
 
‘A good theoretical framework for Phase III may be found by extending the ‘strategic 
environmental audit’ and ‘environmental responsibility’ approach. This could be 
operationalized by the formulation of a ‘code of good risk communication practice’, 
and compliance with the code could be verified through a ‘risk communication audit’ 
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designed to meet the test of public credibility. Some of the much needed foundations 
of trust might be laid in this manner.’ 
So Leiss has proposed a new tradition of risk communication research, where the key 
research objectives include the creation of tools that can serve effectively in the risk 
communication audit process. The concrete output of this audit can be stated in terms of 
good risk communication practices that can contribute to the risk management and risk 
communication policy developments. We interpret this ‘call for research’ as a holistic 
approach to risk research, in which the various concepts that are related to risk, such as risk 
perception, fear, mental distance towards the risk, media exposure, trust etc. will be related 
to each other. Naturally, the specific nature of each risk context will lead to shifts in 
strengths and directions of the relationships between the concepts. So the codes of good 
communication practices will vary accordingly. The perspective of Leiss has inspired us to 
develop and validate our central research methodology. This methodology will be presented 
and discussed in the empirical body. 
3.8.2. Eight stages in risk communication history 
Baruch Fischhoff also provided us with an evolution in risk communication of the last 20 
years, until 1995 (Fischhoff, 1995). He summarized this history in 8 stages (p.138). Each stage 
formulates the key idea of the communication strategy. The stages have evolved historically, 
so each step builds upon the key design of the previous stage and each is supposed to make 
progress toward acquiring new skills. We have briefly summarized the key characteristics 
that accompany each stage in the second column.  
 
 
Evolution / Stages in risk communication Focus 
1. All we have to do is get the number right - Mastering the design, execution and operation of the 
technology: probabilistic risk analysis, risk control 
- No or little risk communication 
2. All we have to do is tell them the number - One-way communication, diffusion of risk analysis 
output, non-customized probabilistic info diffusion 
3. All we have to do is explain what we mean 
by the numbers 
- Full disclosure of analysis outputs, attempts to explain 
technical facts and figures 
4. All we have to do is show them that 
they’ve accepted similar risks in the past 
- Using the concept of cognitive risk comparison 
5. All we have to do is show them that it is a 
good deal for them 
- Focus on potential benefits for the public (other risk 
reduction, payments etc.) 
- Introduction of tradeoffs and integration of the 
tradeoff concept in the risk management process 
6. All we have to do is treat them nice - Introduction of the trustworthiness concept 
(communicator) and information reliability 
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- Training communication skills 
- Development and application of good PR practices 
7. All we have to do is make them partners - Involvement of the public, assigning them a more 
active and constructive role in the risk decision process 
- Incorporating public risk perceptions, accepting 
potential discrepancies between expert and lay risk 
estimates and perceptions and trying to reconcile both 
views 
- Dealing with new problems and conditions of the 
partnership 
8. All of the above - Integration of the seven stages, with varying 
proportions between the stages depending on the risk, 
risk analysis output, audience, etc. 
Table 14: The eight development stages in risk communication history (Fischhoff, 1995 p.138) 
 
We could formulate some critiques on the overview of the eight stages.  
- As Fischhoff (1995) states himself, the eight step process is rather speculative and not 
based on empirically based data such as content analyses of risk analysis and risk 
communication studies. 
- The overview mainly focuses on transparent and calculable risks. Fischhoff speaks in 
terms of risk analysis, probabilistic data diffusion and expert views on risks versus ‘lay’ 
views. He defines risk communication problems in terms of the different languages 
experts use to communicate and the general ‘lay’ public uses to decode these complex 
and scientifically formulated risk analyses. The scientific positivism perspective on risk 
communication is dominant in this description of the evolution of risk communication, 
although the seventh stage already carefully introduces some traits of the constructive 
dialogue perspective. 
- Fischhoff perceives ‘the public’ as one homogeneous, receptive group of people. His 
perception of ‘the public’ does not allow any differentiation between various 
stakeholders nor does it recognize a potentially heterogeneous and fragmented public 
with specific characteristics, information processing capabilities and information needs. 
However, we will proof the importance of a public oriented risk communication 
approach that takes into account the specific characteristics of these various 
stakeholders in chapter four. 
- We could add a new phase that introduces the constructive dialogue perspective. Since 
the current risk society is strongly characterized by new and untransparent risks, socially 
amplified by various sources (opinion leaders, mass media), risk managers do not have 
full control anymore over the risk as such and certainly not over the communication 
flows that arise around these new risks. The current risk communication climate is 
characterized by multiple information flows that are diffused by several sources. Within 
this respect, the issue of source credibility and information reliability has become even 
more important. We have the impression that the current research climate is especially 
86 
 
characterized by the investigation of individual and social risk perception processes, the 
concepts of trust and credibility in the context of risk communication strategies and 
stakeholder participation in risk management practices. 
Fischhoff’s overview has mainly focused on the direct relationships and interactions 
between the risk information sources (experts, scientists) and the risk information receivers 
(the general public). He does not consider the role and importance of information mediators 
that pass the information or even interpret and transform or deform the central risk 
message. We will tackle one of these mediators, the opinion leaders, in chapter four. The 
following section will consider the role of the (mass) media in the risk communication 
process. 
3.9. Risk communication and the media 
3.9.1. News media and the selective reporting of risk information 
The study of the mass media has always involved the issue of the potential influential role of 
the media. Some authors state that the media are generally eager participants to reinforce 
(or in some rare cases attenuate) the existing distribution and perception of risks (Handmer 
& Penning-Rowsell, 1990; R. E. Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996). The mass media are 
important sources of risk and crisis information, and they are very useful tools for 
governments to communicate with the public in times of crisis. The media can amplify or 
attenuate risks (Kasperson et al. 1996) by the way in which the risks are selected and 
presented. This can strongly influence the way in which people perceive certain risks and 
how their attitudes and behaviours change. The media have been criticized for selective and 
biased reporting that tends to emphasize conflicts, dramatical and sensational aspects, 
uncertainties etc. The media have also been accused of dichotomization (P. Sandman, 1987), 
oversimplification, distortion and inaccuracies in reporting risk information of various 
natures (Wilkins & Patterson, 1990) 
The reasons for these limitations are plural. Many of these problems can be allocated to the 
nature and the characteristics of the media, how they cover risk situations and the 
constraints under which reporters work (T. C. Covello, 1989a) and journalists construct 
meanings (Dorothy Nelkin, 1987). We have summarized some of these barriers and 
limitations. 
- There are tight time schedules and deadlines. As a consequence, reporters and 
documentary makers do not have the time to deal with and integrate all technical 
complexities and uncertainties that are linked with most risks. 
- To achieve credibility, reporters strive for objectivity by presenting various views on one 
problem. That is why very often, there are conflicting opinions, coming from various 
sources (experts, laypeople, policy makers) which in the end lead to hazy risk perceptions 
and uncertainty with the public. 
- Reporters also rely on the most accessible and extravert sources of information. 
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- Journalists tend to eschew the scientific risk analysis tools and results because of the 
high level of complexity and technical language (Dorothy Nelkin, 1987). 
Especially the news media play a major role in the public judgments of risks. News media are 
often blamed of disseminating incorrect, biased or preselected information. Risks, and 
especially untransparent risks, have great news value. News media are very eager to cover 
these topics and so they are often blamed of unnecessarily amplifying collective concern 
about risks that not that harmful. Both news selection as the quality of the news coverage 
are crucial within this process. As for the news selection bias, there are quantitative and 
qualitative criteria upon which risk information is selected for media coverage.  
Greenberg et al. have performed a quantitative content analysis of news reports concerning 
environmental risks in 1989 and came to the following conclusions: accidents and 
spectacular, isolated facts were reported more frequently and more detailed than risks that 
are more dangerous and more present but less spectacular (Greenberg, Sachsman, 
Sandman, & Salomone, 1989). The analysis showed that there were seven times more news 
reports about airplane crashes than about risks that are related to smoking, a risk which 
leads to almost 27 time more fatal casualties in the same period. According to Kepplinger, it 
is not the severity of the risk that will determine whether the risk issue will become a news 
item (Kepplinger, 1994). It is the fact whether the risk is considered a ‘key event’ that will 
induce its selection and media coverage. Key events are extraordinary or spectacular, mostly 
isolated, events that may have a large potential influence on the (news) media reality. Media 
coverage about such items often introduced a increase of similar news items, even though 
there was no objective increase of similar events in reality. 
3.9.2. Active or passive role for the media? 
According to Berger and Luckmann, the media play a substantial role in the social 
construction of the reality and in attitude formation (Luckmann & Berger, 1991). 
Others are convinced that there is little evidence that the media play a major role in 
persuading people (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990). As Handmer et al state, using the 
ideas of McGuire (1986): 
 
“That myths can persist despite conflicting evidence is illustrated by the robustness of the 
belief that television and other mass media have sizable impacts on the public’s thoughts, 
feelings and actions even though most empirical studies indicate small to negligible effects.” 
(Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990 p.130) 
 
The author also raises the idea that the media have a more apparent agenda setting role, 
offering the public issues to think about rather than influencing them how and what to think 
(Wood, 1983). They can also be appointed a gatekeeping role in the context of the selection 
of and reporting about risks. We can state that the information agents, as represented in the 
model of Kasperson et al. (1996), all have a potential hand in determining what information 
88 
 
and knowledge can pass through the gates of the media channels. This principle is known as 
the gatekeeping principle (Schramm, 1973).  
Especially in the perspective of governmental risk communication, the media are considered 
as useful information dissemination tools. A lot of governmental representatives have put 
emphasis on the importance to involve the media and if possible try to control the 
information flow about certain risks that is created by the mass media. Principally, the role 
of the Public Relations department has become increasingly more important in the context 
of risk communication. Alvin Alm, former deputy administrator of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency has stated that  
“(…) as scientists, regulators, and policy makers, you have to figure out what the media do, 
how they work and how to make them work for you. (…) you have to learn to deal with media 
inquiry, to supply information in advance and consider the medium” (Davies et al., 1987b 
p.31).  
We do not entirely agree with these statements anymore as the borderlines between 
governments, the media and the public are not very clearly defined anymore.  
Besides the role of the media as agenda setters, gatekeepers and instrumental information 
diffusers, they can also play an important indirect role in setting the context for risk 
communication and serving as a concrete and useful channel to disseminate information 
accurately and effectively in crisis situations. Especially in the new, multi-media information 
society, the new media applications lend themselves excellently as communication platforms 
to exchange information between authorities and the public. In this way, a two way 
communication and information flow can be established and the public can directly be 
involved in the risk management process. The role of the media in the individual risk 
perception processes will be discussed in chapter four (3.5) since this is related to cognitive 
mechanisms of information processing 
Now that we have discussed the role of the media in risk communication processes, we can 
conclude this chapter by summarizing some general risk communication guidelines and best 
practices. 
3.10. Best practices in risk communication 
We have already described potential problems in the risk communication process and 
offered an extensive overview of possible solutions that may help to tackle these barriers. 
We will now concentrate on some general risk communication guidelines, as formulated by 
several pioneers in risk communication research (V. T. Covello & Allen, 1988; Sellnow et al., 
2008). 
The ‘best practices’ approach is a management approach that is widely used in various 
professional and organizational settings to identify and even institutionalize a set of 
practices that have been tested in a real life setting (governmental, organizational or other 
professional setting). Since these best practices were tested in real-life settings and often on 
a longer term, it is an approach that can be considered as a form of grounded theory for 
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process and organizational improvement. These best practices may even evolve into industry 
norms because in certain cases, consistency within and between companies has been 
reached and the practices are accepted as valuable and have achieved the desired outcomes 
(Sellnow et al., 2008). So the practices are very much likely to be fixed in the form of a 
general set of standards, procedures, guidelines, reference points or principles. 
The best practices that will be presented are based on the practices that were formulated by 
Sellnow et al. (2008). They are designed “to help build constructive and mutually beneficial 
relationships with stakeholders, acknowledge the complex and multi-dimensional nature of 
both risk and communication and respond to the communication and information needs of 
diverse and changing audiences” (Sellnow et al., 2008 p.21). We have added sources and 
advice that overlap with the nine basic advices of Sellnow et al., for instance the seven 
cardinal rules of Covello and Allen (1988). Covello and Allen integrated an overview of seven 
prescriptions for effective risk communication, based on the analyses of some case studies 
(V. T. Covello & Allen, 1988; Davies et al., 1987b; Hance, Chess, & Sandman, 1988). 
Risk managers will not be able to implement and apply all of these best practices in one risk 
situation. On the other hand, they are not mutually exclusive but they can be perceived as 
complementary. They can be used as building blocks of a coherent approach to confront risk 
communication problems.  
 
1. Infuse risk communication into policy decisions 
 
Risk policies are often construed on best practices from the past that have been internalized. 
Communication is usually the method for explaining or justifying the pre-existing risk policy 
and it can reiterate previous arguments and positions. Conversely, the communication 
process can also create policy. Public statements by officials that are diffused by the media 
can be reinforced by incorporating them in the official policy. The last method for policy 
development is to systematically and comprehensively review current policies by means of 
empirically driven calculations and estimations on the one hand and information and 
communication input from various sources on the other hand. 
Sellnow et al. (2008) conclude this best practice by stating that “setting the risk policy for an 
organization requires both the fields of risk estimation and risk communication” (Sellnow et 
al., 2008 p. 22) 
 
2. Treat risk communication as a process 
Covello’s cardinal rule n° two: “Plan carefully and evaluate your efforts” (V. T. Covello & 
Allen, 1988 p.1) 
 
Various models incorporate the process features of risk communication: the risk 
communication model of O’Riordan, as described by Handmer and Penning-Rowsell (1990), 
the information flow model reshaped by Baram (1984), the message transmission model as 
shaped by Covello that was based on Laswell’s basic communication model. All these risk 
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communication models show that the process of risk communication is dynamic, interactive 
and adaptive and it involves various components on various levels: sender, receiver, 
message, channel, noise, contextual influences etc. Some crucial elements in the process 
should also be tested on effectiveness for instance the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
certain risk communication channels and information sources that are used (Smith & 
McCloskey, 1998). 
One of the most important elements that can be retrieved in most of the models is 
feedback. Feedback provides the opportunity to upgrade the process, to improve the 
messages, change or add communication channels, delete noise, to meet new expectations 
of adapted audiences or risk situations etc. To summarize, the possibility of feedback is a 
vital element in the construction of more effective strategies. 
Only when risk communication is perceived as a dynamic, continuous and interactive 
process, the opportunities of the strategies that are developed can be leveraged into 
valuable outcomes of diverse natures. 
 
3. Account for the uncertainty inherent in risk 
 
As mentioned in the previous practice, the risk context also continuously evolves and new 
risk information may arise very rapidly. Various risk factors interact with other variables 
sometimes in a very unanticipated, chaotic and non-linear way. Risk messages and 
communication efforts are supposed to be most effective when they are stated in equivocal 
terms. It is very important to take into account this specific trait of risks, acknowledge that 
there will always be uncertainties and integrate this directly into the risk communication 
efforts. 
 
4. Design risk messages to be culturally sensitive 
 
Some risk communication models also involve the contextual factors and more specifically 
the cultural and social context as important elements in the risk management process. The 
elements can be located on a micro and meso level (age, gender, education, language 
differences…) and on a macro level (culture, national history, etc.). Naturally these factors 
have to be taken into account when construing risk communication strategies. As Sellnow et 
al. state : “understanding the personal, community and cultural influences on risk perception 
enables communicators to tailor their communication strategies to audience characteristics 
and increase the probability of success” (Sellnow et al., 2008 p.24). The authors propose one 
strategy that suggests adapting the location and form of the message to fit the specific 
preferences and media consumption patterns of the target audience. We want to add the 
importance of addressing the needs and taking into account the specific information needs 
and media profiles of the target groups. It is important to acknowledge that there can be 
diverse target groups that will react differently to specific risk information types and that can 
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deliver specific contributions and play different roles in the risk management and 
communication process. 
 
5. Acknowledge diverse levels of risk tolerance 
 
This practice builds partly on the previous conclusion that people will have varying 
experiences, perceptions, tolerance levels of risk and they will process risk information 
differently. Perceptions of (risk) realities, that eventually result in the actual behaviour and 
can change the ‘reality’, are socially constructed (Luckmann & Berger, 1991). Risks, or should 
we say risk perceptions, can also be amplified and attenuated through social interaction and 
media coverage (R. E. Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996). A best practice in risk communication 
therefore acknowledges that the empirical and scientific questions and data of risk situations 
should not be the key components of the communication efforts, but that social 
constructions and all factors that are involved in this mechanism play a vital role. 
 
6. Involve the public in dialogue about risk 
 
Covello’s cardinal rule n° one: “Accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner” 
Covello’s cardinal rule n° three: “Listen to your audience” 
(V. T. Covello & Allen, 1988 p.1) 
 
As stated by Sellnow et al., the ‘risk sharing through risk communication’ approach is partly 
driven by community right to know initiatives. Right-to-know acts, such as the Seveso 
Directive that was issued by the European Community in 1982 (B. Wynne & Van Eijndhoven, 
1991), have obliged authorities and organizations to provide risk information and obliges 
them to clarify both the nature and the magnitude of certain risks. Besides informing the 
public, it is important to involve the public actively into the communication process (Leiss, 
1989b; Marks, 1990). The exchange of information between the various stakeholders that 
are involved in the risk debate can take place through various communication platforms: 
community meetings, working groups, focus groups, forums, etc. These platforms are also 
ideal channels to gain feedback. It has been claimed that community outreach and 
collaborative decision making can build trust over time (M. J. Palenchar & Heath, 2007). It 
has also already been mentioned that public participation during decision making about risks 
can lead to more widely accepted risk policies. The majority of people who have directly 
participated in a risk decision making process are generally more supportive of the resulting 
policy decisions (J. L. Arvai, Gregory, & McDaniels, 2001; Gregory, 2000; McDaniels, Gregory, 
& Fields, 1999). However, Arvai (2003) has empirically confirmed that participants in a risk 
decision making process were more satisfied with the decision-making process than with the 
actual outcome of the decision itself. Therefore he concludes that we should perceive the 
benefits of public participatory decision making in terms of their ability to support and 
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improve higher quality decisions that are the product of more widely accepted decision 
processes (Joseph L. Arvai, 2003) 
7. Present risk messages with honesty and transparency 
 
Covello’s cardinal rule n° four: “Be honest, frank and open”(V. T. Covello & Allen, 1988 p.1) 
 
Seeger has defined honesty and accuracy as fundamental values of human communication in 
general (M. Seeger, 1997) and risk communication in specific (Davies et al., 1987b). Honesty 
and accuracy boost source credibility and information reliability (Ahearne, 1990) and allow 
the receiver to gain the information that they perceive to be valuable to their own mental 
risk construction and risk decision process. This process of personal risk information 
gathering is closely linked to the concept of self-efficacy that will be discussed in chapter 
four (2.6.3). As Sellnow et al. state: “Self-efficacy is generally a very effective strategy in risk 
communication in that it reduces the perception of powerlessness and promotes personal 
responsibility and action in managing risk” (Sellnow et al., 2008 p.26). We also strongly 
believe that personal control over risk information increases the feeling of self-efficacy in 
risk contexts and will lead to a decrease of fear. Close to honesty is transparency. 
Transparency is one of the key advises that is given to all risk communicators (M. J. 
Palenchar & Heath, 2007; Smith & McCloskey, 1998). Both horizontal transparency, between 
agencies (C. Chess & Clarke, 2007), as vertical transparency are vital in the interactive debate 
over risk issues. Sometimes, transparency facilitates the exposure of conflicting evidence, 
but as some state, it is better to expose conflicting arguments than conceal them when the 
final aim is to maintain or even increase trust (Sellnow et al., 2008). Naturally, some risk 
managers are skeptic and hesitate. They believe that honest and open communication may 
disclose e.g. trade secrets or in the context of terrorism information that may harm the 
security of the state. Other objections involve a possible lack of information and knowledge 
about a certain risk situation and this uncertainty may raise public concern. Some also think 
that open discussions will promote irrational concerns and fears and enhance legal liability. 
Obviously, authorities and risk managers will have to decide what information can be spread 
and what information should be handled with care to protect the knowledge or e.g. critical 
infrastructures etc. This does not mean that openness and honesty are not values to put out 
front when communicating. Providing a limited amount of information and even admitting 
that some information has to be kept secret for certain reasons is always better than non 
communication or miscommunication. Another related advice is to communicate as soon as 
possible and on a regular basis. The public should be notified immediately when a threat 
rises and the information flow should be continuous, otherwise perceptions may rise that 
the authorities are withholding information. On the other hand, over-assuring the public in 
the beginning of the risk situation without having gathered all relevant information will 
create the feeling that something is being covered-up. 
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8. Meet risk perception needs by remaining open and accessible to the public 
 
Covello’s cardinal rule n° seven: “Speak clearly and with compassion” (V. T. Covello & Allen, 
1988 p.2) 
 
Naturally, openness and accessibility relate closely to honesty and transparency. These traits 
are principal conditions for effective interactive communication. Accessibility has many 
dimensions: it involves message style, language, information form, channels use, source 
characteristics, receiver characteristics,… 
As Sellnow et al. state: “Openness and accessibility denotes a general attitude on the part of 
the organization or agency about issues of risk.  As closed or inaccessible stance can create 
the impression that there is something to hide. In these cases, members of the public and the 
media often become more aggressive in their efforts to access information. In contrast, 
openness can help build trust and promote a sense of collaboration and risk partnership” 
(Sellnow et al., 2008 p.28; Smith & McCloskey, 1998). 
 
9. Collaborate and coordinate about risk with credible information sources 
 
Covello’s cardinal rule n° five: “Coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources” 
Covello’s cardinal rule n° six: “Meet the needs of the media” 
(V. T. Covello & Allen, 1988 p.2) 
 
To avoid contradictory or inconsistent messages that are diffused by various ‘information 
agents’ (governments, organizations, consumer groups, experts, opinion leaders, media,…), 
it would be ideal to  coordinate the various information flows about a certain risk context. 
Smith and McCloskey also stressed the importance of a more integrated strategy for risk 
communication and the vital need for policy integration between several agencies (Smith & 
McCloskey, 1998). Naturally this is impossible, especially in the context of opaque risks that 
have various readings and dimensions. For the transparent risks, it is easier to centralize the 
information that is available and set up congruent and coherent information flows in order 
to increase an effective public understanding of the risk.  
Collaboration and coordination means setting up the networks and infrastructures that are 
needed to exchange information. Constructing the paths is one thing, making people walk 
these paths is something else. Traditionally, the general climate of mistrust between certain 
governmental institutions or organizations will avert full cooperation and collaboration and 
the exchange of information. Of course it is difficult to change a communication climate on a 
very short term, but risk managers should strive to create an initial mentality of cooperation 
and collaboration to obtain mutual benefits. A second barrier to effective collaboration is 
that the information that is being spread by the public, and more in particular by opinion 
leaders, are harder to retrieve and to ‘influence’ by collaboration. Opinion leaders are rather 
critical (as we will see in the empirical body). On the other hand, if we can identify the 
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opinion leaders in a certain risk context, and we can unveil their socio demographical and 
media profiles, risk managers can involve these very important information agents in the risk 
debate. These general guidelines will contribute to effective risk communication 
development. However, one of the primary objectives of risk communication is convergence. 
The next paragraph will describe the convergence principle and the differences with other 
approaches of risk communication efforts like congruence, mutual exclusivity, dominance 
and multiple sources. 
3.11. Message convergence principle in risk communication 
Sellnow et al. (2008) perceive convergence as the primary objective of risk communication. 
They state that convergence occurs when distinct bodies of knowledge overlap, resulting in 
some capacity of agreement (Sellnow et al., 2008). The principle incorporates the interaction 
of deviating or even opposing arguments that interact and eventually form a knowledge 
homeostasis. The authors also elucidate convergence’s distinction from congruence, mutual 
exclusivity and dominance. The following representation will clarify these distinctions. We 
have also added the likeliness and benefits of each approach.  
 
View Meaning Likeliness and benefits 
Convergence Interacting and emerging (sometimes 
conflicting) arguments with the 
settlement of an agreement between the 
parties that is based on overlap 
Most likely and very productive in the 
risk debate 
Congruence All parties have settled on one single, 
unifying interpretation of a risk situation 
Ideal situation but unlikely, since the 
complex nature of the risk debate  
Mutual 
exclusivity 
Discarding or discrediting one body 
(mostly lay people) of knowledge for 
another, ignoring excluding the lay public, 
the competitive nature of risk 
communication prohibits any form of 
synergy in this perspective 
Likely but least productive as the risk 
debate is undermined and non 
interactive 
Dominance Dominant presence of industry or 
government in the public risk debate, 
one-sided denial of valuable potential of 
other the other parties’ input 
Likely but least productive as the risk 
debate is undermined and non 
interactive 
Multiple 
sources 
Various parties that provide information 
to the debate: governments, agencies, 
experts, public, interpersonal sources, 
media etc. 
Multiple points of convergence are 
possible, but also congruence, mutual 
exclusivity and dominance 
Most likely as the risk debate is 
complex and includes various sources 
of risk information and involved 
parties 
Table 15: Key message principles in risk communication (Sellnow et al., 2008) 
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Distinction between convergence, congruence, mutual exclusivity, dominance and multiple sources 
in risk communication (Sellnow et al., 2008) and added likeliness and benefits 
Since the convergence principle is perceived as the most important objective, we may 
assume that a lot of emphasis has to be put on the development of public oriented risk 
communication strategies that allow specific stakeholders to participate and actively 
contribute to the risk management and risk communication management process. We will 
now briefly discuss the importance of public oriented risk communication strategies. 
3.12. The public as puppets or players? Importance of public oriented risk 
communication strategies 
As we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, we opted to base ourselves on the 
dialogue perspective to define, describe and scrutinize the process of risk communication. 
The next paragraph will therefore elaborate on the interactivity aspect of risk 
communication and the role of ‘the public’ within the risk management and risk 
communication processes. 
Many scholars and even the National Research Council have stressed the interactive nature 
of risk communication and the importance of scrutinizing and customizing communication 
strategies to the various stakeholders and target groups. Various scholars have criticized the 
public information model of communication that stresses the one-way dissemination of 
information (R. L. Heath, 1995a; McComas & Trumbo, 2003; Michael J. Palenchar & Heath, 
2002; Williams & Olaniran, 1998) that was sometimes even labeled as “a linear, hypodermic 
communication process, whereby technical information can be injected into non-technical 
audiences” (R. L. Heath, 1995a p.269). Poumadere and Mays have introduced the concept of 
‘entente’ in this perspective. Entente is actually French for ‘agreement’. Naturally, the 
authors have associated a deeper meaning with the word in the context of risk 
communication. Entente refers to a shared sense of reality of all stakeholders that are 
involved in the risk communication process. They state that this shared sense of reality is a 
“prerequisite to communication inside or across any of these bounds” (Poumadere & Mays, 
2003 p.235). They also believe that the entente reconciles the scientific and lay discourse in 
the risk decision debate: “science and the irrational are not mutually exclusive: they can exist 
side by side in the construction of a risk event” (Poumadere & Mays, 2003 p.240). It is 
remarkable however that the authors place science opposite to the irrational, with the latter 
reflecting the public’s input in the risk decision process. They take rather radical views in 
terms of lay people versus scientists in the risk debate. Their final aim is indeed to stimulate 
a debate that accommodates the expressions of various opposing views on one risk issue or 
context but their initial expectations are rather pessimistic in the sense that scientists always 
have opposing views on risk issues than lay people, who are labeled as ‘irrational’. 
Nevertheless they strongly advocate the involvement of the (lay) public in the risk decision 
making process and risk communication process, and so did many other scholars (Caron 
Chess, 2001; T. C. Covello, 1989a; Liston, 1989a; Smith & McCloskey, 1998). Some strongly 
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recommended to stimulate the active rather than passive participation of the public in these 
processes (Marks, 1990). Naturally, when we speak about ‘the public’, we will have to 
differentiate between multiple audiences.  
3.13. Multiple audiences for risk messages 
Sellnow et al. (2008) have identified the need for including multiple audiences or publics in 
the development and transmission of risk messages. They start with an argumentation that 
promotes an audience-centered communication strategy over a sender-centered risk 
communication strategy. They claim that in most, traditional risk and crisis communication 
research traditions, the elite viewpoint prevails through the process of pre-crisis, crisis and 
post-crisis stages (Benoit, 1997; T. C. Covello, 1992; J. S. Heath, 2001a; R. Heath, 1997; R. 
Perry & Lindell, 2004; M. W. Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998; Slovic, 1986; Weick, 1988). As 
Sellnow et al. state: “Elites represent those who are in positions of leadership to plan and 
manage the communication and actions during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis stages” 
(Sellnow et al., 2008 p.34). Much research has focused on the sender and how to construct 
effective risk communication strategies and messages. Very few studies have dealt with the 
receiver, and as Sellnow et al. mention, the studies that have been performed are mostly 
related to the importance of involving people in message testing in order to discover more 
effective ways to influence behaviour and attitudes (Fink, 1986; Leana, Ahlbrandt, & Murrell, 
1992; McMahan & Meyer, 1997; McMahan, Witte, & Meyer, 1998). Many scholars however 
start from the idea that audience characteristics such as socio demographical traits or 
information retrieval processes are variables that affect the outcomes that are sought by the 
elites who are constructing risk communication strategies. These factors should actually be 
shaping the construction of the strategies for risk communication for multiple target groups 
(Coombs, 1999; R. Perry & Lindell, 2004; K. E. Rowan, 1991; Sellnow et al., 2008; Slovic, 
1986; Tierney, 1994). 
Sellnow et al. (2008) stress the importance of changing cultural dynamics and of cultural 
differences in risk message interpretation. This perspective is rather broad. In our empirical 
body, we will focus on the multiple audiences in terms of their differences in risk perception, 
specific information seeking behaviours and social behaviour as the identification of the 
most crucial communication target groups in communities is in our perspective more 
functional for creating risk communication strategies. The deliverable (socio demographical 
and media profiles) will be of much higher practical use. 
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter mainly focused on risk management and risk communication management. We 
indicated the role and importance of risk communication within the risk management 
process by means of several risk management models. We concluded that communication is 
a vital element that should be integrated in almost all stages of the risk management cycle. 
However, the nature, the objectives and the flow of the communication processes may vary 
accordingly. We pointed out some essential differences between risk communication and 
crisis communication and concluded that risk communication can be both pre-crisis 
communication in the context of emergency and crisis management processes as risk 
communication in its purest sense, which has a vital role to play in risk perception 
management processes. This doctoral dissertation primarily focuses on risk perception and 
risk communication processes.  
We mainly based ourselves on the dialogue perspective on risk communication to formulate 
various definitions and discuss several risk communication models since this perspective 
forms a strong base for the receiver-oriented risk communication approach of this doctoral 
dissertation. The integration of the seven stages of the risk communication process, based 
on the strategic toolkit of the UK Resilience Center (Cabinet’s Office, UK) is a conscious 
choice as it is a very useful tool that has been implemented in various risk contexts and has 
strong theoretical roots. This strategic seven-step strategy offers a very valuable structure 
that can be used as a foundation for the creation of a customized risk communication 
strategy. Several problems may occur when constructing and implementing these risk 
communication strategies. We have summarized a lot of these potential problems in a 
comprehensive overview, and attempted to provide some solutions in a similar overview. 
Naturally, new problems may arise since risk communication is a very dynamic process that 
depends strongly on its key elements that could be classified into source, message, channel 
and receiver components. That is why we want to emphasize that the overviews are not 
exhaustive and can be updated and completed on a regular basis, especially when being 
confronted with new risk communication challenges that bring along new problems to be 
solved. The next section focused on the evolution of risk communication research. Leiss 
described three phases (Leiss, 1996) and Fischhoff incorporated eight stages in his overview 
(Fischhoff, 1995). We concluded that a new tradition of risk communication research has 
been established in which the key research objectives include the creation of tools that can 
serve effectively in the risk communication audit process. The concrete output of this audit 
can be stated in terms of good risk communication practices that can contribute to the risk 
management and risk communication policy developments. The new tradition incorporates 
a holistic approach to risk research, in which the various concepts that are related to risk, 
such as risk perception, fear, mental distance towards the risk, media exposure, trust etc. 
will be related to each other. Naturally, the specific nature of each risk context will lead to 
shifts in strengths and directions of the relationships between the concepts. So the codes of 
good communication practices will vary accordingly.  
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The next section focussed on the role of the mass media and more particularly the new 
media in the risk communication process. Besides the role of the media as agenda setters 
and gatekeepers, they can also play an important indirect role in setting the context for risk 
communication and serving as a concrete and useful channel to disseminate information 
accurately and effectively in crisis situations. Especially in the new, multi-media information 
society, the new media applications lend themselves excellently as platforms to exchange 
information between authorities and the public. In this way, a two way communication and 
information flow can be established and the public can directly be involved in the risk 
management process. After providing some best practices of risk communication and 
elucidating the message convergence principle as primary objective of risk communication, 
we have focused on the importance of public oriented risk communication strategies. We 
can conclude that risk management in general and risk communication strategies in 
particular need interactive and participatory approaches. Both directive (encouraging 
attitudinal and behavioural changes) as indirective (informational, explicatory) 
communication strategies can benefit from public participation. Cooperation by exchanging 
information can create new solutions; rapid interaction can cross time bridges and provide 
risk managers with information about risk perceptions, concerns and information needs. 
These beneficiary actions can lead to more efficient risk management strategies and in 
particularly a more efficient and well-considered choice of the most appropriate risk 
communication strategies. 
Informing the public is a delicate process that should take into consideration the 
community’s ‘right to know’, their need to know, the obligations to protect this public’s 
mental and physical health, the costs of unnecessarily alarming people versus the benefits of 
increasing communal awareness and preparedness and the possible repercussions of 
premature or delayed decisions and actions. 
The clash between the micro-interests of the involved communities (including various 
stakeholders) who view the risk on a personal and more emotional level and the macro-
perspectives of the risk regulators, who view the risk in terms of societal repercussions on an 
aggregated, statistical data level, leads to divergent interests and a more difficult decision 
making process. Defining the public and drawing the profiles of the various stakeholders is a 
crucial element in drafting risk communication strategies as the dual construction of ‘public’ 
versus ‘regulators’ does not account anymore. The ‘public’ does not exist, neither does ‘the 
public’s need for one single type of information’. The diversity of public concerns and 
perceptions requires the development of special, customized and targeted forms of 
communication (Gregory, 1989). In the empirical body, we will try to come up to this issue of 
profiling the diverse public groups and their specific information needs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
TRUST, CREDIBILITY AND STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN 
GOVERNMENTAL RISK COMMUNICATION 
1. Introduction 
A risk is often considered as something that needs to be avoided. However, it can also be 
perceived as an opportunity. By identifying a potential threat and analyzing its specific traits, 
governmental institutions will be better prepared because risk and crisis emergency plans 
will be constructed. Of course, when a risk develops into a crisis, the consequences will 
always directly or indirectly affect several groups of people. These potential consequences 
can induce public concern, which is a factor that may undermine effective risk and crisis 
management. That is why it is of vital importance to scrutinize the public perceptions of 
various risks and identify the specific needs. With this information, solid risk management 
and more specifically risk communication strategies can be developed. As mentioned 
previously, communication is one of the key drivers throughout the entire risk management 
process. Let us summarize some important reasons for this. Firstly, good and effective 
communication can prevent risks turning into a crisis since it may stimulate preventive 
behaviour and raise preparedness levels. Secondly, the provision of valuable and customized 
information will allow people to create, adjust or maintain their attitudes, to make well-
informed choices and to stimulate their preventive behaviour. Thirdly, open and transparent 
communication, ideally combined with interactive two-way interactive communication 
flows, will facilitate the implementation of risk management policy decisions. Last but not 
least, good risk communication will reassure the public and will help to build or amplify trust 
and confidence in the governmental institutions and more specifically in the risk information 
that will be spread by these institutions. This chapter will pay special attention to the 
concept of public participation in risk management and governmental risk communication 
and to the importance of trust and credibility for effective risk communication practices. 
2. Governmental risk communication roles 
Governments have a moral responsibility to protect the population and to ensure that 
people obtain the possibilities to make well-informed choices whenever necessary. This 
statement involves two principal roles of the government in the context of risk 
management: risk regulation and risk communication. These roles are complementary as we 
have already mentioned that risk management involves strongly embedded risk 
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communication efforts throughout the entire management process. The Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat at the UK Cabinet’s Office has defined three main perceived roles of the 
government as a risk communicator (GICS). The subjoined table provides an overview of the 
core communication needs (p.17). 
 
Information - Information about the nature of the risk, i.e. its likelihood and potential 
consequences 
- Information about the reliability of risk assessments, including information on 
where the facts are uncertain or disputed, or where assessments are based on 
assumptions or opinions 
- Information about who is responsible for managing the risk 
- Information about the choices and options open to them to control their 
exposure to the risk or mitigate the consequences 
Assurance - Assurance that advice and decisions are based on robust information and 
analysis, and that action is being taken to reduce uncertainty 
- Assurance that the necessary procedures are in place to manage the risk 
- Assurance that those responsible for assessing and managing the risk are 
exercising leadership, acting competently and in the public interest 
Involvement - An opportunity to be involved in the process of assessing the risk and in deciding 
what action to take  
Table 16: Three perceived roles of the government (GICS, p.17) 
 
 
The information needs of the public will vary according to the specific risk contexts. 
According to the risk context, the shift in information priorities will depend on the perceived 
role of the government. The following table provides an overview of the three different roles 
and relates the primary and secondary communication needs to these roles. 
 
 
Government’s perceived role Primary communication needs Secondary communication 
needs 
Advisory Information  Assurance involvement  
Protective Assurance Information involvement 
Redistributive Involvement Information assurance 
Table 17: Three perceived roles of the government and related communication needs (GICS, p.18) 
 
 
When governments have to take up an advisory role, the main focus will be on informing the 
public: providing clear and accurate information about the risk situation that will allow them 
to make well-informed decisions. The primary need is assurance that the information is 
unbiased and evidence-based. 
When the perceived role has a protective nature, the primary communication objective will 
be assurance. People want to be certain that effective initiatives are taken to address and 
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control the risk. Information provision will also be important for target groups that need to 
take action. If people are confident that the government has control over the risk situation, 
they will not need extensive information about the nature of the risk and they will not have 
the need to be actively involved in the decision process. 
When the government will act to redistribute risks and benefits between various 
stakeholders, for example in planning decisions, this will often be accompanied by an 
imposition of risks to certain groups of people. If this is the case, people will feel the need to 
be involved in the decision process to make sure that their own interests are safe-guarded. 
Information assurance is the secondary need since they will need explicit information to help 
them understand the risk situation and make well-informed decisions and contributions to 
the decision process. 
Naturally, the role of the government as risk communicator may evolve as risk situations 
may rapidly evolve and their intrinsic nature may change. Also, the information needs can be 
different for the various stakeholders and even within the general population information 
needs and perceived roles may vary. This induces the need to constantly monitor the 
information needs of all stakeholders. In case of redistribution of risks and benefits, there 
will be a stronger need for public involvement and other stakeholder participation. 
3. Public participation in governmental risk management  
The relationship between citizens and governments has evolved. Increasingly more citizens 
want to play an active role in the decisions that affect their lives. The democratization of 
decision making processes is partly due to a better educated and informed public. The new 
and rapidly evolving information environment has induced a disclosure of information, 
certainly in the field of risk communication. The dissemination of risk information is no 
longer solely in control of the government or other regulatory institutions. People have 
access to various risk information sources and they have the resources to diffuse their own 
contents concerning risks globally through various information channels (internet forums, 
websites etc.). Governmental risk information strategies have to face the challenge of a 
public that is no longer deferential and unquestioning. Also scientific authorities have to 
defend their position as trustworthy information sources. The rise of powerful non-
governmental organizations and special interest groups is a sign of a public that is somehow 
disenfranchised from its government. One fundamental solution is to come up to the need 
for a cooperative strategy in policy making and involving the public. 
One of the key arguments for governments to provide information about risks is based on 
the principle of democratic participation in decisions and on educational objectives. The 
previous chapter already emphasized the importance of stakeholder involvement and active 
public participation in risk management and risk communication (Joseph L. Arvai, 2003; 
Caron Chess, 2001; T. C. Covello, 1989a; Liston, 1989a; Marks, 1990; Smith & McCloskey, 
1998). 
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Public participation plays a very important role in the construction of trust (M. J. Palenchar & 
Heath, 2007). In this way, governments obtain the specific role as facilitator of the two-way 
communication process instead of a role as persuader. The increasing importance of two-
way communication and stakeholder (public) participation has also been confirmed by 
various scholars (Ahearne, 1990; Gurabardhi, Gutteling, & Kuttschreuter, 2005). Gurabardhi 
et al. empirically scrutinized the communication flow, strategy and stakeholder participation 
in the risk communication literature during the period of 1988 till 2000 and found an 
increase in published articles that integrate the two-way communication flow and 
stakeholder participation. The theoretical perspective they use is that of control mutuality. 
Control mutuality emphasizes the interaction between the various stakeholders in the 
decision making process and recognizes the potential of mutual influence, rather than 
unidirectional control of one stakeholder over the other (Gurabardhi et al., 2005 p.499). 
Chess et al. (1995) conducted a study that included in-depth interviews and a survey study 
that scrutinized what research topics are the most important according to risk 
communication practitioners and researchers. They also emphasized the growing interest of 
practitioners and researchers in bottom-up participative communication processes (C. Chess, 
Kandice, Salomone, & Hance, 1995). It is no longer the question whether an input from 
diverse communities should be solicited and incorporated that occupies academics and 
governmental communication experts. It is a matter of finding the right way to do so. ‘Public 
participation’ are the key words in the participatory democracy with regard to the 
management of risks. The main challenge for policymakers will be to efficiently make 
effective and qualitative decisions with the limited resources in terms of time and money 
while involving the public (Davies et al., 1987b). The respondents from the study of Chess et 
al. all agreed on the priorities of scrutinizing the relative effectiveness of mechanisms to 
solicit input (C. Chess et al., 1995; Fiorino, 1995). Based on these researches, government 
agencies may democratize certain issues of their decision making processes and risk 
communication policies. They also emphasized the importance of discovering the risk 
information needs of communities and the importance of evaluating the risk communication 
efforts. 
Horlick-Jones et al. suggested a summary of the role of the government in the establishment 
of an interactive risk communication dialogue. To use their words:  
“Governmental agencies in particular must be unflinchingly even-handed, and above all 
independent in all their risk communication activities” (Horlick-Jones, Sime, & Pidgeon, 
2003).  
In this way, the governmental institutions will be able to take up their roles as trustworthy 
risk communicators and risk information brokers. Naturally, public involvement in risk 
decision processes is a difficult assignment as the concrete implementation includes some 
barriers:  
- Language: the officious language of government officials, the scientific language of 
academics and experts and the normal language of the lay public are not always 
congruent. 
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- Population representation through selected representatives of the various communities 
or by accepting people that have volunteered to participate in the meetings but are not 
really representative. 
- Communication channels: two way communication platforms are rather expensive to 
construct and maintain and for some issues there might be an overload of data and 
information. 
- As described previously, many people interpret complex messages, especially when 
there are multiple messages that are sometimes conflicting heuristically (L.A. Kahlor, 
2003). Instead of interpreting the raw information and data in the message, the receiver 
focuses on the source’s identity and non-content cues that can be perceived as traits of 
credibility. We can perceive credibility as a non-content cue. 
Trust and confidence are probably the most crucial influential elements in effective risk 
management processes that involve stakeholder participation. Unfortunately, the rapidly 
emerging (and often ‘new’) risks have induced a general distrust in the authorities when it 
comes to the risk management capabilities. Survey data have indicated that public 
confidence in both the industry as in the governments has been eroded (Lipset & Schneider, 
1983; Löfstedt, 2005) and the level of credibility of governments as an information sources 
has dropped considerably (Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995). The drop of public confidence and 
erosion of the credibility levels have induced a regulatory dilemma. Löfstedt has proposed 
four premises that can serve as a foundation for research to develop solutions for these 
regulatory dilemma’s (Löfstedt, 2005 p.5): 
1. Regulation is essential. Regulation offers advantages for both efficiency and equity. 
2. Regulatory bodies need to have public trust. This is a fundamental premise for effective 
and influential policy implementation and risk communication (Ruckelshaus, 1983) 
3. Public trust in regulatory bodies is vulnerable, uneven and may even be declining overall. 
There is evidence for this statement and several authors have already confirmed it 
(Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995).  
4. There is a need to re-examine the use of the various risk management tools. This is a 
direct consequence of the previous premise. In order to boost or support the public trust 
in governmental risk regulation, risk management and especially risk communication will 
have to be reconsidered and upgraded to the new and rapidly evolving risk contexts. 
Many studies have also shown that individuals and communities perceive most federal and 
state agencies as untrustworthy (L. J. Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, & Shepherd, 1996; J.F.J.M. 
& Heath, 1987; Slovic, Flynn, & Layman, 1991). Freudenburg used the term ‘recreancy’ to 
describe the tendency that trust in the ability or competency of institutions to fulfill their 
responsibilities is crucial (Freudenburg, 1993).  
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4. The trust determination theory 
Continuing on the previous paragraph which mentions trust as a vital building block for 
successful risk communication, the trust determination theory also proclaims that proactive 
handling is essential in establishing trust. Trust is a necessary condition for the success of 
several risk communication objectives, such as education, information sharing, increasing 
preparedness and awareness etc. (T. C. Covello, 1998a; V. Covello & Sandman, 2001a; Earle, 
2009; Earle & Siegrist, 2008; Jan Gutteling et al., 2006; R. Peters et al., 1997a; M. Siegrist, 
2008). Before discussing the vital role of trust and confidence in risk communication 
processes, we will first define the multidimensional and complex concept of trust. 
4.1. Definitions and dimensions of trust 
Kramer and Tyler have mentioned that there are at least 16 definitions of the word ‘trust’ 
(Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Löfstedt interprets Kramer and Tyler and states that trust is “an 
expression of confidence between the parties in an exchange transaction and can either be 
process/system or outcome based” (Löfstedt, 2005 p.6). Mostly, it is both: people may trust 
risk regulators based on their subjective judgments in the risk management and policy 
development processes as such or they may judge (trust or distrust) regulators based on the 
outcomes of previous risk management initiatives. This duality can also be retrieved in the 
definition of Giddens:  
“Trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given 
set of outcomes or events, where the confidence expresses a faith in the probity of love or 
another, or in the correctness of abstract principle” (Giddens, 1997 p.34). 
The definition uses the concept of confidence to define trust. Certain theories of 
cooperation use the distinction between trust and confidence as a key element, but Siegrist 
et al. state that this dual-mode approach has very little impact on the empirical studies (M. 
Siegrist, Gutscher, & Earle, 2005). They define general trust as the conviction that one can 
rely on certain people and general confidence as the belief that uncertainty is low and 
everything is under control (M. Siegrist et al., 2005 p.145). 
Earle (2009) has dealt with the trust and confidence issues in the context of the financial and 
economical crisis (Earle, 2009; Earle & Siegrist, 2008). He specifies the differences between 
trust and confidence as follows: 
“Trust is social and relational; confidence is instrumental and calculative. We define trust as 
the willingness, in the expectation of beneficial outcomes, to make oneself vulnerable to 
another based on a judgment of similarity of intentions or values. Confidence is the belief, 
based on experience or evidence (e.g., past performance), that certain future events will 
occur as expected.” (Earle, 2009 p. 786) 
So according to Earle, trust is actually about the relationships between people and 
confidence is about the relationships between people and objects (or processes), leading to 
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the two main approaches that Earle suggests for risk management practices: one based on 
political processes and one based on technical processes.  
Renn and Levene did not involve the concept of confidence but defined trust in the context 
of communication as follows: 
“Trust in communication refers to the generalized expectancy that a message received is true 
and reliable and that the communicator demonstrates competence and honesty by conveying 
accurate, objective and complete information.” (Renn & Levine, 1991 p.179) 
The complexity and multidimensionality of the trust construct has been pointed out by 
various scholars (Braithwaite, 1998; L. J. Frewer et al., 1996; Branden B. Johnson, 1999; 
Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Metlay, 1998; R. Peters 
et al., 1997a; Petts, 1998; Renn & Levine, 1991). We will now provide an overview of the 
main classifications of trust dimensions. 
 
Löfstedt has formulated and described three main components of trust: fairness, 
competence and efficiency (Löfstedt, 2005). 
Fairness can be defined in terms of the dual interpretation that is either process related or 
outcome related. Impartiality is the key word that is related to fairness. It pones the 
question whether the regulators are acting out of self-interest or whether they involve the 
interests of all stakeholders, including the public. Nelkin also mentioned that a lack of trust 
may be due to the partiality of experts and regulators that act in their own self-interest (D. 
Nelkin, 1992). Competence is viewed by Slovic as the most important component of trust 
(Slovic, 1993). Competence can be assessed by strict evaluation of the regulators. If the 
perceived competence of the regulators is too low, regulators should consider engaging 
experts into the process. Efficiency is mostly used in terms of how the regulators initiatives, 
for instance expenditures, can have effects on the well-being and welfare of the public and 
the stakeholders in general. We might add that perceived efficiency may vary across these 
stakeholders as they often have different perceptions of the situation and have set different 
priorities. 
Löfstedt has also proposed a risk management decision tree, integrating the concept of trust 
as key driver to take decisions (Löfstedt, 2005 p.131). 
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Figure 20: Risk management decision tree (Löfstedt, 2005 p.131) 
 
The model strongly integrates the idea of top-down risk communication when public trust in 
regulators is high, repelling a deliberative process where interest groups and the general 
public are asked to participate actively. Löfstedt even suggests to actively discourage the 
public from participating in the risk debate and the policy making process because the 
request for active participation when there is no distrust might induce arousal and certain 
stakeholders might exploit the opportunity to promote their own interests and delay the 
decision making process. 
If there is distrust, the first thing to do is to determine the nature of the distrust cause. 
Löfstedt integrated the three dimensions as potential reasons for distrust: unfairness or 
impartiality, incompetency and inefficiency. The first scenario appoints (perceived) partiality 
and requires stakeholder involvement in the decision - and policy - making process in order 
to increase the level of perceived participation. For incompetence as an attenuating factor, 
Löfstedt advises to engage external experts that may be perceived as being more impartial, 
objective and especially more competent. The last factor, inefficiency, is mainly formulated 
in economical terms. Löfstedt advises to engage economists and financial experts who may 
recalculate and scrutinize the expenditures, suggest altered investment policies and, by 
doing so, increase the perceived level of efficiency. 
The decision tree offers a structured view on the risk communication process, which is 
mainly determined by the presence or lack of trust in the risk regulator. However, the final 
outcome is always a top-down and one-way oriented risk communication flow. We are 
critical about this outcome since we have strongly advocated the dialogue based risk 
communication strategy that incorporates public participation and two way interactive 
information exchanges in the previous chapter and section. We accept that trust can be 
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defined in terms of the three main components that Löfstedt proposes, but competency and 
perceived impartiality are traits that will mainly be driven by (pro) actively involving the 
stakeholders in the risk management and risk communication processes.  
Besides Löfstedt, Renn and Levine also formulate five basic elements of trust (Renn & Levine, 
1991 p.180-181), for which they amalgamated suggestions from academic literature 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Lee, 1986; W. J. McGuire, 1985):  
1. Perceived competence: appoints the degree of technical expertise of the message or the 
source 
2. Objectivity: lack of biases in information as perceived by others 
3. Fairness: acknowledgement and adequate representation of all relevant points of view 
4. Consistency: predictability of arguments and behaviour based on past experience and 
previous communication efforts 
5. Faith: perception of good will in composing information 
They mention that trust needs all five components, but a certain lack in compliance in one 
component can be compensated “by a surplus of goals attainment in another attribute” 
(Renn & Levine, 1991 p.180). This five dimensional perspective partly overlaps with the four 
dimensional classification of Löfstedt. 
Kasperson, Golding and Tuler define four components of trust: commitment to a goal and 
fulfilling fiduciary responsibilities, competence, caring and predictability (R.E. Kasperson, 
Golding, & Tuler, 1992). Covello set up a combination of four factors that underlie 
perceptions of trust and credibility: caring and empathy, dedication and commitment, 
competence and expertise, honesty and openness (T. C. Covello, 1998a; V. T. Covello, 
1993b). The subjoined table adds some important guidelines that affect the key factors. 
 
Factors Relevant / influential guidelines 
Perceived empathy and caring The institution should care about similar things 
The institution should be able to see the risk situation 
from various viewpoints and empathize with the concerns 
of all parties 
The institutions should listen carefully to their 
stakeholders 
Perceived competence and expertise Information relating to the specific traits of the institution 
and the traits of the spokesperson (education, 
experience, knowledge, presentation skills, etc.) 
Information relating to the institutions’ affiliations and 
associations 
Perceived honesty and openness Importance of actions, words, non-verbal cues that 
convey truthfulness, candidness and accessibility. 
Perceived dedication and commitment Importance of actions, words, non-verbal cues that 
convey diligence and hard work in the pursuit of general 
public safety. 
Table 18: Key determining factors of trust and relevant guidelines (T. C. Covello, 1998a; V. T. 
Covello, 1993b) 
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The listing of guidelines is not exhaustive but incorporates some general principles that 
clarify the factors. In ‘The determinants of trust and credibility in environmental risk 
communication’, one of the fundamental articles related in this specific field of interest, 
Peters et al. attempt to reconcile the various dimensions of trust that have been defined by 
other scholars (R. Peters et al., 1997a). The surplus value that the research of Peters at al. 
delivers is that the three dimensions have empirically been confirmed by means of survey 
research. They have also tested other hypotheses and one of the main conclusions was that 
“defying a negative stereotype is key to improving perceptions of trust and credibility” (R. G. 
Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1997 p.19). The institution’s perceived image, which is also 
based on perceived competences, will strongly influence the level of initial trust in the 
institution. A government that has failed in the concrete risk regulation will not have a 
positive image as a problem solver. The general confidence in this government will be low 
and uncertainty levels in new risk situations will rise. In many risk situations the 
governmental risk management and risk regulation processes have been successful, but very 
little attention was paid to effective risk communication. So even though the risk regulation 
was very good, governments lost credibility and public trust due to miscommunication or 
non-communication. As we will discuss further on, trust is also a vital element in gaining 
public support for governmental risk policies and concrete governmental initiatives for risk 
regulation. The subjoined table summarizes the dimensions of trust as proclaimed by the 
scholars that have scrutinized trust in risk management and links them to the classification 
of Peters et al. 
 
Authors Dimensions Classification Peters et al. 
Renn and Levine (1991) 1.Perceived competence 
2.Objectivity 
3.Fairness 
4.Consistency 
5.Faith 
Knowledge and expertise (1) 
Openness and honesty (2,3) 
 
Concern and care (4,5) 
Kasperson, Golding and Tuler (1992) 1.Commitment to a goal  
1.bis perceptions of 
objectivity, fairness and info 
accuracy 
2.Fulfilling fiduciary 
responsibilities 
3.Caring 
4.Competence 
5.Predictability 
Concern and care (1, 2, 3) 
Openness and honesty (1.bis) 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge and expertise 
(4,5) 
Covello (1992, 1993) 1.Caring and empathy 
2.Dedication and 
commitment 
3.Competence and 
expertise 
4.Honesty and openness 
Concern and care (1,2) 
 
Knowledge and expertise (3) 
 
Openness and honesty (4) 
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Mayer (Mayer et al., 1995) 1.Ability  
2.Benevolence 
3.Integrity 
Knowledge and expertise (1) 
Openness and honesty (2,3) 
Concern and care (3) 
Peters, Covello and McCallum (1997) 1.Knowledge and expertise 
2.Openness and honesty 
3.Concern and care 
 
Metlay (Metlay, 1998) 1.Affective component 
 
2.Competence component 
Openness and honesty (1) 
Concern and care (1) 
Knowledge and expertise (2) 
Johnson (Branden B. Johnson, 1999) 1.Competence 
2.Care 
3.Consensual values 
Knowledge and expertise (1) 
Concern and care (2) 
Openness and honesty (3) 
Löfstedt (Löfstedt, 2005) 1.Fairness 
2.Competence 
3.Efficiency 
Openness and honesty (1) 
Knowledge and expertise 
(2,3) 
Table 19: Overview of the dimensions and classifications of trust  
 
 
Contradictory to the limited number of dimensions that the previous authors suggested, 
Frewer et al. suggested that trust (and distrust) is clearly multidimensional. By means of 
elaborate survey analysis they concluded that trust cannot be predicted by single items or 
psychological constructs (L. J. Frewer et al., 1996), as claimed by the authors summarized in 
table 19. The conclusion of the study was that specific information sources can be associated 
with particular characteristics which differentiate in the extent to which they are trusted by 
the public. They do state that risk is related to perceptions of accuracy, knowledge and 
concern with public welfare, concepts that can be related to the three dimensions that had 
been previously proposed by Peters et al.: openness and honesty, knowledge and expertise, 
and concern and care. However, they propose a more differentiated approach that suggests 
that every information source may gain or lose trust depending on its efforts and capabilities 
of meeting the specific expectations of the public regarding these specific characteristics 
that induce trust. Naturally, in order to discover the expected traits that the source should 
live up to, institutes, such as the governments, should examine their stakeholders and try to 
discover their perceptions. 
Now that we’ve defined trust and summarized some of the proposed classifications of 
dimensions of trust, we want to conclude by citing the five levels for analyzing trust, as 
proposed by Renn and Levine (1991, p.181). 
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Figure 21: Levels of analysis of trust (1991, p.181) 
 
The schematic overview illustrates the cumulative nature of the five levels of analysis of 
trust: trust in the communicator, trust in the message, confidence in an institution based on 
source perception, credibility of institutions based on institutional performance and climate 
for trust and credibility in a macro-sociological and political context. The levels are ordered 
in terms of degree of abstraction and complexity. The overlap and order of levels integrates 
the principle that, when trust building efforts are implemented or violated on lower levels, 
this will affect the next higher level and even push trough to the highest level. On the other 
hand, as Renn and Levine state: “Distrust on a higher level sets the conditions and 
determines the latitude of options for gaining or sustaining trust on a lower level” (Renn & 
Levine, 1991 p.181). The most important contribution of Renn and Levine however, is the 
development of an overview table that integrates the key variables in each of the five levels 
and illustrates their interrelatedness. This overview is essential for theoretical and empirical 
research of trust in the context of risk. 
 
FACTORS OF CREDIBILITY FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
Message  
Positive 
Timely disclosure of relevant information 
Regular updating with accurate information 
Clear and concise 
Unbiased 
Sensitive to values, feras and concerns of public 
Admits uncertainty 
From a legitimate reputable source 
Organize message 
Use of metaphors 
Explicit conclusions 
Negative 
Stalled or delayed reporting 
Inconsistent updating 
Full of Jargon 
Biased 
Inconsiderate of public perception 
The absolute truth 
From a questionable source 
 
Too literal 
Receiver derive own conclusion 
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Positive information recorded in early part of 
message 
Forceful and intense 
 
 
Dull 
Person  
Positive 
Admits uncertainty 
Responds to emotions of the public 
Appears competent 
Similarity with receiver 
Has some personal stake in the issue 
Clear and concise 
Perceived as expert 
Perceived as attractive 
Charismatic 
Trustworthy-honest, altruistic and objective 
Negative 
Cockiness 
Indifference 
 
Perceived as outsider 
 
Too technical 
Institutions  
ABSTRACT 
Positive 
Healthy economy, low inflation, unemployment 
 
New administration, new ideas 
 
Period of relative tranquility 
Perception of competent leadership  
Perception of altruistic motivation 
Peace 
 
CONCRETE 
Positive 
Positive personal experience 
Strong, competent leadership 
Positive P.R. 
Sound environmental policy 
Produces safe and good service 
Positive past record of performance 
Reasonable rates 
Undertakes socially relevant tasks 
Practical contributions to everyday life 
Benefits outweigh costs 
 
Negative 
Recession 
High inflation, high unemployment 
Corruption 
Domestic violence or unrest 
 
Poor leadership 
Image of self-serving motivation 
War 
 
 
Negative 
Negative personal experience 
Incompetent 
Layoffs/hiring freeze strikes 
Irresponsible environmental policy 
Poor quality goods/services 
Negative past record of performance 
Exorbitant prices 
 
 
Magnitude of risk taking greater than benefits 
Political – cultural context  
Positive 
Faith in institutional structures 
Checks and balance systems functioning well 
 
Negative 
Perception of structural decline 
Poor leadership/incompetence 
Corruption/scandal 
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New and innovative ideas 
Energy crisis 
Perception of unfair taxation 
 
Perception of worsening financial situation 
Social unrest 
Terrorism 
Table 20: Factors of credibility for the five levels of analysis of trust (Renn & Levine, 1991 p.182-
183) 
 
As we can deduct from the table, the number of factors that influence credibility and trust, 
both in a positive as in a negative way, is very large. Renn and Levine have composed an 
elaborated overview, which can serve as a valuable tool to scrutinize certain aspects of 
credibility and trust. The overview is especially useful for practical purposes and the 
concrete creation of communication strategies. It can easily be integrated in best practices 
manuals. Although the table is not based on empirical evidence, the added value of the table 
can be allocated to its comprehensiveness, as it includes many factors, but also to its 
simplicity, as it categorizes all the factors into four main categories (factors related to the 
message, persons, institutions, and political-cultural contexts). In the next paragraphs, we 
will discuss the importance of trust as an essential element in risk communication. 
4.2. Trust as a vital element for effective risk communication 
In general, trust is a popular research object within the discipline of social sciences. Trust is 
perceived as a lubricant for social interactions. Trust is also perceived as an important 
element of the social capital and as a condition for a healthy and flexible democracy and 
economy. In the field of risk research, there is general conformity that trust in risk 
management institutes is very important in the perception and acceptance of risks. One of 
the scholars that discussed this statement was Wynne (1980). He stated that, within the 
context of technological risks, some of the differences between expert and lay perspectives 
could lead to varying evaluations of the trust in and reliability of risk management institutes 
(B. Wynne, 1980). Since his study, much attention has been paid to the relationship between 
trust and risk perception (W.  Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003) and the role of trust in social 
theories of risk (L. Frewer, 2003; Holmström, 2009).  
The trust issue is a non negligible issue in the risk communication process. Academic 
literature proofs that trust is an important factor in the effectiveness of risk communication 
(Beck, 1992; Fukuyama, 1996; Giddens, 1997; Porter, 1995; Renn & Levine, 1991; Sellnow et 
al., 2008). We cite Sellnow et al.: 
 
“The failure to establish trust makes risk communication futile” (Sellnow et al., 2009 p.9). 
 
Many risk communicating experts have written about this subject and concluded that the 
source of information and advice in a risk context needs to have a satisfactory level of trust 
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in the judgment of each public that is involved (Renn & Levine, 1991). Trust is something 
that is normally built on a long-term basis. This intrinsic characteristic conflicts with the 
current short-term, unexpected and opaque risks that are rapidly emerging in the new risk 
society. The number of risks and threats are increasing and the people are becoming aware 
of it through the fast diffusion of information about these risks in the community. This can 
strongly influence the public’s opinions and their confidence in both corporate institutions as 
governments as the latter are not capable of responding immediately and accurately, as 
required when being confronted with these new types of risks. As Smith and McCloskey 
state, “A level of concern has developed that has begun to erode credibility in the expertise of 
these institutions and, if credibility is not to be lost, these institutions will have to become 
more pro-active and effective in their response to newly emerging hazards and potential 
risks” (Smith & McCloskey, 1998 p.47). The shift in the nature of risks and especially in the 
public awareness of these risks, because of the large media coverage and possibilities for 
information acquisition about these risks, is conflicting with the slow and time-consuming 
procedures of risk management processes within private and public institutions that are not 
capable of taking direct actions on a very short term. Giddens has stressed the relationship 
between trust and uncertainty and he suggests that, in the absence of direct actions of 
regulatory institutions, we have come to use surrogates to mediate within risk and trust 
debates (Giddens, 1997; Shoham & Ruvio, 2008). One type of surrogate is the use of risk 
information, both of quantitative as qualitative nature. Some pone that quantitative data are 
well suited for risk communication (Porter, 1995). We agree with the general critique that 
quantitative data require a similar reading of these data and the capability of the public to 
decode the numbers and probabilities that are provided. 
We can conclude that trust is a vital element for effective risk communication, and more 
particularly for institutional risk communication. That is why we will discuss the notion of the 
government as a trustworthy risk information broker and active risk communicator in the 
next section. 
4.3. The government as trustworthy risk information broker 
Roger Kasperson stated that there has been a dramatic change in the general attitudes 
towards social institutions, such as governments, with regard to their trustworthiness. He 
defines this as a much broader issue than certain institutional risk problems that these 
institutions are confronted with (Davies et al., 1987b). Davies, Covello et al. (1987b) also 
pone that social trust is a multidimensional construct that may vary according to the diverse 
social groups. So we cannot speak about one single trust or social trust issue in the context 
of risk communication because of the complexity of the construct. However, he states that 
the fact that people want to believe in the expertise of the experts that assess the risks and 
in the competency the risk regulators to control the risks makes it very important to fulfill 
this need for confirmation in the roles as risk regulators by communicating that they are in 
control. Again, some suggest ‘coactions’ as an answer to the need for effective actions to 
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solve the trust problem. Frances Lynn says that it is a matter of active listening to diverse 
groups and stakeholders, among which the general public or some specific groups that make 
part of the public (Davies et al., 1987b p.48). 
Paul Slovic, a key figure in the literature about scientific risk analysis and risk management 
literature, introduced the importance of trust in his paper ‘Perceived Risk, Trust and 
Democracy’ (Slovic, 1993). He postulates that it is impossible to exclude the public in risk 
communication processes in our unique, participative democratic system. The lack of trust in 
the political and social institutions is a crucial factor in the construction of credible risk 
communication campaigns. The limited efficiency of risk communication efforts can be 
largely allocated to the lack of confidence in the communicator. Eventually, the initial 
attitude towards the communicator and the trust in the communicator will be important 
elements in the complex model that incorporates the relationship between risk perception, 
risk communication and credibility. The distrust in risk analysis procedures and risk 
management practices is fed by our system of participative observation, which is amplified 
by the powerful social and technological changes that systematically demolish trust. Slovic 
cites some current trends that characterize the risk society of today. One trend is the fact 
that societal concern about risk factors has increased into great extend, even though a lot of 
efforts have been made to make the society healthier and safer. In contrast with these great 
efforts of institutions from all layers and sectors of the society, a strong feeling of 
vulnerability has been developed. In a system of participative democracy, involving the 
public is indispensable. That is the reason why governments are trying to establish effective 
risk communication strategies which have to provide a solution for the problem of the trust 
crisis. In many ways, experts and lay people are united. In western societies, this will 
primarily happen by means of the media. Governments will not always do the talking, but 
they will try to communicate and convince in an indirect way. Slovic, however, is convinced 
that risk communication has had no direct, significant impact on the closure of the gap 
between technical risk estimates and the public perceptions. This limited efficiency has its 
roots in the lack of trust. He postulates that trust is a more crucial factor in resolving conflict 
than risk communication as such. Slovic also laid the foundation of the trust asymmetry 
principle: the fact that trust is more easily to be destroyed than to be created.  
4.4. Trust asymmetry principle and the value similarity approach 
Many scholars have scrutinized the trust asymmetric principle in various risk context (G. 
Cvetkovich, Siegrist, Murray, & Tragesser, 2002; Wouter Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004; M. P. 
White & Richard Eiser, 2005) 
Slovic initiated the concept of trust asymmetry in 1993 (Slovic, 1993). He investigated the 
effects on attributions of trust of learning about different events occurring at nuclear power 
plants. He concluded that trust and distrust vary very strongly in the way they are created 
and sustained. His empirical data showed that negative events had a much stronger effect 
on decreasing trust than positive events did on increasing low trust levels. So trust is much 
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easier to destroy than to create. Also Taylor had already provided some fundamentals for 
this principle (S. E. Taylor, 1991). The trust asymmetry principle depicts the fragility of trust. 
The shift to distrust is easier made because of the following reasons:  
 
- Negative information is more informative or diagnostic than positive information 
(Wouter Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004; M.  Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1989). Poortinga and Pidgeon give the following example: if someone has acted 
in a trustworthy way, people will not automatically assume that this person will always 
act like this. However, if this same person has cheated or betrayed someone, people will 
assume that the cheater is definitely untrustworthy (Wouter Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004). 
Poortinga and Pidgeon have empirically proven that the assumption that negative 
information is more informative than positive information is primarily true for undecided 
individuals. 
- Negative information is proclaimed to be less ambiguous and unclear than positive 
information as positive information is very often the mere absence of negative 
information (P. White, Pahl, Buehner, & Haye, 2003). White et al. confirm that in most 
cases, negative information offers much more certainty. They labeled this as the 
’extremity bias’. 
- Negative events are more visible and gain more attention than positive events. Invisible 
and undefined events will play a minor role in the construction of opinions and attitudes. 
Within this process, the media play a crucial role. In this context, we primarily focus on 
the criteria that play in the news selection process. 
- Negative events have more impact and people attach more value to negative 
information than to positive (M.  Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001). These scholars have also 
proven that sources that diffuse negative information are perceived as being more 
credible than sources that diffuse positive information. This principle is called the 
‘negativity bias’. 
- Besides the extremity and negativity bias, we should also take into account the 
confirmatory bias, referring to the fact that negative information may confirm past 
negative experiences of initial negative attitudes towards a certain person, institution or 
situation. This involves the role of prior beliefs (P. White et al., 2003). This bias is in line 
with social cognition studies that have indicated that people select and interpret social 
information in order to support their existing worldviews (Wouter Poortinga & Pidgeon, 
2004). 
Initial distrust initiates the process of continuance and amplification of distrust as such, as it 
is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. When people distrust a source, they will no longer be 
tempted to consult this source and look for elements that support trust and credibility. 
Besides, the negative perspective will bias any other flow of information so that eventually, 
the selection and interpretation of information will be influenced. We could state that 
people feel the need for a reliable information broker that diffuses a sufficient amount of 
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trustworthy information. Within this lays the opportunity for governments to become risk 
communicators as they have access to the most reliable information about potential risks.  
In contrast with the ‘trust asymmetry principle’ is the ‘value similarity approach’ that was 
defined by Earle and Cvetkovich in 1995. According to these academics, the trust asymmetry 
principle overlooks the fact that people do not always have the time, cognitive resources or 
willingness to invest in the continuous process of reevaluating and adapting their ideas 
about others and modifying their trust levels (G. Cvetkovich et al., 2002). They added an 
affective dimensions and state that “trust is an affective social bond that is often based on 
general agreement and sympathy rather than on carefully reasoned arguments or indirect 
evidence” (Wouter Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004 p.1476). They assume that, when a person 
acquires new information, they will not adapt their trust judgments as this sort of time and 
effort consuming assessment is too cognitively costly and it would waste the psychological 
advantages of trust (as this is meant to be complexity-reducing and less intensive). So the 
alternative that Earle and Cvetkovich propose, the principle of perceived value similarity is 
based on the principle that people construct their own perceived trust levels more 
intuitively, basing themselves on the shared social identities or shared parallel 
understanding of a specific situation. We can compare this mechanism with the experiential 
mode of risk perception (Paul Slovic et al., 2004). The experiential mode is an academic 
elucidation for the observation that people construct their own risk perceptions intuitively 
and emotionally-driven. As Slovic states, the experiential mode is dominated by emotional 
responses to information about risk: “intuition, instinct and gut feeling” (P. Slovic, M.L. 
Finucane, E.  Peters, & D.G. MacGregor, 2004 p.311). We will discuss the affective versus 
rational construction of risk perceptions and processing of risk information in chapter four 
(2.4). 
Covello also integrated the trust issue in many of his papers (V. T. Covello & Peters, 1994; V. 
T. Covello et al., 2001b; R. Peters et al., 1997a; R. G. Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1998b). He 
gave several factors that undermine public trust and confidence in industry and government 
(T. C. Covello, 1989a). 
- The first bundle of obstacles relates to public perceptions that the industry protect their 
own interests and try to influence governmental institutes, that risk managers and 
governmental agents are not competent and lack technical expertise, that there is a 
general mismanagement of health and environmental protection programs and that 
experts and officials have mislead the public by providing false, incomplete and 
misleading information.  
Covello also summarizes some concrete factors.  
- The fact that risk assessment experts, risk managers and governmental agencies have 
disagreed and even taken diametrically opposed positions about risk assessments and 
that these disagreements were highly visible lead to a serious dent in the trust and 
credibility of these agencies and experts. 
- There is a lack of resources for risk assessment and management. This lack makes it 
impossible to meet the demands and needs for action by citizens and interest groups 
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that want to be involved in decision making or problems solving processes. The lack of 
adequate coordination among all agencies and institutes that are involved in and 
responsible for the risk management process does not support a strong and trustworthy 
image. This deficiency in coordination is not only located in the area of risk assessment 
but also on the level of risk communication management. Contradictory or deviating risk 
communication flows, arising from various sources that claim the knowledgeable status 
of risk managers, do not reflect a strong and coherent risk communication policy. It only 
stimulates communal anxiety and social distrust. What people encounter is a very 
fragmented risk information pool, with too much information, coming from too many 
and often unknown sources, making it impossible for citizens to distract the correct 
information that comes up to their specific information needs. 
- A fourth factor is the lack of concrete communication skills of government officials. 
These spokesmen were often not trained to communicate with the general public in a 
comprehensible and non-technical language. However, more and more organizations 
and governmental institutes are conscious of the importance of a good PR or 
communication department and try to attract competent and trained staff. They have 
come up to the need to use trained (risk) communicators or experts, depending of the 
nature of the risk context and the need for specific information. 
- The last factor is the insensitivity of governments and industry officials to the specific 
information needs and concerns of the public. 
- Other authors add the importance of public information and participation as crucial 
elements for the success of the risk management decision process. Even if distrust levels 
are high, the involvement of the public and other interest groups in the policy-making 
process can increase public trust in policy makers (George Cvetkovich & Löfstedt, 1999; 
Gambetta, 1988; Löfstedt, 2005; Misztal, 1996). A lack of public participation may 
undermine the general trust and confidence in the legally constituted organs of the 
society (Ahearne, 1990; Burton, 1989).  
To summarize, as mentioned before, there is a strong need to develop detailed and process-
based risk communication strategies that are not generic but rather customized to the 
specific requirements of each specific risk context. Public involvement is the second 
cornerstone of effective risk communication strategies. By taking into account these two 
basic conditions, both short term objectives such as lowering levels of public concern and 
raising  levels of communal preparedness as long term objectives such as building trust and 
increasing confidence levels can be achieved. Also the general credibility of the government 
as information broker will benefit from it. The following section will point out the differences 
between credibility and trust. 
4.5. Trust and credibility 
Trust and credibility are very closely related, often considered synonyms and used 
interchangeably or even joined together as one concept (L. J. Frewer et al., 1996; 
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Jungermann, Pfister, & Fischer, 1995; R. Peters et al., 1997a). It has been proclaimed as a 
challenge in (risk) communication research to explicate and differentiate the concepts of 
trust and credibility (West, 1994). However, we did not find many scholars that have pointed 
out the differences between the two concepts. On the contrary, many scholars use both 
terms as synonyms.  
However, we consider both concepts to differ from each other. Renn and Levine have 
pointed out a very important difference of trust with confidence: “confidence denotes the 
subjective expectation of receiving trustworthy  information from a person or an institution” 
(Renn & Levine, 1991 p.179). They think that confidence in a source is a more enduring 
experience of trustworthiness over time. It is the sum of experiences of trust on a longer 
term. If the confidence in a certain source is shared by many persons, they state that this 
source is granted credibility by this group of people. They define credibility as “the degree of 
shared and generalized confidence in a person or institution based on their perceived 
performance record of trustworthiness” (Renn & Levine, 1991 p.179). 
We define credibility as the perceived trustworthiness of the source and the message, which 
is usually based on the generalized confidence in the source. We consider trust as a 
personally perceived level of confidence in an institution, which is gained over a longer 
period of time and based on the perceived performance record of trustworthiness or 
reputation of the institution. Credibility is a short term concept that can also be attached to 
messages and information. One may have trust in the source, the source may be perceived 
as being credible as well, but the message or the information that is being diffused can only 
be credible. 
The perceived reliability of the message and credibility of the source also plays a crucial role 
in the process of changing beliefs and behavioural intentions of people. Various authors 
have formulated that the degree in which beliefs can be changed depends on the conviction 
with which prior beliefs are held, the degree to which the signal can be interpreted as 
requiring a shift in beliefs and the perceived reliability and the credibility of the message and 
the source that has diffused the message (Icek Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975; Eagly & Himmelfarb, 
1978; Green, 1990 p. 42). So the latter is certainly a very elementary concept to take into 
account when creating effective risk communication messages that will have to change 
beliefs and even induce certain behavioural intentions. Keywords that are associated with 
credibility are “openness, accuracy, trustworthiness, impartiality and completeness of 
information provided to citizens” (McComas & Trumbo, 2003 p.180) 
McComas and Trumbo have used the classification of Infante, Rancer and Womack to devide 
credibility research into three categories: factor, functionalist and constructivist research 
(McComas & Trumbo, 2001 p.468).  
The factor category involves source credibility research that assesses how message 
receivers, the public, asses various factors that may intervene in the interaction between 
sender and receiver. We could compare this sort of viewpoint with the efforts to define the 
underlying components of trust, as discussed in this chapter previously (4.1). The number of 
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factors and their nature vary strongly. The following table provides an overview of three 
scholars that defined some factors of credibility. 
 
Source Factors of credibility 
Berlo et al. (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969) Competence 
Trustworthiness 
Dynamism 
Whitehead (Whitehead, 1968) Competence 
Trustworthiness 
Dynamism 
Objectivity 
Meyer  (Meyer, 1988) Source is watching out for the receivers’ interest 
Concern for the community’s well-being 
Patriotic 
Concerned about public interests 
Table 21: Overview of factors of credibility 
 
There are three main critiques on the factor approach of studying credibility: the first 
question one might pose is whether listing dimensions and factors really adds to in depth 
comprehension of the concept of credibility and the second critique is that there is no 
transparency about which factors are more crucial and whether all factors are involved in 
the source assessment process. The last critique has a methodological nature: the outcome 
of the factor analysis that is used to reveal the dimensions of credibility in quantitative data 
analysis may vary strongly, depending on the specific method of analysis that is used 
(McComas & Trumbo, 2001). We can also add that there is no clear distinction with the 
concept of trust and the dimensions that were formulated by several authors. Some 
dimensions, such as competence and objectivity, are also dimensions that were 
characterizing for trust. This leads to a certain ambiguity concerning both concepts of trust 
and credibility.   
The second classification of credibility research is the functional model. This perspective 
involves the various functions that sources may have in specific contexts and with various 
sorts of public. In this approach, source credibility is related to the degree in which the 
source satisfies the particular needs of the different groups of receivers in specific situations 
or in our field of interest, in the various risk contexts. The central premise is that, the more 
the needs of the receivers are met, the higher the source credibility will be. The question 
raises whether the functional model will explain and elucidate the concept of source 
credibility more deeply (McComas & Trumbo, 2001). We think that this second approach is 
more holistic as it incorporates more elements of the communication process. Besides the 
characteristics of the source and receivers, also the specific needs are taken into 
consideration. These needs can vary strongly according to the specific (risk) context. We 
absolutely agree with the premise that the various types of receivers should be scrutinized 
and their specific needs should be defined in order to choose the most appropriate source 
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and the most effective communication style, elements that will increase the general 
credibility of both the source as the message. 
The last approach is the constructivist model. This is probably the most abstract approach. It 
contends that people use their personal constructs of reality to assess source credibility 
(McComas & Trumbo, 2001 p.469). Scholars that use this approach scrutinize amongst 
others the assumption that people will assess and judge the sources differently in different 
contexts and whether the evaluation criteria vary by situation. McComas and Trumbo use 
the study of Delia et al. to establish support for the constructivist approach (Delia, Crockett, 
Press, & Okeefe, 1975 in McComas and Trumbo 2001). Their research indicated that the 
generalized evaluations were subordinate to context-relevant beliefs and perceptions in the 
evaluation and attitude construction process towards the source. As McComas and Trumbo 
also mention that the constructivist approach has inspired many scholars. One of them is 
Wynne, who plead for the holistic approach of scrutinizing trust and credibility and their 
mutual relationship, taking into account the specific and personal constructs of the 
individual (B Wynne, 1992). Wynne also especially highlighted the importance of the social 
relationships between individuals as they perceive themselves upon other individuals, 
institutions and organizations. We might state that trust and credibility are socially 
constructed. 
A last valuable concept is the principle of credibility transference. This theorem pones that 
lower credible sources take on the credibility of the highest credible source that agrees with 
its position on a (risk) issue. Surveys, mentioned by Covello, have indicated several 
organizations and individuals that have relatively medium to high credibility on various risk 
issues: health professionals, (doctors, pharmacists, …), educators, professional scientific and 
engineering organizations, non-management employees, non-profit organizations, 
environmental activist groups (often citizens), the media and local citizens who are 
respected, neutral and informed. We would like to stress the latter two groups: the media 
and the local citizens with specific traits that allow us to label them ‘opinion leaders’. 
The first remark we want to make is on the media. ‘The media’ is a label that reconciles 
many mass media such as television, radio, but also internet. The internet creates 
possibilities and interaction platforms that allow interpersonal communication as well as 
communication to larger groups, just think about the various forums, blogs, social 
networking sites etc. that allow people to create contents and disperse this content to many 
users. 
The second remark is with regard to these individuals that are respected, neutral and 
informed. These characteristics are some of the traits that we allocate to opinion leaders, 
which we will describe in detail in chapter four (3.7). We will put great emphasis on the 
importance of interpersonal communication and the effect of opinion leaders in the social 
construction of communal risk perceptions. The fact that Covello also indicates these 
individuals as credible sources of information that may increase general trust and credibility 
is a confirmation of our opinion leadership concept. 
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In the end, a good coordination, collaboration and two-way dialogue between all of these 
important groups (both organizations as individuals), will substantially deliver contributions 
to the enhancement of trust and credibility. 
4.5.1. Credibility of opinion leaders 
As mentioned previously, honesty is a crucial trait when building trust. On the contrary, 
when the public perceives the sources to have a hidden agenda or to act out of self – 
interest, credibility levels of both the source and the disseminated information drop. When 
the source is perceived to be unbiased and acting out of the community’s interest, trust and 
credibility may raise (L. J. Frewer et al., 1996; R. Peters et al., 1997a; Renn & Levine, 1991). It 
is also generally assumed and even empirically proven that familiarity with the source 
influences the perceived credibility of the information (Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen, & Heath, 
1987; R.E. Kasperson et al., 1992). As far as the expertise, competence and knowledge traits 
concerns, they are not always facilitating trust and credibility. Some stated that in certain 
risk contexts, e.g. technological risks, sources that are perceived to be most knowledgeable 
and possess most expertise are not always trusted, whereas unofficial messengers are 
accorded greater credibility (Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987). Among those unofficial 
information agents they account social networks, personal networks and opinion leaders. 
The media are far more complex and fickle to scrutinize. Even though the various media 
sources are probably the most omnipresent and important risk information diffusers, their 
levels of credibility (both credibility as a source as credibility of the information they are 
diffusing) are much more instable and uncertain. They are certainly mistrusted and people 
often reproach them for being subjective, for sensationalizing stories that have greater news 
value or for acting out of self-interest. Opinion leaders are to a certain extend perceived as 
experts in the personal environments of people. As we will discuss in the next chapter, 
opinion leaders extensively seek information about the topic (risk information) and they 
communicate about it. They fulfill the role of local experts who communicate 
interpersonally. Naturally, the genuine ‘experts’, who are set on stage by official authorities 
to communicate about their specific expertise probably still remain the most important and 
most credible information sources. 
4.6. Experts as credible information sources 
Governments have always appealed to experts to inform the public about certain risks. In 
the eyes of the public, the expert examined the risk, made objective judgments and 
calculated the probabilities. As a result, the expert would pronounce a certain situation as 
safe or unsafe (Davies et al., 1987b) and provide clear instructions about how to protect 
oneself in case of aggravation. Mostly, the majority of the people were satisfied with this 
information and they relied on the expert, even though there was only little concrete 
information available. Most risk communicators think that this general approach is not 
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suited anymore as a foundation to build solid risk communication strategies. Davies et al. 
(1987b) state that this approach has become inadequate for three reasons: 
First, the change in the nature of the “new” risks that we are confronted with in the risk 
society plays a very important role in the construct that risks are no longer that easily 
quantified, predicted and controlled. The experts’ judgments remain important, but their 
credibility has decreased as they cannot control nor estimate these new risks with as much 
certainty as before. It has also become very difficult for them to draft clear and 
unambiguous guidelines as in some situations it is very hard to predict how the risk can be 
controlled, both in terms of exposure as in terms of crisis control. 
Secondly, the public has changed as well since they are better informed and less tolerant of 
risks. The unlimited access to an immense pool of information through a various and 
growing number of sources has created the possibility for lay people to become more 
informed. Of course, it is not always the case that they become better informed. People can 
be directly or indirectly confronted with information that is incorrect and that is aimed at 
creating certain risk perceptions that are to the advantage of the sources that disseminate 
this information. This untransparency of risk information brokers has created a general 
culture of distrust towards all risk information sources as the public thinks that these sources 
are pursuing institutional or political interests of their own. 
The governments and especially the perceptions about the governments have changed 
particularly in terms of their openness and responsiveness. So their role as a risk regulator 
has been extended with the role as a risk communicator. 
We may conclude that the use of experts as spokesmen is still recommended as they are still 
perceived to be information agents with the competence, qualification and authority to 
diffuse information about certain risk situations. However, there is an important shift in the 
roles of governments. Of course, as the data of our empirical studies will confirm (empirical 
body), governments should primarily fulfill their role as risk regulators: protecting civilians 
against life- and population threatening risks by implementing sufficient solid safety 
measures. As mentioned before, the changes in risk profiles, public profiles and expectations 
about the government as an information broker have induced the need for governments to 
grow into the role of risk communicators. 
4.7. Importance of source credibility 
We can state that credible sources are more effective than non-credible sources and that 
the appraised credibility of the information sources determines the effectiveness of the risk 
communication efforts for a great deal (Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995).  
Rowan has stated that source credibility must be “grounded on sharing power with the 
public” (F. Rowan, 1996 p.28). Manipulative approaches, even when not primarily intended, 
strongly undermine the credibility of the source. When the source aligns the risk message to 
the specific needs of the public, showing their commitment and addressing the specific 
concerns such as certain fears or arousals, the credibility of the source and the information 
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will increase. As mentioned previously, the empowerment of the people starts with 
providing them with sufficient and especially tailor-made risk information. In order to do so, 
policymakers and risk managers should involve the public in the two-way interactive risk 
debate. As Rowan states, experts should understand public concerns (pathos), express a 
commitment in dialogue and power sharing (ethos), and develop accurate risk assessment 
information (logos) (F. Rowan, 1996 p.28). 
According to McGuire, source credibility consists of two main components: expertise and 
reliability. The expertise of the source refers to the perceived know-how and the reliability of 
the source relates more to the perceived intentions of the source to manipulate the public 
and to act from self-interest (W. J. McGuire, 1968). When the source is perceived to be 
acting from self-interest, his reliability decreases (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978). 
5. The role of trust in policy support 
5.1. Trust, credibility and risk perception 
There are several empirical studies that scrutinize the relationship between credibility, trust 
(both trust in persons as in institutions) and risk perception (Bord & Oconnor, 1992; J. Flynn, 
Burns, Mertz, & Slovic, 1992; M. Siegrist, 1999, 2000; Trumbo & McComas, 2003). Trumbo 
and McComas have combined the perspectives of the psychometric model of risk 
perception, the heuristic-systematic information processing model of Eagly and Chaiken and 
Meyer’s credibility index to answer the following question: ‘To what degree does source 
credibility express its effect on risk perception through mechanisms of information 
processing?’ (Trumbo & McComas, 2003). They assumed that the mechanisms linking 
credibility, information processing and risk perception are very likely to be located in 
motivation, issue involvement, information-holding and the effect of message cues (p.346). 
From their empirical analysis, they concluded that a great deal of the effect of credibility on 
risk perception is direct, rather than transmitted through information processing. They 
constructed a new premise that speculated about possible underlying mechanisms for this 
effect: 
“The manner in which information moves from the original source to the individual 
information processor may call for an additional layer of intervening variables: at the very 
least an examination of the traditional dichotomy of mediated versus interpersonal 
channels” (Trumbo & McComas, 2003 p.351).  
They suggest that both mediated information channels as interpersonal communication 
flows may play an important role in the risk information processing and the construction of 
risk perception. Siegrist has empirically proven with several studies and within various 
technology - related risk contexts, that people who have trust in specific companies and 
scientists had lower perceived risk levels and associated more benefits with the technology 
than people with lower trust levels (Earle & Siegrist, 2008; M. Siegrist, 1999, 2000, 2008; M. 
Siegrist, Cousin, Kastenholz, & Wiek, 2007). Results further suggest that social trust in the 
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industry is an important factor directly influencing the affect evoked by the new products 
and the potential risks they bring. As suggested by the affect heuristic, affect had an impact 
on perceived benefits and perceived risks. Also Siegrist et al. scrutinized the relationship 
between trust and perceived risk levels. They concluded that high levels of trust and 
confidence reduce perceived risk levels (M. Siegrist et al., 2005). Other scholars have 
scrutinized the presence and strength of associations between trust and risk indices based 
on risk assessments of various hazards (Greenberg & Williams, 1999; Svetkovich, 1999).  
In the face of opaque risks, trust is even more important as various studies point out that 
trust is vital in when there is lack of knowledge about the risk (Luhmann, 1973). A lack of 
knowledge about the risk can rise because of the complexity of specific risks, for instance the 
complexity of nuclear risks or risks related to gene technology. People may rely on social 
trust to cope with this lack of knowledge and to reduce the complexity of the information 
they are faced with (M. Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). Besides complex risk information as a 
drive to rely on trust, also the absence of knowledge, certainty and probability estimates in 
certain risk contexts may influence the role of trust, both trust as a form of confidence in the 
risk regulators that have to assess and manage the specific risk as trust in the institutes and 
organizations that play a major role in the origin and development of the risks. Especially in 
these uncertain risk situations, people need to have trust in the institutions that may have 
an important impact in the risk assessment and management process. Support for 
governmental initiatives is also very crucial factor that may influence the effectiveness of the 
risk management strategies that have to be implemented as the public is more and more 
involved in the risk debates and risk decision making processes.  
5.2. Trust and public support for policy decisions in the context of risk 
Gerber and Neely have pointed out four main factors, besides direct or indirect socio - 
demographical influences, that influence individuals’ preferences for government action to 
address various hazards (B. Gerber & G. Neeley, 2005 p.398). They have formulated six 
hypotheses about the relationship between these factors and the public support for 
governmental initiatives (B. Gerber & G. Neeley, 2005 p.398-399). 
They firstly expressed their perceptions about trust, both in terms of general trust in the 
government as a risk regulator as trust in the expertise and competence of public officials 
and scientists. They use the theoretical grounds of various scholars to point out that trust in 
the government is critical to individuals’ ratings of various potential hazards which have 
policy implications (R.E. Kasperson et al., 1992; M.  Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001; L. Sjoberg, 
2001). The first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
(H1) As trust in government increases, support for government intervention to address a 
hazard should increase. 
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For the first factor that influences the public support for a governmental intervention, 
Gerber and Neeley make a distinction between general trust in the government and 
perceptions of governmental or scientific competence and expertise, two traits that are 
essential to tackle specific risks. That is why they formulated a second hypothesis: 
 
(H2) As confidence in government or scientific policy competence increases, citizens’ support 
for government intervention to address a hazard will increase. 
 
Gerber and Neeley also integrated political ideology as a key determinant of risk perception, 
as scrutinized and discussed by Douglas and Wildavsky (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983)  and as a 
concept that is closely related to individuals’ preferences for governmental action to address 
a certain hazardous issue. They assumed the following relationship: 
 
(H3) As ideology liberates, support for governmental intervention to address a hazard will 
increase. 
 
The third factor that they use to explain policy preferences is based on the relationship 
between the personally perceived importance of a policy issue and the individual’s perceived 
risk in a particular risk context (Slovic, 1987). They stated the fourth hypothesis as follows: 
 
(H4) As issue awareness increases, support for governmental intervention to address a 
hazard will increase. 
 
The role of the perceived risk itself is proposed as the final element that influences 
preferences for government action. They specify the perceived risk by mentioning that there 
are three dimensions that relate specifically to public policy preferences: personal risk, 
community risk and risk magnification in the future. They have developed two hypotheses 
that integrate these dimensions: 
 
(H5) As the perception of future hazard severity increases, support for governmental 
intervention to address the hazard will increase. 
 
(H6) As ratings of personal and community risk associated with a hazard increase, support 
for governmental intervention to deal with that hazard will increase.  
 
However, the authors also mention that this relationship between perceived risk and the 
attitude towards government policy making is rather fragile in opaque risk contexts, 
characterized by a lack of concrete knowledge about the risk (B. J. Gerber & G. W. Neeley, 
2005). 
A general agreement among risk studies was accomplished by scrutinizing the opinions and 
the expectations about high potential hazards with high consequences. The common 
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findings of this kind of studies have a limited transferability when it comes to the specific 
question how risk perceptions influence public policy support. Gerber and Neeley formulate 
two reasons for this limited transferability. The first reason is methodological. To be able to 
estimate the effects of perceived risks, risk managers should consider that the determinants 
for policy support are linked to the perceptions of the risks: “those factors that predict policy 
preferences (general political attitudes such as ideology) also predict perceived risk, resulting 
in endogeneity among explanatory variables” (B. Gerber & G. Neeley, 2005 p.397). 
Therefore, separating out the effects of perceived risk is necessary to accurately account for 
the role risk plays in attitudes toward government policy actions. The second reason includes 
that the generalizability of inferences of studies of high risk situations could be limited 
because of the fact that the attitudes of civilians towards more controversial policy issues 
are not applicable to the attitudes towards more acquainted risk situations. The familiarity 
of the risk situation depends on the level of experience with the risk, the proximity of the 
risk, the level of knowledge that the individual possesses about the risk etc. Gerber and 
Neeley use the example of air pollution. Individuals who live in areas with poor air quality 
will have more outspoken opinions and will support governmental policy decisions that will 
try to solve the air pollution problems more when they perceive the risk to be harmful for 
their personal health. On the other hand, the attitudes of these individuals towards more 
unfamiliar risk situations may be very different. 
According to Pollak (1996), the limitations of scientific knowledge about certain risks, 
combined with the lack of public trust in the governments and experts has introduced the 
need to create specialized competence centers that have as a primary objective to restore 
the public trust in governmental institutes and their risk management efforts. 
“The inadequacy of scientific knowledge, coupled with the lack of public trust in government 
and in experts, suggests that risk regulators should be concerned not only with creating 
institutional arrangements likely to foster trust but also with creating mechanisms for 
providing concerned individuals with credible reassurance” (Pollak, 1996 p.25) 
The article concludes by discussing divergences between public perceptions and expert 
perceptions of risks, and the weights that a democratic society should give to each in 
assessing and managing risks. 
5.3. Involving the public and crossing bridges between experts and lay 
The role of the public as active participants in the risk communication and even risk 
management processes has been confirmed previously. In the light of trust and credibility, 
effective risk communication is also a key factor in developing, correcting and maintaining 
public confidence (Brown, 1990). Governments and risk managers in general should start by 
recognizing the complex and delicate nature of the communication process that 
incorporates several cultural, social and psychosocial constructs. One of the key challenges is 
to cross the bridges between expert convictions that are based on raw and quantitative data 
(which is not always applicable in opaque risk situations) and public perceptions and 
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opinions that are even more complex, divers and sometimes even conflicting. Only by 
crossing those bridges, that sometimes have yet to be constructed, public trust and 
confidence in professional communities and public institutions will be stimulated and 
maintained (Smith & McCloskey, 1998). Bier states that risk decision making processes, risk 
management and risk communication strategies should be developed to function in a 
general atmosphere of distrust as well (Bier, 2001). This has several implications on the 
tangible strategy development. First of all, Bier suggests to listen to the public before 
providing them new information. It could also be constructive to involve the public as 
passive supervisors. The last and most intensive proposal of Bier is to involve the public 
directly into the risk decision making process. In case of this condition of direct participation, 
people will not have to rely on their general confidence and trust in the policy makers or 
authorities because they have the (perceived) possibility to influence the direction, the 
development or even the outcomes of certain decision processes themselves.  
5.4. Targeting communications 
We already explained comprehensively why al risk communication efforts should be public 
oriented and target-based (chapter two). We have concluded that there is no average 
‘member of the public’, especially in the context of risk perception and risk communication. 
We will also confirm this empirically in our research reports. Based on the specific audience 
profiles (both demographical as media profiles), we will be able to construct customized 
messages, choose the most appropriate communication channels and offer the most 
appropriate interactive communication platforms for feedback and input for the cooperative 
risk management process. We also want to emphasize the fact that information needs can 
change, so that we should try to monitor these needs over time. The proposed methodology 
will offer the tools to monitor these needs and to gain knowledge about the specific 
audience profiles in a given risk context. 
A lot of the manuals and guidelines that have been developed for governmental institutes by 
specialized communication agencies stress the importance of communicating receiver 
oriented and scrutinizing public perceptions as vital elements in risk management and risk 
communication practices. Some examples of these manuals are summarized in the table 
below. 
 
Manual / Guidelines Author 
Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committee (Government Office for Science, 2007) 
Communicating in a crisis: Risk communication 
guidelines for public officials 
(U.S. Department of Health Services, 2002) 
Communicating Risk (GICS) UK Resilience Center 
Viewfinder: a policy maker's guide to public 
involvement 
(Cabinet Office) 
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication. Pandemic (Reynolds, 2007) for Centers for Disease 
130 
 
Influenza Control and Prevention 
Strategic Risk Communications Framework (Health Canada, 2006 and the Public Health 
Agency of Canada) 
De acceptatie voorbij. Risico en Crisiscommunicatie 
met een mondige samenleving 
(Jong & Helsloot, 2005) for the 
Expertisecentrum Risico en 
Crisiscommunicatie 
Effective Media Communication during Public Health 
Emergencies. A who field guide. 
(Hyer & Covello, 2005) for the World 
Health Organization  
Crisis and emergency risk communication: By leaders 
for leaders. 
(Reynolds, 2004) for Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention 
Effective Risk Communication. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission's Guidelines for External Risk 
Communication 
(Persensky et al., 2004) for the United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Tools for Development. A handbook for those engaged 
in development activity 
(Dearden, Jones, & Sartorius, 2003) for the 
Performance and Effectiveness Department  
Department for International Development 
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (Reynolds, 2002) for Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention 
Communication in risk situations. Responding to the 
communication challenges posed by bioterrorism and 
emerging infectious diseases 
(V.T. Covello, 2002) 
Risk Communication. A Guide to Regulatory Practice (ILGRA, 1998) 
Table 22: Overview of official manuals and guidelines for effective risk communication 
 
The summarized manuals and guidelines are developed mainly by governmental institutions 
in cooperation with field experts and academics that are specialized in risk communication.  
These manuals are included as appendices on the CD - rom.  
6. Conclusion 
This chapter mainly focused on the concept of public participation in risk management and 
governmental risk communication processes and on the importance of trust and credibility 
for effective risk communication practices. We started by defining several perceived roles of 
the government as a risk communicator. It is important to define and monitor the roles of 
the government as the information needs of the public and the perceived roles of the 
government will vary according to the specific risk contexts. The primary objectives of the 
governmental risk communication strategies will depend on the desired strategic outcomes 
of the risk managers or government officials on the one hand and on the specific information 
needs of the various stakeholders that are involved in the risk situation on the other hand. 
Depending on whether the government has to pick up an advisory, protective or 
redistributive role, the focus in the information strategy will be on information provision, 
(re)assurance or involvement. Naturally, as various stakeholders may have different 
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perceived roles, the government might be obliged to implement combinations of 
information strategies. The last role, the redistributive role, requires a stronger need for 
public involvement and other stakeholder participation. Many scholars have emphasized the 
growing interest of practitioners and researchers in stakeholder participation in risk decision 
processes and bottom-up participative communication processes. It is no longer the 
question whether an input from diverse communities and stakeholders should be solicited 
and incorporated that occupies academics and governmental communication experts but it 
is a matter of finding the right way to do so. One of the main conclusions was that trust and 
confidence are probably the most crucial influential elements in effective risk management 
processes that involve stakeholder participation. That is why we decided to describe and 
illustrate the concepts of trust, confidence and credibility more comprehensively. Trust is a 
multidimensional and complex concept. The table summarized the dimensions of trust as 
proclaimed by the scholars that have scrutinized trust in risk management and linked them 
to the classification of Peters et al. (R. Peters et al., 1997a). However, we advocate the view 
of Frewer et al. (1996), who defined a more differentiated approach claiming that trust is 
multidimensional but the specific traits are not fixed. They suggest that every information 
source may gain or lose trust depending on its efforts and capabilities of meeting the specific 
expectations of the public regarding these specific characteristics that induce trust. We also 
integrated the five levels of analysis of trust:  the communicator, the message, credibility of 
the institution based on source perception, credibility of institutions based on institutional 
performance and climate for trust and credibility in a macro-sociological and political 
context. We also provided an overview of the key variables that may interact on the various 
levels of analysis.  
We can conclude that trust is vital on all levels of analysis and that it is a primary condition to 
establish and implement risk communication strategies with direct impacts as well as long 
term effects. But when we formulate it the other way round, we can state that effective risk 
communication may increase trust levels and mitigate the trust crisis in governmental 
institutes, primarily by involving the public and stimulating two-way and bottom-up 
communication. Unfortunately, trust is more easily to be destroyed than to be created, as 
claimed by the trust asymmetry principle (Slovic, 1993). We confronted the trust asymmetry 
principle with the value similarity approach (G. Cvetkovich et al., 2002), which claims that 
people construct their own perceived trust levels more intuitively, basing themselves on the 
shared social identities or shared parallel understanding of a specific situation. We also 
defined the difference between trust and credibility. However, the concepts of trust, 
credibility and confidence are often used as synonyms. After having defined the concept of 
credibility, we discussed the importance of experts and opinion leaders as credible sources 
of information in risk communication strategies. Naturally, we had to link trust and 
credibility to risk perception. Trumbo and McComas (2003) assumed that the mechanisms 
linking credibility, information processing and risk perception are very likely to be located in 
motivation, issue involvement, information-holding and the effect of message cues (Trumbo 
& McComas, 2003). Trust was also defined as a crucial driver for public support for policy 
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decisions in the context of risk. But one of the main remarks is that this relationship between 
perceived risk and the attitude towards government policy making is rather fragile in opaque 
risk contexts, characterized by a lack of concrete knowledge about the risk (B. J. Gerber & G. 
W. Neeley, 2005). We concluded the chapter by emphasizing the fact that governments and 
risk managers in general should start by recognizing the complex and delicate nature of the 
risk communication process. This process incorporates several cultural, social and 
psychosocial constructs. Before risk managers are able to cross the bridges between experts’ 
analytical opinions and lay people’s risk perceptions, the bridges have to be constructed with 
tools that should be created by both players. By involving the various stakeholders as passive 
supervisors of the interests of their own group or even as active participants and 
contributors to the risk management processes, trust levels are actually becoming less 
important as they can influence the direction, the development or even the outcomes of 
certain decision processes themselves. We concluded the chapter by offering an overview of 
some essential guidelines and handbooks for good risk communication practice, developed 
by or for several governmental institutes. These guidelines and handbooks all advocate the 
public oriented and targeted risk communication approach. The next chapter will extensively 
discuss this rather new and, in our opinion, most appropriate approach for effective risk 
communication. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
TOWARDS A PUBLIC ORIENTED RISK COMMUNICATION POLICY 
1. Risk communication as a multidisciplinary and multilevel process 
The concept of “risk” is a multifaceted concept that involves the judgments of the individual, 
the group and the whole society about the factors that cause, manage, regulate and 
compensate for potential hazards prior to, during and after the hazards occurs. As O’Riordan 
formulates: 
 
“Risk is a socially derived phenomenon within which the technical interpretation of risk as 
hazard multiplied by probability plays some kind of role, but only as a basis for judgment and 
responsiveness. Risk is essentially the cultural interpretation of hazardousness” (O'Riordan, 
1990 p.294). 
 
So besides the mathematical component of risk as the result of a proporation between 
probability ratios and estimated consequences, the broader concept of risk also involves the 
individual and social perceptions of people that are encountered with uncertainties and 
hazards. O’Riordan also states that risk analysis actually combines both exact sciences and 
social sciences. Naturally, social sciences are a very broad discipline that may scrutinize every 
phenomenon where humans are involved. So when we consider risk communication as an 
social scientific discipline, we can approach it from various levels: we may consider a 
cognitive, motivational and emotional level from a psychological point of view (LeeAnn 
Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, Neuwirth, & Giese, 2003; Marks, 1990; M. Siegrist et al., 2005; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and of course various approaches from socio psychological and 
sociological viewpoints (R. E. Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Wildavsky & Douglas, 1983). 
Even Paul Slovic, one of the founders of the pure psychologically inspired psychometric 
paradigm, stated in his contribution to Krimsky’s and Golding’s Social Theories of Risk: 
 
“It is most certainly the case that information processing (cognition), personality, social 
factors, economic factors and cultural factors interact to determine individual and societal 
response to risk.” (Slovic, 1992 p.149) 
 
This citation indicates that the concept of risk is multi-faceted and that it can, both 
theoretically as empirically, be approached by multiple academic disciplines. Moreover, as 
Slovic states, the most ideal approach is a combination of these disciplines. We believe it is 
absolutely necessary to integrate theoretical perspectives that discuss risk perception and 
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risk information processing on the psychological, socio psychological and sociological level as 
the process of risk communication extends from the individual risk perception and 
information processing to the social construction of risks and the risk information exchange 
processes within an entire community and society. That is why we will divide this chapter 
into two main components. Within the first component we will try to reconcile several 
frameworks that involve individual risk perception risk information seeking and risk 
information processing. The second component will discuss risk as a socially constructed 
concept and the role of interpersonal communication and opinion leadership in the social 
construction of communal risk perceptions. 
In order to construct effective risk communication strategies, it is absolutely necessary to 
scrutinize the public, unveil their beliefs, risk perception levels, behavioural intentions, 
information needs etc. This receiver centered approach has been advocated by various 
scholars (Davies et al., 1987b; Green, 1990; Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990; C. Wilson, 
1990). Bier has stated that it is of crucial importance to reveal the specific characteristics of 
the public (Bier, 2001): their level of education and knowledge about the specific situation or 
context, their attitudes and convictions about the topic, their level of openness and 
susceptibility for information and ideas that are diffused, their involvement and concern 
about the topic. In order to obtain this kind of information, scholars may opt for several 
research designs, both of qualitative as quantitative nature: focus groups, survey research, 
interviews etc. Bier also stressed the importance of socio - demographic and socio - 
economical differences as differentiating elements for creating target oriented risk 
communication strategies. 
We will now quote some important scholars that have indicated the importance of a public 
oriented approach of risk communication. 
 
“(…) effective communication involves taking a “receiver-centered” approach, and 
until the communicator stands in the psychological and perceptual position of the 
receiver, effective transfer of information and ideas will not occur” (C. Wilson, 1990 
p.61). 
 
“The frequent, enormous differences between the senders and recipients of risk 
communication messages highlight the need to tailor messages to the target 
audience” (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990 p.131) 
 
“We have to think very carefully about what we mean by the public if we are really 
going to get at the question of how to communicate with the public” A. Alms (Davies 
et al., 1987b p.50) 
 
“To design an effective risk communication system it is first necessary to determine 
what beliefs and expectations the target population holds about the hazard, and their 
consequent behavioural intentions” (Green, 1990 p.31)  
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The quotes contain both elements about the individual nature of the elements of a 
community (individuals) as elements that refer to the public as an entity of socially 
interacting elements. However, we cannot consider ‘the public’ as a homogeneous entity of 
elements (individuals). We can consider the public as the sum of various groups of 
stakeholders but also as the sum of individuals that can be grouped according to specific 
socio-demographical traits, media profiles and risk perceptions. These individual and group-
based perceptions represent one component in the dual structure of risk. Sandman labeled 
this part of risk as the outrage component. Sandman created the ‘outrage mode’, probably 
the most simple and concise model to define risk (P. Sandman, 1988). The formula consists 
of three components: hazard and outrage. 
 
Risk = Hazard + Outrage 
 
This implies that risk has a dual nature: one component can be scientifically and technically 
calculated but the other component is far more complex and ambiguous. The outrage 
component depends mostly on a multitude of intuitive and emotional factors (V. Covello & 
Sandman, 2001a). The most important components of this outrage dimension are 
voluntariness, controllability, honesty, trust, fear and the acquaintance with the risk. Some 
scholars also refer to a ‘residual risk’ component. The residual risk is “the risk that remains 
after the society has expended all the resources it can afford for purposes of control” (Davies 
et al., 1987b p.22). We might pose that the residual share in ‘new’ and untransparent risks is 
larger than with the more traditional risks that can be calculated and controlled more easily. 
This combination of definitions of risk by Sandman on the one hand and residual risk of 
Davies et al. on the other hand illustrate that risk management and risk perception should be 
dealt with on both the level of the individual, as a rational and emotional being, as on the 
level of the community.  
The social cognitive theory of Bandura is a perfect introductory framework to this chapter as 
it introduces the interplay of elements on the individual or psychological level, elements that 
refer to social interaction and environmental influential elements. 
1.1. The social cognitive theory 
Bandura states that the social cognitive theory is concerned with exploring the social 
diffusion of new styles of behaviour, integrating the interplay of social and cognitive factors 
and how both of them shape behaviour (Bandura, 2001). 
 
“Social cognitive theory provides an agentic conceptual framework within which to analyze 
the determinants and psychosocial mechanisms through which symbolic communication 
influences human thought, affect and action.” (Bandura, 2001 p.265). 
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The viewpoint of this theory is based on “triadic reciprocal causation” in which there is a bi-
directional interaction between behaviour, environmental factors and intrapersonal factors 
(a.o. cognitive processes) (A. Bandura, 1986). 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Triadic reciprocal causation 
 
 
Within this theory, individuals are both producers as products of social systems and function 
as information dispersers in this context. To cite Bandura: “Personal agency and social 
structure operate as co determinants in an integrated causal structure rather than, as a 
disembodied duality” (Bandura, 2001 p.266).  
The cognitive component focuses on the identification of the personal traits of a person that 
explains the variations in his or her information behaviour. The main objective is to describe 
the cognitive processing of information and the potential changes of the mental images 
(perceptions) and individual knowledge structures. It suggests that personal information 
behaviour “(…) is a dynamic, constantly changing condition” (A. Pálsdóttir, 2005 p.49). The 
social component will perceive persons as ‘social beings’. It will primarily analyze the social 
context of information behaviour. Finally, the social cognitive approach will integrate both 
viewpoints and analyzing perspectives. It recognizes that cognitive activities are embedded 
in social practices of the social system that a person lives in. However, we must add that this 
social system is not limited to tangible personal networks, characterized by personal contact 
and direct communication. Due to the rapid expansion of both the real as the virtual social 
sphere that a person cultivates, it is important to realize that the definition of the “social 
system” and consequently the “social practices of people” will change in relation to the 
evolving impact of the new information society and its characteristics.   
So the social cognitive theory integrates two pathways for information / communication 
flows: a direct pathway through which the sources directly inform and motivate participants 
and an indirect or ‘socially mediated’ pathway that enables participants to be linked to social 
networks and community settings through media influences. The framework states that 
structural interconnectedness provides potential diffusion paths and that socio- cognitive 
factors largely determine what diffuses through those paths. The theory has a quite 
distinctive multidisciplinary approach as it reconciles individual information processes that 
are usually studied within the field of psychology with sociological processes. In the 
following paragraphs, we will also try to study the processes of risk perception and risk 
communication through an academic window that exists of psychological, psychosocial and 
137 
 
sociological layers. In the first section, we will primarily focus on the individual, the ‘micro’ 
level: the psychological processes that underlie risk perception and risk information 
processing. 
2. Individual risk perception and behaviour 
In academic literature concerning risk perception, several paradigms are identified: e.g. the 
axiomatic measurement paradigm, the socio-cultural paradigm and the psychometric 
paradigm. The axiomatic paradigm puts emphasis on the way in which people objectively 
transform information to a customized, subjective version that “fits” with their own life and 
their perceived risk environment. The socio-cultural paradigm integrates variables on the 
socio-economic and cultural level that may influence risk perception. Let us start with 
probably one of the most popular paradigms that scrutinize individual risk perception: the 
psychometric paradigm. 
2.1. The psychometric paradigm 
The psychometric paradigm is a very popular academic track to scrutinize and build 
knowledge about risk perception processes. The aim of the psychometric paradigm is to 
unveil the factors that determine risk perception and explain why people perceive various 
hazards differently (M. Siegrist et al., 2005). The godfathers of this paradigm are Baruch 
Fischhoff and colleagues in 1978. Their model pointed out the involvement of feelings and 
emotions with risk perception (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978). Most 
research about risk perception and risk communication has been guided by this approach 
(Slovic, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1982a). The goal of risk communication in the 
tradition of the psychometric paradigm is to close the gap between public, lay risk 
perceptions and expert risk assessments so that the individuals are able to take rationally 
informed choices and decisions (Slavin et al., 2008). However, many scholars have indicated 
that this ‘logical’ reasoning about risk communication and about ‘closing the gap’ is very 
difficult as the public seems to be very persevered in their emotionally-driven, intuitive and 
seemingly ‘irrational’ risk perceptions, as we will discuss further in 3.4. Although the 
psychometric paradigm has focused mainly on developing cognitive maps for measuring 
perceptions, attitudes, … of individuals (M. Siegrist et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987), some scholars 
have claimed that the research tradition has evolved and now also includes concepts that 
are closely related to social and cultural values and the contexts that can be associated with 
risk perceptions (Sellnow et al., 2008). 
For the processing of risk information and more specifically risk messages, Hamilton has 
introduced the concept of ‘frame of acceptance’ (Hamilton, 2000). The frame of acceptance 
refers to an “individual’s orientation that is drawn from and combines elements of larger 
meaning systems or orientations” (Hamilton, 2000 p.292). This means that messages will be 
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selected, processed and interpreted differently by different groups of people, depending of 
the mental map or reference system they are consciously or unconsciously using.  
Analogous to the reference system, other state that it is generally assumed that people 
appeal to a complex array of qualitative and quantitative factors of both conscious as 
unconscious nature to define, evaluate and act on information about risks (W. McGuire, 
1981; Otway & Vonwinterfeldt, 1982; Slovic et al., 1980a; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 
1982; Vlek & Stallen, 1981). 
They have defined factors that are important in public perceptions, we extract the most 
important factors in the context of new and untransparent risks. The following table 
provides us with an overview of the factors that increase or reduce risk perceptions (T. C. 
Covello, 1989a; Grima, 1989). 
 
Factors tending to increase perceived risk Factors tending to reduce perceived risk 
Catastrophic potential, scale, large number of 
fatalities per event 
Small number of fatalities 
Fatalities and consequences are groups in 
space and time 
Fatalities and consequences are scattered or 
random in  space and time 
Unfamiliarity with the risk Familiarity 
No comprehension and understanding of risk 
(mechanisms and process), risk information, 
exposure,  
Comprehension 
Unfamiliar and unknown risks Familiar risks 
Uncontrollability (personal and institutional) Controllability 
Involuntary risks/consequences Voluntary risks/consequences 
High potential effects on children, future,... Low potential effects on children, future,... 
Identifiable victims whom one can identify 
with 
Statistical, anonymous victims 
Dread hazards Common hazards 
General distrust in institutions, sources Trust in institutions, belief in sources 
Biased media coverage (quantity, quality) Correct and true media coverage 
Unknown risk history (similar risks and impact 
of past crisis’s) 
Known risk history 
Unclear or uncertain benefits of risk context, 
lack of knowledge 
Knowledge, clearly understood benefits 
Possible irreversible effects attached to the 
risk 
Reversible and solvable effects 
Immediate risks, degree of personal 
involvement, probability that personal life is 
affected 
Latent or delayed risk 
Direct Indirect 
Table 23: Factors that increase or reduce perceived risk (T. C. Covello, 1989a; Grima, 1989) 
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As we can deduct from the table, many of the factors that increase perceived risk are 
characteristics of the opaque risks that our contemporary society is confronted with.  New 
technologies such as gene technology bring along many uncertainties and their related risks. 
Especially the unfamiliar, uncontrollable, unknown and involuntary traits of these risks make 
that our risk perceptions are high. There are however psychological mechanisms that allow 
possibilities to control the risk perceptions people are faced with. It is not the risk as such 
nor the exposure to the risk that individuals’ will try to control, since this is subjectively not 
possible, it is the level of information about the risk that will play a crucial role in the 
subjective construction of the individual risk perceptions. We will discuss this locus of 
information and the principle of self-efficacy in 2.6.3. 
Let us first take a more in-depth look at the heuristics that play a role in the process of 
cognitive risk perception. 
2.2. Risk perception and heuristics 
In the 1970’s, the academic work on heuristics and probability bias judgments (Tversky, 
1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974) was often cited as pertinent (L. Sjoberg, 1979). The 
three most popular heuristics are anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), 
representativeness and availability (Lee Ross & Nisbett, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 
1982a). Risk perception literature shows us that the availability heuristic is probably the 
most important to understand risk perception (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Heuristic rules 
are cognitive shortcuts to reduce the complexity of a decision making process. The 
availability heuristic emphasizes the crucial role of personal experience as a determinant of 
perceived risk. If a person’s experiences are biased, his perceptions will be biased and 
deviate from the objective reality (Slovic et al., 1981). As people are exposed to many 
sources and information, it is logical that there are as many perceptions of the reality than 
there are people who are exposed to this reality. So a lot of issues are strongly mentally 
constructed by the information that one gathers directly or indirectly, consciously or 
unconsciously. The amount of information that is being spread and that reaches a person 
will influence the mental distance to the issue. So this may comprise that the easier we can 
acquire a large quantity of information about a certain risk, or the more examples we have 
embedded in our minds concerning a certain threat, the bigger the estimated, perceived risk 
will be. So people tend to have the cognitive processing reaction that the more easy 
something comes to one’s mind, the more they think it actually happens in their direct 
environment (Shrum & Oguinn, 1993). Excessive communicating or putting disproportionate 
focus on the risk in communication outputs can lead to an enlargement of the facts. 
Eventually this can foster a process of addressing priority to certain risk related topics in 
one’s personal agenda – setting process.  
The heuristic systematic information processing model builds upon the fundaments of the 
traditional heuristics paradigm and tries to define more specifically how individuals process 
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information. As we will discuss in the next section, this model is adopted by many scholars in 
the field of risk research.  
2.3. The heuristic systematic information processing model 
The heuristic systematic model (HSM) integrates two modes of individual information 
processing: using systematic and/or heuristic strategies (Chaiken, 1980). Systematic 
processing of information takes place when an individual reconciles the information that he 
already possesses with information and arguments that he has gathered and examined 
carefully. The outcome is a well-considered judgment. Heuristic processing is, as we already 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs, a mode of information processing that involves 
rather simple decision rules that may reduce the complexity of an information processing, 
evaluation or decision making process. Both modes can be addressed simultaneously, or one 
mode can dominate over the other one, depending on various factors. Trumbo and 
McComas refer to Eagly and Chaiken, who defined two general types of processing mode 
determinants: cognitive and motivational (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993 in Trumbo and McComas 
2003). As Trumbo and McComas state, the primary cognitive determinant of processing 
mode is the degree to which the individual is capable of processing information. This kind of 
systematic processing implies that people’s abilities to process information thoroughly may 
vary strongly, depending on individual and situational factors (e.g. time pressure, 
experience, prior knowledge) and is much more demanding than heuristic information 
processing. Besides the cognitive mode determinant, Trumbo and McComas refer to two 
closely related motivational determinants: accuracy motivation and information sufficiency 
Chaiken et al. have added the impression motivation and defence motivation (Chaiken, 
Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). The most important input of the HSM is that information 
sufficiency is defined as a factor of judgmental confidence. When people develop certain 
information needs due to a lack of knowledge, their motivation can increase when 
information sufficiency is not achieved and the individual does not hold his personally 
desired level of judgmental confidence (Trumbo & McComas, 2003). This motivation can be 
the trigger for concrete information seeking behaviour. Especially in the context of risk, the 
heuristic-systematic information processing model has proven to be a very useful theoretical 
foundation. Various scholars have applied the model in empirical studies (Griffin, Dunwoody, 
& Neuwirth, 1999; Meijnders, Midden, & Wilke, 2001; Trumbo, 1999, 2002). Again, we may 
state that we find support in this theoretical framework that perceived risk information 
sufficiency may lead to confidence. We might hypothetically suggest that the locus of 
information control plays a vital role in building personal confidence and even reducing 
levels of fear.  
The next paragraph will discuss an update of the psychometric paradigm as suggested by 
Slovic in the context of risk perception. He suggests that, besides the purely rational mode of 
cognition, there is also an ‘experiental’ system that can be addressed to construct risk 
perceptions (P. Slovic et al., 2004). 
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2.4. Risk as feelings and risk as analysis 
In 2004, Slovic et al. published an article that introduced the ‘experiential system’ that is 
increasingly used to construct risk perceptions (Paul Slovic et al., 2004). Slovic et al. start 
from the dual-process theory that proposes a dual structure in thinking, knowing and 
information processing (Sloman, 1996). The theory proposes two modes of cognition: an 
experiential and a rational mode. The rational mode is similar as the purely psychometric 
viewpoint: the idea that all risk perceptions are, or should be, based on calculation, on the 
rules of logic, probability theory and utility maximization. It requires conscious control. The 
experiential mode is rather an answer or academic elucidation for the observation that the 
public keeps on constructing their own risk perceptions intuitively and emotionally-driven. 
As Slovic states, the experiential mode is dominated by emotional responses to information 
about risk: “intuition, instinct and gut feeling” (P. Slovic et al., 2004 p.311). It mostly relies on 
“images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect” (p.311). According to 
Slovic et al. (2004), this system is something that allowed the human race to survive during 
their evolution. It is the most natural and common way to respond to risk. Other authors are 
also convinced that the experiential mode is the basic, instinctive mode to process risk 
information. Some have found new, creative links to evolutionary psychological theories, 
Tucker and Ferson refer to it as ’the evolutionary anthropology of risk’ (Tucker & Ferson, 
2008). They state that this new perspective on risk perception and risk communication could 
provide communication experts with lists of specific environmental cues that activate 
particular mental mechanisms and result in particular perceptions and conceptions of risks. 
The gap between the ‘instinctive’ experiential system and the ‘new, industrialized’ rational 
system could be proposed as an explanation for the differing risk perceptions of the public 
and the experts (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Paul Slovic et al., 2004). Anyway, most scholars 
that adept this view, are convinced that the analytic, rational system cannot be effective 
without the guidance by emotion and affect, so risk perception and the entire process of 
attitudes and behaviour that is triggered by risk perception is a very complex  interplay 
between affect and reason. It is vital to take into account both components in the 
development process of effective risk communication strategies. Peters et al. concluded with 
their study that  
 
“risk communication (about stigmatized objects) may benefit from a more complete 
understanding of how affective and emotional reactions are constructed and the routes 
through which they affect responses and behaviours” (E. M. Peters, Burraston, & Mertz, 2003 
p.1349). 
 
In their article, they also scrutinized the interaction between two psychological information 
processing systems: the emotional (experiential) and cognitive (rational) system. They 
looked at their joined influence on perceptions and acceptability of risks. 
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2.5. Risk perception and the media 
The mass media and especially news media are a very important source of information 
about risks and crisis’s. They are also a very appropriate channel for governments to diffuse 
information into the community. We could assume that because of the specific new 
selection and presentation processes of certain risk items, risk public perceptions may be 
influenced very strongly. We could also hypothesize that the mass media may potentially 
influence the specific behaviour of individuals as their behaviour is a consequence of their 
perceptions, attitudes and beliefs (Kone & Mullet, 1994; McCombs, 1992; Slovic et al., 1982). 
The amount of information that we encounter on a daily base in our contemporary, western 
information society is gaining gigantic proportions. An extensive portion of the population 
can be reached by a divers and comprehensive amount of communication channels. People 
are confronted with risk information through all sorts of media channels on a daily basis. 
Knowledge about certain risk situations is mainly gained by consulting the mass media 
directly or by being confronted with risk information indirectly. Risk information is the key 
component in the construction of the individual risk perception. By developing a cognitive 
and effective experiential system people gain the capabilities to deal with risks and crisis’s 
successfully and survive. Even in their daily lives, parents will pass their knowledge about 
risks to their children. That is why it is of vital importance to gain knowledge about how 
individuals and also the communities they live in as a whole come to their risk perceptions 
and what the role of the mass media as primary sources of risk information may be. This 
knowledge can allow authorities to construct more solid risk management and risk 
communication strategies. 
The idea that there is an obvious relationship between the mass media and risk perception 
has been discussed by various scholars in as many disciplines. The assumption that frequent 
media exposure gives rise to a high level of perceived risk has been accepted and denied by 
several empirical and theoretical studies (Freudenburg, Coleman, Gonzales, & Helgeland, 
1996; Wahlberg & Sjoberg, 2000). Wählberg en Sjöberg scrutinized the impact of the media 
on risk perception  (Wahlberg & Sjoberg, 2000). 
Their study included several research items: 
- The media content: they compared the content of several sources with the objective 
reality and tried to gain knowledge about the factors that could explain the 
differences in the influence of these media contents versus similar information that is 
diffused by other sources of information on risk perception. 
- What psychological and theoretical concepts and models could explain the influence 
of these media contents on risk perception? 
- The difference in impact between common media messages or reports versus 
messages that are specifically constructed and diffused by the mass media as risk 
communication messages. 
They concluded their study by stating that, even though many take media’s influence for 
granted, the evidence they found points the other way. They specify that, for heavy media 
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users, media are probably not a very strong causal factor in risk perception. In general, risk 
perception may be affected by the media via the availability principle, meaning that the 
more risk information is diffused, the higher the risk will be on the agenda and the stronger 
the effect will probably be. But they also state that these effects are attenuated by 
impersonal impact meaning that general risk perception is more easily changed than 
personal risk perception. The most important conclusion is that there are still many 
uncertainties and that it is very difficult to determine the causality and the specific path of 
the effect the media have on the personal and social risk perception. It is very important to 
reason and formulate with caution. 
Other scholars have concluded that there is a substantial impact of the amount of 
information that people are exposed to and will have to process (Mazur & Lee, 1993). We 
already mentioned the availability principle. A remarkable conclusion is that also positive 
media contents can lead to negative emotions and reactions with the public. Public concern 
may rise depending on the amount of information they are confronted with about a specific 
risk or hazard. Some scholars also assigned an important role to the media in the process of 
information verification. 
2.5.1. The role of the media in the process of verification 
It was Bandura who posed that people’s conceptions and perceptions of reality are formed 
through an intensive process of verification (Albert Bandura, 1986). The process includes a 
personal comparison between the individual’s own conceptions and some ‘standard of 
verity’. When encountered with new information about a certain risk situation, the 
individual will first compare it with a certain standard, which is usually based on the person’s 
own experiences with the risk situation. When there is a lack of own, personal or even social 
experience, people will often base themselves on the standard which is proposed by the 
mass media as these channels often provide the people with much information about the 
risk situations. Besides the fact that the mass media function as fast diffusers of information 
in the new and rapidly evolving western information society, they also function as agenda-
setters as a large part of the public debate is determined by the subjects and risks that are 
made available through these media. So in a way, people may even learn from these sources 
and acquire information about a symbolic reality (Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995), which can 
form a basis for their personally constructed risk realities. Wiegman and Gutteling state that 
the more people are confronted with risk information through the media, the more they will 
learn from it and the less information will be acquired through interpersonal sources. It 
functions as a kind of observational learning that can dominate the learning process through 
interpersonal exchange of experiences or personal experiences. Bandura noted that the 
mass media also induce feelings of fear that are created on longer terms because of the rise 
of distortions in the media coverage of certain risk situations. The media tend to focus on 
the sensational, exceptional and dramatic aspects. On the one hand, we have to agree with 
the viewpoint that has just been described. Especially in the context of risk and threats, 
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people often did not experience the threat personally so they have to base themselves on 
the information that has been diffused by the media (Drottz-Sjöberg, 2000; Wiegman & 
Gutteling, 1995), and that has often been considered as the standard of verity. Wiegman and 
Gutteling have mentioned that direct behavioural experiences with risk situations can hinder 
the transfer of information, a principle that is assumed to be also applicable to the 
information that comes from mass media. So direct experiences may attenuate and even 
negate information (also from mass media) that is incompatible with these personal 
experiences (Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995). 
The next section will take a closer look at the specific relationship between risk perception 
and behaviour. The concept ‘behaviour’ is very broad. We include both preventive behaviour 
as a means to prepare or protect oneself against a possible threat or risk context as specific 
risk information behaviour. As we already mentioned previously, risk information seeking 
can lead to satisfactory levels of confidence and information sufficiency and we will also 
mention the role information seeking plays in the context of self-efficacy. 
2.6. Perception and behaviour 
2.6.1. Psychological defences against threat 
Let us first take a closer look at some cognitive defensive mechanisms that human beings are 
subjected to when being confronted with a risk situation. These cognitive mechanisms will 
play a major role in the formation of attitudes and beliefs and will eventually lead to a 
specific behavioural intention. There are certain psychological defense mechanisms defined 
that allow human beings not to be preoccupied with the evaluation of personal risk, which 
would only induce increased levels of chronic anxiety and stress (Handmer & Penning-
Rowsell, 1990). These mechanisms have an important deal of survival value on both a 
physical as psychological level. Handmer et al. discuss four mechanisms that should be taken 
into consideration when designing risk communication strategies, as they are related to the 
core psychological processes when people are confronted with risks or threats. The personal 
invulnerability bias was defined by Thompson. It is a personal conviction that one will survive 
in any risk context, transcending all types of hazards and difficulties (Thompson, 1985). This 
psychological mechanism is especially indispensable when people are not preoccupied with 
the evaluation of risk, considering probabilities and potential outrage. We could state that 
although people that are confronted with direct and near risks may have high risk perception 
levels and low mental distances towards the risk, still a great portion of people will 
unconsciously use the personal invulnerability bias and will think that they will survive the 
threat, notwithstanding the severity of the threat. 
The second mechanism is the defense mechanism of denial. It is different from the personal 
invulnerability bias in the sense that people will just deny the fact that they can personally 
be affected by the risk. In contrast with the Bayes’ theorem, which states that “posterior 
odds equal the prior odds multiplied by the likelihood ratio of the data” (Marks, 1990 p.21), 
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humans are very poor intuitive statisticians and their subjectively perceived probability 
levels are mostly very low. The results in our empirical body will also confirm that a certain 
portion of the population totally ignores the risk and is convinced that the threat will not 
affect them. A third mechanism that can reach very simple to very complex levels is the 
mechanism of rationalization. The psychological process can act as a kind of cognitive 
dissonance reduction. As Marks states: “Rationalizations of various ad hoc kinds invariably 
come to the rescue, and scientists are no exceptions” (Marks, 1990 p.21). Our empirical data 
will also provide evidence for the fact that experts are perceived as the most credible 
sources for certain risk information. The last mechanisms that will be discussed is the one of 
dissociation (Hilgard, 1986). It states that the processing of risk and relevant risk information 
will have varying and even unpredictable impacts on the individual’s beliefs. The individual’s 
information processing will depend on the cognitive sub-system that is addressed when 
exposed to certain risk information. As mentioned by Handmer et al., in order to overcome 
these psychological barriers that can undermine the effectiveness of the risk communication 
programs, it is crucial to take into consideration these psychological defense mechanisms as 
they are inherent to the human nature (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990). It would be 
ignorant to live up to the conviction that human rationality is the norm and irrationality is 
only the exception. Let us now take a closer look at some theories and studies that scrutinize 
the specific relationship between risk perception and behaviour. 
2.6.2. Experience and learning from others as predictors of behaviour 
Saarinen has stated that there is very little empirical support for a direct relationship 
between awareness, risk perception and behaviour. He says that this is mostly because of 
the methodological biases: attitude and behaviour are concepts that are very hard to 
measure (Saarinen, 1990). However, he states that experience, as a form of knowledge, was 
assumed and proven to be a better predictor of behaviour. The association between self-
protective behaviour and personal experience covers a wide range of risks. However, he 
poses the following key question, as not all people can have experience in all risk contexts: 
 
“Are humans capable of learning from the experience of others, and if so, under what 
circumstances?” (Saarinen, 1990 p.281) 
 
Assuming that the relationship between perception and behaviour is not direct or linear and 
taking into account that people could rely on the experience and knowledge of others (both 
experts as people in their personal environments with knowledge), we assume that the role 
of these ‘mediators’ should not be underestimated. Moreover, they can even play a crucial 
role in the diffusion of risk information and influencing attitudes or even behaviours. As Tim 
O’Riordan states: 
“(…) communities and ‘experts’ need to establish cultural risk translators or mediators to 
provide an intelligible bridge between the different parties” (O'Riordan, 1990 p.296). 
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One of the final objectives of the empirical component of this PhD is the development of a 
tool that can identify and profile these mediators. We will refer to them as ‘opinion leaders’, 
which is actually a concept that has been developed long time ago in the context of political 
communication. We will discuss the concept of opinion leadership in section 4. 
So opinion leaders can serve as mediators, but of course we also have to recognize the 
importance of experts and the media as risk information diffusers. Besides experience, there 
is also an important relationship between the concept of self-efficacy and behaviour in the 
context of risk. 
2.6.3. Relationship between self-efficacy and behaviour 
The construct of perceived self-efficacy was introduced by Bandura in 1977 as part of the 
social cognitive theory. It has especially been used in the field of health psychology to 
enhance preventive behaviour. The concept has frequently been integrated as a component 
in theoretical models of health behaviour (Leganger, Kraft, & Roysamb, 2000; Á. Pálsdóttir, 
2008; Rimal, 2001; Schwarzer & Fuchs, 1996). Some examples of the models that the 
concept has been used in are: the Theory of Planned Behaviour (I. Ajzen, 1985, 2002; 
Armitage & Conner, 2009; Norman & Hoyle, 2004; Tolma, Reininger, Evans, & Ureda, 2006), 
in which self-efficacy is also strongly identified with self-control (Konttinen, Haukkala, Sarlio-
Lahteenkorva, & Silventoinen, 2008; Schifter & Ajzen, 1985), the Protection Motivation 
theory (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000), the Modified Social Learning Theory 
(Wallston, 1992) and the Health Action Process Approach (Schwarzer & Fuchs, 1996). The 
influential role of the attitudes and belief of people in their personal efficacy is shown in 
their response to health communications aimed at altering health - impairing habits 
(Bandura, 2001 p.288). Meyerowitz and Chaiken examined four alternative mechanisms 
through which health communications could alter health habits: the transmission of factual 
information, fear arousal, change in risk perception and enhancement of perceived self-
efficacy (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987). Their final conclusion was that communicating about 
health fostered the adoption of preventive health behaviour primarily because of their 
effects on self-efficacy. Also Beck and Lund have proved that preventive health practices are 
stimulated better by a heightened self-efficacy than by elevating fear (Bandura, 2001).  
Gordon defined self-efficacy as “the conviction that one can successfully execute the 
behaviour required to produce outcomes” (Gordon, 2003 p.1287).  
Weigman and Gutteling also described the role of self-efficacy in the context of risk 
perception and behaviour. They state that “the self-efficacy expectation concerns the 
cognitive subjective judgments of the person’s own possibilities of carrying out certain 
behaviours, given adequate skills and sufficient motivation” (Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995 
p.234-235). 
Especially within the context of risk reduction we can apply the concept. People who have a 
strong sense of risk in a certain risk context, are more likely to respond to messages they 
believe provide a functional strategy for reducing their own perceived level of risk (Sellnow 
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et al., 2009). Wiegman and Gutteling made the distinction between controllable and 
uncontrollable risks, relating them to man-made risks (controllable) and primarily natural 
disasters (uncontrollable). They mention that self-efficacy will be rather low with the 
uncontrollable risks because it is very difficult to cope with this type of risks. For the 
controllable risks, self-efficacy levels will be higher as the reactions or the behaviour of the 
individuals and even (part of)  the community will try to control and influence the risk 
situation (Wiegman & Gutteling, 1995). Heath et al. also referred to the controllability of 
risks and the relationship with self-efficacy, but they relate controllability to a more indirect 
process of controllability of risk information (R. L. Heath, Bradshaw, & Lee, 2002a). 
Heath et al. state that the ability to make informed decisions regarding self-efficacy is 
“substantially increased when resources are made available and under their control” but on 
the other hand “access to information without an enhanced capacity for action will only 
frustrate individuals seeking to acquire more information” (R. L. Heath et al., 2002a p.323). 
So in the optimal situation, risk messages can provide some level of self-efficacy. 
It would be good to adopt these findings within the context of preventive risk behaviour. The 
stronger the preexisting perceived self-efficacy and the more responsible institutes promote 
and diffuse the idea that people can enhance their control over the risks that surround 
them, the more people will be convinced of their self-regulative efficacy. This will lead to 
better adoption of the recommended practices and the general preparedness of the public. 
So instead of scaring a certain portion of the population and inducing a culture of fear within 
certain communities or certain groups of people, we should empower them with the tools 
and self-beliefs for exercising personal control over their behaviour. Of course, people will 
never be able to control the risks themselves, nor the probabilities and even in a very limited 
degree they will be able to decide their exposure to risks because of the untransparency and 
the omnipresence of these ‘new’ risks. That is why an alternative approach of control should 
be offered. The risk information control could substitute the perceived control over the risk 
as such. 
The next sections will discuss more thoroughly the specific processing of risk information 
behaviour as this type of behaviour is a vital element in the construction of risk perceptions. 
Risk information seeking will also play a major role in our empirical studies and will form a 
fundamental component for our classification of risk information seekers and the 
identification of opinion leaders. 
2.6.4. A nested model of information behaviour 
Information handling includes the seeking, processing, using and transferring of information 
(T.D. Wilson, 1999). That is why we will first decompose the concept of information 
behaviour in its three subfields: information behaviour, information seeking behaviour and 
information search behaviour. The three subfields can be considered as three levels of 
analysis, hierarchically ordered. The subjoined figure illustrates the hierarchical relationships 
between the three levels. 
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Figure 23: Nested model of information behaviour (T.D. Wilson, 1999) 
 
 
Information behaviour embodies the general field of research, including the exploration of 
general responses on information.  
Information seeking behaviour goes more into depth and incorporates the processes and 
methods that drive the motivations for information search. Information search behaviour 
will tackle the interaction between the media (various sources) and their users. 
2.6.4.1. Information behaviour 
A great deal of studies about information behaviour can be located in the setting of health 
risk factors (Baker, 1996; Baker & Pettigrew, 1999; J. David Johnson, Andrews, & Allard, 
2001; Rimal, 2001; Rimal & Real, 2003). Pettigrew et al. define information behaviour as 
“how people need, seek, give and use information in different contexts, including the 
workplace and everyday living.” (Pettigrew, Fidel, & Bruce, 2001 p.44). Also Wilson gave a 
clear definition of information behaviour: “By information behaviour is meant those activities 
a person may engage in when identifying his or her own needs for information, searching for 
such information in any way and using or transferring that information.” (T.D. Wilson, 1999). 
Based on this definition, we can say that there is a psychological (identification information 
needs and information seeking behaviour) and a socio-psychological (transferring the 
information) component. 
Wilson provides us with a general interdisciplinary model that describes human information 
behaviour (T. D. Wilson, 1997).  
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Figure 24: Interdisciplinary information behaviour model (T. D. Wilson, 1997 p.569) 
 
 
The model integrates both social and cognitive mechanisms as influential concepts on 
information behaviour. The first stage in the model refers to the context of the information 
need (person in context), continuing with the activating mechanisms that should link the 
information need with the information seeking decision. Wilson suggests several activating 
mechanisms, such as the stress and coping theory but also the risk-reward and social 
learning theory. He also includes several intervening variables that may act between the 
various stages of the model. These intervening variables can be located on a personal level 
(personal characteristics such as cognitive dissonance, selective exposure, physiological, 
cognitive and emotional characteristics and knowledge, socio-demographical characteristic 
etc.), a social or interpersonal level and an environmental or situational level. Also the 
accessibility and credibility of the source can play a crucial role in the entire process. 
Information seeking eventually leads to information processing and use of information and 
links back to the primary situation or context of the information need. 
The three activating mechanisms for information seeking behaviour are of vital importance 
to our work as they are closely related to the risk perception context. It is relevant to relate 
the stress and coping theory to information seeking behaviour, as Miller and Mangan state: 
 
“...one key situational property that has consistently been found to affect stress is whether 
the individual has maximal information (predictability) or minimum information 
(unpredictability) about the event and its effects” (Miller & Mangan, 1983 p.223). 
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2.6.4.2. Information seeking behaviour 
Sonnenwald defines information seeking as a process that involves both individual and 
cognitive traits of a person as the social context.  
“Information seeking (IS) is viewed as a dynamic process of a user making sense that involves 
cognitive behaviour at the level of individual perception and an associated communicative 
behaviour at the level of the social context when insight is sought via linguistic means from 
other sources.” (Sonnenwald, 1999 p.1) 
Ter Huurne summarizes that “information-seeking behaviour can be viewed as the totality of 
behaviours or actions motivated by the recognition of missing knowledge” (E. F. J. Ter 
Huurne, 2008 p.15). Ter Huurne also mentioned that information seeking behaviour can be 
classified in different ways. Information retrieval studies integrate two approaches of 
information seeking: the system-centred approach and the person-centred approach (Ellis et 
al., 2002; Ford, 2004). The relationship between information seeking and information 
channels and sources is the key research item in the system-centred approach. Wilson has 
announced the shift towards a more person-centred approach, that arose in the 1980s (T.D. 
Wilson, 2000). The person-centred approach is actually more inspired by social sciences as it 
takes into consideration influential factors of various levels in the information seeking 
process. Both individual factors as attitudes, beliefs, emotions and self-efficacy as the 
contextual factors that the individual is subjected to should be taken into account when 
scrutinizing the information seeking behaviour of people (E. F. J. Ter Huurne, 2008).  
Other classifications in risk information seeking literature refer to the intensity of 
information seeking (L. A. Kahlor, 2007).  The intensity can vary from very little or even more 
unconscious scanning behaviour (passive information seeking) to intense, active information 
seeking (L. Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, & Neuwirth, 2006). 
McKenzie developed a two-dimensional model to describe information practices (McKenzie, 
2003), also including concepts of active information seeking and scanning. 
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Figure 25: Two dimensional model of information practices (McKenzie, 2003 p.26) 
 
 
The four modes of information seeking are the result of two stages of the information 
seeking process: connecting (identifying and connecting directly or indirectly with sources or 
potential sources) and interacting with sources. According to McKenzie, a person’s 
information practice can move iteratively from one mode to another. With this model 
McKenzie reconciles both the system-centred (source oriented) as the person-centred 
approach, but the main focus still lies with the individual as primary actor in the process. 
2.6.4.3. Active and passive information seeking 
Wilson also stated that information behaviour is “the totality of human behaviour in relation 
to sources and channels of information, including both active and passive information 
seeking and information use” (T.D. Wilson, 2000 p.49). Wilson also recognized the dual 
structure of information seeking behaviour: the difference between actively seeking 
information and passively retrieving information is important to acknowledge and to 
incorporate in our studies. These two modes of information seeking were not sufficient in 
our point of view, because we thought that people will also be triggered to seek information 
under certain conditions: e.g. when there is an emergent threat (terrorist attack, …), people 
will shift from passive information gathering to active information seeking because of their 
actual and insistent need for accurate information when they feel the need for information 
control. So according to Wilson, active information seeking is “the purposive seeking for 
information as a consequence of a need to satisfy some goal” (T.D. Wilson, 2000 p.49). A 
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similar definition has been given by Johnson and Meischke, who describe information 
seeking as “the purposive acquisition of information from selected information carriers (…)” 
(J. D. Johnson & Meischke, 1993 p.343). 
Wilson has elaborated on the definition of ‘active information search’ by categorizing this 
behaviour into two types (T. D. Wilson, 1997):  
- active search includes the gathering of information and development of knowledge 
through the active and constant process of seeking information 
- ongoing search which happens only occasionally with the purpose of updating or 
renewing/adding information and knowledge 
 
Huber also bases himself on the active information searching paradigm (Huber, Wider, & 
Huber, 1997). His research confirms the fact that people prefer the reinterpretation of 
uncertainty information to establish an elimination of the uncertainty so that in the end 
probabilities are either so small that the risk becomes negligible or that so large that the 
threshold for further action is passed. Building on this reasoning, we can add the hypothesis 
that people use the information about how and when they could be exposed to the risk and 
information about the controllability of the risk to create a personal probability estimate. 
Sjöberg found out that people will rather use information about the severity of the 
consequences of the risk when they wish to mitigate a risk (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999).  
Besides active information seeking, there have been defined several other styles of 
information seeking. Wilson and Walsh also defined passive attention, which refers to the 
passive and unintended gathering and acquisition of information e.g. when people come 
across information in the media. This passive attention mode could be compared to the non-
directed monitoring in the two - dimensional model of McKenzie (cfr. supra). Sanda Erdelez 
uses similar concepts, which she labeled as ‘information encountering’, ‘accidental discovery 
of information’ (ADI) and ‘incidental information acquisition’ (Erdelez, 1999 p.25). She 
integrates accidental, unintentional and unexpected nature of the information encountering. 
Besides the information encountering, she also scrutinized the information sharing 
behaviour of people in this context. She found out that information was mostly encountered 
in a mixture of information environments and through various channels, but the sharing of 
information was primarily done through personal contacts (face to face or via e-mails) 
(Erdelez & Rioux, 2000). If we refer to McKenzie’s model, this concept can be linked to the 
‘by proxy’ information seeking mode, where people find information through an 
intermediary. Other authors added the concept of serendipity: the ‘fortuitous’ retrieval or 
encounter of useful information (Foster & Ford, 2003; Toms, 2000). Foster and Ford 
mentioned that serendipity is unpredictable and is not something that can be controlled, but 
they do emphasize the importance of the ‘prepared mind’ (Foster & Ford, 2003 p.336) and 
indicate that certain attitudes such as “(…) consciously to be open and receptive to chance 
information encounters” (Foster & Ford, 2003 p.335) may stimulate people to make the best 
out of serendipity. 
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Solomon described in his studies the patterns of information behaviour as dynamic and 
nonlinear. According to him, people do not think of information and perform certain 
information behaviours in isolation from what they are coping with at a given time in a 
certain personal ‘information environment’ (P. Solomon, 1997a, 1997b). We agree with the 
dynamic and nonlinear character of information seeking as the mode of information seeking 
may vary depending on the topic, the involvement of the individual at the time and the 
personal ‘information environment’, as mentioned by Solomon. When the media coverage 
of a certain risk, e.g. terrorism or the H1N1 virus threat, is high, the risk will be put on the 
public agenda and a larger portion of the population will shift from non seeking to passive 
information gathering and even active information seeking. Within this context, we integrate 
the concept of event triggered information seeking: the information seeking behaviour that 
is performed when an important issue in the specific context of the risk has occurred, e.g. a 
new terrorist attack in Europe will induce increased levels of event triggered information 
search or when another person has deceased after being infected with the H1N1 virus, some 
people will look for more information about the virus and how they can protect themselves 
because of this fact.  
This PhD mainly focuses on person-centered information seeking behaviour and 
incorporates both passive information scanning, event triggered information seeking (active 
seeking triggered by an important event that increases involvement) and active information 
seeking. These three types of information seeking will be the main components for the 
classification of risk information seekers, besides social behaviour and the concept of 
opinion leadership, which will be discussed in 3.7. 
2.6.4.4. The Framework of Risk Information Seeking 
The Framework of Risk Information Seeking (FRIS) is a model that identifies factors 
(antecedents, direct and indirect determinants) of risk related information behaviour. It 
discusses how people seek (or alternatively avoid) relevant information, using various 
information sources through information channels in the context of external safety issues (E. 
F. J. Ter Huurne, 2008). The model takes into account various socio psychological risk-related 
factors that drive information seeking behaviour. It incorporates the audience or receiver-
based perspective of risk communication and as the author mentions herself: it incorporates 
guidelines for connecting the underlying processes of responses to risk-related information. 
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Figure 26:  The Framework of Risk Information Seeking, FRIS (Ter Huurne 2008 p.136) 
 
The FRIS model integrates three basic factors that contribute to the awareness of the risk 
context. It involves the particular perception of the risk, the perceived personal control and 
the involvement of the individual with the risk context. 
 
Risk perception 
 
As mentioned before, risk perception is one of the key drivers for concrete behaviour 
(responses). Risk perception is often based on availability heuristics. From a cognitive 
psychological point of view we could say that, based on cognitive heuristics, people reduce 
the complexity of problems. Especially the availability heuristic plays an important role in 
this reduction process. The availability heuristic states that the easier we can acquire a large 
quantity of information about a certain risk, or the more examples we have embedded in 
our minds concerning a certain threat, the bigger the estimated, perceived risk will be. So 
people tend to have the cognitive processing reaction that the more easy something comes 
to one’s mind, the higher their risk perception about the risk in their direct environment will 
be (Shrum & Oguinn, 1993; Slovic et al., 1981). The heuristics can explain a great deal in the 
variance of risk perceptions in similar risk contexts. Various scholars have found strong 
associations between risk perception and affective responses (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & 
Johnson, 2000; Kuttschreuter, 2006; Loewenstein et al., 2001). The correlations were 
consistently positive. Also Ter Huurne found a strong positive relationship between risk 
perception and affective responses. 
 Perceived personal control 
 
Ter Huurne integrated perceived personal control or self-efficacy in the FRIS framework 
because it was a concept that had been absent in frameworks about risk information seeking 
(Afifi & Weiner, 2006). According to her empirical results, a perceived lack of self-efficacy 
evokes affective responses and decreases senses of information sufficiency (E. F. J. Ter 
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Huurne, 2008). As the authors states, the sense to be able to control the risk (hazard and 
outcomes) plays a vital role in the risk response and the information behaviour decisions. 
The Risk Perception Attitude Framework claims that the effects of risk perceptions have to 
be linked to efficacy beliefs (Rimal & Real, 2003). 
 
Involvement 
 
Personal importance or involvement are also valuable contributors to understand the 
process of risk information search. When people are faced with uncertainty or risky 
situations, problem recognition could rise when they perceive their self- or altruistic 
interests are affected (E. F. J. Ter Huurne, 2008). The individual’s awareness of this problem 
will induce and stimulate the involvement or motivation to seek information about the 
specific risk. This has been formulated by Petty and Cacioppo, the founders of one of the 
most important models that incorporates involvement in an information processing model 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) but also by Heath et al. in the specific context of risk 
communication (R. L. Heath, Liao, & Douglas, 1995b). Involvement or motivation could 
increase when risks becomes personally relevant to an individual. A certain level of 
involvement could stimulate this individual to actively seek information about the risk and 
reduce the possible feelings of uncertainty, anxiety or worry (Nathan, Heath, & Douglas, 
1992). Ter Huurne also empirically confirmed that higher levels of involvement increase the 
need for additional information to counter the feelings of information insufficiency as well as 
affective responses such as feelings of worry and anxiety. In this way people are indirectly 
motivated to seek or avoid additional information about the specific risk. Ter Huurne adds 
the affect concept to the basic premise that involvement is positively associated with 
individuals’ willingness to seek information (B.B. Johnson, 2005; LeeAnn Kahlor et al., 2003; 
Nathan et al., 1992; E. F. J. Ter Huurne, 2008). 
The FRIS model, as Ter Huurne states herself “is unique in recognizing the multidimensional 
nature of risk-related information behaviour from a social-psychological perspective” (E. F. J. 
Ter Huurne, 2008 p.137). It recognizes that, besides a lack of knowledge, affect (emotions) 
and social contexts can also be very significant triggers for information search. The 
framework is very much public-oriented in the sense that it scrutinizes how people react to 
risk communication efforts and what individual and contextual factors may play a role in the 
information seeking and processing processes. 
2.6.5. Information needs 
Dervin’s Sense Making Theory describes information needs as ‘cognitive gaps’ as in some 
situations, a person’s (perceived) knowledge is insufficient to deal with the problems that 
have risen. In order to make sense of their experiences, these persons will need and use 
information (Dervin, 1999).  
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Some authors have labeled uncertainty as a driver for information needs and information 
search (Krikelas, 1983; C.C. Kuhlthau, 2004; Sonnenwald, 1999; Yoon & Nilan, 1999). Some 
important theories that include this premise are the information seeking theory or IST  
(Atkin, 1972, 1973), the anomalous state of knowledge theory or ASK (Belkin, 1980), the 
model of the information search process or ISP (C. C. Kuhlthau, 1991), the uncertainty 
reduction theory or URT (Berger, 1986) and the heuristic-systematic model or HSM that we 
already discussed in 2.3 (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Griffin et al., 1999). 
Uncertainty could be seen as a knowledge gap, but with extra emphasis on the awareness 
of the lack of knowledge. Kuhlthau states that uncertainty due to a lack of understanding, a 
gap in meaning, a limited construct initiates the process of information seeking (C.C. 
Kuhlthau, 2004). Also Driskill and Goldstein defined uncertainty as “the perceived lack of 
information, knowledge, beliefs and feelings (…)” (Driskill & Goldstein, 1986 p.41). Albrecht 
states that uncertainty motivates information seeking because it is uncomfortable, it is the 
lack of attribution confidence about cause-effect patterns (Albrecht, 1988). Palenchar and 
Heath take this into consideration to state that people’s information needs are functional to 
reduce uncertainties about the subjects under consideration and those who are creating 
these uncertainties (M. J. Palenchar & Heath, 2007). Information needs have been 
characterized as entirely subjective (Rosengren, 1974), arising from two mismatching self-
perceptions: the desired knowledge about an issue and the assessed knowledge. This 
mismatch results in an ‘anomalous state of knowledge’ (Belkin, 1980). Belkin describes the 
anomalous state of knowledge as the recognition of an anomaly by the recipient in his/her 
state of knowledge. This anomalous state of knowledge triggers an iterative process of 
refinement. Besides the personal drivers as triggers for information needs, there is also a 
social dimension to take into consideration. Wilson added a social dimension to information 
needs: he pones that a person’s information need is formed by a person’s social roles and 
his social environment (T. D. Wilson, 1997). To combine the previous perspectives, we think 
that information needs are to be situated in relationship with an individual’s cognitive and 
affective structures combined with the situational factors that interrelate. Several authors 
share the same opinion (Allen, 1996; T. D. Wilson, 1997). People are at the same time 
individuals and group members, so their information need is the result of the processes 
that integrate both individual needs as social and group needs. These interrelationships 
between the individual and his social context lead to two types of information need: on the 
one hand a need that takes place at an individual level and at the other hand the need that 
takes place within the group he makes part of.  
The concept of ‘Information needs’ has to be refined as there is a difference between a lack 
of knowledge and a need for information. People whom lack knowledge, and are aware of it, 
will not necessarily feel the need for information. So a lack of knowledge is not always to be 
followed by information behaviour (Sonnenwald, 1999).  
Taylor has described four levels in the cognitive development of information needs (A. 
Pálsdóttir, 2005; R. S. Taylor, 1968): the visceral, conscious, formalized and compromised 
need. 
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Figure 27: Four levels in the cognitive development of information needs (R. S. Taylor, 1968) 
 
 
At the lowest, ‘visceral need’ level, the information need only exists unconsciously and is 
inexpressible. This need can develop to a conscious need, which is a mental picture of what 
is needed but it is still very ill-defined. The third level is the formalized level. People reach 
this level when a clear and formal expression of the problem and information need can be 
made. The highest level is the compromised need and is reached when people have 
redeveloped their statement of the information need, bearing in mind the specificities of the 
available information systems. 
2.6.6. Specific information needs in the context of unknown risks 
Lion, Meertens and Bot scrutinized the information seeking process, more specific they 
wanted to find out what kind of information people are looking for when they are 
confronted with unknown risks (Lion et al., 2002). They also presented the relationship of 
necessity of information with the key dimensions of the risk perception concept. In general, 
confrontation with unknown risks induces active information seeking behaviour.  
These authors also discuss the relativity of the dispersion of probability information. As we 
have already mentioned multiple times, some people have difficulties with using this kind of 
information, even when they have to take risky decisions. The central research question was 
to find out the desire for information about unknown risks. In a first phase, nine focus-
groups were conducted. Several categories of risk information were created: by means of 
the results of the focus-groups:  knowledge information (what is the risk?), information 
about the risk consequences, controllability information (what can be done about the risk?), 
information about the exposure (location, level of exposure), responsibility information 
(blame?), social coping information (how do others deal with the risk?).  
The results of the focus-groups were supported by a questionnaire that was distributed 
among 500 households in the Netherlands. 124 questionnaires were used to perform the 
data analysis. The results delivered the following sequence of importance of the information 
categories: 38,3% of the sample rated knowledge about the risk as the most important 
question, followed by information about the exposure (22,3%), consequences (17,2%), 
Compromized need: reformulation 
considering the available information systems 
Formalized need: clearly stated 
problem/need
Conscious need: ill-defined, ambiguous 
formulated need "draft"
Visceral need: unconscious, unexpressed 
need, "feeling"
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controllability information (10%), probability of the consequences (5,8%), others’ 
experiences with the risk (2,9%) and responsibility of the negative consequences (1,2%). 
Remarkable was the significant negative correlation (r=-0,32, p<0,01) between the familiarity 
with the risk and the degree in which people want to know what the risk consists of 
(knowledge component). There was also a significant negative correlation (-0,26, p<0,01) 
between the familiarity and the desire to know to what degree the risk is similar to a more 
familiar risk. These results support the hypothesis that the less familiar people are with a 
certain risk, the more they want to find out about it and create a clear definition and the 
more they will compare the risk to a more familiar one. We could define this process as the 
desire for control. People will induce this feeling of information control by seeking 
information. This may happen unconsciously (passive risk information scanning) or 
consciously (active information seeking). This active information search is then a means to 
satisfy the need for knowledge and achieve a cognitive equilibrium. We must make sure that 
we make the difference between the desire for risk information control or the desire for 
control of the risk and its consequences. Another remarkable result from this study shows 
that some people would rather receive a limited amount of unequivocal information while 
other people want as much information as possible. One of the final conclusions was that, 
even when people are not directly confronted with a risk, risk communication can be very 
difficult since some people are not and will never be susceptible to information about the 
risk. Especially people that are not actively searching for risk information nor passively 
receiving information will make belong to this group. 
This is one of the key arguments in favour of further research regarding risk information 
needs and the necessity of a customized proliferation of certain types of information to 
special target groups. The identification of these key target groups in the process of 
customized communication efforts can be established by means of a psychometric 
measurement model that includes some key identification concepts. The research of Lion, 
Meertens and Bot has delivered a considerable contribution to the operationaliaation 
process of our key items regarding specific information needs in the risk contexts of our 
quantitative empirical studies. 
Now that we have discussed the concrete information seeking processes and how 
information needs are developed, we will glance at the information sources that one the one 
hand may be addressed to retrieve risk information or on the other hand will diffuse risk 
information actively into the community.  
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2.7. Information sources 
The spectrum of information sources has increasingly risen with the diffusion of new 
information and communication technologies. Besides the flood of information, people are 
also confronted with the various sources. Sonnenwald used the term ‘information horizon’ 
to define the range of information sources that people use to seek information 
(Sonnenwald, 1999). He also stressed that a person’s information horizon can be socially 
shaped. So the choice of information sources can be influenced by ones social environment, 
especially when it comes to issues such as source reliability and credibility. Savolainen and 
Kari used the concept of information horizons in their conceptual framework. They state that 
it is in a person’s perceived information environment that the information source horizon is 
constructed (Savolainen & Kari, 2004). This personally en socially constructed information 
environment is a rather general and stable mental ‘map’ of information channels and 
sources. However, information sources are generally stable for everyday information 
seeking, but there are also more dynamic information horizons. Horizons that are 
constructed for specific problems or in certain situations are more dynamic and variable. 
What sources people will use may depend on ones social cognitive factors (P. Solomon, 
1997b), by the phase in which a person is positioned in the process of seeking meaning, by 
the nature of the information need or the characteristics of the information problem that 
has to be solved (Á. Pálsdóttir, 2008). Littlefield et al. use the term ‘meaningful access’ to 
refer to opportunities for interaction with experts and key persons in the decision making 
process and opportunities for acquiring the information that they need to make well-
informed decisions in their risk contexts  (Sellnow et al., 2009). 
Besides the role of the mass media as dominant information diffusers (as discussed earlier), 
we should not underestimate the role of interpersonal sources. With this paragraph we 
trespass the border from the individual to the social level of analysis in this chapter. 
2.8. Interpersonal sources  
Several studies have proved that people often prefer interpersonal sources (Krikelas, 1983), 
especially when they are looking for practical information or when they are in a personal 
situation (Julien & Michels, 2000). Even though the most common mode of delivery for 
‘official’ risk communication is the mass media, some authors suggest that personal contact 
is a more effective approach (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990 p.72) and some even dare 
to pone that there is little evidence that the mass media are effective persuaders (W. J. 
McGuire, 1986). 
Pálsdóttir combined various findings of scholars to explain why people seem to favour 
interpersonal sources in the context of everyday life problems: 
- The ability of the information seeker to interpret the information that is offered is 
different with formal sources than with interpersonal sources. 
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- The interactive nature of interpersonal communication (S. E. Taylor, 1991) allows 
people to ask for additional explanations. 
- Some state that interpersonal information seeking is the continuation in the process 
after having consulted other information sources (mass media etc.) In this way, 
people are able to ask for additional information to relatives or friends so that the 
information will make sense in their own, personal environments (Agada, 1999). 
 
So we may carefully conclude that interpersonal information sources are very valuable 
sources for people to amplify their information processing. Individuals as sources can be 
used to retrieve new information, to gain more comprehensible explanations in difficult 
matters, to confirm one’s thoughts and cross-check information, or to come to mutually 
constructed perceptions based on the shared information exchanges.  
The preference of interpersonal sources also has to do with their higher perceived reliability 
(A. Pálsdóttir, 2005). The reason for this may be twofold. It refers to the perceived reliability 
and trustworthiness of the persons involved. The personal sources are perceived to be 
knowledgeable and have a certain expertise in the domain that the information seeker is 
looking for information. The communication style is likely to be similar for sender and 
receiver, which is not always the case with formal sources (spokespeople authorities, mass 
media etc.) so we may state that people will perceive interpersonal sources as more reliable 
because they ‘speak the same language’ and the information and message style is fitted to 
one’s own style. 
Also the ease of access plays an important role as interpersonal sources are more available 
and more accessible, both in physical as in mental terms. To conclude, interpersonal sources 
will generally be more useful than formal information sources because of the lower physical, 
cognitive and social barriers (A. Pálsdóttir, 2005; Spink & Cole, 2001). Some publications 
with recommendations even include the need to work with specific target group audiences, 
paying special attention to the potential personal interaction in public education programs 
(Filderman, 1990). 
2.9. The role of experts in the risk communication strategy 
Are they an ideal combination of an interpersonal source and an institutional information 
agent? We think the answer to this question is certainly affirmative. Experts that can 
communicate impartially, clearly and unambiguous are perfect intermediary information 
agents as their credibility as a source and the perceived reliability of the information they 
are disseminating will be higher than for spokesmen of governments or organizations.  
Leiss (2004) is convinced that more resources should be spent on risk communication 
strategies in the risk management process and he puts special attention to the role of 
experts. The most important reason is that there is a fundamental and permanent difference 
between de way in which experts and policy makers diffuse information about the risks that 
surround us on the one hand and the public perception of risks on the other hand. Leiss 
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advocates a constructive dialogue between experts and the general public about the nature 
of real risks, their causes and about risk management strategies. He formulates the following 
tasks for experts: (1) interpreting and translating the results of scientific risk judgment 
research into a language that can be understood by the general public, (2) understanding 
and scrutinizing the public risk perceptions and (3) to involve all stakeholders into a process 
to understand all risk factors (Leiss, 2004)  
Experts are the ideal opinion leaders. Of course, opinion leadership is a trait that is not only 
assigned to experts. Opinion leaders can also be found in smaller social networks. The 
interpersonal influence of opinion leaders is probably the most powerful in the risk 
communication process. That is why we will theoretically discuss the concept in the 
following section and try to empirically identify and profile this vital target group in the 
empirical body. Let us first discuss the concept of risk as a socially constructed concept.  
3. Social Risk Perception 
3.1. The social and medial construction of risks 
In previous paragraphs we already stated that the “new” civilized risks are constructed 
through knowledge. Knowledge can be translated in different flows of information which, 
depending on the source and the receiver, result in an induction of socially and medially 
constructed risk perceptions. So the risks are constructed on the base of a causal 
interpretation. The ripple effects that are established through these control processes of 
various information agents (media, governments and scientists) can sometimes be mapped 
and controlled, but we can never be certain that we know all the effects and consequences 
that are induced by the ripple effects. So the amplification and attenuation processes are 
not completely controllable, like the risks that are the main players in these processes.  
Beck also states that we would no longer be able to estimate the new risks on the basis of 
our own knowledge, and that we are completely dependent on the induced social and 
medial definitions. Consequently, we become dependent on the norms, interests, and biases 
of those who possess and disperse the knowledge and define the risks. We could say that 
this theory reflects a lot of the conceptual ideas of the hypodermic needle theory (or magic 
bullet theory) of Katz and Lazersfeld (1955). However, we think that the selective perception 
theory is more appropriate when we take into consideration the new medial context that 
people live in. The context provides them with instant and rapid access to information 
sources. We must take into consideration that media and governments play important 
gatekeeping roles when it comes to information creation and dispersion, but the classical 
perspective of a one-way information injection into the society is not correct. 
Berger and Luckmann have explained the theory of social construction of reality in their 
book ‘The social construction of reality’ (Luckmann & Berger, 1991). The perspective that 
information is not isomorphic and that meaning and realities are constructed by 
understanding, perceptions and social influences was already communicated by Parsons in 
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1951 (Parsons, 1951). However, some scholars claimed that there are still very important 
gaps in knowledge about how to communicate about complex issues and science when 
taking into consideration that meaning is constructed by the receiver and his larger 
community network (Fessendenraden, Fitchen, & Heath, 1987). There are actually two 
perspectives on the importance and function of social influences on the social construction 
of risk realities. On the one hand there are the psychologically inspired frameworks that 
recognize the social aspects and social linkages but merely considers them as sources of 
information and elements in the information transmission process. Direct communication 
between individuals and within groups will influence individuals but eventually the 
cognitions remain the central drive for the formation, maintenance and altering of attitudes 
and behaviours (Bovasso, 1996). On the other hand there are some frameworks that are 
more sociologically inspired. These theories consider the relational aspects of individuals, 
the resulting networks and the larger self-organizing systems as the ‘social’ units of analysis 
that function as attitude, knowledge or behavioural studies (Beer & Walton, 1990) and 
facilitate or constrain the information flow and influence the individuals in that network 
(Scherer & Cho, 2003). One theory that can be situated in this last category of frameworks is 
the contagion theory of risk perception that will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
3.2. A social network contagion theory of risk perception 
In the first part of this chapter we discussed the individual cognitive mechanisms in which 
individuals collect, process and form risk perceptions. However, we considered the 
individuals as atomized units rather than interacting elements of a social system. As Scherer 
and Cho stated, these individual or micro level theories do not help explain how risk 
perceptions may vary within one single community or between communities (Scherer & Cho, 
2003 p. 261). This was their drive to construct the network theory of contagion. This 
framework, that is based on organizational and community social network studies suggests 
that the individual risk perceptions and eventually the communal risk perceptions are 
influenced by the relational characteristics of individuals and their participation in self-
organizing systems.  The social units, as they call the groups of like-minded individuals, 
behave as attitude, knowledge or behavioural studies. Cognitive analyses suggest that 
groups of individuals arrive at similar or differing and even opposing conclusions in certain 
risk contexts because they receive common or varying information through various 
information channels and from various sources. But this approach does not integrate any 
social or social-structural variables that may play part in these social risk constructions. The 
authors empirically confirmed the existence of risk perception networks: “relational 
groupings of individuals who share, and perhaps create ,similar risk perceptions” (Scherer & 
Cho, 2003 p.261). 
As we will discuss further in this chapter, many studies have been performed that have 
examined the functioning of community networks from a diffusion of innovation 
perspective. One of the key scholars in this expertise is Rogers with his diffusion of 
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innovation studies (E. M. Rogers, 1995; Everett M. Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971; T.W. Valente, 
1999). Similar studies were also conducted in other contexts such as the context of the 
adoption of new drugs by medicals (Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1957; T.W. Valente, 1999) or a 
political context (Berelson, Lazersfeld, & Mc Phee, 1954; Erik C. Nisbet, 2005). However, in 
the context of risk communication and the diffusion of risk information there have rarely 
been studies that scrutinize this theory even though better knowledge of these processes in 
risk contexts would have great value for the development of more effective risk 
communication strategies that involve complex risk information (Scherer & Cho, 2003).  
The social network contagion theory bases itself on the assumption that individual risk 
perceptions and eventually the communal risk perceptions are influenced by the relational 
characteristics of individuals and their participation in self-organizing systems. Also the 
diffusion studies start from the idea that the difffusion of an innovation occurs through a 
five–step process. This process is similar to the process of decision-making. It occurs through 
a series of communication channels over a period of time among the members of a similar 
social system. Rogers (E. M. Rogers, 1983) categorizes the five stages (steps) as: awareness 
(knowledge), interest (persuasion), evaluation (decision), trial (implementation), and 
adoption (confirmation). Rogers relies on the ideas of Katz & Lazarsfeld and the two-step 
flow theory (as discussed in 4.3.1.) in developing his ideas on the influence of opinion 
leaders in the diffusion process (Katz & Lazersfeld, 1955). The diffusion model has been 
applied in various contexts, and can deliver a very significant contribution to the field of risk 
communication. Especially the concept of opinion leaders will play a crucial role in the 
following sections. We consider opinion leaders as the driving forces of the social diffusion of 
risk information. As we will discover in our empirical studies, the socio-demographical traits, 
media profiles and specific characteristics of opinion leaders can strongly vary depending on 
the risk contexts. It will be one of the key objectives of our quantitative research studies to 
develop a generic measurement tool to identify the opinion leaders in a specific risk context 
within a community. In the last sections of this chapter, we will put special emphasis on the 
theoretical background of the opinion leadership construct. 
3.3. Opinion leaders and the media in the early age 
Since the raise of mass communication studies, the following question has always risen and 
will always rise: what is more powerful, the mass media or interpersonal communication? 
Naturally, there will also be various, similar or very opposing answers to this question 
because the relationships between individuals, groups and the media are always changing 
due to the evolving characteristics of media. At the end of the early stage of opinion 
leadership studies, the two-step flow theory had gained approval in academic environments. 
It incorporated a new perspective on the mass communication process: the perspective that 
the flow of communication was less direct and immediate and powerful as had been 
previously assumed and proclaimed by several theoretical frameworks such as the ‘powerful 
media paradigm’, or the ‘magic bullet theory’ or ‘hypodermic needle theory’(rooted in 
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1930’s). The vital role of personal communication was stressed by several authors, and more 
specifically, the function of opinion leaders within the process of two- and multi step 
communication flows was stressed and empirically confirmed. As these opinion leaders were 
of great importance because of their specific media behaviour but more important their 
personal influence on attitudes and behaviour of their peers, an intense and exuberant 
effort to investigate the nature of opinion leaders and their characteristics in terms of 
personality, media use and social behaviour was set off. This ushered in a new period of the 
“Golden age of opinion leaders”. Let us first take a look at the three perspectives on mass 
media audiences and the role of opinion leaders in these perspectives. 
3.3.1. Three perspectives on mass media audiences 
DeFleur has described three different perspectives on how individual audience members 
react on and interact with the mass media and their messages (DeFleur, 1972). The three 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive; a cooperative interaction is more probable. Wood 
has summarized these three perspectives schematically (Wood, 1983 p.176-178). 
 
3.3.1.1. Individual differences perspective 
 
 
Figure 28: The individual differences perspective (Wood, 1983 p.176) 
 
 
The individual differences perspective is a modification to the basic stimulus-response model 
of communication which states that a certain media message (stimulus) triggers an identical 
reception or behaviour (response) among all receivers of the message. The first model 
specifies that individuals will have differing responses because of selective attention and 
perception mechanisms. The second model incorporates the effect of social relationships 
and the potential of indirect effects on individuals. 
 
S
R
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R
Attitudes
Beliefs
Emotions
Values
Selective attention
1. Individual Differences Perspective
The stimulus S (media message) 
is filtered through various 
psychological traits
Exposure: selective attention
Processing: selective perception
 Each receiver R will respond 
in a different way
Selective perception
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3.3.1.2. Social relationship perspective 
 
 
Figure 29: The social relationship perspective (Wood, 1983 p.177) 
 
 
 
The social relationship perspective integrates the concept of opinion leaders as mediators of 
messages. Opinion leaders serve as informal information interpreters and personal 
information diffusers. The model is based on the study of Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 
which we will discuss further in this chapter (Berelson, Lazersfeld, & Gaudet, 1950). They 
introduced two step flow of communication by integrating a non-direct pathway for 
messages to reach the audience. Besides indirect message transaction through mediators 
(opinion leaders), direct communication and feedback flows are possible. Earlier, we stated 
that opinion leaders can both be disseminators and recipients of information and influence. 
So actually, instead of the simple two-step process it is more accurate to depict the 
communication flow as a multi-step process (G. Weimann, 1982).  
Even though this model is rather simplistic, it offers many possibilities for studies in mass 
communication. We missed the idea that people who shared similar personality or socio-
demographical traits will react in similar ways to a certain stimulus, with in-group opinion 
leaders as potential mediators of information.  
The next model will integrate this suggestion that groups of people with shared personality 
or socio demographical traits will respond to a certain message in the same way.  
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2. Social Relationship Perspective
The stimulus S (media message) is diffused trough 
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Interpretation: twofold: OL and R
 Two-step flow (Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet) + 
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R
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3.3.1.3. Social categories perspective 
 
Figure 30: The social categories perspective (Wood, 1983 p.178) 
 
 
The third model assumes that there are certain social categories of people who will respond 
in a more or less similar way to a certain stimulus (message) because they share similar 
personality traits or socio-demographical characteristics. Contradictory to the first, individual 
differences model, which has a psychological nature, this last model is inspired by the 
sociological viewpoint that, in spite of the heterogeneity of the contemporary society, 
groups of people will differentiate from each other based on their shared characteristics, 
beliefs, behaviour etc. 
3.3.1.4. Multi  step social interaction perspective 
Since the previous three models were not satisfactory as a theoretical fundament for our 
empirical study, we decided to integrate all modifications into one new model: the multi 
step social interaction perspective. The new model still involves opinion leaders as crucial 
elements in the diffusion of information, but also the idea that members of homogenously 
composed groups will react in similar ways. Every group of people (G or G) can have its own 
key opinion leader (or more). The information (S1) can flow directly from the source to the 
receivers, through the opinion leader (OL G) who transmits the information directly to his 
group member or even through an opinion leader (OL g’) who changes the information and 
sends a modified message (s’1) to certain group member s or to the whole group. The 
individual group members may process the information similarly, but also slightly differently 
due to personal characteristics (level of involvement, motivation, belief, attitude, knowledge 
etc.). These individual group members may also consult other sources that diffuse similar or 
different information (S2). The current information society includes various communication 
platforms that allow information audiences to receive information from various sources but 
S
2. Social Categories Perspective
The stimulus S (media message) is received by groups G
of receivers R
Exposure: direct, individual
Interpretation: similar interpretation by group members
 Individual audience members of one group are likely 
to respond in a similar way 
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also to actively seek information or exchange information with other individuals (in- or out-
group members or even general information sources such as mass media or authorities). 
 
 
 
Figure 31: The multi step social interaction perspective 
 
 
It is indisputable that the information and communication space has become far more 
complex and that information diffusion and exchange processes can take place much faster 
and they have a more complex but open nature. This allows people to consult an infinite 
pool of information, also about risk issues, but on the other hand it is sometimes very hard 
to deal with this information overflow. That is why opinion leaders, perceived to be 
trustworthy sources diffusing credible information, may play a very important role in the 
information selection processes of those individuals. Especially in the context of risks, as 
socially and medially constructed constructs, opinion leaders can act as information agents 
in the risk communication processes. Delivering the right target groups with the right 
information in order to increase risk awareness, stimulate protective behaviour or any other 
objective that risk communication in a certain risk situation may have, is probably the most 
significant key performance index in the risk management process. Opinion leaders may be 
experts with scientific backgrounds as well as individuals that are perceived as experts in the 
specific risk contexts and that are granted the ‘authority to speak and be listened to’. 
3.4. Interpersonal communication, personal influence and opinion leadership 
Several authors emphasized the importance of interpersonal communication in 
disseminating information about new products (King & Summers, 1970). However, it is 
important to stress the difference between interpersonal communication and personal 
influence. Personal influence refers to the effect of interpersonal communication on future 
behaviour. The formation of attitudes and decision taking are the result of the combination 
of information acquisition and processing of experiences.  All this can be based on a broad 
variety of communication media that contribute to the individual’s information inventory 
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(King & Summers, 1970). As Merton states: “If ‘influence’ referred to any and all alternations 
of behaviour it would be virtually identical with ‘social interaction’, since all interaction has 
an effect, however slight, upon behaviour in the immediate situation” (Merton, 1949).  
A central idea that has been tackled by Watts and Dodds is that influentials are important to 
the formation of public opinion. These authors roughly define influentials as “(...) a minority 
of individuals who influence an exceptional number of their peers” (Watts & Dodds, 2007 
p.441). They examine the ‘influential hypothesis’ by using a series of computer simulations in 
interpersonal influence processes. They concluded that large cascades of influence are 
driven not by influentials but by a critical mass of easily influenced individuals. 
Burt described the notion of opinion leadership as “a process of the moving of information 
from the media to opinion leaders, and influence moving from opinion leaders to their 
followers” (Burt, 1999 p.38). So he emphasizes that opinions and trends can be shaped 
across entire communities. This emphasizes the role of opinion leaders not only as 
disseminators of information but also as influencers and shapers of opinions, attitudes and 
probably also behaviour of group members. We might conclude that people who influence 
others are in their turn also influenced by others, resulting in an interactive exchange 
situation. So opinion leaders can be both disseminators and recipients of influence (G. 
Weimann, Tustin, van Vuuren, & Joubert, 2007).  
Opinion leadership is a very fascinating concept for communication scientists, both in the 
expert areas of political communication and interpersonal communication. Since the first 
appearance of this concept in Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet’s ‘The People’s Choice’ 
(Berelson et al., 1950), the social relationships perspective and the two-step flow model 
have provided some understanding about how information and ideas are diffused through 
mass media and interpersonal communication network. We thought that it would be 
interesting to introduce the concept of opinion leadership within the risk communication 
process in the context of new risks. New risks are primarily medially and socially constructed. 
As we might suppose that these personal constructions of reality are merely individual and 
subjective, we may not underestimate the power of social networking, knowledge sharing 
and personal influence. Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet pone that in comparison with 
formal media channels, personal relationships are potentially more influential because of 
the large coverage and their specific psychological characteristics (Berelson et al., 1950) that 
will be discussed in 4.7.6. When we interpret this in the construction of risk perception, we 
can only confirm this statement. However, as the following paragraph will describe, opinion 
leadership is a concept that has been tackled by scholars from various academic disciplines.  
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3.5. The multidisciplinary approach to opinion leadership 
Boone considers the Erie County study of Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1948) together 
with the Decatur study (Katz & Lazersfeld, 1955), the Elmira study of Berelson, Lazersfeld 
and Mc Phee (Berelson et al., 1954) and Merton’s more functionally oriented Rovere study 
(Merton, 1968) as the four main pioneer studies that scrutinized the concept of opinion 
leadership and the two-step flow of communication (Boone, 1971). Up till now, most 
researches about opinion leadership study the personal influence processes (Erie County, 
Elmira, Decatur) or the information diffusion processes in the domains of political 
communication and political behaviour (Berelson et al., 1950; Katz & Lazersfeld, 1955; E. C. 
Nisbet, 2006; Roch, 2005),  public health (Doumit, Gattellari, Grimshaw, & O'Brien, 2007; 
Kelly et al., 1991; Moore et al., 2004; Soumerai et al., 1998) marketing and consumer 
behaviour (K. K. Chan & Misra, 1990a; Coulter, Feick, & Price, 2002; Shoham & Ruvio, 2008; 
Sohn, 2005; Summers, 1970; Van den Bulte & Joshi, 2007; Vernette, 2004) and the diffusion 
of innovations (Coleman et al., 1957; Cosmas & Sheth, 1980; Gatignon & Robertson, 1985; E. 
M. Rogers, 1995; T.W. Valente, 1999; Watts & Dodds, 2007). 
The concept of opinion leadership cannot only be retrieved in various disciplines, scholars 
have also argued that opinion leadership can either vary by product (King & Summers, 1970) 
or by category. Some scientists dispute the existence of a generalized opinion leadership 
trait (Langaard, Crousillat, & Weisz, 1978; Myers & Robertson, 1972). So we may conclude 
from this broad variety of disciplines that the concept is a very important element in many 
different types of opinion formation and decision making processes and that social relations 
are vital elements in the diffusion of information and ideas. In the information exchange 
processes that we have illustrated in the figure of the multi step social interaction 
perspective, we notice that we can identify opinion leaders but also individuals that actively 
seek information from these opinion leaders, from other group members or other sources. 
They are called opinion seekers. The difference and overlap between opinion leadership and 
opinion seeking are described in the next paragraph. 
3.6. Opinion leaders and opinion seekers: two of a kind? 
Opinion seeking is a concept that has been less scrutinized by scholars than opinion 
leadership. However, some state that opinion leaders cannot exist without opinion seekers 
(L. R. Flynn, Goldsmith, & Eastman, 1996).  
Scholars have observed and concluded that some individuals actively seek opinions from 
more knowledgeable consumers about products or services (Arndt, 1967, 1968a; Sohn, 
2005; Wright & Cantor, 1967) so information seeking about a product is included in many 
studies as an element of external information search (Beatty & Smith, 1987; Bennett & 
Mandell, 1969; Punj & Staelin, 1983). However, it would be false to state that opinion 
seekers cannot be opinion leaders and the other way round. Moreover, opinion leaders have 
been characterized, and generally are, also opinion seekers (Shoham & Ruvio, 2008). 
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Engledow et al. first suggested that opinion leaders may also be information seekers 
(Engledow, Thorelli, & Becker, 1975), but on the other hand, not all seekers are leaders 
(Arndt, 1968b; Feick, Price, & Higie, 1986; Sheth, 1968; M. R. Solomon, 1992). The concept of 
opinion seeking was also thoroughly scrutinized and described in the report of Thorelli and 
Becker (Thorelli & Engledow, 1980). Some view opinion seeking as a co-phenomenon of 
opinion leadership (L. R. Flynn et al., 1996) whereas some see it as an extreme point on a 
leadership seeking scale (R. A. Clark & Goldsmith, 2005). Generally we could state that the 
two concepts are related, but independent. We assume that, in risk contexts, opinion 
leaders will also be information and opinion seekers since the nature of the topic is rather 
uncertain. Opinion leaders will be more involved with the risk and they will have stronger 
motivations to actively seek information and share this information with the people in their 
own environment. The relationship between opinion leadership and opinion seeking remains 
rather complex. The following overview of empirical studies illustrate the non-consensual 
nature of their relationship across the various studies (L. R. Flynn et al., 1996; Shoham & 
Ruvio, 2008). 
 
 Context Relationship correlation 
Flynn et al. 
(L. R. Flynn et al., 1996) 
Rock music Positive 0.23 
Girardi 
(Girardi, Soutar, & Ward, 2005) 
Wine consumption Negative -0.35 
Lassar, Manolis & Lassar (2005) Online banking Negative  -0.26 
Sun et al.  
(Sun, Youn, Wu, & Kuntaraporn, 2006) 
Music consumption Positive 0.62 
Bertrandias & Goldsmith 
(Bertrandias & Goldsmith, 2006) 
Fashion  Positive 0.26 
Clark et al. 
(Ronald A. Clark, Zboja, & Goldsmith, 2007) 
Fashion Positive 0.31 
Shoham & Ruvio 
(Shoham & Ruvio, 2008) 
PC/Software Negative -0.56 
Table 24: The non-consensual nature of opinion leadership and information seeking across studies 
 
 
The correlation coefficients illustrate that the relationships can be both positive and 
negative, and varying in strength. We can conclude that, depending on the specific context, 
the relationship between opinion leadership and information seeking can vary strongly in 
different contexts. As concerns the relationship between the two concepts in the context of 
risk, we assume that the correlation will be positive. In the empirical body, we will primarily 
focus on the opinion leadership concept, since this group of people may play a vital role in 
the risk communication strategies. That is why we will now discuss the concept more 
extensively. 
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3.7. Opinion leadership 
3.7.1. Definition of opinion leadership 
Defining opinion leadership is not easy as some scholars strongly emphasize the aspect of 
influence (Katz & Lazersfeld, 1955; E. M. Rogers & Cartano, 1962). Katz and Lazersfeld 
originally defined opinion leadership as “the individuals who were likely to influence other 
persons in their immediate environment” (Katz & Lazersfeld, 1955 p.3). This definition 
remains in use, more or less unchanged (Grewal, Mehta, & Kardes, 2000). 
Rogers and Cartano define opinion leadership as the degree to which the individual is able to 
influence informally other individuals’ attitudes or overt behaviour in a desired way with 
relative frequency (Rogers & Cartano, 1962). Rogers elaborates on the traditional definition 
of opinion leaders being the individuals from whom others seek information and advice. He 
adds the characteristic of influencing others in approving or disapproving new ideas and 
applies this idea in the context of the diffusion and acceptance of innovations. So Rogers 
defined information seeking and sharing as a second essential component of opinion 
leadership, besides the concept of influence. Some authors do not restrain this concept of 
influence. Dröge and Lerg (Boone, 1971) use the term ‘information leaders’ instead of 
‘opinion leaders’, which implies the disconnection from the personal influence aspect. They 
link the opinion leadership principle with the gate keeping concept. Also Klapper attributes 
the opinion leaders the role as information transmission agents or interpreters (Klapper, 
1960). Rogers & Cartano attribute the existence of opinion leadership to the need of the 
followers to obtain information and advice to create or validate their own opinions (Rogers 
& Cartano, 1962). According to us, opinion leadership is primarily about disseminating 
information to connected individuals (through personal contact or even virtual networking). 
So in our view, the primary role of the leader is the role as information transmission agent, 
retrieving, disseminating and exchanging information. The second role that we can address 
to an opinion leader is the role as interpreter. However, the second role is not always 
manifest. The role as interpreter includes a potential for altered message content, since the 
interpretation of the information that the opinion leader has received is subjective and will 
probably also be assessed and compared to knowledge that he has already gained. Naturally, 
we do not want to neglect the influential dimension of the opinion leadership construct. A 
lot of scholars, particularly in the field of public health practices, also relate the concept of 
opinion leadership to the concept of change agents (Kelly et al., 1991; Lomas et al., 1991; C. 
L. Perry, Klepp, Halper, Hawkins, & Murray, 1986; Soumerai et al., 1998). This indirectly 
implies that opinion leaders can influence people and induce change in beliefs, attitudes, 
behavioural intentions or even concrete behaviour. But it depends on the nature of the 
receiver whether he or she will be influenced by the opinion leader. 
As the terminological and conceptual history of opinion leadership is very confusing and 
depending on the concrete context, it is important to create a clear definition of the concept 
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in our own research context. In the context of risk communication, we define the concept as 
follows: 
 
Opinion leaders are information transmission agents that seek, receive, interpret and 
transmit information to other individuals that are in personal (direct) or impersonal 
(through other channels such as the internet) contact with them. Depending on the 
specific personality traits and information needs of the people that receive information 
from or seek information with them, opinion leaders may have an influence on these 
information receivers. 
 
Now that we have defined our perspective on the opinion leadership concept, we will argue 
why it is so important to study them.  
3.7.2. Why study opinion leaders? 
In risk communication strategies, a lot of emphasis is usually put on the media strategies in 
the assumption that messages will reach their target groups most efficiently by means of 
these communication channels. However, we have highlighted the importance of 
interpersonal communication, especially in the context of risk communication. Interpersonal 
communication and opinion leadership are crucial thought to take into account when 
efficient risk communication strategies have to be put up. We will prove the necessity and 
importance to take these opinion leaders into account. Long time ago Van Den Ban 
concluded his article with the following findings (Van den Ban, 1964). His conclusions are in 
fact quite easily reconciled with our risk communication context: 
- Mass media are important institutes to arouse the interest in new methods early in 
the adoption process, but personal contacts and interpersonal communication are 
especially influential in the decision to adopt the new methods. Also in the context of 
risk decisions interpersonal communication and information retrieving via opinion 
leaders may contribute to the risk decision process. 
- The first persons to adopt a new idea make intensive use of all sources which can 
provide reliable information about the idea. Both personal contacts as mass media 
are included in their sources. So opinion leaders will also make part of the source 
horizon and even be a primary source due to their high perceived credibility 
compared to other sources. 
- Problems that are untransparent will often make people turn to the knowledgeable 
people in their environments: the opinion leaders. They are perceived to be the best 
informed people about the topic in the community. Especially the ‘new risks ‘such as 
terrorism and the financial crisis are contexts in which people will try to retrieve 
information and feel more in control from their personal contacts. 
- However, on most new ideas, people will not feel an urgent need for information. In 
this case, people will retrieve their information through personal contacts. As the 
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descriptive statistics of the empirical studies will illustrate, only a very small portion 
of people are actively seeking information about risks. They will rather adopt 
information from people in their personal environment, including opinion leaders.  
As described in chapter one, Kasperson and Kasperson stress the fact that the majority of 
the civil population acquires information through information systems (mediated, indirect 
experiences) and through interpersonal, direct experiences (R. E. Kasperson & Kasperson, 
1996). Certain risk communicators, such as the media and opinion leaders, are information 
agents that can amplify or attenuate risks. It is therefore important to identify these 
information agents as they may play a vital role in risk communication strategies. We find it 
of vital importance to study opinion leadership in the context of risk communication because 
of the crucial role they play in the risk management process. Since every risk context will 
probably have a different opinion leadership profile, it is essential to be able to identify the 
opinion leaders on the one hand and construct their specific socio demographical and media 
profiles.  
Before moving to the classification of opinion leaders and the methods how to identify and 
scrutinize opinion leaders, we will first provide an overview of the pioneer studies of opinion 
leadership. They are all discussed in detail by Boone (1971). The subjoined table on the next 
page summarizes the five key studies between 1940 and 1955. These studies have served as 
the basic works for many scholars that are active in various disciplines, as mentioned in 3.5. 
The Erie County study is considered as the first study that has introduced the concept of 
opinion leadership. Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet were the first to introduce the two step 
flow hypothesis and to scrutinize and confirm that influences of mass media is limited and 
that interpersonal communication and personal influence play a vital role in the formation of 
attitudes and opinions (Berelson et al., 1950). The table also mentions the different research 
methods that were used to identify and describe opinion leaders. Both qualitative 
(interviews, case study) as quantitative research methods are possible but differ in the 
nature of their outcome. 
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Study Period Researchers Method Key finding 
Erie County study 1940 Lazersfeld 
Berelson 
Gaudet 
Panel study 
 
New survey design, longitudinal 
Limits of media influence, importance of personal influence 
Two – step flow theory, opinion leadership concept 
Rovere Study 1949 Merton Case study First typology of opinion leaders 
- Real vs. Potential opinion leaders 
- Local vs. Cosmopolitan opinion leaders 
- Monomorphous vs. Polymorphous opinion leaders 
Elmira Study 1954 Berelson  
Lazersfeld 
McPhee 
  
Decatur study 1955 Katz 
Lazersfeld 
Interviews Three dimensions related to the position and functioning of opinion leaders 
- Position on the social ladder 
- Position in the life cycle 
- Gregariousness: extend of social contacts 
The Drug Study 1955 Menzel  
Katz 
Interviews Dominance of personal influence over media influences in the context of the adoption of 
new drugs 
Table 25: Overview of the pioneer studies of opinion leadership
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3.7.3. Classification of opinion leaders 
The first typology of opinion leaders was developed by Merton in the Rovere study (Gabriel 
Weimann, 1994). He distinguished the following classifications of opinion leaders: 
 
- Real and potential opinion leaders:  depending on the phase of personal influence. 
- Momomorphous and polymorphous opinion leaders: depending on the sphere of 
influence (politics, marketing, etc.). 
- Local and cosmopolitan opinion leaders: depending on their location and influential 
range. 
 
The latter classification is very characteristic for the period in which the concept of opinion 
leadership was defined. The main criterion for this classification is their orientation towards 
their community and their larger society. It uses four dimensions: 
 
- The structure of social relations 
This includes the extend in which the opinion leader is bound to his community and 
the structure of their social networks. Cosmopolitans have a more selective pattern 
of social contacts and locals are concerned with the quantity of contacts. 
- The avenues to influential status 
The cosmopolitan’s credentials are located in their prestige and authority while the 
local opinion leaders rely on his social ties, social record and his ability to get social 
recognition. 
- The exercise of influence 
Cosmopolitans are perceived by Merton as being greater experts (more knowledge) 
but less personal whereas local opinion leaders are depicted as more familiar and 
greater listeners (more understanding). 
- Utilization of mass media 
The last dimension that is used to distinguish the two types of opinion leaders as 
formulated by Merton is the use of mass media and the difference in information 
needs. The general conclusion is that locals rely more on their interpersonal sources 
and prefer reported news while cosmopolitans use more analytical news with a 
broader scope (world news) using various types of mass media. 
 
These dimensions and the resulting classification were very valid in its own context and time 
frame. However, we cannot use these dimensions to classify opinion leaders in our 
contemporary information society because of the following reasons. 
The structures of social relations have changed tremendously. The majority of people in 
contemporary western societies live in a multimedia environment, have access to a very 
diverse horizon of information and communication sources and channels and have the 
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opportunities to connect to far more networks, communities and individuals, covering the 
entire world. This global interconnectedness allows people and opinion leaders to be 
cosmopolitans. 
The avenues to influential status have changed content wise. We could state that opinion 
leaders now find satisfaction in both prestige and authority as social recognition. Space does 
not matter anymore. 
The exercise of influence dimension has changed as well because of the disappearing of 
‘localness’. Since all potential opinion leaders have access to a vast amount of information, 
the knowledge that can be gained is equal. The global interconnectedness may also limit the 
difference between familiarity since the proximity condition to gain familiarity and 
confidence has changed as people can live far apart but still be very close. 
The last dimension has probably become the most important one to base classifications on. 
Since the possibilities of information channels and media has changed tremendously during 
the last decades, people and more specifically opinion leaders will need to define their 
information needs very securely. The selection of information sources will depend on the 
specific information needs and the desired level of credibility of the information that is 
offered. The boundaries between interpersonal sources and mass media have become very 
vague since interpersonal communication is increasingly taking place through mass media 
technologies. The rising possibilities for interactive communication and information 
exchange between individuals and between individuals and authorities have induced a new 
mode of decision taking where the public can be (pro) actively involved in (risk) decision 
processes (constructing solutions and proposals,  evaluating and decision taking).  
We suggest classifying opinion leaders based on their concrete information seeking 
behaviour and their intensity of their social behaviour. We will also add a component that 
refers to the influential aspect of opinion leadership.  
Classifications of opinion leaders will strongly depend on the underlying methodology and 
even statistical methods. That is why it is important to provide information about the 
existing methods to scrutinize opinion leadership. 
3.7.4. Methods of studying opinion leadership 
Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1952) were the first to propose a methodology to measure 
opinion leadership. They stated that an index of personal exposure needs to be created. This 
index could be compared to the media exposure indices and would consist of a systematic 
inventory of the numerous personal contacts and discussions the opinion leaders and 
followers had over a certain sample of days. 
Several other authors (Rogers & Cartano, 1972; Gabriel Weimann, 1994) refer to four main 
methods of identifying opinion leaders: 
1. The Sociometric Method 
2. The Informants’ Ratings Method 
3. The Observation Method  
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4. The Self-designation Method 
Weimann even added two more methods (G. Weimann et al., 2007) 
5. The Positional method 
6. The Reputational method 
The sociometric technique identifies the opinion leaders in a certain population by asking 
the members to whom they address themselves to retrieve information. The method was 
first founded by Moreno in the 1950s to map social ties, individual positions in groups and 
social ranking according to number of preferences (Moreno, 1953). Sociometric designs can 
be used to identify opinion leaders through the eyes of the followers. The main critique on 
this method is that we might question its face validity and the fact that it can only be applied 
in smaller groups as all group members need to be questioned. Some examples of research 
based on the sociometric technique are the studies performed by Rao and Bhaskaran, 
Granovetter and Weimann (Gabriel Weimann, 1994). 
The informant’s ratings technique uses key informants who will identify the opinion leaders. 
In this way, the researchers do not have to interrogate the entire group. This method was 
used to identify opinion leaders in the context of health innovations by Puska et al., Van den 
Ban studied opinion leadership in three Dutch rural communities using both the sociometric 
as the informants ratings method (Van den Ban, 1964 in ; Gabriel Weimann, 1994). The 
limitations of the second method are the uncertainty about the representativeness of the 
informants one chooses to represent the entire group and its limited suitability for empirical 
research in small groups with known boundaries and limited usefulness in the study of large 
social communities (E. M. Rogers & Cartano, 1962). 
The observation method is limited to small social units as well, as the observer monitors the 
group’s activities and investigates communication behaviour in order to describe the 
information and communication flows within the group and the influence of certain 
individuals within the group. Kelly used this method to identify key opinion leaders in the 
context of HIV risk behaviour (Kelly et al., 1991). 
The fourth method, the self-designating technique, will use validated scales to identify 
opinion leaders by means of surveys. We will discuss this method more extensively in 3.7.5. 
The positional method assumes that elected or appointed positions in the community are 
opinion leaders. This technique is cheap because the opinion leaders are easily identified but 
of course, it can be highly inaccurate because it assumes that opinion leadership is solely 
based upon position. 
The reputational method uses the nominations of selected individuals on e.g. ‘the ten most 
influential persons in this community regarding a certain issue’. It is a more accurate method 
than the previous one because the researcher is getting information from various sources. 
Valente and Pumpuang categorized close to 200 studies that have studied or used opinion 
leaders to promote behaviour change into 10 methods. The subjoined overview offers a 
complete summary, including the advantages, disadvantages and sample instruments for 
each (T. W. Valente & Pumpuang, 2007). The subjoined table offers an overview of the 
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methods, techniques, advantages, disadvantages and instruments used for identifying 
opinion leaders. 
179 
 
Methods, Techniques, Advantages, Disadvantages and Instruments Used for Identifying Opinion Leaders 
Method Technique Advantages Disadvantages Instruments 
1. Celebrities Recruit well-known people 
who are national, regional or 
local celebrities 
Easy to implement 
Pre-existing opinion leaders 
High visibility 
Contradictory personal 
behaviour 
Difficult to recruit 
Media or individuals identify 
2. Self-selection Volunteers are recruited 
through solicitation 
Easy to implement 
Low cost 
Selection bias 
Uncertain ability 
Individuals volunteer for 
leadership roles 
3. Self-identification Surveys use a leadership 
scale and those scoring 
above some threshold are 
considered leaders 
Easy to implement 
Pre-existing opinion leaders 
Selection bias 
Validity of self-reporting 
Opinion leadership scales 
4. Staff Selected Leaders selected based on 
community observation 
 
Easy to implement 
 
Staff misperceptions 
Leaders may lack motivation 
Staff determines which 
persons appear to be 
opinion leaders 
5. Positional Approach Persons who occupy 
leadership positions such as 
clergy, elected officials, 
media and business elites  
Easy to implement 
Pre-existing opinion leaders 
May not be leaders for the 
community 
Lack of motivation 
Lack of relevance 
1. Do you hold an elected 
office or position of 
leadership? 
2. Are you a member of 
any community 
organizations? Which 
ones? 
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Methods, Techniques, Advantages, Disadvantages and Instruments Used for Identifying Opinion Leaders 
Method Technique Advantages Disadvantages Instruments 
6. Judge’s ratings Knowledgeable community 
members identity leaders 
Easy to implement 
Trusted by community 
Dependent on the selection 
of raters and their ability to 
rate 
Persons who are 
knowledgeable identify 
leaders to be selected and 
rate all community members 
on leadership ability 
7. Expert identification Trained ethnographers study 
communities to identify 
leaders 
 
Implementation can be done 
in many settings 
Dependent on expert’s 
ability 
Participant observers watch 
interaction within the 
community and determine 
who people go to for advice 
8. Snowball method Index cases provide 
nominations of leaders who 
are in turn interviewed until 
no new leaders are 
identified 
Implementation can be done 
in many settings 
Provides some measure of 
the social network 
Validity may depend on 
index case selection 
It can take considerable time 
to trace individuals who are 
nominated 
Those nominated or a 
random selection of those 
nominated are also asked 
this question 
9. Sample sociometric Randomly selected 
respondents nominate 
leaders and those receiving 
frequent nominations are 
selected 
Implementation can be done 
in many settings 
Provides some measure of 
the social network 
Results are dependent on 
the representativeness of 
the sample may be restricted 
to communities <5000 
members 
Randomly selected sample 
or cases are asked who they 
go to for advice 
10. Sociometric All (or most) respondents 
are interviewed and those 
receiving frequent 
nominations are selected 
 
Entire community network 
can be mapped 
May have high validity and 
reliability 
 
Time consuming and 
expensive to interview 
everyone 
May be limited to small 
communities (< 1000 
members) 
All respondents are asked 
who they go to for advice 
Table 26: Overview of the methods, techniques, advantages, disadvantages and instruments used for identifying opinion leaders (T. W. Valente & 
Pumpuang, 2007)
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We have opted for the self-designation method in our empirical research as it measures the 
individual’s perception of his opinion leadership “level”, which will eventually affect his 
behaviour and attitudes. 
3.7.5. The self-designation method and the use of measurement scales 
The self-designation method requires the development or the implementation of solid and 
valid measurement scales. Several authors have developed multiple item measurement 
scales that aimed to measure the concept of opinion leadership. 
The original opinion leadership scale of Lazersfeld et al. (1948) consisted of two questions: 
‘Has anyone recently asked you for advice on a political question?’ and ‘Have you recently 
tried to convince anyone of your political ideas?’. Rogers (1961) added 4 questions and 
customized the scale to the context of the diffusion of new ideas among farmers in Ohio.  
Childers tested and validated a revised opinion leadership scale with 7 items with an internal 
consistency of 0.79 (cronbach’s alpha) but came to a revised scale with six items (alpha = 
0.83) (Childers, 1986). The Childers’s version of King and Summers opinion leadership scale is 
probably the most common self-report scale, even though some authors think that it is 
rather a tool to measure the engagement in social communication than a measurement of 
the influence of opinion leaders (L. R. Flynn, Goldsmith, & Eastman, 1994). Measuring 
influence is a very complex assignment. When self-designation methods are used, we do not 
measure the actual strength of potential influences of an individual, but we scrutinize the 
degree in which the individual (potential opinion leader) perceives himself as an influencing 
source of information. Measuring and mapping the specific flow of influences and the 
direction and strength of influences requires other methods (e.g. judge’s ratings, expert 
identification or sociometric techniques) and more in depth and qualitative analyses. 
Weimann and his colleagues critically screened and tested the Personality Strength scale in 
the context of a traditional community (G. Weimann et al., 2007). The personality strength 
scale had been used in several studies as an instrument to identify opinion leaders. The 
personality strength scale was created by the Allensbach Institut, headed by Noelle-
Neumann, and was based on numerous questionnaire items related to self-perceived levels 
of personal influence. However, Weimann proved empirically that the PS scale did not 
identify the influentials and on top of that, it did not correlate with assumed opinion 
leadership traits.  
Rogers and Cartano provided the roots for the King and Summers opinion leadership scale 
(King & Summers, 1970). Besides the development of solid instruments to identify opinion 
leaders, scholars also focused on the motivations for opinion leadership (Dichter, 1966), 
measurement issues (Childers, 1986; L. R. Flynn et al., 1994; King & Summers, 1970) and the 
outcomes of opinion leadership (Bloch, 1986). 
Flynn et al. developed and validated a multiple-item self-report scale to measure opinion 
leadership and opinion seeking for specific product or service domains. By means of 5 
separate studies, they provide evidence for the uni-dimensionality, reliability and construct- 
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and criterion related validity of the two final scales. The final scale for measuring opinion 
leadership included 6 items (cronbach’s alpha = 0.86) and the scale to measure opinion 
seeking included the same amount of items (cronbach’s alpha = 0.87). 
In the context of risk communication, the identification of opinion leaders in communities 
has primarily been scrutinized in the context of AIDS (Caceres, Celentano, Coates, Hartwell, 
Kasprzyk et al., 2007; Caceres, Celentano, Coates, Hartwell, Kelly et al., 2007; T. W. Valente, 
2006; T. W. Valente & Pumpuang, 2007) and other health care contexts (Doumit et al., 
2007). Also in the context of political communication, scholars have recognized the 
importance of personal influence and interpersonal discussion in the processes of shaping 
public opinions, political behaviours and idea diffusion (E. C. Nisbet, 2006; E. M. Rogers, 
1995; Scheufele & Shah, 2000; Gabriel Weimann, 1994; Yin, 1998). So scientific literature, 
and especially empirical studies, about opinion leadership in the context of socially 
constructed risks is very scarce. That is why our second research objective in all quantitative 
survey studies in the empirical body is: 
 
The creation and validation of a typology of risk information seekers that is consistent over 
risk contexts. The second part of this objective is to identify the opinion leaders in the 
various risk contexts and to construct their general and media profiles so that this group of 
people, that is the primary target group for the risk communication programs, can be 
described and reached effectively by means of customized messages that address their 
specific risk information needs through the sources channels that are mainly used an 
trusted by them. 
 
Opinion leadership has been previously defined as exhibiting three primary dimensions: 
social embeddedness, information-giving, and information-seeking behaviours (Coleman et 
al., 1957; L. R. Flynn et al., 1996; Gabriel Weimann, 1994). Cross-cultural research on opinion 
leadership has noted that the nature and type of information-seeking behaviours are the 
most culturally contingent of the three dimensions (Dawar, Parker, & Price, 1996). 
Huntington performed several studies in which he tried to categorize health information 
consumers into various groups and profile them according to various traits (Huntington, 
Nicholas, & Williams, 2003; Huntington, Nicholas, Williams, & Gunter, 2002). Huntington 
discovered four groups: active traditional information users, passive traditional information 
users, electronic isolated users and electronic sociable users. So the clustering was primarily 
based on two traits: level of active information behaviour and social behaviour. In our 
empirical findings, we will come to similar conclusions.  
Our approach to identify opinion leaders in large samples is still somewhat different. As the 
empirical chapter points out, our classification of information seekers (or non-seekers) is 
based on three main characteristics that combine both theoretical perspectives of opinion 
leadership as perspectives of information seeking behaviour in risk contexts. The three 
determining dimensions are information seeking behaviour, social behaviour and the specific 
opinion leadership item(s) that measure perceived influence. 
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- Information seeking behaviour, split up in active information seeking, event-triggered 
information seeking and passive information scanning. 
- Social behaviour, expressed in the frequency of talking to others about the involved risk 
context 
- Specific opinion leadership traits: influence. In these first surveys that we conducted, 
this trait was measured by means of one specific item: 
“In conversations, my friends, colleagues, family… attach much importance to my opinion 
concerning (…the risk context…).”  
 
Although we assume that opinion leadership profiles may vary strongly across different risk 
contexts, we summarized some key empirical findings in the next section. 
3.7.6. Characteristics of the opinion leaders 
3.7.6.1. Percentage of opinion leaders 
The percentage of opinion leaders in previous studies varies greatly depending on the used 
methodology: the research context, the formulation of the questions, and the way in which 
they are identified. Of course, the issue arises that we can only determinate the percentage 
of opinion leaders or influentials in relationship with the precise definition that is being used. 
Some classical studies suggest that individuals who directly influence more than three or 
four of their peers should be considered influentials (Coleman et al., 1957; Merton, 1968), 
while market research  studies have concluded that this number rise as high as 14 (Burson-
Marsteller, 2001).  
Some researchers define influentials in relative terms: some authors define influentials as 
those who score in the top 32% of an opinion leadership test (Coulter et al., 2002). Engledow 
et al. related the concept of opinion seeking and leading and identified 42% of their sample 
as opinion seekers (Engledow et al., 1975). 
The amount of self-reported opinion leaders is 21% in the ECS study and 22,1% in the Elmira 
study (Boone, 1971). It is very hard to proclaim an overall number of opinion leaders. 
However, Boone states that, in the political domain, we can considerate the amount of one 
opinion leader per 3 or 4 persons as realistic (Boone, 1971). 
3.7.6.2. Characteristics of opinion leaders 
Weimann uses the early empirical opinion leadership studies as a foundation to define some 
characterizations of opinion leaders (Gabriel Weimann, 1994): 
- Opinion leadership is independent of sex, age groups and all social levels but in most 
areas opinion leaders influence people from the same social level 
- They take part in various social activities and social organizations 
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- They are considered experts in their field by friends, colleagues, family and take 
central positions in their personal networks 
- They are more exposed to mass media 
- They are interested, involved in the field in which they are influential. We might 
deduct from this that opinion leaders are heavy information seekers in their field of 
interest 
- They tend to be more monomorphous than polymorphous 
- They are more involved in formation and informal personal communication than 
non-leaders 
- They are aware of the fact that they are important sources of information and 
influence for their peers. The latter characteristic might illustrate that the self-
designation method should not be underestimated as a reliable method for the 
identification of opinion leaders.  
 
Of course, the characteristics of opinion leaders depend on the socio- economical context in 
which they are defined as the social structures within a society and the interpersonal 
communication flows change according to the resources they possess: media, time etc. 
Lazersfeld, Berelson and Gaudet present five psychological characteristics that make 
personal influences effective. Some of these characteristics can also be used in the context 
of risk perceptions (Berelson et al., 1950). The first characteristic is non-purposiveness. 
Personal contact is much more casual and non-intrusive. We might suppose that people who 
do not actively seek risk information or passively process risk information from media may 
be isolated from general risk information. However we must realize that they can hardly 
avoid information that is spread through personal contact and interpersonal communication. 
One can avoid media exposure, but if there is extra media attention for certain topics about 
terrorism or the terrorist threat it is very hard to avoid the discussions that are be triggered 
by the dominance of the media attention to this media topic. Lazersfeld et al. confirm this by 
stating that personal influence is more pervasive and less self-selective than the formal 
media (Berelson et al., 1950). Besides the non-purposiveness we can also add the non-
persuasiveness trait of the personal contacts. People who are occasionally encountered with 
information about terrorism and the risks involved through personal contact will be less 
suspicious because their information source has no persuasive intentions. A third trait is 
trustworthiness. In the current information society, people must, actively or passively select 
and interpret information from various information sources. Especially the internet has a lot 
of advantages in the process of information gathering and interpreting: people have access 
to an infinite amount of information from all over the world. They can achieve information 
from their personally selected sources, and they will mostly select information which 
confirms their own perceptions. However, the credibility of this information will not be very 
high. Some people will put reliance upon their personal contacts to construct their own risk 
society. These personal contacts they rely on will mostly be defined as the ‘opinion leaders’. 
Trust in these persons’ points of view will be dependent on their status as a risk information 
185 
 
agent. The greater the degree of conformity, the higher the status as an opinion leader will 
be. So people will be more influenced by people who they perceive as being well-informed 
and capable of providing them with trustworthy information about terrorism.  
Rogers and Cartano (1962) also extracted three generalizations about opinion leaders. 
Opinion leaders deviate less from group norms than the average group member, so they 
exemplify the values of their followers. There are two types of opinion leaders: most of them 
are monomorphic: these people have a limited amount of expertise domains. The second 
type of opinion leaders is polymorphic: he has several areas of expertise and influence. The 
general opinion leaders has a high level of social participation and they are likely to use more 
impersonal, technically accurate sources of information (Rogers and Cartano, 1962 p 437).  
In their study of influentials, Keller and Berry have empirically confirmed higher levels of 
education to be the most definitive demographic characteristic of opinion leaders (Erik C. 
Nisbet, 2005). Berelson and Steiner and Shah and Scheufele also found similar relationship 
between opinion leadership and education (Berelson, 1964; Shah & Scheufele, 2006). As 
mentioned previously, no stable demographic factors have been found to be significantly 
linked to opinion leadership, especially since the social, cultural, and issue spheres of opinion 
leadership can vary so widely (Gabriel Weimann, 1994). However, Keller and Berry did note 
that influentials identified by the engagement model tended to be somewhat older than the 
general population (E. C. Nisbet, 2006). 
Opinion leaders have a greater exposure to mass media than their followers (E. M. Rogers & 
Cartano, 1962) and some scholars have stated that they are heavy consumers of mass media 
(E. M. Rogers, 1983; Summers, 1970) 
One of the early researchers, Elihu Katz, suggests that there are three criteria to distinguish 
opinion leaders from non-leaders (Gabriel Weimann, 1994): 
- Who one is: includes the description of the personal values of the opinion leader 
- What one knows: includes the knowledge and competences of the opinion leader 
compared to non-leaders. 
- Whom one knows: what is their strategic location in their social network. 
We chose to use very similar criteria to define our concept of opinion leadership: 
- What one knows: we use the specific information seeking behaviour as a distinguishing 
factor  
- Whom one talks to and how frequently: as it is very complex to map the social network 
of one person in the current information society, we decided that it is better to state that 
opinion leaders will talk to their peers more frequently about their topics and that the 
people they talk to is not limited but includes family friends and colleagues. They can 
definitely be characterized as socially active (Venkatraman, 1990). Either way, consumers 
tend to regard friends and relatives as more credible and trustworthy than commercial 
information sources (Childers, 1986). Also Solomon stated that product opinion leaders 
are innovative and active communicators. Besides purchasing products, they actually 
communicate both positive and negative information about the products (M. R. 
Solomon, 1992). 
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3.7.6.3. Opinion leaders and seekers, their information search profiles and 
media usage 
Besides the identification of opinion leaders, it is important to identify and utilize differing 
information search profiles and eventually construct the media profiles of these key persons. 
In the context of product diffusion models, many authors have attempted to identify the 
opinion leaders en opinion seekers by means of measurement scales (L. R. Flynn et al., 
1996), but they also tried to construct their information search profiles (Shoham & Ruvio, 
2008). Early studies focused on interpersonal discussion as the primary source of 
information for opinion leaders, though this emphasis was most likely the result of the 
limited media density (prior to television, Internet, etc.) of that specific period (Gabriel 
Weimann, 1994). Katz not only confirmed opinion leaders’ generally higher levels of media 
use and exposure, as mentioned previously, but added an additional dimension as well. He 
found that across spheres of influence, opinion leaders paid a higher level of attention to 
media and news specific to that sphere (Katz, 1957). For the use of print media, several 
scholars have confirmed that opinion leaders tend to use the print media at much higher 
levels than the general population (K. K. Chan & Misra, 1990b; Shah & Scheufele, 2006; 
Gabriel Weimann, 1994). The opposite is true when it comes to their television viewing 
behaviour. Opinion leaders tend to watch equally or less television than average (Levy, 1978; 
Shah & Scheufele, 2006; Gabriel Weimann, 1994). 
3.7.6.4. Opinion leaders in the context of risk communication  
The opinion leaders appear to be very important gatekeepers for risk information. Opinion 
leaders are characterized by their information seeking behaviour and their need to share 
information with others. Our empirical research will allow us to describe their information 
needs, their information seeking behaviour and media profiles. We should ask ourselves 
whether it is necessary to use the opinion leaders as change agents in the context of risk 
communication practices about new risks. In our opinion, they can play a very important 
role, especially when we consider them as a crucial link in a multi step social interaction 
process where they can serve as information transmitters, as gatekeepers or even as 
information interpreters. Research has indicated that the socio-demographical profiles of 
opinion leaders vary according to the specific contexts they are scrutinized in. However, we 
could identify three crucial dimensions that will allow us to differentiate leaders from non-
leaders: information seeking behaviour, social behaviour and interpersonal influence. One of 
the key objectives of our empirical research is to identify the opinion leaders in three 
different risk contexts and to construct their specific socio-demographical and media 
profiles. This output may contribute crucial information in the development of effective risk 
communication strategies. 
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4. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this chapter was to construct the theoretical foundations for our 
empirical research studies. When constructing risk communication strategies, the first step is 
to reconcile the actual objective knowledge about the risk with the information about the 
public risk perceptions. As risk communication efforts are aimed at this public, the public risk 
perceptions and risk information needs of the various target groups that can be identified 
are probably even more important. There are two levels of analysis: the individual level and 
the social level. The social cognitive theory of Bandura merges the cognitive and social 
perspectives and tries to link them to the behavioural component (Bandura, 2001). 
The first part of this chapter focused mainly on the individual or cognitive perspective. 
Individual risk perception theories such as the psychometric paradigm, the heuristic 
systematic information processing model and the experiential mode of risk perception 
clarified the mechanisms that underlie risk perception, but also the role of the media in the 
construction of risk perceptions was discussed. The next step was to relate risk perception to 
concrete behaviour. The stronger the preexisting perceived self-efficacy and the more 
responsible institutes promote and diffuse the idea that people can enhance their control 
over the risks that surround them, the more people will be convinced of their self-regulative 
efficacy. One of the main conclusions was that preventive risk practices are stimulated 
better by a heightened self-efficacy than by elevating fear. Besides the concept of self-
efficacy, information search behaviour is of vital importance to our theoretical foundation. 
Information behaviour consists of three levels: information behaviour, information seeking 
behaviour and information search behaviour. We discussed the levels by means of various 
sources that are available. Especially the information seeking level was described into detail 
because the concepts of active and passive information seeking are the main components of 
our opinion leadership identification tool. The Framework of Risk Information Seeking model 
integrates three basic factors that contribute to the awareness of the risk context. It involves 
the particular perception of the risk, the perceived personal control and the involvement of 
the individual with the risk context. So it is a nice reflection of our basic perspective that 
includes the duality of cognitive and social elements. The first part was concluded by 
formulating empirical and theoretical viewpoints about the general and specific information 
needs of people in the context of risk perception and more specifically in the context of 
opaque or untransparent risks. The role of interpersonal sources and interpersonal 
communication in the information seeking processes was confirmed. Interpersonal 
communication was considered to be one of the basic elements of the social construction of 
risk perceptions. This theoretical concept of interpersonal communication was the basic 
ingredient of the second part of this chapter. The social construction of risks has also been 
elucidated by several theoretical viewpoints, such as the model of social and medial 
construction of risks, the social network contagion theory of risk perception. The three basic 
perspectives on how individual audience members react on and interact with the mass 
media and their messages have been described as well: the individual differences 
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perspective, the social relationship perspective and the social categories perspective. We 
concluded the summary with an upgraded model, the multi step social interaction 
perspective since the previous three models did not provide us with a satisfactory answer to 
the contemporary needs. We added concepts of interactivity, non personal direct 
information flows, possibilities of new and interactive information sources and feedback 
loops. The crucial focus within the second part however was on the opinion leadership 
construct. After explaining the multidisciplinary character of the construct, pointing out the 
difference with opinion seeking and constructing an own definition of opinion leadership in 
the context of risk communication, we provided an overview of the first studies of opinion 
leadership and summarized the main methods to scrutinize the construct. We concluded by 
providing the reader with some general characteristics of opinion leaders that were 
empirically confirmed in various contexts. We were also able to identify three crucial 
dimensions that will allow us to differentiate leaders from non-leaders: information seeking 
behaviour, social behaviour and interpersonal influence. One of the key objectives of our 
empirical research is to identify the opinion leaders in three different risk contexts and to 
construct their specific socio-demographical and media profiles. This output may contribute 
crucial information in the development of effective risk communication strategies.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL BODY 
1. General introduction to the empirical body 
This empirical component offers the coherent research reports of the research that has been 
completed during the period of 2004-2009. The final aim of the reports is to provide a clear 
overview of the research topics, objectives, methodologies and results of the 8 studies that 
have been performed in the broad context of risk perception and risk communication. The 
final chapter will try to present an overall summary of the results of the 8 studies that will be 
the foundation of the general managerial recommendations that can be used to construct 
effective and generic risk communication strategies in various risk contexts. 
 
What pulled the trigger 
 
On demand of the NATO Human Factors & Medicine Research and Technology Experts 
Group (HFM-140/RTG) on the Psychosocial, Cultural and Organizational Aspects of 
Terrorism, we developed a conceptual measurement model of psychological resilience in the 
face of terrorism: Resiscope©. By means of the first, exploratory large scaled survey study, 
the  ‘Al Resilience Task Force’5 constructed an eight-dimensional conceptual model for 
psychosocial resilience in the face of a terrorist threat.  Six dimensions – attitudes toward 
governmental initiatives, personal preoccupation, perceived risk and fear, knowledge, 
mental distance and social support – relate specifically to terrorism. The other two 
dimensions – major life stressors, personal and social resources – have a general nature. As 
this was a broad exploratory study no specific hypotheses were put forward, only some 
assumptions abstracted from previous research on different parts of the model. Each of the 
dimensions could serve as input, output or mediator variable for the others, in the end all 
contributing to psychosocial resilience in the face of a terrorist threat. The fundamental aim 
of ‘ResiScope’ at the Department of Communication Studies at Ghent University was to 
connect the two main weapons in this psychological warfare: psychological resilience of the 
general population on the one hand and risk communication strategies on the other hand.  
The first study was a pilot study: a broad exploratory study that had to reveal the 
underpinning concepts of resilience in the face of terrorism. However, the final aim of this 
PhD was not to dig into the field of coping and personal and communal resilience. The 
concept of resilience has many links with the risk communication discipline. So within the 
                                                     
5 “The Al Resilience Task Force” is a task force that was set up in 2004 and that consisted of Prof. dr. Gino Verleye, Isabelle 
Stevens, Pieter A. Maeseele,  Griet Verhaert, Sarah Timmerman, Mike Vandekerckhove and Paul Piedfort. 
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bedding of resilience and risk communication literature, the inspiration source was 
retrieved. However, the scope of this doctoral dissertation was not to develop psychometric 
measurement models for measuring resilience and its underlying drivers in the face of 
terrorism. The aim was to develop concrete risk communication models and strategies. If we 
want to develop communication strategies, it is of course indispensible to scrutinize the 
needs and the profiles of the various target groups, as discussed in chapter four. Besides 
theoretical grounds for the need for identifying and mapping the specific characteristics and 
information needs of the various stakeholders, we also found inspiration with Beljon. Beljon 
developed the Managing Public Confidence wheel (MPC wheel): “a method to develop a 
corporate communication strategy even for issues that involve stakeholders with different 
interests” (Beljon, 2001 p.269). Firstly, he stressed the importance of stakeholder 
involvement and integration in the policy decision making process and capability 
development (integration of knowledge provided by individuals into high-quality and readily 
available information). Secondly, he stated that the MPC wheel uses the information an 
output of three sources of information:  
- The results of a tracking method among the general public that delivers continuous 
information on the public perceptions in specific risk contexts.  
- The outcome of a media analysis that indicates the agenda, hypes and tone-of-voice 
of the media covered risk messages  
- The input of the FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) on Internet sites and telephone 
lines.  
Our focus is mainly on his first suggestion: a tracking method that involves continuous 
monitoring through extensive and representative quantitative research. That is why the 
studies that followed the first, exploratory study had a different aim: to develop and validate 
a measurement instrument or methodology that would bring these risk perceptions and the 
related concepts on the one hand and the risk information needs and profiles of the target 
groups on the other hand, to the surface. Initially, the first questionnaire with the initial 
eight dimensions was used again to perform follow-up measurements in the following 3 
years, but it was completed with new dimensions and items related to the other scope: risk 
communication and information needs. That is why the reader will find questionnaires in 
appendix that are much more extensive, including various items that will not be discussed in 
this empirical body. After having developed a nice blueprint for the risk communication 
methodology, we thought that it would be interesting to apply it to other risk contexts, as it 
would be of great value for governments that they would have a measurement instrument 
at their disposal that could be used not only in the context of terrorism, but also in various 
other risk contexts. As we were confronted with the threat of the H5N1 virus or the bird flu 
in 2005, we thought that it would be appropriate to apply the instrument in this context and 
scrutinize the risk perceptions and the specific risk information needs in this context. In 2008 
the world was confronted with a global financial economical crisis, inducing an intensive and 
global media coverage that would not only create awareness into the collective minds of 
national and regional communities, but that would also induce a certain degree of arousal 
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and anxiety. Even though the risk of the financial and economical crisis differs on various 
dimensions from the risk of the bird flu and from the namely politically and medially 
constructed risk of terrorism, we thought that it would be innovating to apply the risk 
perception methodology in these three contexts and refine the tool so it can be applied to 
other contexts and deliver an output that can be used as a solid input to create good and 
effective risk communication strategies. 
As discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, the H1N1 virus or ‘Mexican flu’ is 
probably the most important threat, as presented by the media, that people are currently 
facing. Even though the facts and figures indicate that the epidemic threshold is not 
exceeded yet for the time of the year, there have already been very strong ripple effects on 
various levels and in various domains of the society.  
It would have been very nice to apply our risk perception methodology to this new context, 
but due to a lack of time and resources we were not able to perform this study. We hope 
that, in the future, the methodology will be put into practice and it will be able to deliver 
concrete and tangible input for the development of customized risk communication 
strategies. 
2. Overall research objectives 
As described in the first, theoretical part, William Leiss has extensively scrutinized the 
evolution of risk communication research. In ‘Challenges in Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management’ (Leiss, 1996), Leiss describes three phases in the evolution or risk 
communication research, starting from 1975 (see chapter two, 3.8.1). According to Leiss, in 
the last, most current phase, risk communication strategies are characterized by the 
integration of social contexts and social proportions in which risk judgements and risk 
conflicts take place. The trust issue is very important as well within this context. Relating to 
this matter, Leiss proposes the following working hypothesis: “the trust in institutional risk 
actors (governments and industries) can be accumulated by the devotion of these institutes 
to communicate responsibly about risks. In this way, this “can put pressure on all players in 
risk management to act responsibly” (Leiss, 1996, p. 91). Continuity and a consistent long 
term communication strategy are basic conditions to communicate efficiently about risks. 
Leiss  concludes his article with the following statement, that at the same time includes a 
clear proposition for exploratory and confirmatory research: 
 
‘A good theoretical framework for Phase III may be found by extending the ‘strategic 
environmental audit’ and ‘environmental responsibility’ approach. This could be 
operationalized by the formulation of a ‘code of good risk communication practice’, 
and compliance with the code could be verified through a ‘risk communication audit’ 
designed to meet the test of public credibility. Some of the much needed foundations 
of trust might be laid in this manner.’ 
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This conclusion could be the central proposition of the doctoral research project that started 
in December 2004. The research objectives were twofold: 
1. Mapping the social and medial construction processes of the perceived ‘new risk 
society’ by means of quantitative survey studies that include the elements of the 
strategic environmental audit. We must emphasize that the audit includes elements 
from the theoretical framework of risk communication and risk information 
processing (see theoretical body). The eventual measurement tool can be used to 
describe current risk perception levels, risk information needs, fear levels etc.  and of 
course the interrelationships between these concepts. It offers us a clear audit of the 
environment, and identifies crucial elements for improvement. From the 
psychometric measurement model that was developed for the NATO to study 
psychological resilience and its relating concepts, we extracted the key drivers that 
were the most important to incorporate in our PhD study. The development of the 
measurement tool was an organic process. Starting from the basic drivers, we 
decided to add more key driver concepts, based on the literature. We also wanted to 
validate certain scales and concepts in other untransparent risk contexts such as the 
bird flu and the recent economical and financial crisis.  
 
2. Development of a code of good communication practices. Based on the information 
needs of the target groups, that are identified and profiled by means of the 
quantitative research studies, we already have an idea of our audience. The content 
of the risk communication efforts will be a reconciliation of the risk information 
needs of the target audience on the one hand (that are identified by means of the 
risk perception and information methodology) and the aspirations of the institutes 
that have set specific objectives for their risk communication programs, depending 
on the final aims of these programs (informing, providing guidelines, preparing etc.). 
Besides target group profiles and message contents, it is important to estimate the 
mode of communication, the communication style and the channels through which 
the messages ought to be spread. These issues relate directly to the practice of risk 
communication: ‘how to’. It is important to incorporate the essential concepts of 
source and information credibility. The importance of these concepts has already 
been revealed in chapter three of the theoretical part. In the empirical body, we will 
try to connect various message characteristics (style, source, quantity, quality etc.) 
with the concepts of trust and credibility. Eventually, the outcome of these studies 
will serve as an input for the creation of effective risk communication messages. 
 
So our key objectives will induce the need to thrust the borders of theoretical framework 
development to empirical confirmation of the two central needs as formulated by William 
Leiss. Our empirical journey will primarily focus on the development and validation of our 
overall underlying measurement framework that will allow us to scrutinize risk perceptions 
195 
 
and all related concepts in various risk contexts. The output of scrutinizing the public by 
means of this methodology will serve as a valuable input for the development for targeted 
risk communication strategies. We will discuss the applied research designs with their 
specific sampling methods more extensively in the research reports. 
The subjoined scheme provides us with an overview of the studies performed in the time 
frame of 2004-2009. It also compares the methods, sample sizes, key objectives and 
contexts of the studies. 
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                           PART ONE: public oriented PART TWO: message oriented 
                                                             Research report I Research report II Research report III Research report IV Research report V 
Name study Terrorism I Terrorism I Terrorism III Terrorism IV Bird flu I Financial crisis I Terrorism V Bird flu II 
Period December 2004 March 2005 December 
2005 
December 
2006 
April 2006 December  2008 March 2005 April 2006 
Method Quantitative 
Survey study 
Quantitative 
Survey study 
Quantitative 
Survey study 
Quantitative 
Survey study 
Quantitative Survey 
study 
Quantitative Survey 
study 
Experiment Experiment 
Concise survey study 
Sample n = 1040 n = 160 n = 851 n = 1558 n = 320 n = 1578 n = 120 n = 417 
Key objectives 
 
 
Descriptive statistics risk perception and related concepts 
Validation key measurement scales 
Identification and profiling information seekers 
Linear relationships between key concepts (correlations) 
Multivariate relationships risk related concepts 
Relationship message characteristics and 
source and information credibility 
 Concise descriptive 
statistics key 
concepts 
Risk context Terrorism Bird flu Financial / 
economical crisis 
Terrorism Bird flu 
Table 27: Overview of the empirical studies in the period of 2004-2009 
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PUBLIC ORIENTED RESEARCH  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
PUBLIC ORIENTED RESEARCH 
1. Contextual outline and problem statement 
As extensively discussed in the theoretical framework, risk communication is a very difficult 
and complex ‘trade’ since the risk communication programs have to be carefully 
constructed, depending on the specific risk context and communication objectives. 
Communicating about risks is in fact always linked to the management of risk perceptions, as 
most risks are socially and medially constructed, and the attitudes, behavioural intentions 
and concrete behaviour will mostly rely on the personal and communal perceptions about 
the risks. The social amplification and attenuation of risks theory, as described by Kasperson 
et al. (1996), propagate the theory that ripple effects that pass from a personal to the 
communal and even global level can induce much larger consequences in the society as a 
whole. According to this theory, many factors play a role in the social and medial 
construction of risks. The identification and examination of these factors is very complex as 
researchers have to have a very multidisciplinary mindset in order to reconcile theories of a 
psychological, socio-psychological sociological and even political nature. When scrolling 
through the literature about risk communication it became clear that little empirical 
research had been done that reconcile the concepts of risk perception and risk 
communication simultaneously. Also the number of academic handbooks that offer concrete 
guidelines and refer to the practical implications of risk communication in various contexts is 
rather limited. Of course, there can be a great overlap with the practice of crisis 
communication. Again, we want to emphasis that in this doctoral dissertation, we want to 
make a clear distinction between risk and crisis communication, even though it is not always 
easy to draw a concrete borderline between the two. During the exploration of the literature 
about the empirical component of risk communication, we noticed that up till then, there 
had not been constructed any concrete quantitative measurement instruments that could 
provide risk communication managers with an extensive and very broad descriptive view on 
the risk perception concepts and all possible related concepts that could be of importance 
for the creation of solid risk communication strategies. It soon became clear that the 
construction process of the risk perception and communication methodology would be an 
exertion of pioneering and exploring the multidisciplinary boundaries of risk perception and 
risk communication. That is why we want to emphasis that our methodology has been 
constructed with items, scales and concepts that are primarily developed and 
operationalized by us, based on the basic literature and theories about risk perception and 
risk communication. Our central problem statement is as follows: 
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What are the key drivers of risk perception and risk communication in various risk 
contexts? How can we measure them in order to achieve valuable knowledge that can 
serve as an input for the creation of effective and customized risk communication 
strategies in various risk contexts? 
 
The first part of the empirical body of this doctoral dissertation consists of three research 
reports. It covers 6 quantitative studies in 3 different risk contexts. The contexts are: 
terrorism, the bird flu and the financial economical crisis. We selected these risks as each of 
them was very much in the spotlight during a certain period of time. Extensive media 
attention was paid to terrorism, firstly in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 and under the 
legacy of Bush jr., secondly after the attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 
2006. The bird flu was a threat that gained much media attention in 2005. Since September 
2008, the worldwide financial and economical problems have dominated both the medial as 
the political landscapes as well. Since we wanted to validate our ‘methodology’ in 
contemporary and ‘new’ risk contexts we opted to scrutinize the risks that presented 
themselves during the course of time and that induce certain perceptions with the general 
public through the media attention. 
In the next paragraphs, we will discuss the overall research objectives of the studies and the 
used research design. 
2. The general objectives of the quantitative studies 
Our primary objective is to map aspects of social and medial construction processes of the 
perceived ‘new risk society’ by means of quantitative survey studies that include the 
elements of the strategic environmental audit, as proposed by Leiss. We must emphasize 
that the audit includes elements from the theoretical framework of risk communication and 
risk information behaviour (see theoretical part). The outcome is a measurement tool can be 
used to describe current risk perception levels, risk information needs, fear levels, 
behavioural intentions and of course the interrelationships between these concepts. The 
methodology that will be developed and validated will serve as a monitoring tool in the risk 
management process. As discussed in chapter two, there is a strong need for monitoring as 
it is a key component of sound governmental risk management processes. Naturally, it was 
also essential to include concepts about governmental communication and some general 
concepts about the attitude towards the perceived role and satisfaction with the 
government as a risk regulator on the one hand (the one that protects) and as a risk 
communicator on the other hand (the one who communicates) as we assume that the 
relationship between the two roles may be very elementary and crucial. 
The measurement tool should offer us a clear audit of the environment, and should be able 
to identify crucial elements for improvement. The development of the measurement tool 
was an organic process. Starting from the basic drivers, we decided to add more key driver 
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concepts, based on the literature. Of course, most of the items had to be customized to the 
specific risk context, and some items were added to some scales to make them more 
complete. But the general ‘backbone’ of the items and scales remained the same over the 6 
survey studies. Eventually, we used the most extensive survey in the context of the financial 
and economical crisis in 2008. So the first main research objective of the quantitative survey 
studies could be formulated as follows: 
 
The creation and validation of concrete items and measurement scales that measure 
risk perception and the related concepts that could serve as an input for the 
development of a concrete risk communication strategy in various risk contexts. The 
measurement scales should be consistent over the various studies in the different risk 
contexts so that the items can be used to construct a general risk perception and 
information methodology that can be used in future risk contexts. 
 
From the results of a segmentation of information seekers in our first study, we could 
distinguish four main groups, from which one is of vital importance for the effectiveness of 
our risk communication efforts: the opinion leaders. The combination of the results about 
the information seeking and the social behaviour in the first study with the literature and 
thoughts about applying the concept of opinion leadership in the context of risk perception 
and communication led us through the creation of a second general research objective: 
 
The creation and validation of a typology of risk information seekers that is consistent 
over risk contexts. The second part of this objective is to identify the opinion leaders in 
the various risk contexts and to construct their general and media profiles so that this 
group of people, that is the primary target group for the risk communication 
programs, can be described and reached effectively by means of customized 
messages that address their specific risk information needs through the sources 
channels that are mainly used an trusted by them. 
 
The third objective is the analysis of the linear relationships between the key concepts that 
surround risk perception and communication. The correlation tables will allow us to discover 
the various relationships between these concepts.  The outcome of these correlations will 
allow us to create some structural equation models that will statistically analyze and confirm 
some multivariate linear constructions that include the most important concepts. So we can 
formulate the third objective as follows: 
 
The creation and validation of multivariate structural equation models that will 
integrate, statistically analyze and confirm key concepts of risk communication. 
 
Now we discussed the objectives of the first part of the empirical body, let us now take a 
look at the research design that we used: quantitative survey study. 
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3. Research design 
3.1. Research method: quantitative survey study 
Survey studies are generally used to proclaim valid and reliable findings about the degree in 
which certain phenomena are present in societies or within certain subgroups on the one 
hand and the extent in which phenomena correlate. The social survey design is characterized 
by (Fowler, 1986; Wester, Renckstorf, & Scheepers, 2006): 
- The collection of a large quantity of research units (respondents) on one single 
moment (period) in time. However, only a fraction of the population is involved in 
the study (sample) but in most cases, this sample will be representative for the 
population so that results can be generalized. 
- The research objects are confronted with one standardized and identical 
questionnaires that incorporate a large quantity of items so in other terms, the 
information (data to be analyzed) is collected by asking people questions. 
The first type of research questions that can be addressed with survey research are 
descriptive research questions. The second type includes explanatory research questions. 
Survey research is also an excellent design to scrutinize subjective issues such as attitudes, 
opinions and behaviour or behavioural intentions that are not directly observable. 
According to Fowler (1986), a sample survey brings together three methodological issues: 
the sampling procedure, the operationalization phase or design of the questions and 
interviewing the respondents or collecting the data. 
Let us start with the description of the construction of the measurement instrument: the risk 
perception and information survey. 
3.2. The measurement instrument  
3.2.1. Operationalization process 
As mentioned previously, we opted to use a survey to be able to collect a large pool of data 
that can be used to describe the phenomenon of risk perception and the related concepts in 
the context of terrorism. The operationalization phase of the first study was the most 
intensive and explorative one. We first decided to translate the basic concepts that surround 
risk perception and communication into concrete items. We opted for closed questions for 
the following three reasons (Fowler, 1986 p.87): 
- Respondents can perform the task of answering the questions more reliably when 
they are provided with several response alternatives. 
- It is easier and more reliable for the researcher to interpret the answers of the 
respondents as the alternatives are ‘standardized’. 
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- Open questions often remain unanswered and when respondents do answer, some 
of these answers are not analytically useful. We also assume that the chance of 
misinterpretation of the questions diminishes as the response alternatives already 
indicate and clarify the question as well. 
The only open questions we integrated were possibilities for the respondents to add an extra 
response category e.g. for media usage in case we might have overseen a certain magazine 
or tv channels that is consulted by the respondent but that we did not integrate in list of 
response alternatives. 
We decided to use Likert scales. As Fowler states: “Likert is credited for building a bridge 
between the elaborate scaling techniques developed by psychophysical psychologists for 
measuring subjective phenomena and the practical requirements of applied social research” 
(Fowler, 1986 p.13). The Likert method is appreciated and used by social scientists in various 
contexts (Guy & Norvell, 1977; van Laerhoven, van der Zaag-Loonen, & Derkx, 2004).  
Since most of the concepts have a relatively strong subjective nature, it was recommended 
to use multiple questions that measure the same subjective state so that scales could be 
constructed and validated (Fowler, 1986). 
During the operationalization phase, we took into account the general guidelines for 
constructing good and workable questions: they need to be unambiguous, unidimensional 
(probe only one issue), comprehensible, not too long etc. (Hüttner, K.Renckstorf, & 
F.Wester, 1995). 
When the items were constructed, we created a basic questionnaire with a sober an clear 
layout. The items were put together according to the concept they measured. The easiest 
concepts were located in the beginning of the questionnaire, the more sensible and more 
difficult questions were posed in the middle and the questionnaire was concluded by the 
socio demographical questions. The next step was to pretest the questionnaire. Five 
members of our task force collected a total of about 20 questionnaires in the pretest phase 
(npretest=100). The respondents gave very clear comments about potential misinterpretations, 
questions with a high social desirability level, unclearly formulated questions, missing 
response alternatives etc. The output of this pretest phase allowed us to construct an 
adjusted and improved version of the questionnaire that was ready to be used in the studies. 
For all additional items that were added in the surveys of the consequent studies, we asked 
some respondents to provide feedback about these new items. 
3.2.2. The concepts: the initial starters’ set 
Based on our theoretical body, we started with key concepts that were presumable related 
to the general concept of risk. 
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3.2.2.1. Risk perception 
As risk perception is a very broad and extensively studied theoretical construct, it is very 
intricate to reduce this concept and its multidimensionality to a some measurable and 
concrete items. In order to operationalize the concept, we must first give a clear definition of 
the concept. With our final aim in mind, developing a solid and practical risk communication 
audit tool, we could state that risk perception includes the subjective or perceived 
judgments of probability of harm to the person himself, other or the environment (E. F. J. 
Ter Huurne, 2008). The operationalization may vary according to the nature of the risk. 
3.2.2.2. Mental distance 
Subjective feelings regarding risks are also related to the mental distance to the risk. The 
mental distance represents the perceived proximity of the risk to the individual and its 
personal environment. It reflects whether the individual perceives the risk as something that 
takes place far from his or her own environment (high mental distance) or whether it can 
take place in his or her near environment. It is very similar to the concept of risk perception 
as we defined it, but risk perception is more the reflection of the perceived probability of the 
risk and perceived level of exposure. 
3.2.2.3. Fear 
The fear component is a very important construct as it reflects to which degree the 
individual exposes affective reactions. We ask the individuals to what degree they are afraid 
that something concrete (may vary according to the risk context) might happen to them. We 
assume that fear will affect behaviour or behavioural intentions. 
3.2.2.4. Attitude towards the government 
The attitude towards the government is actually not a real attitude measurement scale that 
is one dimensional. The dimension reflects the combination of the perception of the 
government as a risk regulator and the perception of the government as a risk 
communicator. Firstly, perceived risk regulation includes the degree to which people think 
that the government and in some risk contexts the services and institutes such as police, fire 
department, … are prepared to tackle the risk and its consequences. Secondly, it reflects the 
attitudes of people towards the governmental initiatives to deal with the risks. Of course, 
this concept has to be customized to the risk context as well as different initiatives and 
protective measures will arise according to specific risks. So in general, it measures the 
attitude towards governmental initiatives, perceived competency and adequacy of the 
government to prevent potential risks and preparedness to reduce negative consequences 
of those risks, and the attitude towards the governmental risk communication strategy. 
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We assume that a positive attitude towards the government as risk regulator and 
communicator will reduce fear levels (protective factor) and perceived risk. 
3.2.2.5. Information seeking behaviour 
An extensive body of literature points out that media exposure to risks, and in particular 
terrorist events is an important predictor of symptoms of stress (Terr et al., 1999; Cantor et 
al., 1993; Pfefferbaum et al., 1999; Pfefferbaum et al., 2001; Pfefferbaum et al., 2000; 
Pfefferbaum et al., 2003; Apolone et al., 2002; Ray & Malhi, 2005; Ahern et al., 2002; 
Fremont, 2005; Saylor et al., 2003). Of course, one cannot avoid being exposed to media 
contents, but we will try to refine the media exposure and try to approach it from the 
viewpoint of the individual as an information seeker. Information seeking behaviour and the 
underlying psychological processes were extensively discussed in chapter four of the 
theoretical body (2.6.4). So instead of assuming that individuals are passive receivers of risk 
information that are exposed to contents through various media channels, we approach the 
individual as a critical, more reflecting being that shows various levels of information 
seeking, ranging from active information seeking to passive information scanning, as 
discussed in 2.6.4.3 in chapter four. 
3.2.2.6. Social behaviour 
Originally, we included a general concept of social behaviour, which reflected to which 
extent one’s social network (colleagues, friends, family, etc.) is able to influence perceptions 
about risks and acts as a kind of buffer. We inquired for opinion leadership, the extent to 
which people can talk to others about terrorism, and the extent to which people feel 
sufficiently backed up by their social network in the face of certain risks. Schuster et al. 
(Schuster et al., 2001) claim that  talking to others and discussing your feelings about what 
happened (mostly as seen on television) proves to be a significant coping strategy, especially 
with those who experienced substantial stress reactions. In this inquiry we focused more on 
social buffering than actually identifying attachment figures and styles, but nevertheless it 
follows this line of reasoning – that healthy and functioning social networks are likely to help 
the individual to buffer stress caused by perceived risks such as perceived terrorist threat. 
However as the final aim of our doctoral dissertation is not to scrutinize resilience and its 
underlying and influencing factors, we decided to reflect on and define social behaviour as a 
form of information seeking and sharing behaviour. We will eventually integrate the concept 
of social behaviour into the concept of opinion leadership. 
3.2.3. The supplementary concepts 
Throughout the life cycle of the research processes, through exploratory analysis, we found 
out that the original set of concepts that made part of the aura of risk communication could 
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be completed with some other concepts that arose from the first exploratory studies. 
Especially the concepts of governmental communication and opinion leadership were 
intensively deepened by adding new related concepts and items. 
3.2.3.1. Specific risk information needs 
As one of the main objectives of the empirical body is also to create a employable tool to 
create effective and target oriented risk communication strategies we decided to integrate 
the need for specific risk information types. 
3.2.3.2. Perceived roles of government 
As we came up with the importance of the government as a risk regulator on the one hand 
and as a risk communicator on the other hand, we decided to integrate three questions that 
measure to what extend people think that the government should protect the public by 
taking concrete protective actions, they should provide the public with general risk 
management guidelines and to what extent they should provide general information about 
the risk. 
3.2.3.3. Reliability risk information sources 
In some studies the perceived reliability of the most common risk information sources will 
also be measured and discussed as we assume that trust strongly relates to risk perception. 
 
3.2.3.4. Suitability specific governmental risk information channels 
In some studies, the evaluation of the suitability of the specific governmental information 
channels will be measured and discussed. This information will provide us with information 
about the perceived suitability and reliability of communication channels to diffuse  risk 
information. 
3.2.3.5. Need for participation in the communication process 
The perceived need for active participation in the governmental communication processes 
was clearly present in the results of our first studies. In the literature, academics have also 
dedicated a lot of attention to the rising and increasing two-way nature of the information 
and communication flow between governments and the public. Both the perception of the 
possibilities people have to interact and communicate as the need to participate in the 
communication process are included. 
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3.2.3.6. Opinion leadership 
The concept of opinion leadership has been extensively discussed in chapter four of the 
theoretical body (3.7). The first exploratory survey study also provided us with a 
segmentation of information seekers. This segmentation was based on the concepts of 
information seeking, social behaviour and one general item that reflected the typical 
influential characteristic of opinion leaders. The segmentation revealed four groups of 
information seekers and this result was confirmed and validated in the first five survey 
studies we performed. We decided to add some extra items in the last study concerning the 
financial and economical crisis. As opinion leaders play a key role in our risk communication 
strategies, we decided to create the specific socio - demographical and media profiles for the 
four groups of information seekers. General descriptive statistics will also be discussed 
specifically for opinion leaders and differences between opinion leaders and the other 
people will be integrated in the tables. The information needs profiles will also be described 
for opinion leaders as well as non-opinion leaders. 
3.3. Sampling 
As resources were limited, we could not draw a completely at random sample from a 
predefined sampling frame. We decided to follow the quota sampling procedure and let our 
interviewers (students) select respondents that yield the same proportions as the population 
proportions on the key identified variables: gender, age and educational level. Quota 
sampling is a non - probability sampling design that has many similarities with probability 
sampling, in particular with stratified probability sampling but it differs in the fact that the 
interviewer selects his respondents rather subjectively, just like in a convenience sample 
where the interviewer selects individuals who are readily available and prepared to 
participate in the study (Henry, 1990). Stuart (1984) has pointed out three major issues to 
take into account when using the quota sampling design: the danger for selection bias as the 
interviewer selects its respondents subjectively, there is no waterproof method of 
estimating the standard error of a sample estimate because of the ill-defined procedure for 
selecting the sample and finally quota sampling could also be suspected to conceal the non-
response (Stuart, 1984) as people who are not willing to participate will not be included in 
the study and results. It is important to bear these critical reflections into mind. 
The students that followed the course ‘Mass Communication Research’ had to collect 6 
surveys; taking into account the primary selection variables: gender, age and educational 
level. We guaranteed the respondents that their answers would be treated confidentially 
and that only the researchers that conduct the study would ever be able to associate 
individual respondents with their answers. In an accompanying letter, we guaranteed the 
anonymity of the respondents, however, we did ask for telephone numbers as we wanted to 
perform random cross checks to make sure that the students did not fill the surveys out 
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themselves. Doubtful cases were deleted from the final files. The subjoined scheme is an 
overview of the sampling specificities. 
 
Study N students N respondents N respondents after data cleaning 
Terrorism I 101 1140 1040 
Terrorism II 8 160 160 
Terrorism III 133 1064 851 
Terrorism IV 267 1602 1558 
Bird flu study 36 324 320 
Financial economical crisis study 280 1680 1578 
Table 28: The quota variables were gender, age and educational level. 
We will integrate the specific sample characteristics in the specific research reports. 
3.4. Interviewing the respondents 
We had two options to collect the data: we could let the respondents fill out the 
questionnaires themselves (self-administered survey) or we could use interviewers to ask 
questions and note the answers. Since the first option requires the least resources in terms 
of money and time, we decided to let the respondents fill out their questionnaires 
themselves. Another argument for this option is the fact that some questions were relatively 
delicate and could induce feelings of social desirability and even influence the answers of the 
respondents if they would be posed by an interviewer (e.g. questions about xenophobia, 
political preference etc.). Previous research confirms the fact that self-administered surveys 
may produce less social desirability bias for some items (Hochstim, 1967). Another 
advantage is that, since the surveys were relatively extensive, the respondents could take 
their time to fill out the survey. Some possible disadvantages are: the self administered 
survey requires good reading and comprehension skills (especially when it concerns the 
longer and specific statements), we are never completely certain that the respondent has 
filled out his survey himself or that another relative has filled it out in his or her place. 
Notwithstanding these disadvantages, we decided distribute the questionnaires through our 
students, who had to take into account several selection criteria. One advantage is that the 
students could clarify questions to certain people (e.g. older people) or ask people to fill out 
parts and questions that they might have forgotten. The decision to let our students do the 
data collection was completely based on practical reasons: we did not have the financial 
resources nor did we obtain the permission of the qualified authorities to use the data from 
the register of population to perform a completely at random sampling procedure.  
3.5. Structure of the research reports 
The first three research reports will be constructed in a similar way as the primary objective 
of the six studies they cover are analogous as well. The first part exists of the validation of 
211 
 
the scales that were used and the descriptive statistics that will provide us with a general 
overview. Secondly, the cluster and discriminant analysis results will be presented in 
response to the second research objective: the segmentation of the information seekers. 
After having identified and profiled the categories of information seekers, we will give some 
more specific descriptive statistics that will show us how the attitudes and behaviour of 
opinion leaders versus non opinion leaders are, especially in the context of governmental 
communication efforts. 
The last part of the research reports will include the general correlation tables that will 
provide us with the statistical building blocks for some linear relationships between the 
various concepts that are scrutinized. We will also try to confirm our structural equation 
models that try to draw the relation between the government as a risk regulator (protector) 
and as a risk communicator in the light of our third research objective. 
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RESEARCH REPORT I 
 
TERRORISM 
1. Introduction to the topic: terrorism as a socially and medially constructed 
risk  
On 11th September 2001, two airplanes crashed into the Twin Towers in New York. About 
3.000 people died in the terrorist attacks that day. The attacks on the 11th March 2004 in 
Madrid had increased the proximity of the threat for the Europeans. In total, 191 people got 
killed and approximately 1.800 people were injured. Some perceive this attack as the most 
deadly terrorist attack in Europe in modern times (Turegano-Fuentes, Perez-Diaz, Sanz-
Sanchez, & Alonso, 2008) 
Also the UK government perceives the preparedness of their citizens as a primary concern. 
The London bombings on 7th July 2005 have increased the communal sense of vulnerability 
(Page, Rubin, Amlot, Simpson, & Wessely, 2008). It was the first suicide terrorist attack by 
Islamic extremists in Great Britain. The attack had a death toll of 52 people and injured at 
least 700 commuters on the London public transportation. 
Besides the directly involved victims, the ripple effects on the community as a whole are far-
reaching and so these effects are also much scrutinized by scholars all over the world, from 
e.g. the general behaviour the public in terms of for instance avoiding public transportation 
(Handley, Salkovskis, & Ehlers, 2009) to the effects of the London attacks on the suicide 
figures in London and Wales (Salib & Cortina-Borja, 2009). 
Rubin et al. have developed a measurement tool that scrutinizes several indicators of the 
population’s overall psychosocial well-being. They are convinced that the overall political, 
medical, economical and psychological well-being can be determined and defined by means 
of some general indicators such as trust, perceived risk, sense of safety etc. (Rubin, Amlot, 
Page, & Wessely, 2008 p.S29). They also recognize the importance of this assessment to 
create efficient and accurate governmental and non-governmental communication 
programs.  
2. Problem statement 
As mentioned in the general problem statement, we have found little specific academic 
literature that provides the readers with concrete measurement tools to scrutinize the 
general risk perceptions and all related concepts as discussed above. As governments are 
facing the challenge to raise the feeling and the actual level of communal preparedness, 
without inducing a culture of fear, clear and well-considered communication strategies 
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should be constructed. In order to do so, they will need information about their 
communication target groups: perceptions, information needs, behaviour and behavioural 
intentions, general attitude towards the governments etc. The primary goal, besides 
assessing the general thoughts, feelings and attitudes, is to identify the key individuals that 
can play a crucial role in the success of their risk communication efforts and to construct the 
concrete profiles of this group so that all possible communication efforts would be effective 
and targeted. Since we will have to know the possible effects of the communication of risk 
information, it will also be crucial to identify the relationships between the processes and 
concepts that are involved in this complex process of risk communication. That is why 
multivariate data analysis can already unveil some important relationships between certain 
concepts. In this way, the effect (which is not always directly measurable and observable) 
can be predicted, even though it takes place on a rather abstract level. As we already 
indicated in the theoretical part, terrorism is a risk that is rather untransparent and that is 
mostly constructed socially and through the input of the media. The threat of a terrorist 
attack is unpredictable. On the other hand, it is of the upmost importance that the 
community is prepared, both on a tangible level (infrastructure, awareness of crisis plan 
instructions etc.) and especially on a psychological level. The question governments must ask 
themselves is: to what degree do our civilians really perceive the risk of terrorism as a 
personal threat and to what degree will risk communication programs about terrorism 
contribute to the raise of operational and communal psychological preparedness and 
resilience. That is why we need a clear view on the descriptive statistics of the key concepts 
that can allow us to take decisions and adjust the central objectives of potential risk 
communication strategies. 
3. Objectives of the studies 
As mentioned, the general objectives are threefold: 
1. Construct and validate the methodology (measurement scales) that maps the key 
concepts of risk perception: the perceived risk of terrorism and the related concepts 
of mental distance, fear, protective behaviour, information seeking behaviour and 
social behaviour. A clear and comprehensive descriptive report on these concepts 
will be provided as well. This part of the report will include the general descriptive 
statistics as means and standard deviations and high and low percentages and will 
also report the statistically significant differences between gender categories and age 
groups. 
2. Perform a segmentation study on the risk information seekers and identify and 
profile the opinion leaders by means of a newly composed clustering instrument. 
Analyze and report the linear relationships between the risk perception and the related 
concepts in the context of terrorism and validate the SEM model that scrutinizes the 
relationship between risk regulation and communication.  
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4. Sampling procedure and descriptive statistics sample 
The four samples for the four studies were convenience samples. The studies were 
conducted with the cooperation of the students that followed the course ‘Mass 
Communication Research’. One part of their evaluation was related to the practical 
assignment of collecting and entering data into an SPSS datafile. First, they had to collect 6 
or more surveys (depending on the size of the group and the required sample size), taking 
into account the primary selection variables: gender, age and educational level. After the 
data merge, the datasets were used to perform datacleaning and to learn them how to 
execute certain statistical tests. We guaranteed the respondents that their answers would 
be treated confidentially and that only the researchers that conduct the study would ever be 
able to associate individual respondents with their answers. In an accompanying letter, we 
guaranteed the anonymity of the respondents, however, we did ask for telephone numbers 
as we wanted to perform random cross checks to make sure that the students did not fill the 
surveys out themselves. Doubtful cases were deleted from the final files.  
The following graphs provide us with the sample statistics (frequencies) of the age and 
gender criteria. Except for the slight overrepresentation of 45-54 years category in the 
Terrorism IV study (33%), we might state that the samples are rather equally distributed for 
age categories and equally distributed for gender. 
 
 
Figure 32: Age distribution samples terrorism 
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Figure 33: Gender distribution samples terrorism 
 
We also compared our sample details to the population facts that are provided by the 
National Institute of Statistics (NIS) in Belgium. However, the available population statistics 
are not that detailed. We can only base ourselves for age groups on the facts of the age 
categories <20 years, 20-54 years and ≥65 years. We left the age group of <20 years out of 
the control check as we did not questioned minors. 
We can see that the largest difference between the sample en the population is 7% 
(underrepresentation females >65 yrs in sample terrorism IV). We decided not to weigh this 
subsample as the differences are minimal. 
 
Terrorism I   
Age category Male Female 
Flanders Sample Flanders Sample 
20-64 
≥65 
 
39% 
10% 
44% 
5% 
38% 
13% 
43% 
8% 
NFlanders =6043161 
Nsample =1040 
 
Terrorism III   
Age category Male Female 
Flanders Sample Flanders Sample 
20-64 
≥65 
 
39% 
10% 
42% 
8% 
38% 
13% 
39% 
10% 
NFlanders =6078600 
Nsample =851 
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Terrorism IV   
Age category Male Female 
Flanders Sample Flanders Sample 
20-64 
≥65 
 
39% 
10% 
45% 
5% 
38% 
13% 
44% 
6% 
NFlanders =6117440 
Nsample =1558 
Table 29: Comparisons sample and population percentages in the three large scaled quantitative 
survey studies 
 
 
We did not include the table for the terrorism II sample as this sample only contains 160 
respondents and we did not have the intention to draw descriptive and extrapolate the 
findings. The terrorism II research had as primary objective to validate the measurement 
scales and the segmentation of opinion leaders and to explore the correlations between the 
general concepts. 
5. Validation of the general measurement scales 
As mentioned previously in the operationalization paragraph, we decided to define the key 
concepts that can be located in the aura of risk perception, based on literature with a strong 
multidisciplinary nature (psychology, social psychology, communication sciences,…). We 
conducted an exploratory factor analysis (principal component analysis with Varimax 
rotation) on the items that were supposed to measure the key concepts. For the exploratory 
factor analysis, we used the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15.0. 
In scale development processes, it is common that academics use split-half techniques to 
come to several independent samples to validate and compute the reliability of 
measurement scales (Hinkin, 1998; E. F. J. Ter Huurne, 2008). However, we will perform four 
quantitative survey studies to validate the methodology that integrates the central research 
objects in the context of risk perception and risk information seeking in the context of 
terrorism. So instead of splitting samples into half, we have four full samples that were used 
to validate the measurement scales.  
The first table is the output of the PCA factor analysis that was conducted on the first 
exploratory quantitative study (Terrorism I, n=1040). It confirms the six dimensions that we 
had proposed and 60.43% of the variance is explained by these six underlying dimensions.  
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Construct/items Factor loadings 
Total variance explained: 60.43% I II III IV V VI 
Social Behaviour (talking to others)       
How often do you talk about terrorism to the following (groups of) 
persons: friends 
0.81      
How often do you talk about terrorism to the following (groups of) 
persons: colleagues or fellow-students 
0.76      
How often do you talk about terrorism to the following (groups of) 
persons: family s 
0.70      
When there is a news items about terrorism, I will discuss it with 
other 
0.70      
When there has been a TV-program about terrorism, it will be 
discussed in my personal environment 
0.70      
I think it’s important to have the possibility to talk to 
friends/family/colleagues… about terrorism 
0.67      
Information seeking       
When there is an item about terrorism in the news, I will follow this 
item with more attention 
 0.87     
When there is a news item about terrorism, I will follow it with more 
attention 
 0.85     
When I’m reading a newspaper, I  will never skip the articles or 
information about terrorism 
 0.70     
I explicitly look for information about terrorism in the media  0.51     
When I hear that there's news about terrorism, I will look for more 
information as quickly as possible 
 0.45     
Behaviour       
I have already thought about a plan to put me and my family in 
safety if a terrorist attack should take place 
  0.77    
I have tried to imagine how I would react in case a terrorist attack 
would take place in my personal environment 
  0.70    
Do you think about taking measures to prepare yourself for a 
possible terrorist attack 
  0.50    
Risk perception       
The presence of the European Commission in Belgium increases the 
risk of a potential terrorist attack in our country 
   0.72 (0.70*) 
Since the attacks in London, my fear for a possible attack in our 
country has increased 
   0.72 (0.77*) 
Since the attacks in London, I think there is a much bigger chance 
that there will be more attacks in Europe 
   0.69 (0.76*) 
I think there is a big chance that a terrorist attack will take place in 
Belgium 
   0.67 (0.58*) 
I think that the probability that an attack will occur in Belgium is 
high* 
Item added in study III & IV 
 
 
  (0.66*) 
Fear        
When I am in a public place, I sometimes realize that I am located at 
a potential target for a terrorist attack 
    0.83  
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I always think twice before taking a plane nowadays     0.81  
I am often looking for suspicious packages when I take the bus     0.80  
Mental distance       
I do not worry about possible terrorist attacks because Bin Laden is 
far from here 
     0.83 
I do not worry about terrorist attacks because they always take 
place far from here 
     0.75 
Terrorist attacks only take place in countries where conflicts are 
fought out 
     0.70 
Terrorism is something that happens in foreign countries      0.69 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq do not have an influence on my 
way of living 
     0.69 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Eigenvalues>1.  
Rotation Method: Varimax. Missing values: cases excluded listwise. 
Table 30: Factor analysis (PCA with Varimax rotation) for key constructs in context of terrorism 
 
 
After the exploratory factor analyses, the scales have to be checked on internal consistency. 
As the items are all rated on Likert scales, it is possible to express the homogeneity of the 
(Likert)scale by means of the Cronbach’s alpha measure. It is a measure that varies from 0 
(low internal consistency or homogeneity of the scale) to 1 (perfect homogeneity). We have 
calculated all cronbach’s alpha’s by means of the reliability procedure in SPSS (15.0). The 
value has to exceed 0.65 (Frissen, Bouwman, & Den-Boer, 1994) and according to others 
0.70 (Reynaldo, 1999). The item-total correlations have to exceed 0.30 to assure that the 
item correlates sufficiently with the total of the remaining items. 
 
Construct N α study I 
n=1040 
α study II 
n=160 
α study III 
n=851 
α study IV 
n=1558 
Social Behaviour (talking to others) 6 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.83 
Information seeking 5 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.82 
Behaviour 3 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.64 
Risk perception 
* study III & IV N=5 
4 0.73 0.73 0.81* 0.83* 
Fear 3 0.80 0.79 0.72 0.81 
Mental distance 5 0.81 0.84 0.77 0.87 
Table 31: cronbach’s alpha values of the main constructs in the four studies 
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As we notice, the key constructs that are the backbone of this doctoral dissertation have 
stable cronbach’s alpha’s and can be labeled to be internally consistent. In all four studies in 
the context of terrorism, the values all exceeded 0.70 (threshold), except for the behaviour 
concept (alpha varies from 0.61 to 0.66), but all outputs showed that the item-total 
correlations for all items exceeded 0.30 and that the alpha if item deleted values never 
increased significantly when a particular item was deleted. 
Besides the general concepts, some of the governmental communication related constructs 
have been constructed and validated. The subjoined tables provide us with an overview of 
the composition and internal consistencies of these constructs. 
 
Construct N Items 
Governmental 
preparedness 
8 To what extent do you perceive the following governments as being prepared 
to terrorist attacks: national and local governments (2 items) 
To what extend do you think the following departments and services are 
prepared to terrorist attacks and their consequences: police, army, red cross, 
fire department, hospitals, civil services (6 items) 
 
Quantity govinfo 3 The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of information 
about terrorism 
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of information 
about their initiatives and measures in the context of terrorism 
To what degree do you thing that the Belgian government offers a sufficient 
amount of information about terrorism? 
General trust in 
government  
 
10 Governmental preparedness (8 items) 
The government is making enough efforts to secure public places 
Governments take enough safety measures in order to keep terrorists away 
from nuclear plants 
Table 32: Overview of the composition and internal consistencies of the government 
communication related concepts 
 
 
 
 
The high alpha values proof the good internal consistency of the constructed scales in the 
four quantitative studies. 
After having validated the measurement scales, we will now provide an extensive and 
comprehensive overview of the descriptive statistics of the key constructs. 
 
Construct 
N α study I 
n=1040 
α study II 
n=160 
α study III 
n=851 
α study IV 
n=1558 
Governmental preparedness 8 0.85 0.89 0.85 0.87 
Quantity govinfo 
*in study I & II only 1 item 
3 -* -* 0.77 0.73 
General trust in government  10 0.84 0.89 0.85 0.85 
Table 33: Cronbach’s alpha values of the governmental related constructs in the studies 
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6. Comprehensive descriptive report 
The first block of tables provides us with a descriptive overview of the general concepts that 
form the backbone of the studies. The tables only include statistically significant results. We 
decided to include both the means as indicators of centrality (with associated standard 
deviations) as the percentages of people who have low (score of 1 and 2 on 6 point scales) 
and high scores (score of 5 and 6 on 6 point scale). The latter can also inform us about the 
degree in which people have a true opinion about a statement, as we have an idea about the 
percentage of people who have answered neutrally. Sometimes people do not have a 
pronounced opinion about certain issues, and this is important to be reflected in the tables.  
The constructs consist of items that were measured on six point Likert scales (1 standing for 
totally do not agree and 6 standing for totally agree), so the means have to be interpreted as 
a figure between 1 and 6. We also performed anova analyses to test the significance of the 
differences in means between the four samples. We find some statistically significant 
differences between the means. However, we have to interpret this with care as the samples 
had slightly different proportions for age, educational and gender. The samples were not 
attuned to one reference sample by means of a weighing procedure. 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Difference % Low % High 
Risk perception 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
3.59* 
3.79* 
3.47* 
 
0.75 
0.83 
0.80 
 
F(2,3406)=44.93 
p=0.000 
 
16 
13 
21 
 
5 
10 
5 
Mental distance 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
2.50* 
2.71* 
2.61* 
 
0.84 
0.89 
0.90 
 
F(2,3404)=14.42 
p=0.000 
 
71 
59 
63 
 
1.3 
1.3 
1.9 
Fear 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
2.50 
2.53 
2.56* 
 
1.04 
0.99 
1.01 
 
n.s. 
 
63 
61 
60 
 
2.7 
1.4 
2 
Behaviour 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
2.19* 
2.25* 
2.51* 
 
0.83 
0.83 
0.88 
 
F(2,3241)=48.65 
p=0.000 
 
 
79 
75 
66 
 
0.5 
0.5 
0.7 
Information seeking 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
3.43 
3.41 
3.77* 
 
0.89 
0.94 
0.92 
 
F(2,3413)=62.41 
p=0.000 
 
26 
26 
26 
 
5 
6 
5 
Talking to others 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
3.34* 
3.10* 
3.44* 
 
0.82 
0.89 
0.81 
 
F(2,3315)=44.87 
p=0.000 
 
27 
39 
26 
 
3 
2 
2 
Significance key * differ significantly from other years min. at 0.05 level    
Table 34: Descriptive statistics of key concepts in the context of terrorism 
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The mean risk perception levels are for all three studies above average (3.6 to 3.8) and the 
mean mental distance is rather low (2.5 to 2.7). However, when we look at the exact 
percentage of people indicating a high risk (% equal or above 5 on 6 point scale), there is 
only a small percentage of people that actually think that an attack will occur in Belgium. On 
the contrary, 59% to 71% of the people (over the three studies) perceive the terrorist threat 
as a rather proximate risk. The fear levels however are rather low: the mean fear level is 2.5 
and approximately 60% of the respondents indicated that they are not affected by feelings 
of fear in their daily life (avoiding public places, taking public transportation). The low 
behavioural intentions in terms of taking protective measures are very low as well (mean = 
2.2 to 2.5 and only 0.5% has a high score on the behaviour construct). In terms of their social 
and information seeking behaviour, there is only a small part of the respondents who have 
high rates on these constructs (respectively 2% and 5%) but the means are above average 
(social = 3.4 to 3.7 and information seeking 3.1 to 3.4). All of these figures indicate that, even 
though the majority of the respondents perceive the terrorist threat as a risk that is very 
near (mental distance), the actual percentage of people who have a high probability level, 
who are affected in their fear levels and behavioural intentions, who talk a lot to others 
about the topic and who indicate that they look for information about terrorism is low. A lot 
of people answer quite neutrally (3 and 4 on 6 point scales), which indicates that the 
majority does not really have an outspoken opinion, probably because the risk is not 
transparent and especially because the Belgian population have not (yet) been confronted 
with terror attacks. We would also like to refer to Lemyre et al., who also scrutinized the 
perceptions of terrorism and the related concepts in Canada (Lemyre, Turner, Lee, & 
Krewski, 2006). We could make prudent comparisons between the results of Lemyre et al. in 
Canada and our results in Belgium as there have not been any terrorist attacks on both 
Canadian as Belgian soil in recent years. So the Canadian and Belgian contexts can be 
expected to distinguish themselves from those in the U.S. or U.K. According to Lemyre et al., 
ony 13.3% of the respondents in their stufy indicated that terrorism posed a high risk to the 
Canadian public. Naturally there are some important restrictions to this comparison 
between our findings and Lemyre’s. First of all, the methodologies are similar (surveys using 
five point scales measuring the key concepts) but we used questionnaires and Lemyre et al. 
questioned their respondents by telephone.Secondly, the questions were similar as well, but 
we have to consider that slight differences in the formulation of the statements may lead to 
differences in the answers as well. Thirdly, cultural differences between both populations 
may play an important role in the differences of risk perception. Despite of these limitations 
for the comparison, there are still some remarkable similarities.  
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6.1. Gender differences 
Construct Terrorism I Terrorism III Terrorism IV 
Risk perception 
Male 
Female 
t value 
 
n.s. 
 
3.70 
3.87 
t(837)=-2.98** 
 
3.41 
3.52 
t(1538)=-2.74** 
Mental distance n.s. n.s.  n.s. 
Fear 
Male 
Female 
t value 
 
2.38 
2.61 
t(1014)=-3.71*** 
 
2.41 
2.65 
t(844)=-3.48*** 
 
2.49 
2.63 
t(1544)=-2.66** 
Behaviour n.s. n.s.  n.s. 
Information seeking n.s. n.s.  n.s. 
Talking to others n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 35: Gender differences for key constructs 
 
Gender differences can only be statistically confirmed for risk perception and fear: women 
have slightly higher means for both constructs. Similar results were retrieved by Lemyre et a. 
in their survey study about the risk perception of terrorism in Canada (Lemyre et al., 2006). 
Lemyre et al. also confirmed that women have significantly higher risk perception scores 
than men for the perceived risk of terrorism. 
6.2. Differences for age groups 
Concerning differences between age categories, we have found more significantly different 
results: 
 
Construct Terrorism I Terrorism III Terrorism IV 
Risk perception 
<25 years 
25-44 years 
45-64 years 
>64 years 
 
 
3.42 
3.59 
3.65 
3.76 
F(3,1021)=6.41*** 
 
3.59 
3.76 
3.87 
3.79 
F(3,830)=5.35*** 
 
3.28 
3.46 
3.56 
3.55 
F(3,1531)=10.74*** 
Mental distance 
<25 years 
25-44 years 
45-64 years 
>64 years 
 
 
2.54 
2.40 
2.43 
2.93 
F(3,1012)=14.16*** 
 
2.62 
2.59 
2.67 
3.14 
F(3,836)=13.73*** 
 
2.73 
2.64 
2.51 
2.71 
F(3,1528)=5.94*** 
Fear 
<25 years 
25-44 years 
45-64 years 
 
2.17 
2.45 
2.67 
 
2.04 
2.53 
2.71 
 
2.16 
2.55 
2.71 
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>64 years 
 
2.78 
F(3,1015)=13.86*** 
2.70 
F(3,837)=17.96*** 
2.95 
F(3,1537)=36.89*** 
Behaviour 
<25 years 
25-44 years 
45-64 years 
>64 years 
 
 
2.36 
2.19 
2.14 
1.99 
F(3,1021)=5.51*** 
 
n.s. 
 
2.40 
2.53 
2.53 
2.71 
F(3,1363)=4.38** 
Information seeking 
<25 years 
25-44 years 
45-64 years 
>64 years 
 
 
3.26 
3.39 
3.47 
3.76 
F(3,1020)=8.78*** 
 
3.11 
3.34 
3.58 
3.42 
F(3,836)=9.63*** 
 
3.55 
3.71 
3.86 
4.04 
F(3,1529)=15.43*** 
Talking to others 
<25 years 
25-44 years 
45-64 years 
>64 years 
 
 
3.53 
3.40 
3.26 
2.88 
F(3,978)=17.23*** 
 
3.24 
3.19 
3.11 
2.65 
F(3,793)=12.03*** 
 
3.50 
3.43 
3.47 
3.18 
F(3,1516)=6.01*** 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 36:  Age differences for key constructs 
 
For risk perception, respondents younger than 25 years old have the lowest means. Older 
people tend to have higher risk perceptions (>45years old). Lemyre et al. found similar 
results for the risk perception across the various age categories in their study (2006 p. 761). 
Contradictory, the mental distances of the >64 year olds are the highest, indicating that they 
perceive the risk of terrorism as something that is not very proximate. The respondents who 
are older than 45 years also have somewhat higher fear levels but the values do not exceed 
3, it is remarkable however that the youngest group has the lowest fear levels. For behaviour 
we find significant differences, but they are not consistent for the two studies. Concerning 
risk information seeking, the youngest age category has the lowest mean, opposite to the 
social behaviour where the youngest respondents (<24) have the highest mean and the 
oldest group the lowest. 
6.3. Information seeking behaviour 
In this paragraph, we will take a closer look at the specific information seeking behaviour. As 
mentioned previously, we split up the information seeking behaviour into three types, 
according to the intensity of seeking: active information seeking, event triggered information 
seeking (active seeking behaviour in the aftermath of a terrorist attack) and passive 
information scanning. 
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Construct Mean St.Dev. Difference % Low % High 
Active info seeking 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
2.33 
2.37 
2.75* 
 
1.06 
1.08 
1.13 
 
F(2,3436)=57.52 
p=0.000 
 
 
59 
57 
59 
 
4 
4 
8 
Event triggered info seeking 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
3.16 
3.16 
3.50* 
 
1.34 
1.33 
1.35 
 
F(3433)=27.60 
p=0.000 
 
 
33 
33 
37 
 
16 
16 
26 
Passive info scanning 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
3.88 
3.85 
4.20* 
 
1.04 
1.07 
1.02 
 
F(2,3428)=45.69 
p=0.000 
 
 
19 
19 
16 
 
19 
19 
16 
Significance key * differ significantly from other years min. at 0.05 level 
Table 37: Information seeking in the context of terrorism 
 
To summarize, only 4% to 8% of the respondents actively seek for risk information in the 
context of terrorism (means also lower than 3). The percentage for event trigger information 
search is higher (16% to 26%) and the means range from 3.16. to 3.5. The percentage of 
people that passively scan information is not much higher (16% to 19%) but the means vary 
from 3.9 to 4.2, which is higher than with event triggered information search. So the 
pyramidal structure for information seeking categories, ranging from intensive information 
seeking to passive information scanning is empirically confirmed. In the fourth study, we also 
integrated the perceptions about specific types of risk information. 
6.4. Information nature (Terrorism IV only) 
The subjoined table integrates the frequency of seeking specific types of information, the 
mean score of importance of that type of information (score on 10) and the % of 
respondents who attributed a score equal or higher than 7. 
Risk info nature  How often do you look for the 
following type of information 
Mean 
score/10 
St.Dev. % score 
≥7/10 
 % rarely/never % often/always    
Info about the probability that a terrorist 
attack will take place in Belgium 
53 7 5.6 2.7 43 
General information about terrorism 44 5 5.5 2.5 41 
Specific info about recent terrorist attacks 23 13 6.4 2.4 56 
Info about the controllability of the risk 64 5 5.1 2.7 33 
Info about exposure to the risk 57 5 5.0 2.6 32 
Info about the consequences of an attack 50 6 5.5 2.5 40 
Guidelines about what to do during a 
terrorist attack 
66 5 5.4 2.9 42 
Info about who's responsible 48 6 5.2 2.6 35 
Experiences of other people with the risk 71 2 4.3 2.4 21 
Info about similarity with other risks 68 3 4.2 2.5 20 
Table 38: Descriptive statistics for information nature 
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The information that is searched for most often is specific information about recent terrorist 
attacks (13%), however, the general percentages (of people that often or always look for)  
for all categories are very low (ranging from 2% to 7%). This is an extra confirmation of the 
fact that the active seeking behaviour is very low. The mean scores are all located around 5 
on the 10 point scale. However, we notice that the % of people who perceive that the 
specific information is important (score >7/10) varies from 20% to 56%, which indicates that 
people are convinced that risk information is important. The most successful are specific 
information about recent attacks (56%), probability information (43%), guidelines about 
what to do in case an attack occurs (42%) and general information about terrorism (41%). 
The least important information is information about experiences of other people with the 
risk (21%) and info about the similarity of the risk with other risks (20%). 
In this first part, we have tried to briefly summarize the general descriptive statistics of the 
central constructs that surround risk perception. We have ascertained that there are some 
general gender and age differences and that the general figures of risk perception, fear, 
social behaviour and information seeking are rather low. As we strongly assumed that the 
‘public’ is not a homogeneous group of receivers, basing ourselves on the traditional 
personal influence and social behaviours theories, we have attempted to explore possible 
segmentations of information seekers. In the next part, we will try to identify and profile the 
potential groups of information seekers by means of a basic cluster analysis. 
7. Identifying and profiling the public 
7.1. Identification of opinion leaders 
From the literature on opinion leadership, discussed in chapter four (3.7) and the link with 
information seeking behaviour in risk contexts, we decided to identify opinion leaders by 
means of three mains traits: 
1 Information seeking behaviour, split up in active information seeking, event-
triggered information seeking and passive information scanning. 
2 Social behaviour, expressed in the frequency of talking to others about the 
involved risk context 
3 Specific opinion leadership traits: influence. In these first surveys that we 
conducted, this trait was measured by means of one specific item 
“In conversations, my friends, colleagues, family… attach much importance to my 
opinion concerning the financial economical crisis.”  
We opted to perform K – means cluster analyses to reveal groups and we performed 
discriminant analyses to further investigate the retrieved clusters.  
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7.2. Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis actually consists of a group of techniques (k-means, hierarchical, two step) 
whose purpose is to group objects (respondents) based on the characteristics they possess. 
Taking into account several predetermined selection variables, the analysis tries to classify 
cases into groups that exhibit high internal homogeneity (within clusters) and high external 
homogeneity (between clusters) (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). We used cluster 
analysis to explore and form a taxonomy or an empirically based classification of our 
respondents based on their risk information seeking and social behaviour. We decided to 
use the k-means cluster analysis technique because we have predefined the clustering 
variables. Missing data were deleted casewise. As mentioned by Hair et al. (1998), there is 
no standard and objective selection procedure to determine the number of clusters. We 
decided to perform the analysis for two, three, four and five clusters as our aim is to define 
target groups for risk communication efforts, and more than five target groups are not 
manageable. The two and three group solutions were good but not specific enough, the five 
group solution was too complex and did not lend itself to be interpreted in a meaningful 
way. Moreover, the two, three and five group solutions were not similar at all in the three 
studies (and neither in the studies about the bird flu and financial economical crisis). The 
four group solution was a perfectly explicable and stable solution that was retrieved in all 
four terrorism studies and also in the bird flu and financial economical crisis study.  
First, we will graphically describe the four clusters that were retrieved in the four studies.  
 
 
Figure 34: Segmentation of opinion leaders of sample I (K-means clustering) 
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Figure 35: Segmentation of opinion leaders of sample II (K-means clustering) 
 
 
Figure 36: Segmentation of opinion leaders of sample III (K-means clustering) 
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Figure 37: Segmentation of opinion leaders of sample IV (K-means clustering) 
 
 
The subjoined table depicts the presence of each cluster in the samples, expressed in 
percentages. 
 
We have consistently retrieved and defined the following four groups: 
1. Opinion leaders. This is the group of respondents that has the highest scores on all 
cluster variables. Their information seeking behaviour is high (active, passive and 
event triggered search), they consider themselves as opinion leaders and they talk 
more about terrorism to other people than the other groups. This is the most 
important group of people as it will also be our primary target group in our risk 
communication programs since the diffused information will reach them more 
accurately and they will talk to other people about the risk of terrorism. The 
percentage of opinion leaders varies from 21% (in three studies) to 25%, so this 
3,85
4,95 4,97
4,27
4,05
2,71
4,19
3,06
4,06
3,61
2,68
4,38 4,36
2,39
3,18
1,68
3,28
1,92
2,39
2,73
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Active IS Passive IS Event triggered IS Opinion leader talk
Means
Segmentation of opinion leaders Terrorism IV
Opinion leaders
Talking scanners
Silent seekers
Ignorants
Table 39: Overview of the presence of each cluster of information seekers in the samples 
 
Cluster % Terrorism I 
N=1040 
% Terrorism II 
N=160 
% Terrorism III 
N=851 
%Terrorism IV 
N=1558 
Opinion leaders 21 21 21 25 
Talking scanners 24 33 34 34 
Silent seekers 37 20 22 18 
Ignorants 19 26 23 23 
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percentage is quite stable. This figure also corresponds with the percentage of 
opinion leaders that had been found in previous studies in various contexts: 21% in 
the ECS study and 22% in the Elmira study and 1 opinion leader for 3 or 4 persons (so 
25 to 33%) in the field of political communication (Boone, 1971).  
2. The second group is the group of silent seekers. Their active information seeking 
behaviour is low, but their passive and especially their event triggered information 
search behaviour is rather high. However, they only score averagely on social 
behaviour and they even score rather low on the opinion leadership (perceived 
influence) trait. The percentage varies from 18% to 37%, so it is quite variable. This 
group does not play a very important role as a target group for communication 
efforts as they will not spread the information that they retrieve. Their active 
information seeking behaviour is not high either so they will not come to the 
information that would be deliberately spread by the governmental institutions. 
3. The third group is the group of talking scanners. This group is characterized by its 
rather high passive information search behaviour, but a low active and moderate 
event triggered information search. On the contrary, they have high scores on social 
behaviour and opinion leadership in terms of perceived influence. The percentage 
varies from 24% to 34% so it is not as stable as the opinion leaders but not as variable 
as the silent seekers. This group may be of importance to risk communicators as they 
do talk about terrorism and they perceive themselves as opinion leaders, but they do 
not look for specific (and correct) information actively. It may be important to 
discover their media profiles so that they could be reached effectively if very crucial 
information would have to be disseminated in the community (e.g. guidelines). This 
group could be a secondary target group in the risk communication strategy. 
4. The last group is the group of ignorants. These people generally score low on all 
variables. They are not interested in terrorism, they do not talk about it and do not 
consider themselves as opinion leaders. They are no primary and even no secondary 
target group as they do not look for or retrieve information about terrorism neither 
do they talk about the subject. Their percentages vary from 19% to 26%. 
7.3. Additional analyses 
The analysis of variance is used to compare the means for each of the five dimensions 
between the four groups (taking into account the between and within group variance). We 
see that the means of the specific clustering variables differ significantly from each other for 
all four groups in all four studies. 
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Analysis of Variance (risk I to merge)
Variable
Between
SS
df Within
SS
df F signif.
p
active IS
event triggered IS
opinion leader
talk
passive IS
482,973 3 605,0107 965 256,7826 0,00
1184,469 3 571,4273 965 666,7591 0,00
470,537 3 575,0065 965 263,2252 0,00
250,857 3 394,1367 965 204,7318 0,00
350,666 3 711,6811 965 158,4944 0,00
 
Analysis of Variance Terrorism II
Variable
Between
SS
df Within
SS
df F signif.
p
active IS
event triggered IS
opinion leader
passive IS
talk
86,4531 3 81,54685 143 50,5346 0,000000
165,5802 3 57,08647 143 138,2579 0,000000
46,1027 3 80,44147 143 27,3188 0,000000
42,3430 3 98,88306 143 20,4115 0,000000
31,3335 3 62,63131 143 23,8469 0,000000
 
Analysis of Variance Terrorism III
Variable
Between
SS
df Within
SS
df F signif.
p
active IS
event triggered IS
opinion leader
talk
passive IS
403,7968 3 496,5916 789 213,8549 0,00
913,1453 3 463,7349 789 517,8760 0,00
499,0317 3 421,1827 789 311,6115 0,00
286,2475 3 333,9888 789 225,4060 0,00
317,1407 3 566,4236 789 147,2537 0,00
 
Analysis of Variance Terrorism IV
Variable
Between
SS
df Within
SS
df F signif.
p
talk
event triggered IS
active IS
opinion leader
passive IS
346,347 3 643,962 1496 268,202 0,00
1970,776 3 761,015 1496 1291,381 0,00
848,144 3 1060,244 1496 398,909 0,00
1121,349 3 959,096 1496 583,028 0,00
513,658 3 1047,781 1496 244,464 0,00
 
Table 40: Analyses of variance for four samples of terrorism 
 
Other useful results to examine are the Euclidean distances (E.D.) and squared Euclidean 
distances (E.D.²) between clusters These distances (Euclidean and squared Euclidean) are 
computed from the cluster means on each dimension. 
 
Euclidean Distances between Clusters Terrorism I
Distances below diagonal
Squared distances above diagonal
Cluster
Number No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
No. 1
No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
0,000000 2,151813 0,821821 4,658165
1,466906 0,000000 0,698345 0,988483
0,906543 0,835670 0,000000 1,623097
2,158278 0,994225 1,274008 0,000000
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Euclidean Distances between ClustersTerrorism II
Distances below diagonal
Squared distances above diagonalCluster
Number No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
No. 1
No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
0,000000 0,771554 0,535609 1,176114
0,878381 0,000000 1,341373 3,734798
0,731853 1,158176 0,000000 1,154714
1,084488 1,932562 1,074576 0,000000
 
Euclidean Distances between Clusters Terrorism III
Distances below diagonal
Squared distances above diagonalCluster
Number No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
No. 1
No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
0,000000 1,415359 1,228835 0,686088
1,189689 0,000000 4,647094 1,251235
1,108528 2,155712 0,000000 1,495073
0,828304 1,118586 1,222732 0,000000
 
Euclidean Distances between Clusters Terrorism IV
Distances below diagonal
Squared distances above diagonalCluster
Number No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
No. 1
No. 2
No. 3
No. 4
0,000000 0,933214 1,153649 1,343406
0,966030 0,000000 1,266352 1,670167
1,074081 1,125323 0,000000 4,410228
1,159054 1,292349 2,100054 0,000000
 
Table 41: Euclidean distances between clusters for four samples of terrorism 
 
The table shows that the opinion leaders are closer to the talking scanners, but still the 
distances versus the other groups are quite high. Silent seekers and talking scanners are 
closest to each other, they differ significantly but not as much as from the other clusters. The 
next step for validating our four clusters is the performance of a discriminant analysis. 
7.4. Discriminant analysis 
By means of the discriminant analysis, we will cross-check and further analyze our 
segmentation. Hair et al. determined four main purposes of discriminant analysis (Hair et al., 
1998): 
1. To determine whether the differences between the average score profiles of two 
or more groups (in our case 4 groups of information seekers) on a set of variables 
(here 5 variables) are statistically significant. 
2. To determine which one of the 5 independent variables in the analysis account 
the most for the differences in the average score profiles of the four groups 
3. To construct classification functions that can classify the respondents into the 
correct group on the basis of their scores on the 5 determining independent 
variables. 
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4. To establish the number and composition of the discriminating dimensions 
between the four groups from the set of independent variables. 
7.4.1. Assessing the overall fit of the proposed model 
The Wilks’ Lambda, Hotellings’s trace and Pillai’s parameters all evaluate the statistical 
significance of the discriminatory power of the discriminant functions  As we use Statistica 7 
software program to perform the discriminant analyses, the Wilks’ Lambda is calculated and 
interpreted. Wilks’ Lambda is calculated by dividing the determinant of the within the 
between-groups multivariate dispersion matrix ІWІ through the determinant of the sum of 
the within- and between groups ІAІ multivariate dispersion matrix: Wilks’ Lambda = ІWІ / 
ІW+AІ. So the larger the between-groups dispersion, the smaller the value of Wilks’ Lambda 
and the greater the implied significance (Hair et al., 1998). Wilks' Lambda can assume values 
in the range of 0 (perfect discrimination) to 1 (no discrimination). 
Wilks’ Lambda is varies from 0.10 (study II and IV) to 0.11 (study I and II) with significant F 
values (p<0.000), so the low Wilks’ Lambda proves that the between-groups dispersion is 
large compared to the within groups dispersion. The four groups differ significantly and the 
five independent variables are discriminant items. 
The Wilks’ Lambda’s which are mentioned in the first column of the output, refer to the 
Wilks' Lambda for the overall model that will result after removing the respective variable 
from the model. None of the Wilks’ lambda’s exceed 0.246 (infoaans). So each one of the 
independent variables contribute to the discrimination. The Partial Lambda’s in the second 
column are associated with the unique contribution of the respective variable to the 
discriminatory power of the model. The value (that ranges from 0 to1) has to be as low as 
possible. We can read that the partial lambda’s range from 0.447 to 0.956. 
The F-remove values are associated with the respective partial Wilk's Lambda’s and the p-
levels indicate the significance levels of the F values. All F values are significant, except for 
the talk variable in the second study, even though the other parameters are good. The 
higher p level is probably due to the small sample of 160 respondents. 
The Tolerance values are in fact the results of 1-r² of the respective variable with all other 
variables in the model as shown in the output. It is a measure of the redundancy of the 
respective variable. Naturally, 1-Tolerance is the r² of the respective variable with all other 
variables in the model/output.  The miminum r² (0.04) is the one of the variable infoaans. Its 
Tolerance value is 0.96, which means that the variable talk is 4% redundant with the other 
variables. The highest r² is 0.14 (Tolerance=0.86), which means that 14% of the variable 
opionlea is explained by the other five variables in the model. 
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Discriminant Function Analysis Summary Terrorism I
No. of vars in model: 5; Grouping: CLUSTER (4 grps)
Wilks' Lambda: ,11027 approx. F (15,2653)=216,27 p<0,0000
N=969
Wilks'
Lambda
Partial
Lambda
F-remove
(3,961)
p-level Toler. 1-Toler.
(R-Sqr.)
active is
event triggered is
opinion leader
talk
passive is
0,143947 0,766013 97,8495 0,000000 0,955497 0,044503
0,246580 0,447179 396,0093 0,000000 0,959279 0,040721
0,152676 0,722217 123,2086 0,000000 0,862241 0,137759
0,115278 0,956521 14,5608 0,000000 0,917134 0,082866
0,131527 0,838349 61,7671 0,000000 0,916899 0,083101
 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary Terrorism II
No. of vars in model: 5; Grouping: CLUSTER (4 grps)
Wilks' Lambda: ,10594 approx. F (15,384)=32,141 p<0,0000
N=147
Wilks'
Lambda
Partial
Lambda
F-remove
(3,139)
p-level Toler. 1-Toler.
(R-Sqr.)
active is
event triggered is
opinion leader
passive is
talk
0,131174 0,807621 11,03682 0,000002 0,890089 0,109911
0,228842 0,462933 53,75321 0,000000 0,921216 0,078784
0,144494 0,733168 16,86271 0,000000 0,850293 0,149707
0,125032 0,847290 8,35084 0,000038 0,951985 0,048015
0,110699 0,956997 2,08202 0,105379 0,887901 0,112099
 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary Terrorism III
No. of vars in model: 5; Grouping: CLUSTER (4 grps)
Wilks' Lambda: ,11225 approx. F (15,2167)=174,60 p<0,0000
N=793
Wilks'
Lambda
Partial
Lambda
F-remove
(3,785)
p-level Toler. 1-Toler.
(R-Sqr.)
active is
event triggered is
opinion leader
talk
passive is
0,131143 0,855954 44,0352 0,000000 0,960620 0,039380
0,213301 0,526262 235,5510 0,000000 0,971411 0,028589
0,167339 0,670808 128,4105 0,000000 0,915629 0,084371
0,120496 0,931589 19,2153 0,000000 0,915691 0,084309
0,124061 0,904818 27,5260 0,000000 0,961762 0,038238
 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary Terrorism IV
No. of vars in model: 5; Grouping: CLUSTER (4 grps)
Wilks' Lambda: ,10047 approx. F (15,4119)=356,67 p<0,0000
N=1500
Wilks'
Lambda
Partial
Lambda
F-remove
3,1492
p-level Toler. 1-Toler.
(R-Sqr.)
talk
event triggered is
active is
opinion leader
passive is
0,103580 0,969972 15,3964 0,000000 0,901577 0,098423
0,211929 0,474072 551,7343 0,000000 0,969032 0,030968
0,119433 0,841224 93,8687 0,000000 0,947736 0,052264
0,169575 0,592479 342,0776 0,000000 0,886213 0,113787
0,107029 0,938714 32,4697 0,000000 0,961388 0,038612
 
Table 42: Lambda values in the four samples of terrorism 
 
The variable ‘Event triggered information seeking’ contributes most to the overall 
discrimination in all four studies (lambda if variable removed ranges from 0.21 to 0.25 and 
partial lambda ranges from 0.45 to 0.53). The variable that contributes least is the social 
behaviour (talk) (lambda if variable removed ranges from 0.11 to 0.12 and partial lambda 
ranges from 0.93 to 0.97). For all four studies, the converted F values of all variables in the 
model are statistically significant on the 0.0001 level, except for the social behaviour variable 
(talk) in study II (F=2.08, p=0.10), probably because of the small sample size (n=160). So the 
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most discriminating variable is the event triggered information seeking variable, followed by 
the opinion leadership variable, the active and passive information seeking variables and 
eventually social behaviour (talk) as the least important discriminator. 
7.4.2. Assessing groups membership prediction accuracy 
The classification matrix contains information about the number and percent of correctly 
classified cases in each group. The subjoined classification matrix shows us that the 
percentage of cases that are correctly assigned to the predicted groups varies from 94% 
(study I) to 97% (study II and III). For the most important group in our research, the opinion 
leaders, this percentage varies from 86% to 97%. These hit ratios are high and so we can 
state that the model with 5 variables is a good predictive model that is stable as well as both 
the hit ratios as the Lambda’s are stable across the four studies. 
 
Classification Matrix Terrorism I
Rows: Observed classifications
Columns: Predicted classifications
Group
Percent
Correct
Opinion
leaders
p=,20640
Talking
scanners
p=,23529
Silent seekers
p=,37049
Ignorants
p=,18782
Opinion leaders
Talking scanners
Silent seekers
Ignorants
Total
86,00000 172 0 28 0
93,42105 0 213 15 0
99,72145 0 1 358 0
93,95605 0 7 4 171
94,32404 172 221 405 171  
Classification Matrix Terrorism II
Rows: Observed classifications
Columns: Predicted classifications
Group
Percent
Correct
Talking
scanners
p=,32653
Ignorants
p=,25850
Silent seekers
p=,20408
Opinion
leaders
p=,21088
Talking scanners
Ignorants
Silent seekers
Opinion leaders
Total
100,0000 48 0 0 0
97,3684 1 37 0 0
93,3333 2 0 28 0
96,7742 0 0 1 30
97,2789 51 37 29 30
 
Classification Matrix Terrorism III
Rows: Observed classifications
Columns: Predicted classifications
Group
Percent
Correct
Talking
scanners
p=,34048
Opinion
leaders
p=,21438
Ignorants
p=,22951
Silent seekers
p=,21564
Talking scanners
Opinion leaders
Ignorants
Silent seekers
Total
100,0000 270 0 0 0
96,4706 2 164 0 4
92,8571 11 0 169 2
97,0760 2 2 1 166
96,9735 285 166 170 172
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Classification Matrix Terrorism IV
Rows: Observed classifications
Columns: Predicted classifications
Group
Percent
Correct
Talking
scanners
p=,34400
Silent seekers
p=,17533
Opinion
leaders
p=,24733
Ignorants
p=,23333
Talking scanners
Silent seekers
Opinion leaders
Ignorants
Total
97,09303 501 0 8 7
95,05704 5 250 6 2
94,87871 19 0 352 0
93,71429 19 3 0 328
95,40000 544 253 366 337  
Table 43: Classification matrices in the four studies of terrorism 
 
7.5. Profiling opinion leaders 
It is clear that the most important group to reach with risk communication programs are the 
opinion leaders as these people look for risk information, they talk to others more than 
other people about the topic. We will first create both the general socio-demographical 
profiles as the media profiles of all four groups of information seekers. Secondly, we will 
focus on the specific information needs of the opinion leaders, as this group of people will 
play a key role in our risk communication strategy. 
 
Socio-demographical profiles Terrorism I 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Gender 58% male 
43% female 
 
54% male 
46% female 
50% male 
50% female 
42% male 
58% female 
Χ²=9.91, p<0.002 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=88.93) 
Age (mean) 40.04  38.70 39.96 42.94 
F(3,957)=2.29, p=0.07 
Educational level 27% low  
29% average 
44% high 
32% low 
30% average 
39% high 
27% low 
31% average 
43% high 
22% low 
22% average 
56% high 
Χ²=14.67, p=0.02 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=47.07) 
Income level 
€ net / month 
No sign. diff. 
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Socio-demographical profiles Terrorism III 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Gender 63% male 
37% female 
 
51% male 
49% female 
43% male 
57% female 
45% male 
55% female 
Χ²=15.85, p=0.001 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=84.04) 
Age (mean) 44.82  39.02 46.65 45.97 
F(3,786)=8.74, p=0.000 
Educational level 2% low  
29% average 
43% high 
28% low 
35% average 
37% high 
29% low 
32% average 
38% high 
44% low 
25% average 
30% high 
Χ²=18.31, p=0.005 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=52.20) 
Income level 
€ net / month 
19% <1000€ 
60% 1000€-2500€ 
21%   >2500€ 
31% <1000€ 
55% 1000€-2500€ 
15%   >2500€ 
17% <1000€ 
70% 1000€-2500€ 
14%   >2500€ 
27% <1000€ 
60% 1000€-2500€ 
13%   >2500€ 
 Χ²=19.39, p=0.004 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=25.46) 
 
Socio-demographical profiles Terrorism IV 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Gender 58% male 
42% female 
 
50% male 
50% female 
44% male 
56% female 
46% male 
54% female 
Χ²=14.38 p=0.002 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=131.06) 
Age (mean) 44.24 39.67 47.15 41 
F(3,1490)=13.74, p=0.07 
Educational level 12% low  
35% average 
52% high 
12% low 
39% average 
49% high 
12% low 
40% average 
48% high 
15% low 
37% average 
48% high 
Χ²=14.67, p=0.02 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=47.07) 
Income level 
€ net / month 
No sign. diff. 
Table 44: Socio demographical profiles of information seekers in context of terrorism (4 studies) 
 
 
When we compare the socio demographical profiles of the opinion leaders of the four 
studies, we can say that the opinion leaders in the context of terrorism are dominantly males 
(ranges from 58% to 63%) and the average age is 40 to 44 years old. We might also conclude 
that the opinion leaders have higher educational levels (43% to 52%). For income level, there 
has only been found significant differences in study III, so we will not state that opinion 
leaders differ significantly from the other groups for income as we did not find the difference 
in all four studies. There were no significant differences for residence (city or countryside), 
profession, marital status (divorced, married, living together, widow(er), or household 
composition (number of children). We will now provide an overview of the differences in the 
general concepts between the information seeker groups. 
 
 
238 
 
General concepts profiles Terrorism I 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Mental distance 2.15 2.57 2.48 2.83 
F(3,956)=23.11*** 
Risk perception 3.95 3.76 3.78 3.68 
F(3,958)=19.28*** 
Fear 3.84 3.57 3.61 3.27 
F(3,957)=13.58*** 
Behaviour 2.66 2.00 2.25 1.74 
F(3,960)=49.83***    
 
General concepts profiles Terrorism III 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Mental distance 2.29 2.72 2.81 3.03 
F(3,785)=16.75*** 
Risk perception 3.99 3.61 3.51 3.20 
F(3,786)=21.27*** 
Fear 2.95 2.53 2.54 2.00 
F(3,785)=30.29*** 
Behaviour 2.70 2.32 2.09 1.89 
F(3,779)=30.29***    
 
General concepts profiles Terrorism IV 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Mental distance 2.21 2.66 2.63 2.95 
F(3,1481)=43.25*** 
Risk perception 3.78 3.46 3.46 3.16 
F(3,1486)=37.13*** 
Fear 2.89 2.54 2.64 2.16 
F(3,1492)=34.30*** 
Behaviour 2.93 2.59 2.35 2.06 
F(3,1331)=62.86***    
Table 45: General concepts profiles of information seeker in the context of terrorism (4 studies) 
 
The results were consistent over the three studies, so we may conclude that the following 
pronouncements are valid and reliable. Opinion leaders consistently have the lowest mental 
distances towards the threat of terrorism, they perceive the terrorist threat as something 
that can happen in one’s own environment and not only in countries that are at war or 
where ‘terrorist leaders’ live. Ignorants have the highest mental distances and perceive the 
risk as being further away from one’s own surroundings. The risk perception levels are 
statistically higher for opinion leaders than for the other groups, while ignorants have the 
lowest risk perception levels. Fear levels are also statistically higher for opinion leaders. For 
the concrete behavioural intentions (personal safety measures etc.), opinion leaders score 
significantly higher than the other three groups, however, the levels do not exceed the 
average of 3 on the 6 point scale. These results are very relevant as governments should 
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now recognize the fact that opinion leaders, who are probably the most important risk 
communication target group since they look for information about terrorism and talk to 
others about it, have leveraged risk perception and fear levels (and lower mental distance 
levels) and higher behavioural intentions. It is not possible to lower the risk perception 
feelings since governments should not try to spirit away threat facts but it is possible to 
reduce the fear levels (even though they are not very high).  
The construction of the media profiles of the information seekers might be useful to build 
concrete and targeted risk communication strategies. We will now discuss the primary 
results of these analyses. 
 
Media profiles Terrorism I, Terrorism III and Terrorism IV 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Television No sig. differences 
Internet 
Table 46: Media profiles information seekers in the four terrorism studies 
 
 
There were no statistical differences in general media usage in all three studies. We will only 
discuss the specific media profile of the opinion leaders in the three studies as we consider 
them as our primary communication targets. We only integrated the media (tv station, 
newspaper, magazine and radio station) that had the highest percentages (%regulary-often-
always). For study I and III, we integrated the option to indicate the specific media channels, 
for study IV, we opted to integrate the option to indicate the frequency of consultancy (for 
information seeking about terrorism) of the general media.  
 
 
Specific media usage opinion leaders 
Medium 
% regularly-often-always 
Terrorism I % Terrorism III % 
Internet  24.7  40.5 
Television station TV1 (één)  
Canvas  
79.3 
68.2 
TV1 (één)  
Canvas  
82 
73.3 
Newspaper De Standaard  
Het Nieuwsblad  
De Morgen 
23.8 
25.5 
23.3 
De Standaard  
Het Nieuwsblad  
De Morgen 
24.2 
31.9 
18.4 
Magazine Knack 
Humo 
26.4 
28.8 
Knack 
Humo 
25.2 
22.8 
Radio station Radio 1 31.4 Radio 1 34.8 
Table 47: Specific media usage opinion leaders (study I and III) 
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Terrorism IV % 
Internet websites 27.3 
Internet forums 5.5 
Newspapers 80.3 
Magazines 52.2 
Television programs 86.1 
Radio 68.4 
Table 48: Specific media usage opinion leaders study IV 
 
We can conclude that in general, especially television and newspapers are the media 
channels that are most consulted for information search about terrorism., followed by radio 
and magazines. Surprisingly, the internet is not mentioned as a medium that is used very 
often. We also conclude that, even though the general media usage questions in the 
terrorism IV study provides an overview of the general media consultancy, it is better to 
integrate the specific media channels in order to be able to create the specific media profiles 
of the target groups, e.g. the opinion leaders. We can derive from the descriptive results that 
opinion leaders consult the public broadcasting stations (één and Canvas) and that they 
mostly read the ‘quality newpapers’ (De Standaard, De Morgen) and Het Nieuwsblad. The 
most popular magazine is Knack. However, we do recognize the need for the integration of a 
more extensive media profiling instrument in the methodology. This may provide more 
specific information about the general and specific media usage of the target groups, such as 
the opinion leaders. 
 
Opinion leaders’ profile 
 
To conclude the profiling of opinion leaders, we have summarized the most important 
characteristics in the subjoined overview. 
 
 
Table 49: General profile opinion leaders 
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This profile of the opinion leaders in the context of terrorism as a risk was retrtrieved in all 
three studies. 
Besides the general media usage, we decided to add questions about the specific risk 
information needs in study IV. These questions provided us with some important 
information about the specific nature of the risk information that is sought. The next section 
will discuss the results. 
8. Specific risk information needs in the context of terrorism 
The next table compares the perception of risk information types in the context of terrorism 
of both non opinion leaders as opinion leaders (marked in bold). The most important 
differences were discovered when we compared the percentage of opinion leaders versus 
non-opinion leaders who appointed a score equal or higher than 7 on the 10 point scale of 
importance. These differences are graphically represented in the subjoined bar chart. 
 
Risk info nature  How often do you look for the 
following type of information 
Mean score/10 St.Dev. 
 % rarely/never % often/always   
Info about the probability that a terrorist 
attack will take place in Belgium 
61 
36 
4 
12 
5.3 
6.4 
2.8 
2.4 
General information about terrorism 52 
24 
3 
9 
5.2 
6.3 
2.6 
2.2 
Specific info about recent terrorist attacks 29 
5 
8 
26 
6 
7.4 
2.5 
1.8 
Info about the controllability of the risk 89 
46 
4 
10 
4.8 
6 
2.7 
2.5 
Info about exposure to the risk 65 
39 
11 
10 
4.7 
5.8 
2.6 
2.3 
Info about the consequences of an attack 57 
32 
4 
11 
5.2 
6.4 
2.5 
2.3 
Guidelines about what to do during a 
terrorist attack 
72 
52 
3 
10 
5.2 
5.6 
2.9 
2.6 
Info about who's responsible 55 
32 
4 
12 
5 
5.9 
2.6 
2.5 
Experiences of other people with the risk 77 
56 
1 
5 
4 
5 
2.4 
2.5 
Info about similarity with other risks 75 
52 
6 
6 
3.9 
4.8 
2.4 
2.5 
Opinion leaders analysis results are marked in bold 
Table 50: Specific risk information needs in the context of terrorism 
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Figure 38: Perceived importance risk information type in the context of terrorism 
 
 
Compared with the overall risk information needs of the general public, the opinion leaders 
have much higher percentages. The priorities in information perceptions are very similar, but 
both the % of opinion leaders that look for the information often/always as the % of opinion 
leaders that rate the information higher than 7 on the 10 point scale are much higher for all 
types of risk information. Same accounts for the general means. The information that is 
searched most often by opinion leaders is specific information about recent terrorist attacks 
(26% versus 8% for general public), the mean score for this type of information is 7.4 and 
76% of the opinion leaders appointed a score higher than 7 (compared to 48% of the general 
public).  The second and third most important types of information are information about 
the probability of a terrorist attack in Belgium (12% looks often/always, mean = 6.4 and 53% 
rated it 7 or more) and general information about terrorism (9% looks often/always, mean = 
6.3 and 53% gave it a 7 or more). The other mean scores are all located around 6 to 7 on the 
10 point scale, except for the info about similarity of the terrorist risk to other risks (mean 
score 4.8, 6% looks for this information often always and 29% appointed a score >7) and the 
experiences of other people with the terrorism as a risk (mean score 5, 5% looks for this 
information often/always and 31% appointed a score>7).  
To conclude we can state that the % of opinion leaders that often or always look for risk 
information in the context of terrorism is higher than the figures of the general public and so 
are the mean scores that were appointed on the 10 point scale. For some types of 
information (general information, probability information and specific information about 
recent terrorist attacks), the percentage of opinion leaders that gave a score of 7 or more 
was much higher (10% to 20% difference) than for the general public. 
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9. Governmental communication 
We will now discuss the results of the descriptive statistics analyses for the concepts that 
relate specifically to governmental issues, such as perceived roles of the government, trust in 
governmental institutes, reliability of the governmental information, the perceptions of the 
government as a dominant risk information controller and disperser, the general perceptions 
of the governmental risk communication in the context of terrorism and a general evaluation 
of the possible governmental risk communication channels. We will consistently split the 
results for the general public on the one hand and for the opinion leaders on the other hand. 
The analyses will deliver strong empirical proof for the differences between opinion leaders 
and the general public. Again, we want to integrate this dual interpretation of figures to 
indicate the specific profile of opinion leaders and the importance to take this group of 
people in special consideration when construing and implementing risk communication 
strategies.  
9.1. Perceived roles of the government 
In the last survey that we performed about terrorism as a threat (study IV), we decided to 
measure the public perceptions of the governmental roles: effective risk regulation in terms 
of preventing terrorist attacks by taking concrete safety measures, providing concrete and 
workable guidelines as an element of concise proactive risk and crisis communication and 
providing general information about terrorism as a risk, indicating and expanding the role of 
the government as a regulator to the leveraged role of the government as a risk 
communicator. The latter is rather novel but essential as governmental risk communication 
in the context of terrorism includes more than pre crisis communication but may also play an 
important role in increasing public understanding of the phenomenon and risk of terrorism 
and thereby invigorating communal resilience in the face of the mainly socially and medially 
constructed risk. 
We decided to include both the means as indicators of centrality (with associated standard 
deviations) as the percentages of people who have low and high scores. The latter can also 
inform us about the percentage of people have a pronounced opinion about a statement, as 
means do not reflect information of this descriptive nature. Sometimes people do not have a 
pronounced opinion about certain issues. The statements were rated on a 6 point Lickert 
scale (1=Totally not important-6=Extremely important)  
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 Mean St.Dev. % Low % High 
Preventing terrorist attacks by taking concrete safety 
measures 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
5.26 
5.46 
t(948)=-4.35*** 
 
 
0.98 
0.79 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
81 
88 
Providing concrete guidelines to civilians 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
4.58 
5.03 
t(902)=-8.98*** 
 
0.98 
0.84 
 
3 
0 
 
 
55 
75 
Providing general information about terrorism 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
4.50 
4.95 
t(910)=-9.05*** 
 
0.96 
0.82 
 
3 
0 
 
50 
71 
Significance key * p≤0.05 ** p≤0.01 *** p≤0.001 
Table 51: Perceived roles of the government in the context of terrorism (study IV only) 
 
The primary rol of the government is, as we expected, the risk regulation role. The mean is 
very high (for both opinion leaders as non opinion leaders) and 81% to 88% finds this role 
important to very important. The provision of concrete guidelines is also very important, 
however, we can clearly see the different perceptions of opinion leaders: 75% thinks that 
this role of pre crisis communication is important to very important compared to only 55% of 
the non opinion leaders (meanOL>meanNonOL). Same accounts for the provision of general 
information (risk communication): 71% of the opinion leaders versus 50% for non opinion 
leaders (and meanOL>meanNonOL). It is also very remarkable that the percentages of people 
who think that these roles are not/not at all important are very low: the percentages range 
from 0% to 3%. 
We might conclude that the government is primarily perceived as a risk regulator, carefully 
preventing terrorist actions. However, we can also state that its role as a crisis and risk 
communicator is perceived very important as well, especially because only negligible 
percentages of respondents stated that these roles are not important. The noteworthy 
differences between opinion leaders and non opinion leaders support our general premise 
that governmental risk communication strategies should carefully constructed, taking into 
consideration the differences between various audiences that may play crucial roles in the 
risk information diffusion and two way communication and risk management strategy. 
Of course, the concept of general trust in the governmental institutes is a crucial construct to 
scrutinize as well as the credibility of the government as a crisis and risk communicator will 
depend on its reputation and the general attitude of the public.  
245 
 
9.2. Trust in institutes 
The general trust in governmental institutions is reflected in the perceived preparedness of 
the governments on the various levels (local, national, European) to cope with a terrorist 
attack. 
 
Terrorism I 
 
Degree of trust in following instances (5 point Likert scale) 
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Perceived preparedness 
European government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.21 
3.14 
 
 
0.94 
0.90 
Male = 3.12 
Female = 3.28 
t (963)=-
2.70** 
  
 
20 
24 
 
 
44 
40 
Perceived preparedness national 
government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3 
3 
 
 
0.89 
0.90 
   
 
28 
29 
 
 
33 
36 
Perceived preparedness local 
government  
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
1 
0.94 
   
 
68 
71 
 
 
7 
11 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 52: Levels of trust in the various instances in the context of terrorism study I 
 
Terrorism III 
 
Degree of trust in following instances  
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Perceived preparedness 
European government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.27 
3.18 
 
 
0.93 
0.88 
   
 
20 
22 
 
 
48 
42 
Perceived preparedness 
national government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.12 
3.02 
 
 
0.91 
0.85 
   
 
24 
25 
 
 
39 
31 
Perceived preparedness 
local government  
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.12 
2.04 
 
 
1.02 
1.06 
 <35 year = 1.92 
35-44 year = 2.09 
45-64 year = 2.19 
>64 year = 2.39 
F(3,828)=7.50*** 
 
 
65 
70 
 
 
10 
11 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 53: Levels of trust in the various instances in the context of terrorism study III 
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Terrorism IV 
 
Degree of trust in following instances  
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Perceived preparedness 
European government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.46 
3.35 
 
 
0.85 
0.95 
Male = 3.36 
Female = 3.49 
t (963)=-3.08** 
<35 year = 3.56 
35-44 year = 3.39 
45-64 year = 3.35 
>64 year = 3.33 
F(3,1541)=6.79*** 
 
 
14 
20 
 
 
58 
54 
Perceived preparedness 
national government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.26 
3.17 
 
 
0.90 
0.90 
   
 
20 
23 
 
 
47 
40 
Perceived preparedness local 
government  
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.29 
2.36 
 
 
0.94 
0.89 
Male = 2.26 
Female = 2.36 
t (963)=-2.07* 
<35 year = 2.12 
35-44 year = 2.26 
45-64 year = 2.46 
>64 year = 2.40 
F(3,1542)=14.55*** 
 
 
60 
56 
 
 
10 
10 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 54: Levels of trust in the various instances in the context of terrorism study IV 
 
 
The figures point out that the perceived preparedness of the European government is 
slightly higher than the preparedness of the national government. However, both score fairly 
above the average of 2.5 on the 5 point Likert scale. The low trust levels in the local 
government is consistently found in the three studies (means range from 2 to 2.3 on the 5 
point scale). When we take a look at the percentages, we see that only about 10% of the 
respondents have high perceived preparedness levels for the local government and that no 
less than 60% to 70% of the respondents in the three studies perceive the local governments 
as being unprepared. For the national and European government, these figures reflect an 
even dispersion and even more positive than negative perception of the preparedness 
(40%to 54% positive perceptions for the European government and 31% to 47% for the 
national government). 
There were no statistically significant differences between opinion leaders and non-opinion 
leaders. Concerning gender differences, we could only statistically confirm the higher level of 
perceived preparedness for women of the European government in study I and study III and 
for the local government in study IV (even though the mean is still below the average of 2.5). 
So we might carefully state that women have slightly higher trust levels than men. For age 
differences, we can confirm that in study III and study IV, the older respondents (>45 years) 
have higher scores on perceived preparedness of the local government (however below the 
average).  
The main conclusion that we can draw is that mainly the local government is perceived to be 
rather unprepared in the context of potential terrorist attacks. We consistently found this 
result in the three large scaled studies. This is contradictory to the general expectations that 
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local governments are the first in line to deal with potential crisis situations. It is important 
so set up the general objective to raise the general trust and perceived preparedness of local 
governments. This raise could contribute to the general construction of a communal 
resilience and a perceived preparedness climate so that risk and crisis guidelines will be 
taken at heart when they are communicated.  
9.3. Reliability institutional information  
Besides the general trust in governments as risk regulators (perceived preparedness), our 
second objective is to take a look at the trust in the governments as risk communicators. We 
will first compare the perceived reliability of the governmental information on various levels 
and then discuss the perceived governmental control of information flow. 
 
Terrorism I 
 
Degree of trust in following instances (5 point Likert scale) 
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Perceived reliability 
NATO info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.21 
3.22 
 
 
0.88 
1.0 
 <35 year = 3.43 
35-44 year = 3.07 
45-64 year = 3.01 
>64 year = 3.13 
F(3,1016)=15.42*** 
 
 
19 
23 
 
 
41 
43 
Perceived reliability 
American info  
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.24 
2.19 
 
 
0.95 
1.0 
 <35 year = 2.01 
35-44 year = 2.29 
45-64 year = 2.36 
>64 year = 2.64 
F(3,1019)=16.97*** 
 
 
66 
68 
 
 
11 
15 
Perceived reliability 
European info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.26 
3.27 
 
 
0.86 
0.97 
 <35 year = 3.48 
35-44 year = 3.08 
45-64 year = 3.11 
>64 year = 2.98 
F(3,1022)=19.21*** 
 
 
19 
24 
 
 
46 
51 
Perceived reliability 
Belgian info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.26 
3.25 
 
 
0.99 
0.90 
 <35 year = 3.44 
35-44 year = 3.10 
45-64 year = 3.12 
>64 year = 3.05 
F(3,1020)=19.21*** 
 
 
21 
24 
 
 
47 
51 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 55: Trust levels of the governmental information in the context of terrorism study I 
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Terrorism III 
 
Degree of trust in following instances  
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Perceived reliability 
NATO info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.14 
3.25 
 
 
0.92 
0.82 
 <35 year = 3.38 
35-44 year = 3.06 
45-64 year = 2.97 
>64 year = 3.15 
F(3,825)=10.79*** 
 
 
23 
17 
 
 
39 
46 
Perceived reliability 
American info  
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.32 
2.43 
 
 
0.96 
1.03 
 <35 year = 2.09 
35-44 year = 2.29 
45-64 year = 2.46 
>64 year = 2.76 
F(3,828)=17.15*** 
 
 
62 
57 
 
 
14 
18 
Perceived reliability 
European info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.26 
3.34 
 
 
0.85 
0.87 
 <35 year = 3.48 
35-44 year = 3.24 
45-64 year = 3.12 
>64 year = 3.13 
F(3,828)=10.29*** 
 
 
19 
18 
 
 
46 
54 
Perceived reliability 
Belgian info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.28 
3.34 
 
 
0.91 
0.90 
 <35 year = 3.52 
35-44 year = 3.24 
45-64 year = 3.11 
>64 year = 3.13 
F(3,831)=11.89*** 
 
 
20 
19 
 
 
50 
57 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 56: Trust levels of the governmental information in the context of terrorism study III 
 
 
Terrorism IV 
 
Degree of trust in following instances  
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Perceived reliability 
NATO info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.32 
3.27 
 
 
0.96 
0.99 
Male = 3.23 
Female = 3.36 
t (963)=-2.64** 
<35 year = 3.60 
35-44 year = 3.28 
45-64 year = 3.13 
>64 year = 3.04 
F(3,1540)=30.66*** 
 
 
19 
25 
 
 
51 
49 
Perceived reliability 
American info  
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.28 
2.22 
 
 
1.00 
1.00 
 <35 year = 2.11 
35-44 year = 2.23 
45-64 year = 2.30 
>64 year = 2.63 
F(3,1542)=11.68*** 
 
 
67 
72 
 
 
15 
16 
Perceived reliability 
European info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.41 
3.35 
 
 
0.88 
0.93 
Male = 3.34 
Female = 3.43 
t (963)=-2.03* 
<35 year = 3.69 
35-44 year = 3.30 
45-64 year = 3.25 
>64 year = 3.09 
 
 
18 
23 
 
 
58 
58 
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F(3,1537)=33.28*** 
Perceived reliability 
Belgian info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.39 
3.33 
 
 
0.89 
0.95 
 <35 year = 3.63 
35-44 year = 3.29 
45-64 year = 3.25 
>64 year = 3.07 
F(3,1539)=26.09*** 
 
 
19 
24 
 
 
57 
58 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 57: Trust levels of the governmental information in the context of terrorism study II 
 
For the information that comes from NATO, European and Belgian sources (governmental 
institutes), the means are all very similar across all three studies: they vary from 3.14 to 3.43 
on the 5 point Likert scale. The percentage of people that appoint high credibility scores 
varies from 39% to 58% and the percentage that appointed low credibility scores varied from 
17% to 25%.  
Based on these figures, we may state that the perceived reliability of the information that 
comes from these three sources is relatively high and stable in the context of terrorism. The 
advantage of this initially positive attitude towards the governments as risk information 
brokers is that one can build upon this positive image. We only found significant gender 
differences in study IV, indicating that women have slightly higher credibility rates for NATO 
and European information but since we only found these differences in the last study, we do 
not want to generalize this finding. We did find many significant differences between the age 
categories. In all three studies, the youngest age group (<35 years) has significantly higher 
credibility rates for NATO information (means vary from 3.38 to 3.60), European information 
(means vary from 3.48 to 3.63) and Belgian information (means vary from 3.44 to 3.63). The 
oldest age group (>64 years) consistently have the lowest scores on for these sources 
(means vary from 2.98 to 3.15). 
Concerning the information that comes from American sources, the respondents were 
rather critical, the means vary from 2.19 to 2.43 and the percentages of respondents that 
allocate high credibility scores does not exceed 18% whereas the percentage of respondents 
that allocates negative scores varies from 57% to 72%. The data did not show any significant 
gender differences, but for age categories, we found the opposite results than for the other 
three sources: the oldest age category tends to allocate significant higher credibility scores 
and the youngest group (<35 years) the lowest scores. 
Concerning the attitude towards American information, we can state that people do not 
perceive this information as credible and this mainly accounts for people in the youngest age 
category. 
9.4. Governmental control of information flow (only terrorism IV) 
Besides the trust in the government as a risk communicator, the perception about the 
dominant position of the government concerning risk information possession and diffusion is 
also related to the fact that people are more critical about the risk information that the 
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government spreads. We will discuss the general descriptive statistics about the 
governmental control of risk information in the next paragraph. We only integrated these 
items in the last study (study IV). The items were rated on 5 point Likert scales. 
 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % 
Low 
% High 
Information 
control 
government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.86 
3.85 
 
 
 
0.90 
0.90 
 <35 year = 3.87 
35-44 year = 4.04 
45-64 year = 3.79 
>64 year = 3.86 
F(3,1533)=3.79** 
 
 
9 
10 
 
 
78 
75 
We know 
everything that 
the government 
knows 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
1.64 
1.69 
 
 
 
0.79 
0.80 
 <35 year = 1.55 
35-44 year = 1.73 
45-64 year = 1.67 
>64 year = 1.93 
F(3,1539)=10.62*** 
 
 
 
86 
86 
 
 
 
2 
2 
Approval of 
government as 
selective info 
diffuser 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
3.48 
3.34 
t (1494)=2.51* 
 
 
 
 
1.02 
1.01 
Male = 3.52 
Female = 3.38 
t (1541)=2.70** 
<35 year = 3.38 
35-44 year = 3.17 
45-64 year = 3.55 
>64 year = 3.51 
F(3,1538)=7.27*** 
 
 
 
 
18 
22 
 
 
 
 
59 
51 
Critical about 
govinfo 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.85 
4.06 
t (880)=-4.76*** 
 
 
0.83 
0.73 
   
 
7 
3 
 
 
75 
83 
Need for 
participation 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.38 
3.11 
t (1494)=-12.18*** 
 
 
1.04 
1.04 
 <35 year = 2.34 
35-44 year = 2.45 
45-64 year = 2.78 
>64 year = 2.77 
F(3,1541)=19.21*** 
 
 
58 
31 
 
 
16 
40 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 58: Perceptions about governmental risk information flows in the context of terrorism 
  
The perceived information control of the government is high: 78% of the respondents agrees 
(4 and 5 on scale) with the statement that that the governments decide what information 
about terrorism is being spread (mean = 3.9) and only 2% thinks that ‘we’ know everything 
that the government knows (mean = 1.6). So a large majority of the population recognize 
that the government controls the risk information flow about terrorism. It is remarkable that 
51% (opinion leaders) to 59% (non opinion leaders) approves that the government is rather 
selective in spreading information about the risk of terrorism (means of 3.48 and 3.34). On 
the other hand, 75% (non OL) to 83% (OL) perceives themselves as being critical about 
governmental information about terrorism. Opinion leaders perceive themselves as more 
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critical about governmental information than non opinion leaders (mean 4.06 versus 3.85, 
t(880)=-4.76, p=0.000). Considering the specific need for active participation in the 
communication process with the government, the opinion leaders score significantly higher 
(mean = 3.11 versus 2.38 for non opinion leaders) and 40% of the opinion leaders has a 
positive score on this item versus 16% of the non opinion leaders. Furthermore, we found 
some significant and meaningful differences for between age groups. The youngest age 
group (<35 years) agrees the least with the statement that they know everything that the 
government knows and they have a significant higher need to participate in the 
communication process. 
Apparently, the majority of the public puts up with the fact that the government is in control 
of the information flow but this feeling induces a kind of critical attitude towards the 
governmental information. It is also essential to recognize the differences between opinion 
leaders and the general public in terms of this critical attitude, relating with the fact that 
they have a higher need to participate in the communication flow with the governments. 
The latter is another argument to set up and give concrete form to a two-way 
communication platform that lends the possibility to the opinion leaders to retrieve and 
contribute to the information pool. Let us now take a closer look at the specific perceptions 
about the quantity and quality of governmental information. 
9.5. General perception of government as risk regulator and risk communicator 
First, we will discuss the satisfaction levels of the public with the quantity and quality (only 
study IV) of the governmental information about terrorism.  In the first study, we only 
integrated one single item that reflected the satisfaction with the quantity of provided 
governmental information about terrorism. In study III and IV we added some more items 
and validated a 3 item scale (supra) that we labeled ‘quantity of govinfo’ (items rated on 5 
point likert scales). The satisfaction with the quality of governmental information was only 
measured in study IV by means of 1 item. 
 
Terrorism I 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
To what degree do you think that the government 
provides enough information about terrorism 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.25
 
2.25
 
 
 
0.90 
0.99 
   
 
52 
61 
 
 
26 
24 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 59:  Perceptions of quantity governmental risk information in the context of terrorism (I) 
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Terrorism III 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Quantity of govinfo 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.63 
2.51 
 
 
1.12 
1.05 
   
 
51 
58 
 
 
27 
22 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 60: Perceptions of quantity governmental risk information in the context of terrorism (III) 
 
Terrorism IV 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Quality of govinfo 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.22 
3.16 
 
0.82 
0.83 
 <35 year = 3.38 
35-44 year = 3.09 
45-64 year = 3.11 
>64 year = 3.16 
F(3,1526)=12.08*** 
 
17 
19 
 
41 
37 
Quantity of govinfo 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
2.80 
2.69 
 
0.78 
0.78 
 <35 year = 2.87 
35-44 year = 2.68 
45-64 year = 2.71 
>64 year = 2.76 
F(3,1533)=4.96*** 
 
52 
62 
 
11 
10 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 61: Perceptions of quality and quantity governmental risk information in the context of 
terrorism (IV) 
 
Concerning the satisfaction with the quantity of governmental information, the means were 
2.25 in study I (1 item) and varied from 2.51 to 2.80 in study III and IV. These means, that 
should be interpreted on a 5 point scale, indicate that the public is quite neutral towards the 
quantity of information. However, when we take a look at the percentages, we notice that 
51% to 62% of the people answer negatively (1 and 2 on 5 point scale) and are rather 
dissatisfied with the amount of information about terrorism that is being provided. Only 10% 
to 27% score positively. We did not find significant differences for gender and we only 
discovered some differences between age groups in study IV, but these differences were not 
really meaningful as we did not retrieve them in the other studies. People are more satisfied 
with the quality of information (means of 3.22 and 3.16). The percentage of people who 
rated the quality of information high was 37% (OL)  and 41% (non OL). Only 17% assigned 
low scores to the quality item. 
To conclude, we can state that in general, the public is rather satisfied with the quality of 
governmental information about terrorism, but there is a rather negative perception about 
the quantity.  
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9.6. Evaluation of communication channels 
In the last study, we decided to integrate the perception of the suitability of certain 
communication channels that the government can use to provide risk information. The 
respondents were asked to rate the communication channels on 6 point Likert scales 
(1=totally not suited to 6=totally suited). 
 
 
Communication channel Mean St.Dev. % Low % High  
Tv advertisements 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.47 
3.76 
t (1493)=-3.30*** 
 
1.54 
1.51 
 
28 
22 
 
27 
35 
Website 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
4.22 
4.59 
t (1488)=-5.53*** 
 
1.21 
1.07 
 
10 
5 
 
43 
55 
Brochure 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
4.17 
4.48 
t (1488)=-4.42*** 
 
1.21 
1.46 
 
10 
6 
 
41 
51 
Hotline 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.84 
4.26 
t (1484)=-5.51*** 
 
1.35 
1.29 
 
17 
9 
 
33 
47 
Printmedia 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
4.06 
4.35 
t (1467)=-4.12*** 
 
1.26 
1.94 
 
12 
7 
 
39 
49 
Experts 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
4.23 
4.74 
t (895)=-7.48*** 
 
1.32 
1.12 
 
11 
4 
 
47 
63 
Table 62: Evaluation of the governmental risk communication channels (IV) 
 
The means are rather high for most channels but moderate for tv advertisements. The most 
suitable communication channels are the experts: the means are 4.23 and 7.74 and 47% and 
63% assign high scores (5 and 6 on 6 point scale) to the experts as an information source. 
Websites come in second place with means of 4.22 and 4.59 and percentages of 43% and 
55% of people that rate the channels positively. The remaining channels are all very close to 
the website as a communication channel: brochures, print media and information hotlines. 
For all channels, the opinion leaders score significantly higher, probably because of their 
general need for more information and communication.  
We would suggest composing the communication platforms based on the available 
resources, both in terms of time (some channels are more time-consuming than others) and 
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money. In any case, it is advisable to set up a small database of experts that are specialized 
in a certain matter and that can be enlisted to provide information through various news 
sources (TV news, print media interviews etc.). A website and a hotline are also essential 
communication channels as they lend themselves perfectly for two way communication 
flows. Brochures and tv advertisements are very costly and time consuming and cannot be 
put on rapidly. 
The descriptive statistics have provided us with some very interesting and even vital 
information about the perceptions about the risk of terrorism and all the concepts that are 
related to it. We will now try to focus on these relationships between the various concepts 
by correlating the constructs and integrating some of them into structural models. 
10. Multivariate analyses 
10.1. Correlations 
In this section, we will discuss the most remarkable findings and conclusions of the 
correlations between our key constructs. We decided to perform the correlations both for 
the non-opinion leaders and for the opinion leaders, as we assume that some correlations 
might be stronger for opinion leaders than for non-opinion leaders. The results for the 
opinion leaders are marked in italic. We marked the most important results in bold. 
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 Mental distance Risk perception              Fear          Behaviour       Info need Info seeking Info sufficiency Talk Trust 
 Non OL           OL  Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL   Non OL    OL Non OL     OL Non OL    OL Non OL OL  
Mental distance          
Risk perception 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism II 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
 
-0.21*** 
-0.17        
-0.24***    
-0.31***  
 
-0.27*** 
-0.62*** 
-0.38*** 
-0.35*** 
    
 
       
Fear  
Terrorism I 
Terrorism II 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
-0.05        
-0.12 
-0.10*       
-0.10***    
 
-0.15*    
-0.68*** 
-0.02 
0.18*** 
 
0.36***   
0.36*** 
0.38***   
0.39*** 
 
0.43***   
0.69*** 
0.49***   
0.46*** 
       
Behaviour 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism II 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
0.08*       
-0.15 
-0.17**      
-0.03 
 
-0.08*   
 -0.46** 
-0.14       
 -0.08 
 
0.19***   
0.20* 
0.13***   
0.22*** 
 
0.41***   
0.20 
0.23***   
0.22*** 
 
0.31***   
0.38*** 
0.27***   
0.31** 
 
0.51***   
0.48** 
0.47***   
0.33*** 
      
Info need 
Terrorism IV 
 
-0.23***    
 
-0.28*** 
 
0.27***    
 
0.27*** 
 
0.27***    
 
0.27*** 
 
0.34***    
 
0.30*** 
     
Info seeking 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism II 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
-0.16***   
-0.07 
-0.19***        
-0.20*** 
 
-0.19***   
-0.38*** 
-0.22***   
-0.19*** 
 
0.26***   
0.09 
0.17***        
0.19*** 
 
0.24***   
0.27 
0.19*   
0.28*** 
 
0.20***   
-0.001 
 0.29*** 
0.27*** 
 
0.16***   
0.41* 
0.20***   
0.20*** 
 
0.21***    
-0.11       
0.18*** 
0.24*** 
 
0.09   
0.25 
0.25***   
0.20*** 
 
 
 
 
0.42***    
 
 
 
 
0.38** 
    
Info sufficiency 
Terrorism IV 
 
-0.10***    
 
0.17*** 
 
-0.11***    
 
-0.07 
 
-0.10***    
 
-0.16*** 
 
0.02    
 
-0.03 
 
-0.17***    
 
-0.26*** 
 
-0.07*    
 
-0.08 
   
Talk 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism II 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
-0.35***   
-0.25*** 
-0.35***    
-0.26*** 
 
-0.34***   
-0.34*** 
-0.28***   
-0.15*** 
 
0.18***   
0.27** 
0.23***    
0.27*** 
 
0.01   
0.06 
0.15*   
0.16*** 
 
0.07         
-0.07      
0.18*** 
0.14** 
 
0.03   
0.12 
0.03   
0.14** 
 
0.28***   
0.18 
028***       
0.31*** 
 
0.10   
0.08 
0.03   
0.15** 
 
 
 
 
0.36***    
 
 
 
 
0.21*** 
 
0.36***    
0.23*      
0.34*** 
0.25*** 
 
-0.02   
0.09 
0.23***   
0.16*** 
 
 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
0.04 
  
Trust 
Terrorism I 
Terrorism II 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
0.06       
-0.01     
0.01 
-0.003 
 
0.14*      
0.58** 
0.01 
 0.03 
 
-0.16***      
0.02           
-0.01 
-0.02 
 
 
-0.30***         
-0.52** 
-0.14      
 -0.05 
 
-0.05            
-0.08           
0.03 
0.10 
 
-0.10            
-0.52** 
-0.04 
0.01 
 
0.04      
0.02      
0.07 
-0.01 
 
-0.006      
-0.28 
0.04 
-0.002 
 
 
 
 
-0.01  
 
 
 
 
-0.03 
 
0.001        
0.08         
0.16*** 
0.05 
 
 -0.10 
-0.31        
-0.04 
0.04 
 
 
 
 
0.08** 
 
 
 
 
0.05 
 
0.03          
0.06         
0.05 
-0.01 
 
0.04          
0.28 
0.01 
0.05 
 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 63: Correlations between the general concepts in the context of terrorism  
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10.1.1.1. Correlations general concepts 
In the following section, we will draw the most important and significant conclusions from 
the correlation tables. The correlation coefficients (r) vary from 0 (no linear relationship) to -
1 (strongest negative linear relationship) or 1 (strongest positive linear relationship). The p-
values for the correlation coefficients that are mentioned range from 0.000 to 0.05. We 
would like to refer to the p level indications in the correlation table above. 
10.1.1.2. Mental distance, risk perception, fear and behaviour 
The relatively strong negative linear relationship between mental distance and risk 
perception, r varies from -0.21 to -0.62, seems of course very logical as the higher the risk 
perceptions are, the lower the feeling will be that the risk of terrorism is something that 
takes place abroad. These concepts seem similar but when we take a look at the relationship 
between risk perception and fear levels, we discover relatively high significant positive 
correlations (0.36 < r < 0.69), which is not the case for the relationship between mental 
distance and fear. The correlation coefficients are somewhat higher for opinion leaders in 
this context. We can draw the same conclusion for the linear relationship between 
behaviour (intentions) and risk perception (0.13 < r < 0.41).We could state that explicit risk 
perception is more tangible than the more abstract construct of mental distance. As 
expected, the linear relationship between fear and behaviour was positive and relatively 
strong (0.27 < r < 0.51). 
10.1.1.3. Risk perception, information seeking and social behaviour 
When we take a look at the linear relationships between information seeking and the other 
concepts, we can state that information seeking correlates moderately negative with mental 
distance (-0.38 < r <-0.16) and moderately positive with risk perception (r varies from 0.17 to 
0.28), fear (0.16 < r < 0.41) behaviour (0.18 < r < 0.25) and of course information need (0.38 
< r < 0.42). For the relationship with social behaviour, there is a small but noteworthy 
difference between opinion leaders (0.16 < r < 0.23) and non opinion leaders, for whom we 
found more significant and stronger positive correlation coefficients over the four studies 
(0.23 < r < 0.36). This correlation is weaker for opinion leaders, probably because of the fact 
that they already have very low mental distances and high information seeking levels. 
The relationship between mental distance and social behaviour (talk) is moderately negative 
(-0.15 < r < -0.35). People with low mental distances talk more to other people. However, we 
discovered another difference between opinion leaders and non opinion leaders in this 
context: we found significant moderate positive correlations between risk perception and 
social behaviour for non opinion leaders (0.18 < r < 0.27) but not for opinion leaders (0.15 < r 
< 0.16). This difference could be explained by the fact that opinion leaders already have high 
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scores on social behaviour and do not necessarily need to have high risk perception levels to 
talk to other people about terrorism. It is a nice finding that people who have higher risk 
perception levels also have higher needs to talk to others.  
So to summarize all these descriptive relationships, we can draw the following conclusions: 
High levels of risk perception and low levels of mental distance correlate significantly with 
the need for information and some concrete behavioural efforts like information seeking, 
concrete behavioural actions (or plans) and social behaviour (talking to others). Fear is also 
correlated with risk perception of course  (same as for fear and behaviour, except for social 
behaviour) and people who have higher fear levels will also look for information about the 
risk. So people who are more afraid will take more concrete actions and will have a greater 
need for information and vice versa.  
It is however remarkable that fear is highly correlated with risk perception, but not with 
mental distance. Combined with the results of the descriptive statistics in the previous part 
of this report, which stated that there is only a small percentage of people that actually 
thinks that an attack will occur in Belgium and on the contrary, 59%  to 71% of the people 
(over the three studies) perceive the terrorist threat as a rather proximate risk, we can 
assume that the risk of terrorism is something that is mainly medially constructed, and the 
media bring the threat closer in the mental perceptions of people, but on the other hand, 
the concrete perceptions of the probability of an attack and the concrete involvement of a 
person in this attack is very low. So even though the risk is perceived to be near, the people 
are not really afraid to be involved, probably because of the personal invulnerability bias and 
especially the denial bias (Thompson, 1985). These psychological defense mechanisms allow 
human beings not to be preoccupied with the evaluation of personal risk, which would only 
induce increased levels of chronic anxiety and stress (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990). 
They are extensively discussed in chapter four 2.6.1. We will now draw conclusions about 
the linear relationships between the concepts that are all related to governmental 
communication. 
10.1.2. Correlations governmental communication 
We integrated the perceived quality, quantity and reliability of the governmental 
information about terrorism with the general trust in the government, information seeking, 
and the information need and information sufficiency.   
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 Quality govinfo Quantity govinfo Reliability govinfo Trust Info need Info seeking 
 Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL 
Quality govinfo        
Quantity govinfo  
Terrorism IV 
 
0.52***    
 
0.51*** 
 
 
    
Reliability govinfo  
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
0.42***    
 
 
0.40*** 
 
0.44***   
0.39*** 
 
0.40***   
0.43*** 
    
Trust  
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
 
0.27***    
 
 
0.34*** 
 
0.42***   
0.38***    
 
0.46** 
0.35*** 
 
0.27***   
0.28***    
 
0.26*** 
0.23*** 
   
Info need 
Terrorism IV 
 
-0.19***    
 
-0.36*** 
 
-0.15***    
 
-0.27*** 
 
-0.03    
 
-0.24*** 
   
Info seeking 
Terrorism III 
Terrorism IV 
 
 
-0.05    
 
 
-0.15** 
 
-0.05        
-0.04       
 
0.02 
-0.10* 
 
-0.02        
-0.02        
 
-0.11 
-0.17** 
 
0.16**   
0.05        
 
-0.04 
-0.03 
  
Info sufficiency 
Terrorism IV 
 
 
0.25***    
 
0.14** 
 
0.28***    
 
0.21*** 
 
0.11**     
 
0.18*** 
 
0.08**     
 
0.04 
 
-0.17***    
 
-0.26*** 
 
-0.07*        
 
-0.08 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001     
Table 64: Correlations between the governmental risk communication concepts in the context of terrorism 
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There are very high positive linear relationships between information quantity, quality and 
reliability, the correlation coefficients between these concepts all vary between 0.40 and 
0.52 and are significant at the 0.001 level. There are also a relatively high correlations with 
the general trust in the government (0.23 < r < 0.46), especially for the satisfaction with the 
quantity of governmental information (0.35 < r < 0.46). There are also significant negative 
correlations between information need and satisfaction with information quality and 
quantity so people who are not satisfied with the information quantity and quality will need 
more information and vice versa. The latter conclusion accounts primarily for opinion 
leaders. The correlation coefficients are much higher for opinion leaders than for non 
opinion leaders (r=-0.36 versus r =-0.19 for relationship information need and r=-0.27 versus 
r=-0.15 for quantity), especially for the relationship between information reliability and 
information need (r=-0.03, non significant, versus r=-0.24 for opinion leaders). 
These results indicate that it is absolutely necessary to provide enough and qualitative 
information because these concepts do not only correlate strongly with each other but also 
with the perceived reliability of the information and the general trust in the government.  
We will try to validate these multivariate relationships in three structural equation models. 
10.2. Structural equation models 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) procedures were used to test the plausibility of the 
postulated models. Several authors have acknowledged the growing importance of 
structural equation modelling for testing causal relationships and interdependency in 
behavioural and social sciences (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996; Byrne, 2001; McDonald, 
2004; McDonald & Ho, 2002; Schulze, 2007; Stephenson & Holbert, 2003) and more 
specifically communication research (Stephenson & Holbert, 2003), especially when latent 
variables are integrated in models. With structural equation modelling it is possible to 
statistically test and confirm hypothesized multivariate models and it allows researchers to 
test a set of regression equations and covariance structures simultaneously. The structural 
relationships can be modelled graphically to conceptualize the theoretical assumptions more 
clearly (Byrne, 2001). Ter Huurne has summarized a variety of advantages of structural 
equation modelling compared to more traditional statistical analytical techniques (E. F. J. Ter 
Huurne, 2008 p. 24). She bases herself on MacCallum and Austin (2000) and Stephenson and 
Holbert (2003). Firstly, she indicated that SEM is rather a confirmatory than an exploratory 
technique. It is clear that we will have to construct a hypothetical model at first and define 
the relationships between the integrated concepts. Secondly, SEM offers the possibility to 
explicitly estimate error variance parameters. Last but not least, SEM allows the researcher 
to integrate both manifest (observed) as latent (unobserved) variables into the model which 
makes it possible to analyze the relationships between concepts on higher, unobserved 
levels: “SEM is a technique used for specifying and estimating models of linear relationships 
among variables. Variables in a model may include both measured variables and latent 
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variables” (MacCallum & Austin, 2000 p. 202). So structural equation modeling allows us to 
test the overall fit of our model. 
Amos, a statistical software package for SEM was used to estimate the parameters. The chi-
squared p- value should exceed 0.05, however, with large samples, this value is not reliable. 
To counter this, we performed chi-square analyses on random, small sub-samples (approx. 
10% of the sample) of 150 respondents. The use of chi-square is appropriate for sample sizes 
between 100 and 200 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). All other analyses were 
performed on the full samples (nTI=1040, nTII=160, nTIII=851 nTIII= 1558). The model fit was 
assessed by means of the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Normed Fit Index (NFI), the 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). The values of these Goodness of Fit measures should exceed 0.90 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). The Root Mean Square Error of approximation 
(RMSEA) was calculated. Values from 0.05 to 0.08 are deemed acceptable, but are 
preferable less than 0.05. Firstly, we will test one simple model that depicts the relationship 
between the perception of the government as a risk communicator and as a risk regulator. 
We will test it with the data of the four studies. The second model will integrate the 
satisfaction with the possibilities to participate in the communication flow (bottom-up 
communication). In the third model, we will add the specific need for communication 
participation and opinion leadership, the concept that is closely related to this need. 
10.2.1. Relationship between the perceived roles of the government 
10.2.1.1. Study I, II and III 
In study I, II and III, we did not yet integrate the concept of quality of governmental 
information. That is why the first model does not include this concept. The model depicts 
the relationship between the satisfaction with the government as a risk communicator and 
the satisfaction with the government as a risk regulator. The chi-squared p values for the full 
samples were smaller than 0.001 in study I and III. When we performed the analysis on a 
random sample of 150 cases, the chi-squared p-valued were 0.33 and 0.58, which proofs 
that the actual (observed) and the model implied covariance matrices not statistically 
different. Based on the data in study II, the chi-squared p value was 0.21. This means that 
the proposed model fits the observed covariances and correlations well in all three studies. 
The NFI, CFI and TLI values all exceed the critical value of 0.90 and the RMSEA values (0.037, 
0.054 and 0.06) are all excellent.  
 
The government as a risk communicator is presented as a latent variable (not measured) 
that is measured by two manifest variables: satisfaction with the quantity of governmental 
information (quantity govinfo) and the perceived reliability of the governmental information 
in the context of terrorism (reliability govinfo). The first concept (quantity) was measured by 
means of one single item in study I and II and by means of three items in study III and IV 
(alpha=0.77 and 0.73). The perceived reliability of governmental risk information in the 
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context of terrorism was measured by one single item. The regression weights (standardized 
beta values, marked in italic) of the two variables that measure quantity are all very high and 
the satisfaction with the quantity of governmental information has the largest weight in the 
prediction of the perception of the government as a good risk communicator (beta ranges 
from 0.68 to 0.76, p<0.001) followed by the reliability of governmental information (beta 
ranges from 0.48 to 0.58, p<0.001).  
The perception of the government as a risk regulator is a latent variable, measured by three 
manifest variables. The perception of the governmental initiatives to secure public places (1 
item) is the most important predictor (beta varies from 0.61 to 0.67, p<0.001), followed by 
the perceived preparedness of governmental services (construct with 8 items, alpha’s vary 
from 0.85 to 0.89 and beta values vary from 0.58 to 0.69, p<0.001). Securing infrastructure 
(beta varies from 0.51 to 0.63, p<0.001) is the weakest predictor. The most important 
conclusion from this analysis is that the total amounts of explained variance in the 
perception of the government by the perception of the government as a risk communicator 
are as follows: 65% in study I (beta=0.80, p<0.001), 86% in study II (beta=0.93, p<0.001) and 
41% in study III (beta=0.64, p<0.001). These explained variances are high. To summarize, we 
have added a table with an overview of the general parameters of fitness and the 
pathmodel. 
 
 
Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =150 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Terrorism I 9.67 / 4 / 0.046 4.61 / 4 / 0.33 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.037 
Terrorism II 5.82 / 4 / 0.213  0.96 0.99 0.95 0.054 
Terrorism III 16.13 / 4 / 0.003 2.89 / 4 / 0.58 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.06 
Table 65: Overview of the general parameters of fitness of the basic SEM models in the context of 
terrorism (I, II and III) 
 
Merror stands for the measurement error related to the observed variable and Serror stands for 
the structural error. 
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Figure 39: SEM integrating the relationship between the perceptions of the government as a risk 
regulator and as a risk communicator in the context of terrorism (study I, II and III) 
 
 
Study IV 
 
In study IV, we have added the concept of perceived quality of governmental risk 
information (1 item) to measure the latent concept of the government as a risk 
communicator. The table below provides us with an overview of the goodness of fit 
parameters. The chi squared p value for the full sample (n=1558) was too low, so we 
performed the analysis on a small subsample, resulting in an acceptable p value of 0.06. The 
goodness of fit indices were very high (NFI, CFI, TLI all exceed 0.90 abundantly) and the 
RMSEA value was good (0.059). 
 
Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =150 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Terrorism IV 51.13/8/0.00 6.42 / 8 / 0.06 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.059 
Table 66: General parameters of fitness of the basic SEM model in the context of terrorism (IV) 
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As the model depicts, the perception of the government as a risk communicator is a latent 
variable that is measured by the three manifest variables: satisfaction with the quantity and 
quality of the governmental information about terrorism and the perceived reliability of the 
information. The regression weights (standardized beta values, marked in italic) of these 
three variables are all very high and the satisfaction with the quantity of governmental 
information has the largest weight in the prediction of the perception of the government as 
a good risk communicator (beta=0.74, p<0.001), followed by quality of governmental 
information (beta=0.71, p<0.001) and reliability of governmental information (beta=0.55, 
p<0.001). The perception of the government as a risk regulator is a latent variable, measured 
by three manifest variables. The perception of the governmental initiatives to secure public 
places is the most important predictor (beta=0.50, p<0.001), followed by securing 
infrastructure (beta=0.43, p<0.001). The perceived preparedness of governmental services is 
the weakest predictor (beta=0.16, p<0.001). The most important conclusion from this 
analysis is that the total amount of explained variance in the perception of the government 
by the perception of the government as a risk communicator is 54%, which is rather high 
(beta=0.73, p<0.001). 
 
Figure 40: SEM integrating the relationship between the perceptions of the government as a risk 
regulation and as a risk communicator in the context of terrorism (IV) 
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To conclude, we can state that there is statistical proof for the following causal relationship: 
the better people perceive the government as a good risk communicator, the better the 
government will be perceived as a risk regulator. 
10.2.2. Linking the perception on possibilities of participation in communication 
In a second phase, we added the variable that measures how strongly people agree with the 
statement that citizens get the possibility to communicate with the government about 
terrorism. This reflects their view on the possibility of bottom-up communication. 
After testing diverse models, a nice result was found when we linked this item directly to the 
perception of the government as a risk communicator. The chi-squared p-value (0.41 for 
n=140), goodness-of-fit measures (NFI, CFI, TLI >0.90) and the RMSEA value (0.048) all proof 
that the model is good. We found a quite strong negative relationship between the latent 
variable perception risk communicator and negative perception participation (beta=-0.40, 
p<0.001) and 16% of the variance in the latter is explained by the latent variable. 
 
 
Figure 41: SEM linking the perception of possibilities of participation to the basic model in the 
context of terrorism (IV) 
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Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =140 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Terrorism IV 59.82/13/0.00 13.58 / 13 / 0.41 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.048 
Table 67: General parameters of fitness of the SEM model linking participation to the basic model 
in the context of terrorism (IV) 
 
So we can say that the more people are satisfied with the government as a risk 
communicator, the less they will think that there is no possibility for bottom-up 
communication. The next step was to determine whether the need for bottom-up 
communication correlates with the satisfaction with the government as a risk 
communicator, taking into account the opinion leadership principle. 
10.2.3. Incorporating the need for bottom-up communication and opinion 
leadership 
A last variant of the model integrates the need for communication with the government 
about terrorism and the concept of opinion leadership. As mentioned before, the opinion 
leadership concept is measured by five items (alpha = 0.76) that unite information seeking 
variables (extend to what people look for information about terrorism in general) and social 
behaviour variables (extend to what people consider themselves as opinion leaders and talk 
to others about terrorism). Again, the chi-squared p-value (0.53 for n=150), goodness-of-fit 
measures (NFI, CFI, TLI>0.90) and the RMSEA value (0.048) all proof that the model is good. 
The results show us that the satisfaction with the government as a risk communicator has a 
negative causal relationship with the need for bottom-up communication (beta=-0.21, 
p<0.001) which means that the more people are satisfied with the government as a 
communicator, the less they will feel the need to communicate with the government about 
terrorism themselves. We can also state that the opinion leadership concept has a quite 
strong positive causal relationship with the need for bottom-up communication (beta=0.40, 
p<0.001) which means that the higher people rate on opinion leadership, the more they will 
feel the need to exchange knowledge with the government about terrorism. Opinion 
leadership and satisfaction of the government as a risk communicator together explain 20% 
of the variance within the variable that measures the need for bottom-up communication. 
 
Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =150 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Terrorism IV 86.42/19/0.00 30.59 / 13 / 0.053 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.048 
Table 68: General parameters of fitness of the SEM model linking bottom-up communication and 
opinion leadership in the context of terrorism (IV) 
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Figure 42: SEM linking bottom-up communication and opinion leadership in the context of 
terrorism (IV) 
 
So for governments, it is important to communicate effectively, but also to determine who 
those opinion leaders are and how they can be reached, because this group of people that is 
characterized by a high level of influence on other social groups within society and an 
extensive information searching behaviour will feel the need to communicate about 
terrorism. 
10.2.4. Conclusion structural equation models 
The models provide us with statistical evidence that the better people perceive the 
government as a good risk communicator, the better the government will be perceived as a 
risk regulator. This evidence can be used to convince governments to put more efforts in 
creating efficient communication strategies that increase the public’s satisfaction with the 
amount, quality and reliability of the provided information. The gain of trust in the 
government as a risk communicator will result in an increase of trust in the government as a 
risk regulator, perceived to be able to prevent terrorist attacks. Besides this increase in trust, 
citizens will also be less critical about the statement that there is no room for bottom-up 
communication. Moreover, citizens will feel less need to communicate with the government 
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about terrorism, probably because they are confident in the fact that the government 
controls the risk. However, the opinion leaders are a special group of people that extensively 
search information about terrorism, talk about the topic to others and perceive themselves 
as opinion influencers. The results show us that this group of people will need to 
communicate for example to exchange knowledge. Governments should take initiatives to 
create communication platforms to provide citizens, and especially the opinion leaders who 
will normally quite rapidly seek access to these platforms, enough, qualitative and reliable 
information. 
11. General conclusion research report I 
In this first research report, we presented an overview of the results of four quantitative 
survey studies that scrutinized the risk perception construct and its related concepts in the 
context of terrorism. We were able to collect a lot of data in four main datasets (n I=1040, 
nII=160, nIII=851, nIV=1558). These data allowed us to construct, confirm and validate our 
main measurement scales to measure the key concepts that surround risk perception in the 
context of terrorism. Let us confront the results of the analyses with the central research 
objectives. 
The first, descriptive part provided a clear descriptive report on the perceived risk of 
terrorism and the related concepts of mental distance, fear, protective behaviour, 
information seeking behaviour and social behaviour. The analyses results in the report 
provided us with some interesting depicting results. 
For the concepts of risk perception, mental distance, level of fear and behaviour (intentions), 
the descriptive figures indicate that, even though the majority of the respondents perceive 
the terrorist threat as a risk that is very near (mental distance), the actual percentage of 
people who have a high probability level, who are affected in their fear levels and 
behavioural intentions, who talk a lot to others about the topic and who indicate that they 
look for information about terrorism is low. Another remarkable finding is that a lot of 
people answer quite neutrally (3 and 4 on 6 point scales), which indicates that the majority 
does not really have an outspoken opinion, probably because the risk is not transparent and 
especially because the Belgian population have not (yet) been confronted with terror 
attacks. 
A separate descriptive part was written about the public perceptions of the government as a 
risk regulator and risk communicator. We might conclude that the government is primarily 
perceived as a risk regulator, carefully preventing terrorist actions. However, we can also 
state that its role as a crisis and risk communicator is perceived very important as well, 
especially because only negligible percentages of respondents stated that these roles are not 
important. For the specific trust in the government as a risk regulator, we assessed the 
perceived preparedness of the governments on four levels. The data revealed that mainly 
the local government is perceived to be rather unprepared in the context of potential 
terrorist attacks. We consistently found this results in the three large scaled studies. This is 
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contradictory to the general expectations that local governments are the first in line to deal 
with potential crisis situations. It is important so set up the general objective to raise the 
general trust and perceived preparedness of local governments. This raise could contribute 
to the general construction of a communal resilience and a perceived preparedness climate 
so that risk and crisis guidelines will be taken at heart when they are communicated. Also 
the perceived reliability of the information that comes from the three governmental sources 
that we included (NATO, European government and national government) is relatively high 
and stable in the context of terrorism. The advantage of this initially positive attitude 
towards the governments as risk information brokers is that one can build upon this positive 
image. Closely linked to the concept of reliability and certainly not negligible is the concept 
of perceived information flow control of the government. Apparently, the majority of the 
public puts up with the fact that the government is in control of the information flow but 
this feeling induces a kind of critical attitude towards the governmental information. 
Concerning the satisfaction with the quantity and quality of the governmental information 
we can state that the public is rather satisfied with the quality of governmental information 
about terrorism, but there is a rather negative perception about the quantity. For the usage 
of specific communication channels, we would suggest to compose the communication 
platforms based on the available resources, both in terms of time (some channels are more 
time-consuming than others) and money. The data revealed that the usage of experts as risk 
information sources is the best way to provide information. In any case, it is advisable to set 
up a small database of experts that are specialized in a certain matter and that can be 
enlisted to provide information through various news sources (tv news, print media 
interviews etc.). A website and a hotline are also essential communication channels as they 
lend themselves perfectly for two way communication flows. Brochures and tv 
advertisements are very costly and time consuming and cannot be put on rapidly. They can 
however be useful for longer term informing communication campaigns. For the satisfaction 
of immediate risk information needs, the quick response communication platforms that 
offer two way interactive communication flow possibilities (e.g. website, hotline) are the 
best channels to use to appease the first information needs.  
For risk information seeking behaviour, only 4% to 8% of the respondents actively seek for 
risk information in the context of terrorism. The percentage for event triggered information 
search is higher (16% to 26%). The percentage of people that passively scan information is 
not much higher (16% to 19%) but the means vary from 3.9 to 4.2, which is higher than with 
event triggered information search. So the pyramidal structure for information seeking 
categories, ranging from intensive information seeking to passive information scanning is 
empirically confirmed. Concerning the type of information that is perceived by the 
population as most important to be communicated, the most successful are specific 
information about recent attacks, probability information, guidelines about what to do in 
case an attack occurs and general information about terrorism. We interpret these concrete 
needs of information as a signal to provide information that can satisfy the need for personal 
information control as a substitute of personal risk control. As the risk of terrorism cannot be 
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controlled by the individual himself since its unpredictable and untransparent nature, it is 
assumable that the locus of risk control will shift to a locus of personal information control 
so that the individual is able to construct his own perceived risk reality. We could wonder 
why we should communicate more when these describing results are indicating that only a 
certain proportion of the population is actually looking for information about terrorism. The 
answer is that we should especially communicate more effectively by creating customized 
target based risk communication strategies. We can only create these strategies when we 
have gained sufficient knowledge about the dynamics that play within the social structures 
of the society. How does risk information spread and what is the role of opinion leaders 
within these dynamic processes? We already formulated a theoretically based answer on 
this question in chapter four (3.) of this doctoral dissertation. It was of course one of our 
challenges to try to empirically confirm our theoretical propositions by means of our four 
datasets. This challenge has been successfully accomplished and will be discussed now in the 
discussion of the second objective. 
This second objective was to develop a typology of risk information seekers. Based on our 
first study, we managed to confirm a primary empirically based classification of risk 
information seekers. We tried to classify the seekers, based on their specific information 
seeking behaviour (active, passive and event triggered information seeking), on their specific 
social behaviour in the context of terrorism (talking to others about the risk) and finally on 
their specific perception of the opinion leadership trait within themselves. In the first study, 
the best solution of the exploratory cluster analysis unveiled four main groups of 
information seekers: opinion leaders, talking scanners, silent seekers and ignorant. The 
clustering was based on the main dimensions that we defined on the basis of the literature: 
information seeking, split up in active seeking, passive scanning and even triggered 
information seeking, social behaviour and the presence of a specific opinion leadership trait. 
The four group solution was retrieved in all four studies and the percentages were 
comparable. The results of the discriminant analyses confirmed the four group solution and 
in the four studies, the classification matrix showed that we could scientifically predict the 
group membership by means of the five predictors. For the opinion leaders, the best 
predictors (according to the discriminant analysis) are event triggered information search 
and the specific opinion leadership trait. This finding is consequently revealed across the 
four studies. The socio demographical profiles were stable as well over the four studies. The 
four groups also had very specific results for the general concepts, indicating that the groups 
really had a specific profile concerning risk perception, mental distance, fear and behaviour. 
The main conclusion is that we were able to identify our primary communication target 
group: the opinion leaders. The opinion leaders have a very distinct but stable profile across 
the four studies in the context of terrorism. They are mainly male with an average age of 40 
to 45 years and they are mainly higher educated. The opinion leaders differ significantly 
from the other groups on the main concepts that surround risk perception. They have 
significantly lower mental distances and higher risk perception levels, so their perception of 
terrorism as a potential threat is stronger.  Their fear level is higher as well, but still does not 
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exceed the average. Higher fear levels are also accompanied with a higher level of 
behavioural intentions and concrete behaviour. Since we clustered the groups also on 
information seeking behaviour, it is obvious that their risk information seeking behaviour 
and social behaviour in the context of terrorism is higher than for the other groups. These 
results are very relevant as governments should now recognize the fact that opinion leaders, 
who are the most important risk communication target group since they look for 
information about terrorism and talk to others about it, have leveraged risk perception and 
fear levels (and lower mental distance levels) and higher behavioural intentions. Compared 
with the risk information needs of the general public, the opinion leaders have much higher 
percentages for all types of risk information in the context of terrorism. The priorities in 
information desire are very similar, but both the frequency of risk information search as the 
perceived importance of all types of risk information are much higher for opinion leaders 
than for the other information seeking groups. Opinion leaders also have very distinct 
perceptions about the role of the government as a risk communicator. Their satisfaction with 
the quantity and quality of governmental information is as low as for the non opinion 
leaders. On the other hand, concerning the perceived suitability of the potential 
governmental communication channels to communicate about terrorism, the opinion 
leaders have significant higher scores on all channels, probably because their greater initial 
need for risk information. It is also essential to recognize the differences between opinion 
leaders and the general public in terms of this critical attitude, relating with the fact that 
they have a higher need to participate in the communication flow with the governments. 
The latter is another argument to set up and give concrete form to a two-way 
communication platform that lends the possibility to the opinion leaders to retrieve and 
contribute to the information pool.  
Now we have discovered the four types of risk information seekers and identified our main 
communication target group, the opinion leaders, we have gained valuable knowledge to 
create a tangible risk communication strategy. We were able to create their socio 
demographical profile and to detect their specific risk information needs.  
The third research objective included the analyses of the linear relationships between risk 
perception and the related concepts in the context of terrorism and validate the SEM model 
that scrutinizes the relationship between risk regulation and communication. For the general 
concepts, the correlation matrix revealed that high levels of risk perception and low levels of 
mental distance correlate significantly with the need for information and some concrete 
behavioural efforts like information seeking, concrete behavioural actions (or plans) and 
social behaviour (talking to others). Fear is also correlated with risk perception of course 
(same as for fear and behaviour, except for social behaviour) and people who have higher 
fear levels will also look for information about the risk. So people who are more afraid will 
take more concrete actions and will have a greater need for information and vice versa. It is 
however remarkable that fear is highly correlated with risk perception, but not with mental 
distance. Combined with the results of the descriptive statistics in the previous part of this 
report, which stated that there is only a small percentage of people that actually thinks that 
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an attack will occur in Belgium and on the contrary, 59% to 71% of the people (over the 
three studies) perceive the terrorist threat as a rather proximate risk, we can assume that 
the risk of terrorism is something that is mainly medially constructed, and the media bring 
the threat closer in the mental maps of people, but on the other hand, the concrete 
perceptions of the probability of an attack and the concrete involvement of a person in this 
attack is very low. So even though the risk is perceived to be near, the people are not really 
afraid to be involved. We allocated this to the denial and the invulnerability biases, as 
defined by Thompson (1985). 
The results in our correlation table about the governmental communication indicate that it is 
absolutely necessary to provide enough and qualitative information because these concepts 
do not only correlate strongly with each other but also with the perceived reliability of the 
information and the general trust in the government.  
Based on the correlation outputs, we had reasons to assume that the importance of 
governmental communication in the context of terrorism is not to be underestimated. We 
wanted to explore and validate potential relationships between the concepts of risk 
communication and risk regulation. We assumed that effective governmental risk 
communication can raise the levels of trust in the government as a risk regulator. We tested 
some structural equation models in AMOS. The models provided us with statistical evidence 
that the better people perceive the government as a good risk communicator, the better the 
government will be perceived as a risk regulator. This evidence can be used to convince 
governments to put more efforts in creating efficient communication strategies that increase 
the public’s satisfaction with the amount, quality and reliability of the provided information. 
The gain of trust in the government as a risk communicator will result in an increase of trust 
in the government as a risk regulator, perceived to be able to prevent terrorist attacks. 
Besides this increase in trust, citizens will also be less critical about the statement that there 
is no room for bottom-up communication. Moreover, citizens will feel less need to 
communicate with the government about terrorism, probably because they are confident in 
the fact that the government controls the risk. However, the opinion leaders are a special 
group of people that extensively search information about terrorism, talk about the topic to 
others and perceive themselves as opinion influencers. The results show us that this group 
of people will need to communicate for example to exchange knowledge. Governments 
should take initiatives to create communication platforms to provide enough, qualitative and 
reliable information to citizens. We also assume that especially the opinion leaders will 
normally quite rapidly seek access to these platforms to satisfy their need for risk 
information. The outcomes of the multivariate analyses have provided an answer to the 
third research objective.  
 
To conclude, we want to propose some general recommendations. Governmental 
institutions must be aware of the fact that communicating about terrorism as a risk is very 
delicate as they will have to find the balance between raising the communal resilience and 
preparedness levels and inducing a culture of fear. Chapter one already discussed this issue 
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extensively. As the data revealed, even though terrorism is perceived as a threat that is 
relatively nearby and the risk perception levels are relatively high,  the percentage of people 
that is actually looking for information about terrorism is low, as for the percentage of 
people that have high fear levels and behavioural intentions. This means that the majority of 
the population is not really concerned (yet) about the risk. Of course, fortunately, we have 
never been directly confronted with terrorist attacks as they occurred in New York, Madrid 
or London. We assume that the risk of terrorism is especially medially and socially 
constructed. It is brought into the hearts and minds of the Flemish population, but we can 
assume that it is rather perceived as a media reality than a proximate and personal threat. 
However, we are convinced that governments need to construct and implement specific risk 
communication programs about terrorism for the following reason. A substantial portion of 
the population has a specific profile that is characterized by raised information seeking levels 
(active and event triggered seeking and passive information scanning), social behaviour 
(talking to others about terrorism) and a specific opinion leadership trait. We call them 
opinion leaders. This group of people is the primary target group in risk communication 
programs. They are especially characterized by their higher information need and their need 
to participate in the risk communication and management strategies. Practically, 
governments can create communication platforms that are suited for a two way information 
and communication flow. Websites, forums and hotlines are channels that are very well 
suited for this. As for the type of information, it is important to take into consideration the 
objectives of the institutions on the one hand (providing practical information, guidelines 
etc.) and the specific risk information needs of the target groups on the other hand (general, 
explicative and reliable information about terrorism). 
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RESEARCH REPORT II 
 
THE BIRD FLU OR H5N1 
1. Introduction to the topic: the mortal threat of the bird flu or H5N1 
The H5N1 virus, Avian Influenza or so called bird flu virus is a very contagious and mortal 
viral disease that arises with poultry. The first known direct avian to human transmission of 
the H5N1 virus was discovered and reported during an outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997 (Di 
Giuseppe, Abbate, Albano, Marinelli, & Angelillo, 2008). As mentioned by the World Health 
Organization, there are several public health interventions required for effective disease 
prevention and control of the multi faceted issues posed by avian influenza (WHO, 2006). 
The creation and implementation of effective communication plans to keep the population 
fully and adequately informed is absolutely necessary. Di Giuseppe et al. mention that, in the 
past years, only a very limited number of studies have been published that scrutinized 
knowledge, attitudes and practice about avian influenza among specific target groups and 
the general population (Abbate, Di Giuseppe, Marinelli, & Angelillo, 2006; Fielding et al., 
2005; Lau, Kim, Tsui, & Griffiths, 2007). Di Giuseppe et al. performed a study about the 
knowledge, attitudes and practices towards avian influenza with the Italian population.  The 
data of their large scaled survey study revealed that the respondents had no detailed 
understanding and knowledge about the virus, they had a great perceived risk of 
experiencing the disease and had a low compliance with precautions behaviour.  
Based on their research, Di Giuseppe et al. conclude by stating that the design and 
implementation of avian influenza educational programs and measuring their effectiveness 
should be priorities to incentive the population to take a more active role.  
The probability of an outbreak of the virus in Belgian was communicated as relatively high. 
On the other hand, civilians were also advised to take safety measures e.g. by avoiding direct 
contact with poultry and live up to strict hygienic measures. The media coverage of the bird 
flu was periodical but rather intensive. People were confronted with the risk through the 
mass media. However, the information that was spread tried to induce the feeling that the 
virus could be avoided by personal protective actions such as the protective safety measures 
that were mentioned above. The risk was more transparent than for example the risk of 
terrorism.  
In august 2005, when there was a new outbreak of avian influenza virus in South-East Asia 
and the virus appeared for the first time in Siberia, the Belgian Federal Agency for Food 
Safety started a communication policy that was formulated by themselves as ‘proactive, 
objective and free of sensationalism’. Besides the information campaign for the poultry 
breeding industry, the agency launched a large scaled national media campaign on 1st March 
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2006. In this campaign, information about the obligatory safety measure of screening all 
poultry (industry as well as civilians) was diffused as well so that people would know what to 
do. The agency created brochures and TV - and radio infomercials that targeted various 
target groups (industry, adults and children). All of the information was diffused through the 
website of the Agency, the mass media and a special hotline. As the agency stated in their 
press release on 2nd February 2006, ‘the participation of the responsible spokesmen of the 
agency to public debates and lectures contributed to the diffusion of realistic, to the point 
and scientifically based information that also included references to the Belgian and 
European legislation’. 
The information campaign injected the necessary risk information about the bird flu and the 
concrete protective guidelines into the community by means of several media and especially 
the usage of experts that participated in news debates, interviews etc.  
As we already performed some large scaled quantitative survey studies in the context of 
terrorism, and they idea of creating a risk perception and communication monitor had 
already arisen from the results of these studies, it seemed like a good idea to perform a 
quantitative survey in the context of the bird flu as well as it is one of our primary amis to 
validate the methodology in various risk contexts. We set up very similar research objectives 
in this new context, involving a more tangible risk. 
2. Objectives of the studies 
This research study focuses on the concepts of risk perception, risk information seeking, 
behaviour and trust in the government as a risk regulator and risk communicator in the 
context of the bird flu. It actually builds upon the previous studies, but it incorporates some 
additional concepts. We will now summarize the main objectives of this study: 
1. Confirmation of the measurement scales (validation and reliability analyses) and the 
methodology in a new risk context. 
2. Delivering a full and comprehensive descriptive report on the statistical descriptives 
of the central concepts in our risk management strategies, including risk perception, 
mental distance, fear levels, specific behavioural intentions, information seeking 
behaviour and trust in the government.  
3. Confirmation of the information seekers segmentation and validation of the tool to 
identify opinion leaders in this new and different risk context. 
4. Developing concrete communication guidelines and a concise risk communication 
strategy in the specific context of the bird flu. 
So the key objectives are comparable to the objectives of the first study in the context of 
terrorism. However, we added additional items concerning source reliability and information 
channel usage in order to create a more specific and detailed risk communication strategy.  
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3. Sampling procedure and sample descriptive statistics 
In total, 36 students each had to select 9 respondents according to our selection criteria: 18 
students had to select 4 male and 5 female respondents, 18 students selected 5 male and 4 
female respondents, three respondents from each category of age, starting from the age of 
18 as minors are less relevant in our studies. The age categories were as follows: 18-34 
years, 35-54 years, and 54 years. Eventually, questionnaires were distributed in the period of 
April 2006. From this sample, 320 surveys could be used for analysis after the data cleaning. 
The sample is a convenience sample (quota sample) and the distribution of age and gender 
are comparable to the distribution in the Flemish population, except for a slight 
overrepresentation of the respondents in the age category of 20-64 years and an very slight 
underrepresentation of the respondents older than 65 years. As the maximum difference 
was  6%, we did not weigh the data for these categories. However, as the sample size is 
restricted to 320 respondents, it is important to take into consideration that the descriptive 
statistics give a clear indication but should be interpreted with care.  
 
 
 
Figure 43: Age distribution sample bird flu 
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Figure 44: Gender distribution sample bird flu 
 
 
Bird flu   
Age category Male Female 
Flanders Sample Flanders Sample 
20-64 
≥65 
 
39% 
10% 
44% 
4% 
38% 
13% 
44% 
7% 
NFlanders =6043161 
Nsample =320 
 
Table 69: Comparisons sample and population percentages sample bird flu 
 
 
We can see that the largest difference between the sample en the population is 6% 
(underrepresentation males and females >65 yrs in sample). We decided not to weigh this 
subsample as the differences are minimal. 
4. The concepts 
As the nature of the risk of bird flu is quite different than the threat of terrorism, we had to 
customize our items to the specific traits in the operationalization phase. However, the 
concepts that were scrutinized were similar to the concepts in the other survey studies as 
our key objectives were similar as well. We did add some specific questions that relate to the 
specific behaviour of people in the context of the bird flu as the resulting descriptive 
statistics could be of great value to estimate risk perceptions and concrete behaviour. We 
will now present an overview of the key concepts and the internal consistency of their items. 
The items that are included were all statements that were measured on 6 point Likert scales 
(mostly varying from totally don’t agree to totally agree). 
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Construct N Items α 
Risk perception 5 How large do you estimate the probability that there will be an outbreak of 
the bird flu in Belgium? 
How large do you estimate the probability that a variant of the virus that can 
be transferred between humans will spread in Belgium? 
How large do you estimate the probability that you will get infected with the 
harmful variant of the bird flu virus? 
I estimate that there is a high probability that there will be an outbreak of the 
bird flu virus in Belgium 
Since the confirmed outbreaks of the bird flu with animals in our neighbor 
countries, fear for a possible outbreak in our country has increased 
0.84 
Mental 
distance 
3 I do not worry about a possible outbreak of the bird flu because the virus has 
only affected other countries 
An outbreak of the bird flu is something that takes place abroad 
De variant of the bird flu virus that is harmful for humans will only affect 
countries where people have a lot of contact with birds 
0.68 
Fear 2 When I am using the public transportation I will try to avoid coughing people 
When I am in a public place, I sometimes realize that I could easily be 
contaminated with the bird flu virus 
r=0.61*** 
 
Behaviour 2 I have tried to image how I would react when there would be an outbreak of 
the bird flu in Belgium 
Do you think about taking measures to prepare yourself for a possible 
outbreak of the bird flu in Belgium? 
r=0.53*** 
 
Information 
need 
3 I feel the need to communicate with the government about the threat of the 
bird flu 
I feel the need for immediate and reliable information about the bird flu virus 
(0800 hotline, website…) 
I think it is important to be informed about the things that happen in the 
context of the bird flu 
0.70 
Information 
seeking 
5  0.88 
Active info 
seeking 
Event triggered 
info seeking 
Passive info 
scanning 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
I explicitly look for information about the bird flu in the media 
 
When there is new info about the bird flu, I will look for more information as 
quickly as possible 
When there is an item about the bird flu the news, I will follow this item with 
more attention 
I will never skip articles or information about the bird flu in newspapers 
When the tv or radio is on and there is some news about the bird flu, I will 
follow it with more attention than the other items that are mentioned 
 
 
0.87 
 
Talking to 
others 
6 When there has been a TV-program or item about the bird flu, it will be 
discussed in my personal/social environment 
I think it’s important to have the possibility to talk to 
friends/family/colleagues… about the bird flu 
When there is a news items about the bird flu, I will discuss it with others 
How often do you talk about the bird flu to the following (groups of) persons 
0.88 
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Familiy/friends/colleagues or fellow students (3 items, measured on six point 
scales) 
Table 70: Factor analysis (PCA with Varimax rotation) for key constructs in context of the bird flu 
 
 
The cronbach’s alpha’s vary from 0.68 (mental distance) to 0.88 (information seeking, social 
behaviour) so they all exceed the crucial value of 0.65. We can conclude that the scales are 
internally consistent. 
5. Comprehensive descriptive report 
As in the first research report, we will first discuss all general descriptive statistics that will 
provide us with a clear overview of the key concepts of risk perception in the context of the 
bird flu. When interpreting the figures, we must bear in mind that the simple size was 
limited (n=320), so the results are indicative. Let us first take a look at key the risk perception 
constructs: risk perception, mental distance, fear, behaviour (intentions), information needs, 
information seeking behaviour, information saturation and social behaviour. 
5.1. Risk perception 
Again, we included the means and standard deviations as well as the percentages of people 
with low and high scores. The figures should be interpreted on a scale from 1 to 6, as the 
concepts were constructed with items that were measured on 6 point Likert scales.  
 
 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Risk perception 
 
3.41 0.89   29 5 
Mental distance 
 
2.86 0.79  <35 year = 2.84 
35-44 year = 2.51 
45-64 year = 2.85 
>64 year = 3.26 
F(3,311)=4.74** 
44 1 
Fear 2.77 1.18  <35 year = 2.37 
35-44 year = 3.17 
45-64 year = 2.91 
>64 year = 3.71 
F(3,311)=16.42*** 
48 6 
Behaviour 2.39 1.01   65 1 
Information 
need 
3.37 0.96 Male = 3.24 
Female = 3.49 
t (318)=-2.32* 
<35 year = 3.12 
35-44 year = 3.75 
45-64 year = 3.50 
>64 year = 3.69 
F(3,313)=6.76*** 
32 6 
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Information 
seeking 
3.15 0.97 Male = 3.03 
Female = 3.49 
t (313)=-2.15* 
<35 year = 2.84 
35-44 year = 3.53 
45-64 year = 3.27. 
>64 year = 3.81 
F(3,308)=13.47*** 
37 4 
Info saturation 2.74 1.08   41 6 
Talking to 
others 
 
2.73 0.84 Male = 2.63 
Female = 2.84 
t (309)=-2.23* 
 58 7 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 71: Descriptive statistics key constructs in the context of the bird flu 
 
The risk perception level is above average (mean = 3.41) and the perceived distance towards 
the threat is below average (mental distance mean = 2.86). When we take a look at the 
concrete percentages, only 5% of the respondents has high risk perception levels and 44% 
has low mental distance levels. The fear level is below average (mean = 2.77) and only 6% of 
the respondents have a high fear level while 48% is not afraid that the bird flu will affect 
them. These figures indicate that the risk is perceived as a threat that is present in one’s 
close environment, but that it is not perceived as something that will happen to the 
respondents personally. On the other hand, we see that 46% to 66% answers neutrally and 
does not have really outspoken opinions about the bird flu. This might be a sign that there is 
a lack of interest, or a lack of knowledge about the risk.  
When we take a look at the concrete behaviour of people, we notice that only 1% has 
already thought about concrete protective actions (mean = 2.39). For information seeking 
behaviour, the mean is above the average (3.15) as well as the need for information (mean = 
3.37), but the percentages illustrate more outspoken results: only 4% of the respondents 
seeks information (combination of active, passive and event triggered information seeking) 
about the bird flu and 6% states to have a high need for risk information. Again, we discover 
that a large part of the respondents answer neutrally: 63% to 68% has scores between 3 and 
4 on the 6 point scale. So the relatively moderate answering patterns indicate that the 
general public is not really involved in the matter.  
For social behaviour, the mean is below average as well (2.73)  and only 7% states that they 
talk to others about the bird flu (construct with 6 items) while 58% declares that they have a 
low social interaction in the context of the bird flu. 
5.2. Gender and age differences 
We have only found gender differences with regard to the information seeking behaviour. In 
general, women have significantly higher means for information seeking, information need 
and social behaviour, indicating that they might be more involved with the matter than men. 
They do not differ in terms of risk perception and fear. 
Concerning the age groups, we found more significant differences. The youngest age 
category (<35 years) has the lowest level of fear, information need and information seeking, 
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indicating that they are not as involved. The oldest age category (>64 years) has the highest 
fear level, high information needs and high information seeking behaviour, on the other 
hand, their mental distance is the highest, indicating that they perceive the risk as being 
more remote. The category of 35-44 years has the lowest mental distance, the highest need 
for information and the highest information seeking level. We assume that the opinion 
leaders will be identified within this age group. 
We were intrigued we the results concerning the risk perception levels, so we decided to 
analyze the concept of risk perception somewhat more into depth. 
5.3. Specific risk perception and protective behaviour 
We asked the respondents to indicate the probability of three events on a 7 point Likert 
scale, ranging from ‘that will certainly never happen’ to ‘that will certainly happen’: the 
probability that the virus will spread in Belgium, the probability that there will be a variant of 
the virus in Belgium that can be spread between humans and the probability that they will 
be infected with the harmful variant of the bird flu virus. We recoded the 1, 2 and 3 (will 
certainly take place, there is a minimal chance, the chance is small) on the 7 point scale into 
‘low’ perceived probability level, 4 remained the ‘moderate’ probability level and 5, 6 and 7 
(there is a considerable chance, there is a large chance, this will certainly happen) to high 
perceived probability level. 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Specific risk perception levels I nthe context of the bird flu 
 
 
As the bar charts indicate in the graph above, the perceived probability levels are rather high 
but decrease as the threat is positioned in the near proximity of the respondents. We 
ascertain that 40% of the people thinks that there is a high probability that the bird flu virus 
will be spread in Belgium. This percentage decreases to 16% when we ask to indicate the 
probability level of the outbreak of the variant that is harmful for human beings and 
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eventually only 6% of the respondents thinks that they will be infected with the virus. So we 
can clearly see that the bird fu as a threat is a perceived risk that is near, but will not affect 
the person himself. This is what is called the ‘personal invulnerability’ bias and especially the 
‘denial’ bias (Thompson, 1985). These psychological defense mechanisms allow human 
beings not to be preoccupied with the evaluation of personal risk, which would only induce 
increased levels of chronic anxiety and stress (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990). 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Specific protective behaviour in the context of the bird flu 
 
When we take a look at the concrete protective behaviour of the respondents, we can see 
that, even though some protective actions were obligatory (locking up poultry), the 
percentages of people who really implemented these preventive actions are rather low: less 
than 1% has bought or taken antiviral medicine and keeps their cats indoors. About 10% has 
stopped eating poultry, 18% has locked up their poultry (of course, there is a bias because 
not all people own poultry and we did enter a selection variable that allowed us to 
determine the percentage of people who own poultry) and 30% has avoided contact with 
poultry. Besides concrete behaviour, we were especially interested in the information 
seeking behaviour. 
5.4. Information seeking behaviour 
The items that the constructs are based upon were measured on 6 point Likert scales so the 
means should be interpreted on a continuous scale from 1 to 6. The ‘low’ percentages are 
the sum of the percentages of the 1 to 2 interval and the high percentages are the sum of 
the 5 to 6 interval.  
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Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Active info 
seeking 
 
2.52 1.10  <35 year = 2.22 
35-44 year = 2.88 
45-64 year = 2.69 
>64 year = 2.89 
F(3,313)=6.86*** 
49 6 
Event 
triggered info 
seeking 
2.52 1.08  <35 year = 2.16 
35-44 year = 3.04 
45-64 year = 2.66 
>64 year = 3.09 
F(3,313)=12.24*** 
50 4 
Passive info 
scanning 
3.58 1.12  <35 year = 3.27 
35-44 year = 3.91 
45-64 year = 3.66 
>64 year = 4.36 
F(3,308)=11.14*** 
24 15 
Significance key: * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 72: Information seeking behaviour descriptive statistics in the context of the bird flu  
  
 
The percentages of active and event triggered information seeking are very low (respectively 
6% and 4% of the people have high scores) and the means are below average (2.52 on 6 
point scale). For passive information scanning, the mean is higher (3.58) and 15% scores high 
on this construct.  
Again, there is a large portion of the respondents that answers rather neutrally (3 or 4 on 6 
point scale): it varies from 54% to 61%. We found clear differences between age groups: the 
youngest age category (<35 years) scores significantly lower. We assume that this group is 
less involved and less worried about the risk. The oldest age category has the highest scores 
on all three types of information seeking. 
6. Identifying and profiling the public 
The second central research objective, the classification and profilation of risk information 
seekers, was also scrutinized in the context of the bird flu. We will perform a cluster analysis 
for the primary confirmation, and validate the exposed groups with a discriminant analysis.  
6.1. Identification of opinion leaders 
Based on the preceding results in report I in the context of terrorism, we decided to use the 
same central concepts to validate the information seekers classification as exposed in the 
previous studies. So three main traits were used as a foundation for the cluster analysis and 
the identification of the opinion leaders: 
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1 Information seeking behaviour, split up in active information seeking, event-triggered 
information seeking and passive information scanning. Again, we wanted to 
differentiate in the information seeking behaviour as we assumed that the specific 
information seeking behaviours (active, event-triggered and passive) might 
separately be determining variables that distinguish one group from another. So we 
will integrate the three concepts separately.  
2 Social behaviour, expressed in the frequency of talking to others about the involved 
risk context 
3 Specific opinion leadership traits. In the first surveys that we conducted, this trait was 
measured by means of one specific item 
“In conversations, my friends, colleagues, family… attach much importance to my 
opinion concerning the bird flu.”  
6.2. Cluster analysis 
The first research report empirically confirmed the classification of four groups of risk 
information seekers in four studies. We will therefore use the basic assumption of four 
groups in this analysis as well. Also the five main concepts, as mentioned above, were used 
in the cluster analysis. Again, we used the k-means cluster analysis technique because we 
have predefined the clustering variables. Missing data were deleted casewise.  
First, we will graphically describe the four clusters that were retrieved. 
 
 
Figure 47: Segmentation of information seekers in the context of the bird flu 
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The four group solution was retrieved again.  
1. Opinion leaders. This is the group of respondents who have the highest scores on all 
cluster variables. Their information seeking behaviour is high (active, passive and event 
triggered search), they consider themselves as opinion leaders and they talk more about 
terrorism to other people than the other groups. This is the most important group of 
people as this will also be our primary target group in our risk communication programs 
since the diffused information will reach them more accurately and they will talk to other 
people about the risk of terrorism. The percentage of opinion leaders is 15%, somewhat 
lower than in the context of terrorism (varied from 21% to 25%).  
2. The second group is the group of silent seekers. Their active information seeking 
behaviour is moderate, but their event triggered and especially their passive information 
search is above average. However, they only score averagely on social behaviour and 
they even score rather low on the opinion leadership (perceived influence) trait. The 
data revealed that 25% of the respondents are silent seekers. This group does not play a 
very important role as a target group for communication efforts as they will not spread 
the information that they retrieve. Their active information seeking behaviour is not high 
either so they will not come to the information that would be deliberately spread by the 
governmental institutions. 
3. The third group is the group of talking scanners. This group is characterized by its rather 
high passive information search behaviour, but low active and event triggered 
information search. They have moderate scores on social behaviour but higher scores on 
opinion leadership in terms of perceived influence. The only difference with the four 
group classification in the terrorism context is that talking scanners and silent seekers 
have the same (statistically non-significant difference of 0.1) score on the social 
behaviour construct, whereas in the terrorism context, the difference in social behaviour 
was more outspoken. This group may be of importance to risk communicators as they do 
talk about terrorism and they perceive themselves as opinion leaders, but they do not 
look for specific (and correct) information actively. It may be important to discover their 
media profiles so that they could be reached if very crucial information would have to be 
disseminated in the community (e.g. guidelines). This group could be a secondary target 
group in the risk communication strategy. 
4. The last group is the group of ignorants. These people generally score low on all 
variables. They are not interested in the bird flu, they do not talk about it and do not 
consider themselves as opinion leaders. They are no primary and even no secondary 
Segment % 
Opinion leaders 15 
Silent seekers 25 
Talking scanners 33 
Ignorants 26 
Table 73: Overview of the presence of each cluster of information seekers in the context of the bird flu 
285 
 
target group as they do not look for or retrieve information about terrorism neither do 
they talk about the subject. The percentage of respondents in this category is 26%. 
6.2.1. Additional analyses 
The output of the analysis of variance shows that the F values are high and statistically 
significant for all cluster variables (p values are all 0.000). This indicates that the means differ 
significantly on these variables. 
 
Analysis of Variance Bird flu
Variable
Between
SS
df Within
SS
df F signif.
p
actiefinfo
infozoek
opinionl
passinf
talk
256,0806 3 112,4161 302 229,3157 0,000000
211,6935 3 136,8065 302 155,7710 0,000000
210,0703 3 175,7500 302 120,3247 0,000000
189,6532 3 187,5305 302 101,8062 0,000000
105,6347 3 105,3497 302 100,9390 0,000000
 
Table 74: Analysis of variance (cluster analysis) in the context of the bird flu 
 
The Euclidean distances (E.D.) and squared Euclidean distances (E.D.²) are all high. These 
distances are computed from the cluster means on each dimension. The two groups that 
differ the most are opinion leaders and ignorants (E.D.=2.32, E.D.²=5.38). The two groups 
that differ the least from each other are, as presumed, the silent seekers and the talking 
scanners (E.D.=0.81, E.D.²=0.65). 
 
Euclidean Distances between Clusters Bird flu
Distances below diagonal
Squared distances above diagonalCluster
Number No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
Silent seekers
Opinion leaders
Ignorants
Talking scanners
0,000000 0,998524 1,791107 0,650411
0,999262 0,000000 5,381473 2,517624
1,338322 2,319800 0,000000 0,925227
0,806481 1,586702 0,961887 0,000000
 
Table 75: Euclidean distances cluster analysis in the context of the bird flu 
 
The next step in the validation of our four group solution is a discriminant analysis. 
6.3. Discriminant analysis 
6.3.1. Assessing the overall fit of the proposed model 
Wilks’ Lambda is  0.10; F (15.82)= 69.82 (p<0.000), so the low Wilks’ Lambda proves that the 
between-groups dispersion is large compared to the within groups dispersion. The four 
groups differ significantly and the six independent variables are discriminant items. 
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The Wilks’ Lambda’s which are mentioned in the first column of the output, refer to the 
Wilks' Lambda for the overall model that will result after removing the respective variable. 
None of the Wilks’ lambda’s exceed 0.154. So each one of the independent variables 
contribute to the discrimination. 
The Partial Lamda’s in the second column are associated with the unique contribution of the 
respective variable to the discriminatory power of the model. The value (that ranges from 0 
to1) has to be as low as possible. We can read that the partial lambda’s range from 0.67 to 
0.94. 
The F-remove values are associated with the respective partial Wilk's Lambda’s and the p-
levels indicate the significance levels of the F values. All F values are significant as the p-
levels are all far lower than 0.001. 
The Tolerance values are in fact the results of 1-r² of the respective variable with all other 
variables in the model as shown in the output. It is a measure of the redundancy of the 
respective variable. Naturally, 1-Tolerance is the r² of the respective variable with all other 
variables in the model/output.  The miminum r² (0.07) is the one of the variable passive 
information retrieval and social behaviour (talk). Their Tolerance values are 0.93, which 
means that the variables passive IS and talk are 7% redundant with the other variables. The 
highest r² is 0.12 (Tolerance=0.88), which means that 12% of the variable event triggered 
information seeking is explained by the other five variables in the model. 
 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary (survey vogelgriep cluster.sta)
No. of vars in model: 5; Grouping: CLUSTER (4 grps)
Wilks' Lambda: ,10372 approx. F (15,823)=69,819 p<0,0000
N=306
Wilks'
Lambda
Partial
Lambda
F-remove
(3,298)
p-level Toler. 1-Toler.
(R-Sqr.)
active IS
event triggered IS
opinion leader
passive IS
talk
0,138979 0,746321 33,76398 0,000000 0,889611 0,110389
0,122232 0,848568 17,72667 0,000000 0,875871 0,124130
0,154034 0,673375 48,18232 0,000000 0,907327 0,092673
0,124316 0,834347 19,72184 0,000000 0,930851 0,069149
0,110338 0,940046 6,33525 0,000354 0,926639 0,073361
 
Table 76: Discriminant function analysis summary in the context of the bird flu 
 
 
To summarize, the variable with the highest discriminatory power is opinion leadership 
(Wilks’ Lambda = 0.14, partial lambda = 0.67), followed by active information seeking, 
passive information seeking and event triggered information seeking (the latter two are 
equally discriminating). The least discriminating variable is social behaviour (talk) because it 
has the lowest Wilks’ lambda (however 0.11 is still higher that the general Wilks’ lambda 
value of the model of 0.10) and the highest partial lambda (0.94) but still, the F value is 
statistically significant.  
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6.3.2. Assessing groups membership prediction accuracy 
The classification matrix contains information about the number and percent of correctly 
classified cases in each group. The subjoined classification matrix shows us that more than 
96% of the cases are correctly assigned to the predicted groups. For the most important 
group in our research, the opinion leaders, this percentage is 87%, which is rather low, but 
this is probably due to the smaller sample size which leads to the fact that within the group 
of opinion leaders, there are only 47 respondents (from which 41 are classified by the 
discriminant analysis as opinion leaders). 
 
Classification Matrix Bird flu
Rows: Observed classifications
Columns: Predicted classifications
Group
Percent
Correct
Silent seekers
p=,33333
Opinion
leaders
p=,15359
Ignorants
p=,26144
Talking
scanners
p=,25163
Silent seekers
Opinion leaders
Ignorants
Talking scanners
Total
100,0000 102 0 0 0
87,2340 6 41 0 0
98,7500 0 0 79 1
93,5065 5 0 0 72
96,0784 113 41 79 73  
Table 77: Classification matrix discriminant analysis in the context of the bird flu 
6.4. Profiling opinion leaders 
In this section, we will first describe the socio-demographical profile of the opinion leaders 
and the other information seekers, followed by the specific media profiles. The description 
of the profiles of these groups is crucial in the construction process of a public oriented risk 
and crisis communication program. As mentioned previously, the most crucial target group 
to reach with risk communication efforts are the opinion leaders as these people look for 
risk information, they talk to others more than other people and they have some general 
opinion leadership traits (convincers, leaders, valuable sources of information). 
 
Socio-demographical profile 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Gender 45% male 
55% female 
 
51% male 
49% female 
43% male 
57% female 
58% male 
42% female 
Age (mean) 47.81 36.53 43.79 36.20 
F(3,300)=7.65, p<0.000 
Educational level 30% low  
28% average 
43% high 
14% low 
22% average 
64% high 
15% low 
35% average 
51% high 
10% low 
38% average 
53% high 
Χ²=14.10, p=0.023 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=7.40) 
Table 78: Socio demographical profile of information seekers in the context of the bird flu 
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Opinion leaders are mainly female, but the difference is not very outspoken (45% men 
versus 55% women). The mean for age is almost 48 years old, which is rather high compared 
to the other groups. The respondents in the opinion leadership group are rather highly 
educated. The talking scanners are younger (mean = 36 years) and equally distributed for 
gender and silent seekers are mainly female with an average age of 44. The ignorants are 
mainly male (58%) and include the youngest people (mean age = 36 years). The perception 
profiles will provide us with a more detailed view on status of the general concepts that 
surround risk perception in the context of the bird flu. 
 
Perception profiles 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Risk perception  3.85 3.20 3.52 3.21 
F(3,297)=7.55*** 
Mental distance 2.76 2.82 2.83 2.91 
n.s. 
Fear 3.55 2.37 2.95 2.45 
F(3,300)=13.89*** 
Behaviour 3.45 2.31 2.55 1.71 
F(3,295)=39.58***    
Need for information 4.34 3.11 3.74 2.57 
F(3,302)=69.70*** 
Information 
saturation  
3.57 2.53 2.89 2.3 
F(3,302)=18.24*** 
Table 79: Perception profiles of the information seekers in the context of the bird flu 
  
The data revealed significant differences for all constructs, except for mental distance. The 
opinion leaders have the highest means on all constructs. They are most worried about the 
bird flu as a threat and they are the only group that has a fear level that is above the average 
of 3 on the six point scale (3.55). Same accounts for their behaviour level (3.45). We would 
like to stress their high need for risk information (mean score of 4.34). These results indicate 
that our most important target group, the opinion leaders, are most worried about the risk 
of bird flu and that they have a high need for risk communication. That is why we will now 
take a look at the specific media consumption patterns for both the opinion leaders versus 
the non opinion leaders (sum of the talking scanners, silent seekers and ignorants). 
 
Media profiles of target groups (opinion leaders) 
 
General media consumption 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Television n.s. 
Internet n.s. 
Table 80: Media profiles of the opinion leaders in the context of the bird flu 
There were no significant differences in general television and internet consumption. 
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Specific media profiles 
 
The following bar chart represents the specific media usage of opinion leaders and non-
leaders. The bars represent the percentage of respondents who look for information about 
the bird flu in the specific media (sum of categories weekly, several times a week and daily). 
We can conclude from the chart that the percentage of people that often look for 
information about the bird flu is generally much higher for opinion leaders than for non-
leaders. The media that are most consulted are newspapers (62% of opinion leaders and 
23% non leaders), followed by tv (50% and 23%) and radio (48% and 21%) in general. 
Magazines (39% and 8%) and governmental communication efforts on public television (35% 
and 11%) and radio (26% and 11%) are moderately consulted. Almost 22% of the opinion 
leaders consult personal sources for information about the bird flu (versus 3% of the non 
opinion leaders). Surprisingly, the internet is one of the least consulted sources (15% and 
0,4%). The specific governmental communication channels are the least popular (13% and 
1% consult governmental brochures and folders and 7% and 0,4% consult the information 
hotline). Foreign media are not popular either (7% and 2%) probably because of the fact that 
the nature of the threat is very much bound to geographical boundaries. People will look for 
information about the threat in their specific personal and geographical environment; it will 
probably not really interest them how the risk is evolving abroad as much as it is evolving in 
Flanders. 
 
 
Figure 48: Specific media usage by opinion leaders and non leaders to retrieve information about 
the bird flu 
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As for the perceived reliability of the information sources, the subjoined bar chart represents the 
percentages of respondents (both opinion leaders as non leaders) that perceive the specific source 
as rather to totally reliable. 
 
 
 
Figure 49: Perceived reliability of the information channels in the context of the bird flu 
 
 
The sources that are most trusted are the experts: 80% of both opinion leaders as non 
leaders perceive ‘the experts’ as reliable sources. Information brochures and folders come in 
second place (68% and 72%), together with newspapers (72% and 66%) and tv (79% and 
68%). Moderate percentages can be assigned to the information hotline (57% and 65%), 
radio (61% and 63%), governmental ads on tv (65% and 61%) and radio (59% and 61%) and 
finally magazines (52% and 44%). A lower percentage of people thinks that the following 
information channels are reliable: foreign media (31% and 46%), people in the personal 
environment (44% and 32%) and internet (36% and 27%).  
 
There are a few somewhat contradictory results when we confront usage and reliability. 
Governmental communication channels are not consulted by a lot of people who look for 
information about the bird flu, but these channels are perceived as reliable by a large part of 
the respondents (57% to 72%). We can assume that this is simply because of the fact that 
the government is currently not communicating very intensively by means of these 
communication tools. As we will see in the next sections, only 30% to 35% of the 
respondents were satisfied with the quantity of governmental information about the bird 
flu. So fortunately, the governmental information and communication efforts are perceived 
as reliable (as we will also confirm by data analysis in the next sections). 
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Another contradiction lies within the result that 32% to 44% thinks that people in their 
personal environment are reliable sources for information about the bird flu but only 3% 
(non leaders) and 22% (leaders) consult personal contacts for information, while we are 
intensively promoting the communication strategy that uses opinion leaders as information 
leaders and agenda setters. We can counter this with the fact that experts are perceived as 
very reliable by the vast majority of the respondents (80%). We could assume that experts 
can be perceived as the vital sources of information for opinion leaders. The non leaders will 
perceive both experts in the media as people in their personal environments (whom they 
perceive as experts) as reliable sources to consult. We are also hypothetically assuming that, 
even though not many people perceive the internet as a reliable source, the governmental 
information that would be communication through various forums, official websites etc… 
will be consulted, especially by the opinion leaders, and will be perceived as reliable sources 
of information. We will now dig into the specific perceptions about governmental risk 
regulation and communication in the context of the bird flu (preparedness, reliability, 
quantity and quality of governmental information). 
7. Governmental communication 
7.1. Trust in institutes 
We will first discuss the general trust in the governmental institutes on the four levels 
(European, national, provincial and local). The trust concepts is a reflection of the perceived 
preparedness of the governments on the four levels and we will also refer to it as the 
perception of the government as a risk regulator. The subjoined table includes both the 
means (and standard deviations) as the percentages of respondents that assign low (1 and 2) 
and high scores (4 and 5) on the 5 point Likert scales. 
 
Degree of trust in following instances (5 point Likert scale) 
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Perceived preparedness European government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.60 
3.50 
 
0.73 
0.89 
   
9 
15 
 
66 
61 
Perceived preparedness national government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.56 
3.39 
 
0.75 
0.99 
   
10 
20 
 
61 
54 
Perceived preparedness provincial government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.11 
3.06 
 
0.92 
1.11 
   
24 
32 
 
32 
45 
Perceived preparedness local government  
Non-OL 
OL 
 
2.82 
2.87 
 
1.02 
1.30 
   
38 
38 
 
30 
39 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 81: Levels of trust in the various instances in the context of the bird flu 
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The perceived preparedness decreases with the level of the governmental instances. The 
European government has the highest mean (3.6 and 3.5 on the 5 point scale) and 61% (OL) 
and 66% (non OL) of the respondents assign high preparedness scores while only 15% (OL) 
and 9% (non OL) has little faith in the preparedness of the European government. We can 
draw parallel conclusions for the perceptions of the national government, the means are a 
little lower and so are the percentages of high scores (54% and 61%). The provincial 
government, responsible for the first in line crisis planning, is perceived as less prepared 
(means of 3.06 and 3.11 and only 45% of the opinion leaders and 32% of the non opinion 
leaders assign high scores) but the local government has got the lowest scores (means of 
about 2.8 and low percentages of high perceived preparedness). Remarkable is that the 
latter two have higher percentages of low perceived preparedness scores: 24% to 38% thinks 
that the national and local governments are not prepared on a crisis situation due to the bird 
flu. Besides the perception of the government as a risk regulator, we will now take a look at 
the specific perceptions about the government as a risk communicator, starting out with the 
levels of perceived reliability of the governmental information provided by the governmental 
institutes on the four levels. There were no significant differences for age or gender. 
7.2. Reliability institutional information  
Degree of trust in following instances  
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Perceived reliability 
European info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.56 
3.55 
 
 
0.85 
1.02 
 <35 year =3.73 
35-44 year = 3.72 
45-64 year = 3.34 
>64 year = 3.11 
F(3,313)=7.68*** 
 
 
12 
17 
 
 
61 
57 
Perceived reliability 
National info  
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.64 
3.68 
 
 
0.83 
0.91 
   
 
11 
13 
 
 
69 
70 
Perceived reliability 
Provincial info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.43 
3.43 
 
 
0.81 
0.95 
   
 
11 
17 
 
 
50 
51 
Perceived reliability 
Local info 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.35 
3.40 
 
 
0.80 
0.99 
   
 
15 
15 
 
 
47 
47 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 82: Levels of perceived reliability of the governmental information about the bird flu 
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We can draw parallel conclusions for the perceived reliability of the governmental 
information coming from the institutes on the four levels. The national governmental 
information is perceived to be the most reliable (means of 3.64 and 3.68 and 70% of the 
respondents indicated that this information is reliable). The European information has very 
similar reliability levels: the means are both 3.5 and 57% (OL) and 61% (non OL) assigned 
high reliability scores. On this level, we found statistically significant differences for age 
groups: The youngest age category (<35 years) and the group of 35 to 44 years old have a 
significantly higher mean (3.73 and 3.72) than the other age categories. The seniors (> 64 
years) have the lowest mean. The levels of reliability for the provincial and local 
governmental information are somewhat lower (means of 3.35 to 3.43) and so are the 
percentages of people that give high reliability scores (47% to 51%). In general, only 11% to 
17% has assigned low reliability levels to the information coming from the four levels of 
governments (European, national, provincial and local). We can conclude that the reliability 
levels are rather high, exposing an opportunity for the governments to start with an initial 
image as a reliable information source. However, as we will empirically establish later on, 
the satisfaction with the quantity of information is low. We will now take a look at the 
specific needs in terms of concrete governmental protection measures and risk information. 
7.3. Specific needs for measures and information type 
We asked our respondents how important they perceive the following governmental 
(protective) measures. To what degree do they think that it is important that the 
government undertakes these measures? The statements had to be rated on 5 point Likert 
scales. 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Vaccination of 
poultry 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.45 
3.55 
 
 
1.07 
1.27 
Male = 3.30 
Female = 3.61 
t (316)=-2.56* 
  
 
17 
23 
 
 
53 
68 
Locking up poultry 
of agricultural 
industry 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
3.94 
4.26 
t (303)=-2.23* 
 
 
 
0.88 
0.97 
Male = 3.83 
Female = 4.09 
t (317)=-2.54* 
  
 
 
8 
6 
 
 
 
77 
89 
Locking up all 
poultry (domestic 
and industrial) 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
3.53 
4.00 
t (301)=-2.79* 
 
 
 
1.06 
1.07 
Male = 3.39 
Female = 3.77 
t (305)=-
3.17** 
  
 
 
20 
11 
 
 
 
58 
78 
Performing strict 
controls of the 
 
 
 
 
Male = 3.82 
Female = 4.13 
<35 year =4.06 
35-44 year = 4.52 
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obligatory safety 
measures 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.93 
4.28 
t (302)=-2.20* 
 
 
0.98 
0.99 
t (302)=-
2.86** 
45-64 year = 3.86 
>64 year = 3.71 
F(3,311)=4.32** 
 
 
9 
6 
 
 
73 
87 
To stock anti viral 
medicines for the 
human variant of 
the flu 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
4.46 
4.66 
t (303)=-2.04* 
 
 
 
 
0.75 
0.60 
Male = 4.37 
Female = 4.57 
t (303)=-2.38* 
  
 
 
 
2 
0 
 
 
 
 
89 
98 
Abandoning the 
import of poultry 
from high risk 
countries 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
4.12 
4.49 
t (304)=-2.58* 
 
 
 
 
0.92 
0.83 
 <35 year =3.97 
35-44 year = 4.36 
45-64 year = 4.32 
>64 year = 4.51 
F(3,313)=5.45*** 
 
 
 
 
5 
6 
 
 
 
 
75 
92 
Providing 
information to 
civilians about the 
dispersion of the 
bird flu virus 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
 
4.41 
4.66 
t (303)=-
2.78** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.75 
0.52 
Male = 4.26 
Female = 4.62 
t (299)=-
4.57*** 
  
 
 
 
2 
0 
 
 
 
 
88 
98 
Providing 
information to 
civilians about how 
to prevent 
contamination with 
the virus 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.51 
4.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.74 
0.70 
Male = 4.39 
Female = 4.67 
t (299)=-
3.41*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
92 
Providing 
information to 
civilians about the 
risks involved with 
the bird flu virus 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
 
4.40 
4.66 
t (304)=-2.57* 
 
 
 
 
 
0.79 
0.60 
Male = 4.26 
Female = 4.61 
t (282)=-
4.21*** 
  
 
 
 
 
3 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
94 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 83: Perceptions of specific needs for governmental initiatives and information types in the 
context of the bird flu 
 
295 
 
Almost all measures are perceived to be important. We can conclude this from the high 
means (most of them exceed 4 on the 5 point scale) and the high percentages of 
respondents who assign high importance levels to the measures. The respondents address 
the lowest importance to the vaccination of poultry and locking up all poultry (lower means 
and lower percentages that assign high importance scores). The highest scores were for the 
following measures: stocking antiviral medicine (concrete protective risk regulation 
measure) and providing information about how to prevent contamination with the virus and 
information about the risks involved with the bird flu (percentages vary from 88% to 98% 
and means from 4.4 to 4.66). The opinion leaders score significantly higher on all measures, 
except for the vaccination of poultry (moderate means and percentages) and the provision 
of information about how to prevent contamination with the virus (both rate this measure 
as very important: high means and high percentages). There are also significant gender 
differences for most of the measures: women score significantly higher than men, except for 
the proposal to abandon import of poultry from high risk countries and information 
provision about prevention. This may lead us to the conclusion that women are more 
involved with the risk than men. For age differences, we only found significant results for 
performing strict controls of the obligatory safety measures (youngest age category has the 
highest mean) and abandoning the import of poultry from high risk countries (oldest age 
category has highest mean). As we did not really find a substantial explanation for these 
differences and there were no age differences for the other measures, we cannot state that 
there are general well-founded differences between the age groups. 
7.4. General governmental information  
In the next paragraph, we will discuss the particular perception of the role of the 
government to inform the civilians as good as possible about dispersion and prevention of 
the virus and the specific need of the people to participate in the governmental 
communication process. Both statements were measured on a 6 point Likert scale. 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Duty of government 
to inform civilians as 
good as possible 
(dispersion, 
prevention…) 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
 
5.16 
5.38 
 
 
 
 
 
0.80 
0.99 
Male = 5.06 
Female = 5.29 
t (318)=-2.49* 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
83 
Need for 
participation 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.54 
3.80 
t (304)=-7.01*** 
 
 
1.15 
1.10 
Male = 2.58 
Female = 2.91 
t (318)=-2.43* 
<35 year =2.43 
35-44 year = 3.12 
45-64 year = 2.96 
>64 year = 3.09 
F(3,313)=6.19*** 
 
 
50 
11 
 
 
5 
24 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 84: Perceptions about the governmental information in the context of the bird flu 
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Both opinion leaders as non leaders give high ratings for the statement that it is the duty of 
the government to inform civilians as good as possible about the dispersion and prevention 
of the bird flu virus: the means are 5.16 and 5.38 (difference is not significant) and more 
than 80% of the respondents agrees to strongly agrees with the statement (only 1% to 2% 
does not). This illustrates again the important role of the government as a risk 
communicator. 
There is a higher need for participation for the opinion leaders (mean = 3.8, 24% scores high 
on this need and only 11% does not feel the need to participate) than for non leaders 
(significantly lower mean of 2.5 and 50% does not feel the need to participate.  
Again, women have significant higher scores on both concepts, indicating that they are more 
involved. We could already deduct from the opinion leaders profile that they exist more out 
of women than men, this explains of course the differences that are presented here. The 
youngest age category scores significantly lower than the other age groups on the need for 
participation.  
So we can conclude that all respondents perceive it as the task of the government to 
communicate about the risk of the bird flu and that especially the opinion leaders will feel 
the need to communicate with the government about the risk and take part in a two way 
communication flow.  
The next section will take a look at the specific perceptions about the quality, quantity and 
reliability of governmental information about the risk of the bird flu.  
7.5. General perception of government as risk regulator and risk communicator 
For the perception measurement of the quality of the governmental communication efforts, 
we added some new items that are more specific than the single item that we used in the 
previous studies in the context of terrorism (“I think the quality of the governmental 
information is good”). The added items are more specific. We performed a Factor Analysis 
(PCA with varimax rotation) to explore and eventually confirm the dimensions. The analysis 
revealed 3 factors that explained almost 70% of the variances. The cronbach’s alpha values 
for the three constructs exceed 0.65 (they range from 0.84 to 0.89) so the internal 
consistency of the scales is confirmed. 
 
Construct/items Factor 
loadings 
 
Total variance explained: 69.83% I II III IV 
Quality of governmental information (α=0.87)     
Governmental information about the bird flu is:     
Sufficiently scientific 0.78    
Sufficiently up to date 0.76    
Sufficiently specific 0.75    
Sufficiently interesting 0.73    
Sufficiently comprehensible 0.67    
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Sufficiently more reliable than info from the media 0.62    
Sufficiently more available through various channels 0.59    
Reliability of governmental information (α=0.89)     
Reliability info from provincial government  0.88   
Reliability info from local government  0.86   
Reliability info from federal government  0.81   
Quantity of governmental information (α=0.84)     
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of information 
about the bird flu (virus) 
  0.79  
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of information 
about their initiatives and measures in the context of the bird flu 
  0.64  
To what degree do you thing that the federal government offers a sufficient 
amount of information about terrorism? 
  0.64  
To what degree do you thing that the local government offers a sufficient 
amount of information about terrorism? 
   0.89 
To what degree do you thing that the provincial government offers a 
sufficient amount of information about terrorism? 
   0.83 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Eigenvalues>1. 
Rotation Method: Varimax. Missing values: cases excluded listwise. 
    
General trust in the government in context of bird flu (α=0.79)     
To what extent do you perceive the following governments as being 
prepared to terrorist attacks: national government 
    
To what extent do you perceive the following governments as being 
prepared to terrorist attacks: provincial government 
    
To what extent do you perceive the following governments as being 
prepared to terrorist attacks: local government 
    
Our hospitals are sufficiently prepared for an outbreak of the bird flu     
The government is making enough efforts to prevent an outbreak of the bird 
flu 
    
I do not think that the government  has to take more severe safety measures 
to prevent an outbreak of the bird flu RECODED 
    
Table 85: Factor analysis (PCA with Varimax rotation) for governmental communication constructs 
in context of the bird flu 
 
The general trust construct exists of 6 items. The chronbach’s alpha is 0.79 so we can 
consider the scale as internally consistent. 
We will now interpret the descriptive statistics for these concepts. 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
General trust in 
government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.35 
3.12 
 
0.67 
0.85 
   
26 
41 
 
21 
20 
Quality of govinfo 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.87 
3.90 
 
0.70 
0.91 
   
6 
17 
 
46 
59 
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Quantity of govinfo 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.44 
3.35 
 
0.78 
0.98 
   
30 
41 
 
30 
35 
Reliability of govinfo 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.47 
3.50 
 
0.75 
0.87 
   
13 
19 
 
41 
45 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 86: Descriptive statistics for the governmental communication constructs 
  
The general trust in the government is moderate (means of 3.12 and 3.35) and only 21% of 
the respondents have high confidence scores. This is probably due to the fact that there are 
rather low perceived preparedness levels for the local governments compared to the 
perceived preparedness level of the national government. On the other hand, 26% (non 
opinion leaders) and 41% (opinion leaders) of the respondents have indicated low levels of 
confidence, so there is a large fraction of people who have a rather neutral attitude towards 
the government in terms of trust (39% to 53% answers neutrally). 
The perceived quality of the governmental information is good: the means are around 3.90 
on the six point scale and 46% (non leaders) and 59% (opinion leaders) thinks the quality is 
good to very good. Only 6% to 17% assign low scores for quality. 
The quantity has lower means (3.44 and 3.35) and less people assign high scores (30% and 
35%). More people are not satisfied with the quantity of governmental information about 
the bird flu (30% and 41% assign low scores). 
The reliability is moderately rated (3.47 and 3.50) and 41% and 45% assigns high scores to 
the general reliability of governmental information about the bird flu. We have to take into 
account however that there were some differences between the reliability of the local, 
provincial and national governmental information. There were no significant differences for 
opinion leaders versus non leaders, gender or age categories.  
The multivariate analysis that includes the correlations between the concepts and the basic 
structural equation models will be discussed in the next section. 
8. Multivariate analyses 
We decided to perform the correlations both for the non-opinion leaders as for the opinion 
leaders, as we assume that some correlations might be stronger for opinion leaders than for 
non-opinion leaders. 
8.1. Correlations general concepts 
The negative linear relationship between mental distance and risk perception (r=-0.35 and -
0.42) is of course a very likely result as the lower the mental distance towards the risk will 
be, the higher the perceived risk is (and vice versa). We also found a moderate linear 
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relationship between fear and risk perception, which is stronger for opinion leaders (r=0.29) 
than for non opinion leaders (r=0.19). Focusing on behaviour, we notice a moderate negative 
relationship with mental distance (-0.20) and a stronger positive linear relationship with risk 
perception (r=0.37) but we could not confirm this for the opinion leaders, probably because 
of the limited number of cases. The most important results from this table are related to 
information seeking behaviour. The need for information correlates moderately positively 
with risk perception (r=0.25 for non leaders) and of course negatively with mental distance 
(r=-0.14 for non leaders and -0.30 for opinion leaders). Information seeking behaviour 
correlates positively with risk perception as well (r=0.22) and with fear for both opinion 
leaders (r=0.37) and non leaders (r=0.22). We notice that this linear relationship is stronger 
for opinion leaders. We also notice that the social behaviour of people (talk) correlates 
positively with information seeking behaviour (r=0.45 and r=0.21), protective behaviour 
(r=0.50 and r=0.39) and information need (r=0.45 and r=0.54). This last moderately strong 
linear relationship between information need and social behaviour indicates that the more 
people need information, the more they will talk to others about the risk (and vice versa). 
There are also non negligible positive relationships between social behaviour and risk 
perception (r=0.22) and fear (r=0.14 and r=0.20, however the latter is not statistically 
significant due to the limited sample size again). 
Finally, we will discuss the concept of trust and its correlates. At first sight, the trust level 
lowers when the risk perception level rises (r=-0.30 and r=-0.44) and when fear levels rise 
(r=-0.14). Second fact is that, the lower the trust levels are, the higher the need for 
information will be, and this positive correlation is much stronger for opinion leaders 
(r=0.41) than for non leaders (r=-0.13). 
To summarize these findings, we can state that risk information seeking has empirically 
confirmed positive relationships with risk perception and fear. The need for information is 
correlation with risk perception and fear as well, but particularly with the concept of trust 
and this especially accounts for the opinion leaders. The correlations are stronger for opinion 
leaders when it comes to the linear relationships between risk perception, information need 
and trust.  
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 Mental distance 
 
Risk perception Fear Behaviour Info need Info seeking Info sufficiency Talk 
 Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL  Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL 
Mental distance         
Risk perception -0.35*** -0.42***        
Fear  -0.02 -0.19 0.19** 0.29*       
Behaviour -0.20*** -0.20 0.37*** 0.24 0.18** 0.17      
Info need -0.14* -0.30* 0.25*** 0.28 0.25*** 0.07 0.44*** 0.12     
Info seeking -0.04 -0.27 0.22*** 0.10 0.22*** 0.37** 0.41*** 0.08 0.64*** 0.35*    
Info sufficiency -0.22*** -0.02 0.13* -0.09 -0.03 -0.15 0.16* 0.35* 0.18** -0.16 0.13* -0.21   
Talk -0.15* -0.26 0.22*** 0.22 0.14* 0.20 0.50*** 0.39* 0.45*** 0.54*** 0.45*** 0.21 0.21*** 0.21  
Trust 0.18** 0.32* -0.30*** -0.44** -0.14* -0.09 -0.20 -0.34* -0.13* -0.41** -0.07 -0.10 0.06 0.12 -0.01 -0.24 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 87: Correlations of the general constructs in the context of the bird flu 
 
 
 
 
 Quality govinfo  Quantity govinfo Reliability govinfo 
 Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL 
Quality govinfo    
Quantity govinfo 0.59*** 0.57***   
Reliability govinfo 0.40*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.77***  
Trust 0.42*** 0.31* 0.64*** 0.74*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 
Info need -0.04 -0.11 -0.14* -0.13 -0.10 -0.15 
Info seeking 0.02 -0.12 -0.04 0.002 -0.06 0.04 
Info sufficiency 0.15* 0.29* 0.15* 0.22 0.17** 0.25* 
Talk 0.04 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 88: Correlations of the constructs for governmental communication in the context of the bird flu
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8.2. Correlations governmental risk communication 
The correlation table of the governmental communication traits unveils some interesting 
significant linear relationships. The perceived quality of the governmental information 
correlates strongly with the perceived quantity (r=0.59 and r=0.57) and with the perceived 
reliability (r=0.40 and r=0.55). The perceived quantity of governmental information is even 
correlated more strongly than the perceived quality with the perceived reliability. 
Remarkable is the fact that this correlation is much stronger for opinion leaders (r=0.77) 
than for non leaders (r=0.57). We found a parallel result for the strong positive relationship 
between trust and perceived quantity of information: the correlation between both 
concepts is higher for opinion leaders (r=0.74) than for non leaders (r=0.64). Besides this 
results, trust levels will also increase as the perceived quality (r=0.42 and r=0.31) and 
reliability (r=0.51 and r=0.54) increase. 
The last correlation we want to mention is a moderate positive linear relationship between 
information sufficiency and the reliability of governmental information, again stronger for 
opinion leaders (r=0.25) than for non leaders (r=0.17). So we can state that people who think 
that the governmental information about the bird flu is reliable will also have higher trust 
levels and vice versa. 
To conclude, we want to summarize the empirically proven correlations by saying that there 
are some very strong and non negligible linear relationships between the perceived 
satisfaction with the quantity, quality and reliability of information and the trust in the 
government as a risk regulator. It will be vital for the government to communicate 
sufficiently and provide the civilians with qualitative information about the risk. This will 
probably lead to higher reliability rates and increase the general trust in the government, 
who has to deal with the threat. 
We found similar results in the other contexts as well (terrorism and the financial 
economical crisis), that is why we will now try to validate the three basic structural equation 
models in the context of the bird flu as a risk. 
8.3. Structural equation models 
The following structural equation models were build and confirmed four times in the context 
of terrorism. The multivariate relationships that are tested with these models were found to 
be stable. Our aim now is to confirm the same models in the context of the bird flu. The first 
model considers the relationship between the government as a risk communicator and as a 
risk regulator. The second model incorporates the concepts of need for participation and 
opinion leadership.  
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8.3.1. Relationship government as a risk communicator and risk regulator 
Again, Amos, a statistical software package for SEM was used to estimate the parameters. 
The chi-squared p- value should exceed 0.05, however, with large samples, this value is not 
reliable. To counter this, we performed chi-square analyses on a random, small sub-sample 
of 100 respondents. The analysis of the first model revealed very nice results. 
 
 
Figure 50: SEM integrating the relationship between the perceptions of the government as a risk 
regulator and as a risk communicator in the context of the bird flu 
 
 
Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =150 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Bird flu 6.15/ 4 / 0.19  0.99 0.99 0.98 0.04 
Table 89: General parameters of fitness of the basic SEM model in the context of the bird flu 
 
The model shows us the relationship between the satisfaction with the government as a risk 
communicator and the satisfaction with the government as a risk regulator. The chi-squared 
p value for the full sample is 0.19. So even with a sample larger than 200, we found that the 
Perception
risk communicator
Quantity govinfo Quality govinfo Reliability govinfo
Satisfaction with
safety measures
Perceived
preparedness gov
0.51
0.790.10
0.87 0.40 0.41
Merror Merror
Merror Merror Merror
0.93 0.63 0.64
0.71
0.890.31
Perception
risk regulator
Serror
303 
 
actual and the predicted are not statistically different. This means that the proposed model 
fits the observed covariances and correlations well.  
The NFI, CFI and TLI values all exceed the critical value of 0.90 abundantly (NFI=0.99, 
CFI=0.99 and TLI= 0.98) and the RMSEA value (0.04) is very good.  
The perception of the government as a risk communicator is a latent variable that is 
measured by the three manifest variables: satisfaction with the quantity and quality of the 
governmental information about the bird flu and the perceived reliability of the information 
provided by the government. We should mention that the constructed scale ‘quality of 
governmental information’ consists of completely different items (6 items, alpha=0.79) than 
the concept we used in the context of terrorism (1 item) (see above).  
The regression weights (standardized beta values, marked in italic) of these three variables 
are all very high and the satisfaction with the quantity of governmental information has the 
largest weight in the prediction of the perception of the government as a good risk 
communicator (beta=0.93, p<0.001), followed by reliability of governmental information 
(beta=0.64, p<0.001) and quality of governmental information (beta=0.63, p<0.001). The 
perception of the government as a risk regulator is a latent variable, measured by two 
manifest variables. The perceived preparedness of the government is the most important 
predictor (beta=0.89, p<0.001), followed by the satisfaction with governmental safety 
measures to prevent a possible outbreak of the bird flu (beta=0.31, p<0.001). The most 
important conclusion from this analysis is that the total amount of explained variance in the 
perception of the government by the perception of the government as a risk communicator 
is 51%, which is rather high (beta=0.71, p<0.001). 
8.3.2. Incorporating the participation and opinion leadership concepts 
The second model incorporates the need for active participation in the two communication 
flow between government and public and the concept of opinion leadership. The model is 
also found to be significant. The chi-squared value for the full sample (n=320) however was 
0.002, so we decided to perform the analysis on a subsample of 100 respondents. The chi-
squared value raise to 0.09, so we have statistical evidence that the model fits the data. The 
NFI, CFI and TLI values all exceed 0.90 as well (respectively 0.95, 0.97 and 0.93) and the 
RMSEA value is acceptable (0.06). The next step is the interpretation of the beta-values and 
the explained variances. 
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Figure 51: SEM linking bottom-up communication and opinion leadership in the context of the bird 
flu 
 
Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =150 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Bird flu 32.50/ 13 / 0.002 20.38 / 13 / 0.09 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.06 
Table 90: General parameters of fitness of the SEM model linking bottom-up communication and 
opinion leadership in the context of the bird flu 
 
The results show us that the satisfaction with the government as a risk communicator has a 
negative causal relationship with the need for bottom-up communication (beta=-0.18, 
p<0.001) which means that the more people are satisfied with the government as a 
communicator, the less they will feel the need to communicate with the government about 
the bird flu themselves. We can also state that the opinion leadership concept has a strong 
positive causal relationship with the need for bottom-up communication (beta=0.59, 
p<0.001) which means that the higher people rate on opinion leadership, the more they will 
feel the need to exchange knowledge with the government about terrorism. Opinion 
leadership and satisfaction of the government as a risk communicator together explain 38% 
of the variance within the variable that measures the need for bottom-up communication. 
Perception
risk communicator
Quantity govinfo Quality govinfo Reliability govinfo
Satisfaction with safety
measures
Perceived
preparedness gov
0.50
0.810.10
0.85 0.40 0.42
Merror Merror
Merror Merror Merror
0.92 0.63 0.65
0.71
0.900.31
Perception
risk regulator
Merror
Need for active
participation
communication
Opinion leadership
Serror
0.38
0.59
-0.18
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So for governments, it is important to communicate effectively, but also to determine who 
those opinion leaders are and how they can be reached, because this group of people that is 
characterized by a high level of influence on other social groups within society and an 
extensive information searching behaviour will feel the need to communicate about the risk 
of bird flu. 
9. Conclusion research report bird flu 
In this second research report, we presented the results of a moderately scaled quantitative 
survey study that scrutinized the risk perception construct and its related concepts in the 
context of the bird flu. Our data (n=320) allowed us to construct, confirm and validate our 
main measurement scales that measure the key concepts that surround risk perception in 
the context of the bird flu. In this concluding paragraph, we will confront the results of the 
analyses with the central research objectives. The first, descriptive part provided a clear 
descriptive report on the perceived risk of the bird flu and the related concepts of mental 
distance, fear, protective behaviour, information seeking behaviour and social behaviour. 
Again, for many concepts, we notice that a large portion of the respondents answers 
neutrally and does not have an outspoken opinion about the bird flu. This might be a sign 
that there is a lack of interest, or a lack of knowledge about the risk. On the other hand, 
some specific significant gender and age differences were revealed. For risk perception and 
mental distance, the figures indicate that the bird flu virus is perceived as a threat that is 
present in one’s close environment, but that it is not perceived as something that will 
happen to the respondents personally. More in depth analysis of the specific perceived 
probability levels, the data revealed levels that are rather high but decrease according as the 
threat is positioned in the near proximity of the respondents. So we can clearly see that the 
bird flu as a threat is a perceived risk that is near, but it will not affect the person himself. 
For concrete protective behaviour of the respondents, we notice that, even though some 
protective actions were obligatory (locking up poultry), the percentages of people who really 
implemented these actions were rather low. For information seeking, information needs and 
social behaviour, the percentages of respondents with high scores were very low as well. 
Both active as event triggered information seeking is not performed intensively by our 
respondents. Passive information scanning has a higher score. These figures indicate that 
there are not many people looking for information about bird flu or talking about it. We did 
find some gender and age differences. Women have significantly higher means for 
information seeking, information need and social behaviour, indicating that they might be 
more involved with the matter than men. Concerning the age groups, we found more 
significant differences. The youngest age category has the lowest level of fear, information 
need and information seeking, indicating that they are not so involved. The category of 35-
44 years has the lowest mental distance, the highest need for information and the highest 
information seeking level. These differences indicate that it might be valuable to try to 
identify the crucial target groups for risk communications about the bird flu. 
306 
 
We can state that we provided a full and comprehensive report on the descriptive statistics 
of the central concepts in our risk management strategy and that the first research objective 
has been accomplished. As mentioned, the gender and age differences already indicated 
that some specific profiles will have higher scores on certain concepts. So let us now take a 
look at the conclusion that we can draw for the second research objective. 
The second research objective included a confirmation of the information seekers 
segmentation and validation of the tool to identify opinion leaders. As we assumed, we 
could confirm the four target groups that were found in the context of terrorism as well, 
based on the three basic concepts (five items): information seeking, social behaviour and the 
opinion leadership trait. The cluster analysis indicated that 15% of our respondents could be 
classified as opinion leaders. This percentage is somewhat lower than in the context of 
terrorism (21% to 25%). The classification matrix of the discriminant analysis stated that 
more than 96% of the cases are correctly assigned to the predicted groups. For the most 
important group in this study, the opinion leaders, this percentage is 87%, which is rather 
low, but this is probably due to the smaller sample size which leads to the fact that within 
the group of opinion leaders, there are only 47 respondents (from which 41 are classified by 
the discriminant analysis as opinion leaders). For all further analyses about governmental 
communication efforts, we compared the results of the opinion leaders versus the non 
leaders (talking scanners, silent seekers and ignorants).  Let us start with a brief summary of 
the opinion leaders’ profile. Opinion leaders are mainly female, but the difference is not very 
outspoken (45% men versus 55% women). The mean for age is almost 48 years old, which is 
rather high compared to the other groups. The respondents in the opinion leadership group 
are rather highly educated. This group of people scores significantly higher on all constructs, 
except for mental distance. The results indicate that our most important target group, the 
opinion leaders, are most worried about the risk of bird flu, that they have a high need for 
risk communication and that they look for information about the bird flu more intensively. 
As for their specific media profiles, we can conclude that the percentage of people that often 
look for information about the bird flu by means of the various media is generally much 
higher for opinion leaders than for non-leaders. The media that are most frequently 
consulted are newspapers, followed by TV and radio. Magazines and governmental 
communication efforts on public television and radio are moderately consulted. 
Governmental communication channels are not consulted by a lot of people who look for 
information about the bird flu, but these channels are perceived as reliable by a large part of 
the respondents. We can assume that this is simply because of the fact that the government 
is currently not communicating very intensively by means of these communication tools. 
Another contradiction lies within the result that a relatively large portion (especially opinion 
leaders) thinks that people in their personal environment are reliable sources for 
information about the bird flu but only very few people actually consult personal contacts 
for information. We can counter this with the fact that experts are perceived as very reliable 
by the large majority of the respondents and again, we assume that experts can be 
perceived as the vital sources of information for opinion leaders and that the non leaders 
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will perceive both experts in the media as people in their personal environments as reliable 
sources of information about the bird flu. We are also hypothetically assuming that, even 
though not many people perceive the internet as a reliable source, the governmental 
information that would be communication through various forums, official websites etc… 
will be consulted, especially by the opinion leaders, and will be perceived as reliable sources 
of information. As for the general perception of the government as a risk communicator in 
the context of the bird flu, the reliability levels of the governmental information are rather 
high, exposing an opportunity for the governments to start with an initial image as a reliable 
information source. The public perceptions about the government as a risk regulator in the 
context of the bird flu are very dispersed. The perceived preparedness of the governments 
decreases with the level of the governmental instances. The European government and the 
national governments are perceived as rather prepared. On the other hand, the provincial 
government, responsible for the first in line crisis planning, is perceived as less prepared and 
the local government has got the lowest scores. Remarkable is that a relatively large portion 
thinks that the national and local governments are not prepared on a crisis situation due to 
the bird flu. As for the perceptions about the specific governmental initiatives that should be 
taken in the context of the bird flu, the respondents assigned the highest scores to the 
following measures: stocking antiviral medicine (concrete protective risk regulation 
measure) and providing information about how to prevent contamination with the virus and 
information about the risks involved with the bird flu. The opinion leaders score significantly 
higher on all measures, except for the provision of information about how to prevent 
contamination with the virus, that was perceived as a very important protective safety 
measure by both opinion leaders and non leaders. Another result was that almost all 
respondents perceive it as the task of the government to communicate about the risk of the 
bird flu and that especially the opinion leaders will feel the need to communicate with the 
government about the risk and take part in a two way communication flow. The general 
trust in the government is moderate. This is probably due to the fact that there are rather 
low preparedness levels for the local governments compared to the perceived preparedness 
level of the national government. The perceived quality of the governmental information is 
good and only a small fraction assigns low scores for the quality of governmental 
information about the bird flu. On the other hand, a larger fraction is not satisfied with the 
quantity of governmental information about the bird flu. The results indicate that people are 
generally not satisfied with the amount of information that is being spread by the 
government(s) about the bird flu. The reliability is moderately rated.   
The third research objective was to scrutinize the multivariate relationships between the key 
concepts. We first performed the correlation analyses that revealed some interesting linear 
relationships: we can state that risk information seeking has empirically confirmed positive 
relationships with risk perception and fear. The need for information is correlation with risk 
perception and fear as well, but particularly with the concept of trust and this especially 
accounts for the opinion leaders. The correlations are stronger for opinion leaders when it 
comes to the linear relationships between risk perception, information need and trust. For 
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the governmental communication concepts, we found some very strong and non negligible 
linear relationships between the perceived satisfaction with the quantity, quality and 
reliability of information and the trust in the government as a risk regulator. It will be vital 
for the government to communicate sufficiently and provide the civilians with qualitative 
information about the risk. This will probably lead to higher reliability rates and increase the 
general trust in the government, who has to deal with the threat. As we found similar results 
in the context of terrorism, we assumed that our structural equation models that we build in 
the first context could be confirmed in the context of the bird flu as well. Again, the strong 
relationship between the government as a risk communicator and a risk regulator is 
statistically confirmed. Especially the second model, which incorporates, besides the basic 
relationship between the government as a risk communicator and risk regulator, the 
concepts of opinion leadership and need for active participation in the communication flow, 
is of great importance. The results indicate that the satisfaction with the government as a 
risk communicator has a negative causal relationship with the need for bottom-up 
communication which means that the more people are satisfied with the government as a 
communicator, the less they will feel the need to communicate with the government about 
the bird flu themselves. We can also state that the opinion leadership concept has a strong 
positive causal relationship with the need for bottom-up communication which means that, 
the higher people rate on opinion leadership, the more they will feel the need to exchange 
knowledge with the government about terrorism. Opinion leadership and satisfaction of the 
government as a risk communicator together explain 38% of the variance within the variable 
that measures the need for bottom-up communication. So for governments, it is important 
to communicate effectively, but also to determine who those opinion leaders are and how 
they can be reached, because this group of people that is characterized by a high level of 
influence on other social groups within society and an extensive information searching 
behaviour will feel the need to communicate about the risk of bird flu.This study was a 
confirmatory survey study to validate the methodology in another risk context. It included a 
limited sample of 320 respondents. However, besides the interesting descriptive statistics, 
we also found statistical confirmation of the two research objectives that we wanted to 
achieve in specific risk context. A first glance at the descriptive percentages and means could 
mislead governmental officials in the sense that the figures are not very arousing. But when 
we take a look at the figures for our main target group, the opinion leaders, we notice that 
this groups significantly scores higher on most concepts. Especially the multivariate analyses 
pointed out that opinion leaders can play a crucial role in effectively spreading risk 
information about the bird flu and preparing the community for a crisis situation. The 
specific media profile and information needs of the opinion leaders allow us to construct 
very customized risk communication programs. As in the context of terrorism, it is important 
to construct communications that include both information that is primarily to be diffused 
by governmental institutions for crisis management reasons and the specific information 
that is desired by the opinion leaders. 
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RESEARCH REPORT III 
 
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CRISIS 
 
1. Introduction to the topic: the financial and economical crisis as a new 
(social) risk 
“The 2008 global financial crisis has been compared to a ‘once-in-a-century credit tsunami’, a 
disaster in which the loss of trust and confidence played key precipitating roles and the 
recovery from which will require the restoration of these crucial factors.”(Earle, 2009 p.786) 
 
Since the beginning of the worldwide financial and economical crisis in 2008, academic 
interest in certain issues such as trust and confidence in this specific context has been 
increasing. Earle mentions that the crisis “is already recognized as one of the greatest risk 
management failures in recent history” (Earle, 2009 p.786). He draws the analogy with 
certain risks and crisis situations in other fields such as technological hazards or other 
environmental risk management issues. As previous research has indicated that trust and 
confidence play important roles in the risk management process in all fields of risk types 
(Davies et al., 1987b; R. Peters et al., 1997a; Wouter Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004), Earle tries 
to discuss the importance of the two concepts in the specific context of the financial crisis. 
He also provided us with some clear facts and figures from a national public opinion poll that 
was initiated in the U.S. after the first bailout plan: some figures are stated below: 
 
A record high of 88% rated the condition of the national economy as “fairly bad” or “very 
bad.”  
A near-record high of 93% thought that the economy was “getting worse” or “staying about 
the same.”  
Trust in the federal government was at a record low, with only 17% saying they trust it 
“always” or “most of the time.” 
 
These results illustrate the raise of general distrust and the increasing lack of confidence in 
crisis situations that stretch over longer periods of time.  
Mazur has shortly discussed the presumed large scale effects of the intensive media 
coverage on the U.S. financial crisis, beginning September 6, 2008. He claims, however he 
does not empirically prove, that this media coverage has exacerbated underlying financial 
problems and facilitated the global diffusion of risk panic (Mazur, 2009). He quotes the 
discrepancy between the reality, fact and figures, and the perceptions and mental models 
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that are induced by the intense media coverage. He also states that the primary reactions 
are emotional and rather extreme, creating a loss of confidence in and negative perceptions 
of the responsible governmental institutions and Wall Street, resulting in a sharp cutback in 
consumer expenditures. He refers to these ripple effects as the results of a social 
amplification of risk (see chapter one). However, he concludes his article by stating that 
people eventually habituate to warnings, and media coverage becomes less frequently and 
less specific, placing crisis related issues further into the newspapers and news. So the real 
threat and risk does not disappear, nor does the perception of the risk, but the panic 
gradually recedes and the fear levels and concrete preventive behaviours of people 
(spending less, redrawing savings,…) lower. 
The financial and economical crisis has also been labeled as a ‘new’ or ‘new social’ risk, as 
defined by Beck. As mentioned in the first chapter, the public in the modern risk society 
question the promise of security and the idea of insurance, the two main building blocks of 
the modern welfare states (Beck, 1992; Beck, 1999). Chan is one of the authors who labeled 
the financial crisis as a social risk: 
 
“When the financial crisis deepened, the sense of being ‘at risk’ spread from the vulnerable 
and marginalized social groups to other classes. These new social risks, coupled with family 
instability and government’s mismanagement of the economy, engendered further risks.” (R. 
K. H. Chan, 2009 p. 25) 
 
Despite the lack of academic publications on the financial and economical crisis as a social 
risk, we can state that the key components in risk management literature has already been 
tackled and put out front: risk perception, trust and confidence are again the key building 
blocks that will have to be incorporated in the risk management strategies.  
The financial and economical crisis is labeled as a crisis in the first place, but it still brings 
along many risks that are very uncertain, especially in Europe as governments do not dare to 
proclaim the troubles in the financial sector as a general ‘crisis’ yet. The mental model of the 
general public is one that is strongly build on the idea of being ‘at risk’, not being in a crisis. 
We have the impression that, as long as the terminology of risk is used, the traits that go 
along with the risks are perceived to be associated with individuals. On the contrary, when 
we speak about a common crisis, the mental associations with the crisis reach much further 
than individuals. The entire society and national economy is covered, so people will feel 
much more involved as they make part of the society and the national economy, that cannot 
be controlled by them personally.  
The financial crisis can be labeled as a new risk as it possesses some of the general traits that 
have been formulated by Beck: the presence of the crisis as a risk is mostly ascertained by 
experts, the consequences are irreversible, the risks are no longer bound to time or location 
and the possible damage of the new risks is so large, that previous responds such as 
insurance and responsibility are deficient.   
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2. Objectives of the studies 
This research study also focuses on the concepts of risk perception, risk information seeking 
behaviour and trust in the government as a risk regulator and risk communication in the 
context of the financial and economical crisis as a new risk. The primary objective is to 
validate the methodology in a new risk context: the financial and economical crisis. Besides 
the key constructs, the study incorporates some additional concepts, especially related to 
the opinion leadership identification model. The main concrete objectives of this study are 
similar to the objectives of the previous studies in the context of terrorism and the bird flu. 
1. Confirmation of the measurement scales (validation and reliability analyses) 
In scale development processes, it is common that academics use split-half 
techniques to come to several independent samples to validate and compute the 
reliability of measurement scales (Hinkin, 1998; E. F. J. Ter Huurne, 2008). However, 
this study is the sixth study that has been performed to our methodology. So instead 
of splitting samples into half, we have six full samples that were used to validate the 
measurement scales. 
2. Delivering a full and comprehensive descriptive report of the central concepts in our 
risk management strategies, including risk perception, mental distance, fear levels, 
specific behavioural intentions, information seeking behaviour and trust in the 
government.  
3. Confirmation of the risk information seeking segmentation and the validation of the 
tool to identify opinion leaders. However, we tried to optimize the identification tool 
by adding some additional items concerning opinion leadership. 
4. Developing concrete communication guidelines and a concise risk communication 
strategy in the specific context of the financial and economical crisis. 
3. Research method and survey construction 
For the operationalization of the central research concepts, we based ourselves on the 
survey questions that have been used in the previous research contexts of terrorism and the 
bird flu. However, since the development of this tool is an iterative process, we decided to 
develop some new concepts and items that face the need that had raised in the previous 
research conclusions. We will describe these new concepts and their components and 
validate the new measurement scales further in this chapter. Most of the items (statements) 
were measured on 5-point Likert scales (Totally do not agree – Totally agree) that followed 
statements.  
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4. Sampling procedure 
The population we want to scrutinize are the Flemish people starting from 18 years old. We 
did not have the necessary resources to take a sample in the Walloon region of the country. 
In total, 280 students each had to select 6 respondents according to our selection criteria: 2 
male and 2 female respondents, one respondent from each category of age, starting from 
the age of 18 as minors are less relevant in our studies. The age categories were as follows: 
18-24 years, 25-34years, 35-44 years, 45-54years 55-64 years and >64years. Eventually, 1680 
questionnaires were distributed in the period of December 2007 – January 2008. From this 
sample, 1578 surveys could be used for analysis after the data cleaning. The quota sample 
can be labelled as representative for the population of Flanders, Belgium as we controlled 
the sample for gender, age and educational level. 
5. Sample descriptive statistics 
 
Figure 52: Age distribution sample financial crisis 
 
 
 
Figure 53: Gender distribution sample financial crisis 
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We also compared our sample details to the population facts that are provided by the 
National Institute of Statistics in Belgium. However, the available population statistics are 
not that detailed. We can only base ourselves for age groups on the facts of the age 
categories <20 years, 20-54 years and ≥65 years. We left the age group of <20 years out of 
the control check as we did not questioned minors. We can see that the largest difference 
between the sample en the population is 4% (overrepresentation male 20-64 yrs in sample). 
We decided not to weigh this subsample as the difference is minimal. 
 
Age category Male Female 
Flanders Sample Flanders Sample 
20-64 
≥65 
 
39% 
9% 
43% 
7% 
38% 
13% 
39% 
10% 
NFlanders =6161600 
Nsample =1578 
Table 91: Comparisons sample and population percentages sample financial crisis 
 
 
Missing data 
 
The percentage of missing data was acceptable and we have no indications of non ignorable 
missing data. 
6. Reliability and validity 
The cronbach’s alpha’s were calculated and integrated in the subjoined overview. The values 
all exceeded 0.70 (threshold), except for the information need concept (alpha = 0.67), but all 
outputs showed that the item-total correlations for all items exceeded 0.30 and that the 
alpha if item deleted values never increased significantly when a particular item was deleted. 
 
Construct N Items α 
Risk perception 3 I think the fin/ec situation will get worse 
I think that there is a real chance that the fin/ec crisis will get worse 
Since the financial problems of Fortis and Dexia, I think that there’s a big 
chance that other banks will get in financial troubles as well 
0.74 
Mental 
distance 
5 I do not worry about the financial/economical crisis because it will mainly 
have its consequences abroad 
The fin/ec crisis does not affect me, it will not influence my way of life 
I do not worry about the fin/ec crisis because it mainly takes place in the U.S. 
The fin/ec crisis is something that takes place abroad 
0.81 
Fear 2 I’m sometimes afraid that I will lose my savings because of the fin/ec crisis 
I’m sometimes afraid that I will lose my job 
r=0.30*** 
 
314 
 
Behaviour 10 Please indicate for the following product categories whether your 
consumption behaviour has changed (10 product categories) 
0.92 
Information 
need 
5 I feel the need to communicate with the government about the fin/ec crisis 
I feel the need to be more informed about the fin/ec crisis 
I need accurate information before developing an opinion about the fin/ec 
crisis 
I feel the need for immediate and reliable information about the fin/ec crisis 
(0800 hotline, website…) 
I miss a good communication and information flow about the fin/ec crisis 
0.67 
Information 
seeking 
5  0.87 
Active info 
seeking 
Event triggered 
info seeking 
Passive info 
scanning 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
I explicitly look for information about the fin/ec crisis in the media 
 
When there is new info about the fin/ec crisis, I will look for more information 
as quickly as possible 
When there is an item about the fin/ec in the news, I will follow this item with 
more attention 
I will never skip articles or information about the fin/ec crisis in newspapers 
When the tv or radio is on and there is some news about the fin/ec crisis, I will 
follow it with more attention than the other items that are mentioned 
 
 
0.84 
 
Info saturation 1 I have the feeling that I know enough about the fin/ec crisis  
Talking to 
others 
6 When there has been a TV-programme about the fin/ec crisis, it will be 
discussed in my personal/social environment 
I think it’s important to have the possibility to talk to 
friends/family/colleagues… about the fin/ec crisis 
When there is a news items about the fin/ec crisis, I will discuss it with others 
How often do you talk about the fin/ec crisis to the following (groups of) 
persons 
Familiy/friends/colleagues or fellow students (3 items) 
0.83 
Table 92: Factor analysis (PCA with Varimax rotation) for key constructs in context of the financial 
crisis 
7. Comprehensive descriptive report 
The first block of tables provides us with a descriptive overview of the general concepts that 
form the backbone of the studies. The tables only include statistically significant results. We 
decided to include both the means as indicators of centrality (with associated standard 
deviations) as the percentages of people who have low (1-2 on 5 point scale) and high (4-5 
on 5 point scale) scores. The latter can also inform us about the degree in which people have 
a true opinion about a statement, as we have an idea about the percentage of people who 
have answered neutrally.  Sometimes people do not have a pronounced opinion about 
certain issues, and this is important to be reflected in the tables.   
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7.1. General concepts 
The scores of the concepts are continuous variables and range from 1 to 5. 
  
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Risk perception 
 
3.79 0.65  <35 year = 3.71 
35-44 year = 3.83 
45-64 year = 3.91 
>64 year = 3.71 
F(3,1556)=10.19*** 
8 22 
Mental distance 
 
1.78 0.68 Male = 1.73 
Female = 1.83 
t (1569)=-2.75** 
<35 year = 1.87 
35-44 year = 1.68 
45-64 year = 1.63 
>64 year = 1.98 
F(3,1567)=21.35*** 
92 1 
Fear 2.44 0.87 Male = 2.35 
Female = 2.53 
t(1476)=-4.09*** 
<35 year = 2.24 
35-44 year = 2.42 
45-64 year = 2.59 
>64 year = 2.59 
F(3,1474=17.11*** 
64 6 
Behaviour 1.6 0.76  <35 year = 1,49 
35-44 year = 1,62 
45-64 year = 1,67 
>64 year = 1,67 
F(3,1562)=6.09*** 
92 2 
Information 
need 
3.37 0.66  <35 year = 3.26 
35-44 year = 3.34 
45-64 year = 3.53 
>64 year = 3.34 
F(3,1546)=15.70*** 
22 22 
Information 
seeking 
3.28 0.91  <35 year = 2.27 
35-44 year = 3.33 
45-64 year = 3.55 
>64 year = 3.51 
F(3,1562)=64.29*** 
33 26 
Info saturation 2.57 0.97 Male = 2.75 
Female = 2.39 
t (1565)=7.63** 
<35 year = 3.24 
35-44 year = 3.33 
45-64 year = 3.37 
>64 year = 2.82 
F(3,1563)=3.60* 
52 18 
Talking to 
others 
 
3.24 0.82  <35 year = 3.24 
35-44 year = 3.33 
45-64 year = 3.37 
>64 year = 2.82 
F(3,1511)=26.13*** 
32 21 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 93: Descriptive statistics general constructs in the context of the financial crisis 
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As the results illustrate, the risk perception is rather high (mean 3.79 and 22% perceives risk 
to be high) and the mental distance is low (mean=1.78), 92% thinks that the crisis is 
something that can affect their direct environment. The data revealed significant differences 
for age categories, where the group of 35-44 years and 45-64 years old have higher risk 
perceptions and lower mental distances, probably because they are more involved with the 
crisis as they are in the middle of their career cycle. The mental distance of men is lower 
than of women. When we take a look at the mean fear level, it is moderate (2.44) and only 
6% has a high fear level. Men are significantly less frightened of losing their jobs or money 
than women. Also older people have significantly higher fear levels than the younger people, 
probably because of their lack of possibilities to cope with the consequences of the crisis and 
recover. When it comes to concrete behavioural intentions, the mean is low (1.6) and only 
2% has or will take concrete actions. The information need and information seeking levels 
are rather high and we notice that the youngest age category scores least on these issues. 
People do not really have the feeling that they know enough about the crisis (mean =2.57 
and 18% has a high info saturation degree). Next to the fact that people look for 
information, they also talk to others about the crisis (mean = 3.24 and 21% talks to others), 
except for the oldest age category, who score less on this concept.  
The results indicate that on the one hand, risk perception levels are high and mental 
distances to the risk are low, but on the other hand, people are not very frightened and do 
not proceed to concrete protective behaviour (yet). This might indicate that the risk is 
perceived to be present but people do not think it will affect them personally. However, they 
need information so they look for information and talk to others about the risk to satisfy 
their need for information. Especially the people that have the highest involvement (mid of 
their careers) display these characteristics. 
7.1.1. Information seeking behaviour 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Active info 
seeking 
 
2.73 1.19 Male = 2.95 
Female = 2.52 
t(1572)=7.26*** 
<35 year = 2.36 
35-44 year = 2.82 
45-64 year = 3.08 
>64 year = 2.74 
F(3,1570)=35.92*** 
46 29 
Event 
triggered info 
seeking 
2.70 1.16 Male = 2.86 
Female = 2.53 
t(1575)=5.64*** 
<35 year = 2.28 
35-44 year = 2.71 
45-64 year = 3.02 
>64 year = 2.91 
F(3,1573)=41.99*** 
48 27 
Passive info 
scanning 
3.65 0.95 Male = 3.77 
Female = 3.54 
t(1568)=4.87*** 
<35 year = 3.24 
35-44 year = 3.72 
45-64 year = 3.89 
>64 year = 3.97 
18 49 
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F(3,1566)=61.61*** 
Significance 
key 
* p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 94: Descriptive information seeking behaviour in the context of the financial crisis 
  
 
When we take a closer look at the information seeking behaviour, we notice that people 
rather passively scan information concerning the financial economical crisis (mean = 3.65, 
49% have high scores) than actively look for information (mean = 2.73 and 29% high scores) 
or look for information when there is a new item on the crisis (mean = 2.70 and 27% high 
scores). Men have significantly higher scores on active, passive and event triggered 
information seeking than women. Concerning the age categories, the youngest category 
(<35 years old) score significantly lower than the other groups. The people who are most 
involved and most vulnerable are again the most active information seekers (active, event-
triggered and passive). 
 
Risk info nature  How often do you look for the 
following type of information 
Mean 
score/10 
St.Dev. % score 
≥7/10 
 % rarely/never % often/always    
Info about the probability that the 
financial economical crisis will become 
more severe 
15 29 7,1 2,07 70 
General information about the 
financial/economical crisis 
10 31 7,3 1,8 75 
Specific info about recent events in the 
financial sector (banks/) 
18 31 7 2,1 66 
Info about the controllability of the risk 24 23 6,6 2,2 60 
Info about exposure to the risk 19 26 6,8 2,08 63 
Info about the consequences of a 
financial/economical recession 
14 29 7,1 1,9 70 
Guidelines about what to do during a 
financial/economical recession 
31 21 6,3 2,3 53 
Info about who's responsible 31 28 6 2,4 46 
Experiences of other people with the risk 40 13 5,5 2,4 38 
Table 95: Specific risk information needs in the context of the financial crisis 
 
Concerning the nature of risk information, we asked people what kind of risk information 
they look for (how often, six point scale) and what kind of information they perceive as most 
important (score on 10). Top information categories are general information about the crisis, 
specific information about recent events followed by the probability information and 
information about the possible consequences. The least popular categories are experiences 
of other people with the risk, information about who is responsible and general guidelines 
about what to do during a recession. It is not surprising that the latter category and the 
categories that include information about control and exposure to the risk are not the most 
popular as people realize that the financial economical crisis is not a type of risk that can 
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individually be controlled, so concrete guidelines and information about exposure 
controllability do not really add a lot of value to their mental models about the risk. We 
could state that in a sense, people are trying to construct their own risk realities by 
informing themselves about the general risk and keeping this information up to date, taking 
into account the possible effects on their personal lives. However, as they realize that they 
cannot control the risk because it is something that is too abstract and driven by invisible 
and uncontrollable forces. As general guidelines are hard to formulate and would come from 
higher order social institutes as the governments and financial institutes (IMF, National bank, 
…) people would not trust the guidelines anyway as they would perceive them to be in the 
best interests of these institutes rather than in the interest of the society as a whole. We will 
discuss the issues of trust and credibility later on in this report. 
8. Identifying and profiling the public 
The next research objective is the confirmation and validation of the information seeking 
segmentation and of the identification tool for opinion leaders.  
8.1. Identification of opinion leaders 
We used the classical traits of information seeking behaviour (active, passive and event 
triggered information seeking) and social behaviour, together with specific opinion 
leadership traits to cluster the information seekers. Originally, the specific opinion 
leadership item was limited to one specific trait, referring to influence:  
“In conversations, my friends, colleagues, family… attach much importance to my opinion 
concerning the financial economical crisis.”  
However, we decided to add new items that measure opinion leadership in this study as we 
wanted to counter the critique that the single item approach was too narrow-minded. The 
new opinion leadership items were inspired by the existing opinion leadership scales of 
Flynn, Goldsmith and Eastman and Rogers and Cartano, as described in the theoretical body 
(L. R. Flynn et al., 1994, 1996; E. M. Rogers & Cartano, 1962). Naturally, we customized the 
items to the context of the financial economical crisis and translated the items into Dutch. 
In order to determine the factorial structure of the concepts and to compute the internal 
consistency of the measurement scales, we tried to validate our theoretical assumptions 
regarding the dimensions of opinion leadership by means of a factor analysis. The calculation 
of the Cronbach’s alpha values provided us with information about the internal scale 
reliabilities. 
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The subjoined table provides us with the information of the analyses. 
 
Construct/items Factor loadings 
 
Total variance explained: 66.12% I II III IV 
Social Behaviour (talking to others) (α=0.83)     
When there is a news items about the fin/ec crisis, I will discuss it with 
others 
,755    
I think it’s important to have the possibility to talk to 
friends/family/colleagues… about the fin/ec crisis 
,734    
When there has been a TV-program about the fin/ec crisis, it will be 
discussed in my personal environment 
,727    
How often do you talk about the fin/ec crisis to the following (groups of) 
persons: friends 
,718    
How often do you talk about the fin/ec crisis to the following (groups of) 
persons: family 
,677    
How often do you talk about the fin/ec crisis to the following (groups of) 
persons: colleagues or fellow-students 
,615    
Information seeking (α=0.87)     
When there is an item about the fin/ec crisis in the news, I will follow this 
item with more attention 
 ,848   
When there is a news item about the fin/ec crisis, I will follow it with more 
attention 
 ,846   
When I’m reading a newspaper, I  will never skip the articles or information 
about the fin/ec crisis 
 ,762   
When I hear that there's news about the fin/ec crisis, I will look for more 
information as quickly as possible 
 ,720   
I explicitly look for information about the fin/ec crisis in the media  ,684   
Opinion leadership traits (α=0.84)     
People think of me as a valuable source of information about the fin/ec 
crisis 
  ,823  
My opinion influences people on what they do with their investments, 
money,  
  ,761  
People ask me questions about the fin/ec crisis because I know a lot about 
it 
  ,739  
My friends, colleagues, family… attach much importance to my opinion 
concerning topics about the financial economical crisis 
  ,642  
Convincer (α=0.85)     
I like to convince people about my opinions    ,861 
I like to take the lead in a group    ,844 
I notice that I am sometimes an example for others    ,764 
I can make people change their minds by convincing them    ,698 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Eigenvalues>1. Rotation Method: Varimax. Missing 
values: cases excluded listwise.  
Table 96: Factor analysis (PCA with Varimax rotation) for the opinion leadership dimensions in 
context of the financial crisis 
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The factor analysis confirmed the dimensions that were found in the previous researches, 
but it added two new dimensions that included the opinion leadership items that were 
added. The output of the PCA factor analysis included two new dimensions, labeled by us as 
‘Opinion leadership traits’ (α=0.84) and ‘Convincer’ (α=0.85).  The next step was to perform 
the cluster analysis to confirm the segmentation. 
8.1.1. Cluster analysis 
We opted to perform a K – means cluster analysis as we already confirmed that there are 
four groups in the other empirical studies and as our sample consists of 1578 cases, it is not 
recommended to perform a hierarchical cluster analysis. Missing data were also casewise 
deleted. Besides the three basic clustering variables (active information search, passive 
information search and event triggered information search), we added the two new 
dimensions that were retrieved by means of the PCA factor analysis: the ‘upgraded’ opinion 
leadership sumscale (consisting of 4 items) and the ‘convincer’ scumscale (consisting of 4 
items). The K-means cluster analysis with 6 clustering variables provided us with the 
subjoined cluster result. 
 
 
Figure 54: Segmentation of information seekers in the context of the financial crisis 
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Segment % 
Opinion leaders 25 
Talking scanners 28 
Silent seekers 24 
Ignorants 24 
Table 97: Overview of the presence of each cluster of information seekers in the context of the 
financial crisis 
 
In the context of the financial economical crisis, based on our sample, 25% of the population 
can be labeled as opinion leaders.  
 
 
Table 98: Analysis of variance (cluster analysis) in the context of the financial crisis 
 
 
The analysis of variance is used to compare the means for each of the six dimensions 
between the four groups (taking into account the between and within group variance). We 
see that all means differ significantly from each other. 
Other useful results to examine are the Euclidean distances between clusters These 
distances (Euclidean and squared Euclidean) are computed from the cluster means on each 
dimension.   
 
 
Table 99: Euclidean distances between the clusters in the context of the financial crisis 
 
The table shows that the opinion leaders are closer to the talking scanners, but still the 
distances versus the other groups are quite high. Silent seekers and talking scanners are 
closest to each other. 
Analysis of Variance (file financiele crisis discr.sta)
Variable
Between
SS
df Within
SS
df F signif.
p
actiefin
infocrisis
passinf
talk
opleader
convinc
1431,779 3 652,0698 1489 1089,821 0,00
1382,537 3 628,4260 1489 1091,933 0,00
613,460 3 734,8538 1489 414,342 0,00
382,866 3 614,3586 1489 309,313 0,00
488,336 3 522,7638 1489 463,646 0,00
379,525 3 771,4762 1489 244,169 0,00
Euclidean Distances between Clusters (file financiele crisis discr.sta)
Distances below diagonal
Squared distances above diagonalCluster
Number No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4
Silent seekers
Talking scanners
Opinion leaders
Ignorants
0,000000 0,669203 0,747455 1,466749
0,818048 0,000000 1,431592 0,647926
0,864555 1,196491 0,000000 3,572581
1,211094 0,804939 1,890127 0,000000
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1. Opinion leaders. This is the group of respondents who have the highest scores on all 
cluster variables. Their information seeking behaviour is high (active, passive and event 
triggered search), they consider themselves as opinion leaders and convincers in general 
and they talk more about terrorism to other people than the other groups. The 
percentage of opinion leaders in the context of the financial crisis is 25%. 
2. The second group is the group of silent seekers. Their active, event triggered and 
especially their passive information search is above average. However, they only score 
averagely on social behaviour and they score low on the opinion leadership and 
convincer variables. The data revealed that 24% of the respondents are silent seekers.  
3. The third group is the group of talking scanners. This group is characterized by its rather 
high passive information search behaviour, but low active and event triggered 
information search. They have a rather high score on social behaviour and the general 
‘convincer’ variable but a rather low score on the opinion leadership variable. He analysis 
pointed out that 28% of the respondents are talking scanners. 
4. The last group is the group of ignorants. These people generally score low on all 
variables. They are not interested in the bird flu, they do not talk about it and do not 
consider themselves as opinion leaders. They are no primary and even no secondary 
target group as they do not look for or retrieve information about terrorism neither do 
they talk about the subject. The percentage of respondents in this category is 24%. 
8.1.2. Discriminant analysis 
By means of the discriminant analysis, we will cross-check our segmentation. Hair et al. 
determined four main purposes of discriminant analysis (Hair et al., 1998): 
We performed the discriminant analysis to determine whether the differences between the 
average score profiles of two or more groups (in our case 4 groups of information seekers) 
on a set of variables (here 6 variables) are statistically significant, to determine which one of 
the 6 independent variables in the analysis account the most for the differences in the 
average score profiles of the four groups and to establish the number and composition of 
the discriminating dimensions between the four groups from the set of independent 
variables. 
8.1.2.1. Assessing the overall fit of the proposed model 
Wilks’ Lambda is  0.10; F (18.42)= 289.35 (p<0.000), so the low Wilks’ Lambda proves that 
the between-groups dispersion is large compared to the within groups dispersion. The four 
groups differ significantly and the six independent variables are discriminant items. 
The Wilks’ Lambda’s which are mentioned in the first column of the output, refer to the 
Wilks' Lambda for the overall model that will result after removing the respective variable. 
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None of the Wilks’ lambda’s exceed 0.127. So each one of the independent variables 
contribute to the discrimination. 
The Partial Lamda’s in the second column are associated with the unique contribution of the 
respective variable to the discriminatory power of the model. The value (that ranges from 0 
to1) has to be as high as possible. We can read that the partial lamda’s range from 0.808 to 
0.900, so they are all very high. 
The F-remove values are associated with the respective partial Wilk's Lambda’s and the p-
levels indicate the significance levels of the F values. 
The Tolerance values are in fact the results of 1-r² of the respective variable with all other 
variables in the model as shown in the output. It is a measure of the redundancy of the 
respective variable. Naturally, 1-Tolerance is the r² of the respective variable with all other 
variables in the model/output.  The miminum r² (0.015) is the one of the variable talk. Its 
Tolerance value is 0.98, which means that the variable talk is 5% redundant with the other 
variables. The highest r² is 0.129 (Tolerance=0.87), which means that 13% of the variable 
infocrisis is explained by the other five variables in the model. 
 
 
Table 100: Discriminant function analysis summary in the context of the financial crisis 
8.1.2.2. Assessing groups membership prediction accuracy 
The classification matrix contains information about the number and percent of correctly 
classified cases in each group. The subjoined classification matrix shows us that more than 
97% of the cases are correctly assigned to the predicted groups. For the most important 
group in our research, the opinion leaders, this percentage is almost 99%. 
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Table 101: Classification matrix in the context of the financial crisis 
 
Now that we have identified the opinion leaders by means of our clustering tool, we can 
construct their specific socio-demographical and media profile. 
8.1.3. Profiling opinion leaders 
We will first create both the general socio-demographical profiles as the mediaprofiles of all 
four groups of information seekers. Secondly, we will focus on the specific information 
needs of the opinion leaders, as this group of people will play a key role in our risk 
communication strategy. 
 
Socio-demographical profile 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Gender 70% male 
30% female 
 
50% male 
50% female 
44% male 
56% female 
39% male 
61% female 
Χ²=79.58, p<0.000 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=174.04) 
Age (mean) 45.39  38.53 50.72 41.21 
F(3,1489)=34.87, p<0.000 
Educational level 10% low  
32% average 
58% high 
9% low 
33% average 
58% high 
26% low 
34% average 
41% high 
19% low 
35% average 
46% high 
Χ²=61.21, p<0.000 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=55.27) 
Income level 
€ net / month 
17% <1000€ 
61% 1000€-2500€ 
22%   >2500€ 
32% <1000€ 
57% 1000€-2500€ 
11%   >2500€ 
23% <1000€ 
70% 1000€-2500€ 
7%   >2500€ 
36% <1000€ 
61% 1000€-2500€ 
3%   >2500€ 
Χ²=96.71, p<0.000 (0% Fe<5, min.Fe=36.85) 
Table 102: Socio-demographical profile of the information seekers in the context of the financial 
crisis 
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As we can derive from the data in the table above, the opinion leaders in the context of the 
financial crisis are very dominantly male (70% versus 30% female). The average age is 45 
years old and they have higher educational levels. A very important difference is that the 
percentage of people with a high income is greater within the opinion leaders category (22% 
has a net income of more than 2500€/month) than within the other groups (% ranges from 
3% to 11%). Remarkable as well is that the ignorants are mainly female (61%) with lower 
incomes (36% has a net income of less than 1000€/month).  
Besides the socio-demographical profiles of the clusters, we gain much information from the 
perception profiles that integrate the key constructs of risk perception in the context of the 
financial crisis.  
 
Perception profiles 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Mental distance 1.48 1.84 1.71 2.11 
F(3,1484)=59.40*** 
Risk perception 3.95 3.76 3.78 3.68 
F(3,1478)=11.77*** 
Fear 2.51 2.37 2.59 2.23 
F(3,1431)=11.72*** 
Behaviour 1.70 1.60 1.61 1.47 
F(3,1484)=5.68**    
Need for information 3.95 3.29 3.55 2.91 
 F(3,1473)=121.43*** 
Information 
sufficiency 
3.04 2.62 2.43 2.26 
F(3,1482)=47.98*** 
Table 103: Perception profiles of the information seekers in the context of the financial crisis 
  
 
The opinion leaders differ significantly from the other groups of information seekers on 
various constructs. They have the lowest score for mental distance towards the risk and they 
have the highest mean for risk perception. Even though they have an average level of fear 
(mean of 2.51 on 5 point scale), they don’t have the highest level of fear (silent seekers have 
a mean of 2.59 for this construct). The overall levels of behaviour are low (1.70 on 5 point 
scale) but the opinion leaders do have the highest mean (1.70). As expected, they also have 
the highest level of information need (3.95) and information sufficiency (3.04). We may 
conclude by stating that opinion leaders have the highest risk perception values but they are 
not more afraid than the other groups. They do have an outspoken information behaviour.  
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Media profiles of target groups (opinion leaders) 
 Opinion leaders Talking scanners Silent seekers Ignorants 
Television 98.71 99.58 125.45 114.96 
F(3,1485)=11.36*** 
Internet 329.41 339.55 216.22 309.99 
F(3,1470)=1.9* 
Media usage 
%regularly-often-always 
 
Websites (67%) 
Online forums(16%) 
De Standaard (41%) 
De Tijd (33%) 
Één (92%) 
Canvas (76%) 
Kanaal Z
6
 (35%) 
Websites (26%) 
Online forums(2%) 
De Standaard (27%) 
 
Één (78%) 
 
Kanaal Z (6%) 
 
Websites (29%) 
Online 
forums(5%) 
HLN (28%) 
Één (82%) 
 
Kanaal Z (16%) 
 
Websites (11%) 
Online 
forums(5%) 
HLN (19%) 
Één (62%) 
 
Kanaal Z (2%) 
 
Table 104: Media profiles of the information seekers in the context of the financial crisis 
 
 
The opinion leaders also have an outspoken media profile. They do not watch television as 
much as the other groups but their general internet usage is rather high. A larger percentage 
consults websites and online forums for information concerning the financial crisis. They 
mainly read De Standaard and De Tijd (specific newspaper with much financial and 
economical news). The vast majority watches Eén, Canvas (public television channels) and 
Kanaal Z. We notice that the opinion leaders mainly consult very specific and mainly ‘quality’ 
news sources to retrieve their information about the risk of the financial and economical 
crisis. The subjoined overview will summarize the profile of the opinion leaders. 
 
 
Table 105: General profile opinion leaders in the context of the bird flu 
                                                     
6 ‘Kanaal Z’ is a specific tv channel that focuses on financial news. ‘De Tijd’ is a newspaper that also puts a lot of 
attention to the financial field. 
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The next section will discuss the specific risk information needs of the opinion leaders. 
 
Risk information needs of opinion leaders 
Risk info nature  How often do you look for the 
following type of information 
Mean 
score/10 
St.Dev. % score 
≥7/10 
 % rarely/never % often/always    
Info about the probability that the 
financial economical crisis will become 
more severe 
3 56 7.7 1.8 66 
General information about the 
financial/economical crisis 
1 57 8 1.5 86 
Specific info about recent events in the 
financial sector (banks/) 
1 62 8.2 1.5 89 
Info about the controllability of the risk 8 44 7.3 1.9 70 
Info about exposure to the risk 4 49 7.6 1.7 77 
Info about the consequences of a 
financial/economical recession 
3 53 7.8 1.6 85 
Guidelines about what to do during a 
financial/economical recession 
17 38 6.8 2.2 61 
Info about who's responsible 14 23 6.6 2.3 66 
Experiences of other people with the risk 20 25 6.3 2.2 50 
Table 106: Risk information needs of the opinion leaders in the context of the financial crisis 
 
 
Opinion leaders have higher scores on these items in general. Their preferred type of risk 
information is also general information, information of recent events and info about the 
consequences but they also look for information about the probability of the risk. They think 
that these kinds of information are important (score >7), but also think that information 
about the controllability and exposure to the risk is important. Least important for them are 
the general guidelines, info about who’s responsible and experiences of other people. 
In the next paragraph, we will discuss the descriptive and specific results for opinion leaders 
about the perceptions of the government and governmental communication. 
 
9. Governmental communication descriptive statistics 
In this block, we will discuss the perceived roles of the government, trust in the institutes, 
the perceived governmental information flow control, the general perception of 
governmental information and the evaluation of the communication channels.  
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9.1. Perceived roles of the government 
Measured on a 6 point Lickert scale (1=Totally not important-6=Extremely important) 
 Mean St.Dev. Age % Low % High 
Protecting the population 
against the crisis by taking 
concrete measures 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
5.32 
5.49 
t(1489)=-3.50*** 
 
 
 
0.80 
0.71 
  
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
87 
91 
Providing concrete 
guidelines to civilians 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
4.89 
5.08 
t(1490)=-3.73*** 
 
 
 
 
0.87 
0.86 
<35 year = 4.84 
35-44 year = 4.96 
45-64 year = 5.04 
>64 year = 4.96 
F(3,1570)=5.18** 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
73 
78 
Providing general 
information about the 
financial economical crisis 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
 
4.91 
5.15 
t(1490)=-4.75*** 
 
 
 
 
0.81 
0.79 
<35 year =4.94 
35-44 year = 4.91 
45-64 year = 5.06 
>64 year = 4.95 
F(3,1572)=2.96* 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
74 
85 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 107: Perceived roles of the government in the context of the financial crisis 
 
In general, people attach high importance to the three roles that were proposed: protecting 
the population, providing concrete guidelines and providing general information. Means are 
high and the percentages important/extremely important are very high. The most important 
role remains protecting the population by taking concrete measures. We also notice that 
opinion leaders score significantly higher on all roles and there are no differences for gender 
and no striking difference for age categories. 
We can conclude that people do think that the role of the government as a risk 
communicator is almost as important as the risk regulator role. 
9.2. Trust in institutes as risk communicators 
We wanted to compare various sources of risk information concerning their reliability. 
Measured on a 5 point Lickert scale (1=Do not trust this source at all-5=totally trust this 
source) 
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Degree of trust in following instances when they communicate about crisis 
Source Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Experts 
 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
3.71 
3.62 
 
 
 
 
0.80 
0.83 
 <35 year = 3.80 
35-44 year = 3.60 
45-64 year = 3.64 
>64 year = 3.58 
F(3,1566)=6.39*** 
 
 
 
 
8 
10 
 
 
 
 
72 
70 
Prime minister 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
2.99 
2.81 
t(1489)=3.21** 
 
 
 
0.95 
1.03 
Male = 2.87 
Female = 3.03 
t (1574)=-
3.05** 
<35 year = 2.94 
35-44 year = 2.82 
45-64 year = 2.90 
>64 year = 3.19 
F(3,1572)=6.75*** 
 
 
 
29 
37 
 
 
 
33 
27 
Minister of finance 
 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
2.68 
2.56 
t(1490)=2.16* 
 
 
 
 
0.98 
1.03 
Male = 2.56 
Female = 2.73 
t (1573)=-
3.45** 
<35 year = 2.83 
35-44 year = 2.66 
45-64 year = 2.50 
>64 year = 2.54 
F(3,1571)=11.38*** 
 
 
 
 
39 
46 
 
 
 
 
20 
20 
CEO’s of banks 
 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
2.22 
2.17 
 
 
 
 
0.94 
1.01 
Male = 2.12 
Female = 2.28 
t (1573)=-
3.46** 
<35 year = 2.23 
35-44 year = 2.31 
45-64 year = 2.08 
>64 year = 2.26 
F(3,1571)=4.38** 
 
 
 
 
64 
66 
 
 
 
 
10 
13 
Media 
 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
3.05 
3.01 
 
 
 
 
0.85 
0.91 
 <35 year = 3.11 
35-44 year = 3.00 
45-64 year = 3.08 
>64 year = 2.83 
F(3,1568)=6.54*** 
 
 
 
 
23 
25 
 
 
 
 
31 
32 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 108: Trust levels in governmental risk communication about the financial crisis 
 
The most trusted sources of risk information are the experts, followed by the media and the 
prime minister. The minister of finance scores averagely. CEO’s of banks are perceived to be 
not trustworthy (mean score below 2.5). Opinion leaders significantly have lower trust 
scores on the minister of finance and the prime minister, they are more critical towards 
these sources of information. Women generally have significantly higher trust scores, except 
for the experts and the media. There are also some significant differences between the age 
categories: the media and experts are trusted most by the youngest age category, the prime 
minister by the oldest age group. We sense a certain distrust in the governmental officials 
(prime minister and minister of finance). In the next table, we verify how people perceive 
the domination of the information flow by the government. 
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9.3. Governmental control of information flow 
We tried to expose the perceptions about the government as a risk information broker. Do 
people perceive the government to be in total control of the information flows? Do they 
approve this? Do they think that they know as much as the government does? The 
statements had to be answered on a 5 point Lickert scale (1=totally do not agree-5=totally 
agree). 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Information control 
government 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
3.45 
3.54 
 
 
1.00 
1.14 
   
 
19 
20 
 
 
57 
61 
We know everything 
that the government 
knows 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
1.47 
1.47 
 
 
 
0.71 
0.72 
   
 
 
92 
93 
 
 
 
2 
2 
Approval of 
government as 
selective info 
diffuser 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
2.74 
2.64 
 
 
 
 
1.11 
1.21 
 <35 year = 2.64 
35-44 year = 2.63 
45-64 year = 2.75 
>64 year = 2.92 
F(3,1571)=4.26** 
 
 
 
 
46 
52 
 
 
 
 
29 
30 
Critical about 
govinfo 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
 
3.72
 
4.08 
t(1491)=-7.17***
 
 
 
 
 
0.85 
0.86 
Male = 3.88 
Female = 3.73 
t (1575)=3.65*** 
<35 year = 3.77 
35-44 year = 3.82 
45-64 year = 3.94 
>64 year = 3.61 
F(3,1573)=8.67*** 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
7 
 
 
 
 
72 
83 
Need for 
participation 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
2.48
 
2.95
 
t(1490)=-7.50***
 
 
 
 
 
1.01 
1.15 
 <35 year = 2.37 
35-44 year = 2.61 
45-64 year = 2.87 
>64 year = 2.67 
F(3,1573)=19.84*** 
 
 
 
 
47 
35 
 
 
 
 
20 
34 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 109: Perceptions about governmental risk information flows in the context of the financial 
crisis  
 
In general, people perceive the government to be in control of the information that is being 
spread (means are high, high percentages of agreement). Only two percent thinks that they 
know as much as the government does (92% does not believe this so people have a 
pronounced opinion about this statement). The average score on the approval of the 
government as a selective info diffuser does not offer us a great deal of information, 
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however, almost 50% of the people do not think it is a good thing that the government is 
selective in their information diffusion whereas 30% approves. We notice that the oldest age 
category have significantly higher scores on this statement. People state that they are rather 
critical about governmental information, and men agree more with this than women, as well 
as the category of 45-64 years does. Opinion leaders are also more critical than the other 
groups. The need for active participation in the communication with the government is 
moderate, except for the opinion leaders, who score higher on this issue (as well as the 
group of 45-64 years, where the opinion leaders are located). We will now describe the 
general perception of the governmental communication. 
9.4. General trust and general perception of governmental communication 
We will discuss the general trust in the government as a risk regulator and the quality, 
quantity and reliability of the governmental information about the financial economical 
crisis. 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
General trust in 
government 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
2.96
 
2.83
 
t(1480)=3.14**
 
 
 
 
 
0.62 
0.75 
Male = 2.88 
Female = 2.97 
t (1560)=-2.57*** 
<35 year = 3.02 
35-44 year = 2.88 
45-64 year = 2.83 
>64 year = 2.97 
F(3,1558)=8.05*** 
 
 
 
 
42 
51 
 
 
 
 
4 
6 
Quality of govinfo 
 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
2.89
 
2.69
 
t(1488)=3.74***
 
 
 
 
 
0.85 
0.93 
Male = 2.79 
Female = 2.88 
t (1575)=-2.1* 
<35 year = 2.94 
35-44 year = 2.80 
45-64 year = 2.72 
>64 year = 2.88 
F(3,1570)=6.25*** 
 
 
 
 
34 
48 
 
 
 
 
24 
24 
Quantity of 
govinfo 
 
 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
 
 
2.85
 
2.63 
t(1486)=4.16***
 
 
 
 
 
0.86 
0.93 
 <35 year = 2.94 
35-44 year = 2.76 
45-64 year = 2.65 
>64 year = 2.80 
F(3,1568)=9.77*** 
 
 
 
 
53 
65 
 
 
 
 
20 
17 
Reliability of 
govinfo 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
 
2.94
 
2.80 
t(1485)=2.53*
 
 
 
0.90 
1.03 
   
 
35 
38 
 
 
31 
32 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 110: Trust and perception of general governmental communication in the context of the 
financial crisis 
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When we look at the means, the general trust in the government as a risk regulator is 
moderate, with opinion leaders having a significantly lower trust level. The same accounts 
for the perceived quality, quantity and reliability of the governmental information about the 
crisis. Opinion leaders have significantly lower means than the others. When we look at the 
percentages, more people have negative scores than people who have positive scores on the 
five point scale, especially for the general trust, only 4% has a high trust level. Concerning 
the other concepts, the percentage of people who  have positive scores on perceived 
quality, quantity and reliability varies from 20% to 30%, which is not satisfactory at all. 
Especially for the perceived quantity of information, 50% to 65% (opinion leaders) are not 
satisfied. However, we notice that for most of the constructs, the percentage of people that 
answers neutrally varies from 28% to 54%. Especially for the general trust in the government 
construct, half of the respondents answered neutrally. This means that for these issues, 
people do not always have an outspoken opinion. Again, this could be explained by the low 
involvement or interest of a large portion of the respondents. However, for opinion leaders, 
these percentages of neutral answers are lower. Especially concerning the quality and 
quantity of governmental information about the financial and economical crisis, the opinion 
leaders have very outspoken opinions that are rather negative.  
From these facts we may conclude that the general image of the government as a risk 
information broker is not positive or satisfactory at all. Especially for the fragile group of 
opinion leaders, who are key components in our risk communication strategies, there have 
to be concrete actions to jack up the satisfaction with the amount, quality and reliability of 
governmental information. 
9.5. Evaluation of governmental communication channels 
The last table will describe the evaluation of the governmental communication channels. 
Measured on 6 point Lickert scales (1=totally not - 6 = Absolutely) 
 
Communication channel Mean St.Dev. % Low % High  
Tv advertisements 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
2.66 
2.45 
t(1465)=2.50* 
 
1.38 
1.33 
 
47 
51 
 
9 
7 
Website 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.74 
3.95 
t(1463)=-3.19** 
 
1.12 
1.06 
 
14 
11 
 
23 
33 
Brochure 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.59 
3.54 
 
1.11 
1.15 
 
16 
19 
 
20 
18 
Hotline 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.37 
3.31 
 
1.26 
1.22 
 
24 
25 
 
17 
16 
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Printmedia 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.57 
3.54 
 
1.13 
1.19 
 
17 
19 
 
21 
23 
Media in general 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
4.40 
4.47 
 
0.80 
0.82 
 
3 
4 
 
51 
59 
Experts 
Non-OL 
OL 
 
3.85 
4.16 
t(1438)=-4.55*** 
 
1.12 
0.99 
 
12 
8 
 
31 
43 
Table 111: Evaluation of governmental risk communication channels in the context of the financial 
crisis 
 
The communication channels that are perceived to be most appropriate to communicate 
with the people are the media in general, experts and websites (official website). These 
channels have rather moderate to higher means and a rather high percentage of people that 
agrees. However, we might state that there are a lot of people who do not have a 
pronounced opinion about this matter. Opinion leaders prefer experts and websites 
(significantly higher scores) but condemn TV ads as communication tools.  
Besides the general descriptive statistics, we also wanted to correlate the key concepts in 
order to discover linear relationships. The next tables will go into this matter. 
10. Multivariate analyses 
We decided to perform the correlations both for the non-opinion leaders as for the opinion 
leaders, as we assume that some correlations might be stronger for opinion leaders than for 
non-opinion leaders. 
10.1. Correlations 
In the subjoined tables, the correlation results are integrated. We will first present the two 
tables: the correlations of the general concepts and the correlations of the governmental 
information related concepts. The results will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
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 Mental distance Risk perception Fear  Behaviour Info need Info seeking Info 
Sufficiency 
Talk  
 Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL 
Mental distance                 
Risk perception -0.30*** -0.17***               
Fear  -0.14*** -0.03 0.25*** 0.33***             
Behaviour -0.02 -0.02 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.31*** 0.31***           
Info need -0.26*** -0.22*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.15***         
Info seeking -0.31*** -0.16*** 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.11* 0.11*** 0.08 0.46*** 0.30***       
Info sufficiency 0.007 0.05 -0.06* -0.08 -0.14*** -0.23*** -0.02 -0.06 -0.13*** -0.28*** 0.06 0.06     
Talk -0.32*** -0.27*** 0.24*** 0.13* 0.08*** 0.02 0.08** 0.10 0.34*** 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.06* -0.04   
Trust 0.08*** 0.21*** -0.16* -0.22* -0.11*** -0.13* -0.05 -0.05 -0.27*** -0.34*** -0.06* -0.14** 0.08** 0.10 -0.01 -0.11 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001      
Table 112: Correlations general concepts in the context of the financial crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Quality govinfo Quantity govinfo Reliability govinfo Trust Info need Info seeking Info sufficiency Talk 
 Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL Non OL OL  
Quality govinfo                
Quantity govinfo 0.55*** 0.66***              
Reliability govinfo 0.50*** 0.59*** 0.50*** 0.59***            
Trust 0.53*** 0.68*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.61***          
Info need -0.32*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.42*** -0.25 -0.33*** -0.27*** -0.34***        
Info seeking -0.11*** -0.13* -0.16*** -0.09 -0.10** -0.10 -0.06* -0.14** 0.46***       
Info sufficiency 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.08** 0.12 0.08** 0.10 -0.13** -0.28*** 0.06 -0.01    
Talk -0.04 -0.07 0.006 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.11* 0.34*** 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.13** 0.06* -0.04  
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001       
Table 113: Correlations governmental communication concepts in the context of the financial crisis
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10.2. Correlations general concepts  
There are some evident negative linear relationships like the positive correlation between 
mental distance and risk perception (r=-0.30) and info need and info seeking (r=0.46). The 
correlation tables reveal strong relationships between trust and information need (r=-0.27), 
which means that the more people feel that they need information, the lower their general 
trust in the governments as a risk regulator (and vice versa). This relationship is even 
stronger for opinion leaders (r=-0.34). There is also a relatively strong negative relationship 
between the mental distance and information seeking behaviour (r=-0.31) which indicates 
that the lower the mental distance, the more people will look for information about the risk. 
This correlation is weaker for opinion leaders, probably because of the fact that they already 
have very low mental distances and high information seeking levels. Same accounts for the 
relationship mental distance and social behaviour (talk). People with low mental distances 
talk more to other people (r=-0.32, opinion leaders r=-0.27). More important are the positive 
correlations between fear and behaviour and fear and information need (respectively r=0.31 
and r=0.21). So people who are more afraid will take more concrete actions (withdrawing 
money etc.) and will have a greater need for information and vice versa. For opinion leaders, 
we have discovered a statistically significant negative linear relationship between fear and 
information sufficiency (r=-0.23 compared to r=-0.14 for the others) which means that the 
more opinion leaders have the feeling that they have achieved a satisfactory level of 
information about the risk, the less frightened they are. 
10.3. Correlations governmental information 
There are strong positive linear relationships between information quantity, quality and 
reliability, the correlation coefficients between these concepts all vary between 0.50 and 
0.55 and they are significant at the 0.001 level. There is also a very high correlation with the 
general trust in the government. This means that it is absolutely necessary to provide 
enough and qualitative information because these concepts do not only correlate strongly 
with each other but also with the perceived reliability of the information and the general 
trust in the government. The correlations between the concepts are even stronger for 
opinion leaders (correlation coefficients vary from 0.59 to 0.68).  
We will try to validate these multivariate relationships in three structural equation models.  
336 
 
10.4. Structural equation models 
10.4.1. Relationship government as a risk communicator and risk regulator 
Prior to further analysis, some summary variables were constructed. The following table 
explains the variables used in the proposed SEM models and gives, where necessary, the 
cronbach’s alpha value that measures the internal consistency of the scale (value should 
exceed 0.70). 
 
Construct N Items α 
Quantity govinfo 3 The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of information 
about the fin/ec crisis 
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of information 
about their initiatives and measures in the context of the fin/ec crisis 
To what degree do you thing that the Belgian government offers a sufficient 
amount of information about the fin/ec crisis? 
0.81 
Quality govinfo 1 The quality of the governmental information about the fin/ec crisis is good  
Reliability 
govinfo 
1 To what degree do you think that information coming from the Belgian 
government about the fin/ec crisis is reliable? 
 
General trust in 
government  
 
 
Perceived 
preparedness gov 
Gov measures to 
protect economy 
Trust in gov as 
protector of 
economy 
5 How much trust do you have in the prime minister when he says something 
about the fin/ec crisis?  
How much trust do you have in the minister of finance when he says 
something about the fin/ec crisis?  
To what extent do you perceive the Belgian government as being prepared for 
the fin/ec crisis? 
The government is taking enough measures to protect the population during 
the fin/ec crisis 
I trust the government that they will protect the civilians during the fin/ec 
crisis 
0.71 
Negative 
perception 
participation 
1 Civilians do not have the possibility to communicate with the government 
about the fin/ec crisis 
 
Need for 
participation 
(communication) 
1 I feel the need to communicate with the government about the fin/ec crisis 
 
 
Opinion 
leadership 
6 Passive information scanning 
Active information seeking 
Event-triggered information seeking 
Talk 
Convincer 
Opinion leadership traits 
0.81 
Table 114: Cronbach’s alpha values of the governmental communication related constructs in the 
context of the financial crisis 
 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) procedures were used to test the plausibility of the 
postulated models. Amos, a statistical software package for SEM was used to estimate the 
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parameters. The chi-squared p- value should exceed 0.05, however, with large samples, this 
value is not reliable. To counter this, we performed chi-square analyses on a random, small 
sub-sample (approx. 10% of the sample) of 100 and 150 respondents. The use of chi-square 
is appropriate for sample sizes between 100 and 200 (Hair et al., 1998). All other analyses 
were performed on the full sample (n=1558). The model fit was assessed by means of the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Normed Fit Index (NFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). The 
values of these Goodness of Fit measures should exceed 0.90 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & 
Black, 1998). The Root Mean Square Error of approximation (RMSEA) was calculated. Values 
from 0.05 to 0.08 are deemed acceptable, but are preferable less than 0.05. 
 
 
Figure 55: SEM integrating the relationship between the perceptions of the government as a risk 
regulation and as a risk communicator in the context of the financial crisis 
 
 
Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =150 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Financial crisis 91.11/8/0.000 9.16 / 8 / 0.33 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.08 
Table 115: Overview of the general parameters of fitness of the basic SEM model in the context of 
the financial crisis 
This model depicts the relationship between the satisfaction with the government as a risk 
communicator and the satisfaction with the government as a risk regulator. The chi-squared 
p value for the full sample was smaller than 0.001. When we performed the analysis on a 
random sample of 100 cases, the chi-squared p-value was 0.33 (random sample of 150 
Perception
risk communicator
Perception
risk regulator
Quantity govinfo Quality govinfo Reliability govinfo
Gov measures to 
protect economy
Trust in gov as 
protector of economy
Perceived
preparedness gov
0.78
0.460.180.37
0.59 0.58 0.48
Merror Merror Merror
Merror Merror Merror
0.77 0.76 0.69
0.89
0.42 0.680.61
Serror
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cases, p=0.09), which proofs that the actual and the predicted input matrices are not 
statistically different. This means that the proposed model fits the observed covariances and 
correlations well. The NFI, CFI and TLI values all exceed the critical value of 0.90 and the 
RMSEA value (0.08) is acceptable. The perception of the government as a risk communicator 
is a latent variable that is measured by the three manifest variables: satisfaction with the 
quantity and quality of the governmental information about the financial/economical crisis 
and the perceived reliability of the information provided by the government. The regression 
weights (standardized beta values, marked in italic) of these three variables are all very high 
and the satisfaction with the quantity of governmental information has the largest weight in 
the prediction of the perception of the government as a good risk communicator (beta=0.77, 
p<0.001), followed by quality of governmental information (beta=0.76, p<0.001) and 
reliability of governmental information (beta=0.69, p<0.001). The perception of the 
government as a risk regulator is a latent variable, measured by three manifest variables. 
The trust in the government as a protector of our economy is the most important predictor 
(beta=0.68, p<0.001), followed by the satisfaction with governmental measures to protect 
our economy (beta=0.61, p<0.001). The perceived preparedness of governmental services is 
the weakest predictor (beta=0.42, p<0.001). The most important conclusion from this 
analysis is that the total amount of explained variance in the perception of the government 
as a risk regulator by the perception of the government as a risk communicator is 78%, 
which is very high (beta=0.89, p<0.001). 
10.4.2. Linking the perception on possibilities of participation in communication 
In a second phase, we added the variable that measures how strongly people agree with the 
statement that citizens get the possibility to communicate with the government about the 
financial and economical crisis. This reflects their view on the possibility of bottom-up 
communication. After testing diverse models, a nice result was found when we linked this 
item directly to the perception of the government as a risk communicator. The chi-squared 
p-value (0.09 for n=100), goodness-of-fit measures (NFI, CFI, TLI >0.90) and the RMSEA value 
(0.06) all proof that the model is good. We found a quite strong negative relationship 
between the latent variable perception risk communicator and negative perception 
participation (beta=-0.22, p<0.001), however only 5% of the variance in the latter is 
explained by the latent variable.  
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Figure 56: SEM linking the perception of possibilities of participation to the basic model in the 
context of the financial crisis 
 
 
Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =150 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Financial crisis 101.6/13/0.000 20.44 /13/0.09 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.06 
Table 116: General parameters of fitness of the SEM model linking participation to the basic model 
in the context of terrorism 
 
So we can say that the more people are satisfied with the government as a risk 
communicator, the less they will think that there is no possibility for bottom-up 
communication. The next step was to determine whether the need for bottom-up 
communication correlates with the satisfaction with the government as a risk 
communicator, taking into account the opinion leadership principle. 
10.4.3. Incorporating the need for bottom-up communication and opinion 
leadership 
A last variant of the model integrates the need for communication with the government 
about terrorism and the concept of opinion leadership. As mentioned before, the opinion 
Perception
risk communicator
Perception
risk regulator
Quantity govinfo Quality govinfo Reliability govinfo
Gov measures to 
protect economy
Trust in gov as 
protector of economy
Perceived
preparedness gov
0.78
0.460.180.37
0.59 0.58 0.48
Merror Merror Merror
Merror Merror Merror
0.77 0.76 0.69
0.89
0.42 0.680.61
Negative perception
participation
Serror
-0.22
0.05
Serror
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leadership concept is measured by six elements, as described in the factor analysis. Again, 
the chi-squared p-value (0.16 for n=100), goodness-of-fit measures (NFI, CFI, TLI>0.90) and 
the RMSEA value (0.06) all proof that the model is good. The results show us that the 
satisfaction with the government as a risk communicator has a negative causal relationship 
with the need for bottom-up communication (beta=-0.25, p<0.001) which means that the 
more people are satisfied with the government as a communicator, the less they will feel the 
need to communicate with the government about terrorism themselves. We can also state 
that the opinion leadership concept has a quite strong positive causal relationship with the 
need for bottom-up communication (beta=0.31, p<0.001) which means that the higher 
people rate on opinion leadership, the more they will feel the need to exchange knowledge 
with the government about terrorism. Opinion leadership and satisfaction of the 
government as a risk communicator together explain 16% of the variance within the variable 
that measures the need for bottom-up communication. 
 
 
Figure 57: SEM linking bottom-up communication and opinion leadership in the context of the 
financial crisis 
 
 
Study Chi²/df/p Chi²/df/p for n =150 NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Financial crisis 101.6/13/0.000 20.44 /13/0.09 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.06 
Table 117: General parameters of fitness of the SEM model linking bottom-up communication and 
opinion leadership in the context of the financial crisis 
Perception
risk communicator
Perception
risk regulator
Quantity govinfo Quality govinfo Reliability govinfo
Gov measures to 
protect economy
Trust in gov as 
protector of economy
Perceived
preparedness gov
0.78
0.460.180.37
0.59 0.58 0.48
Merror Merror Merror
Merror Merror Merror
0.77 0.76 0.69
0.89
0.42 0.680.61
Need for active
participation
communication
Opinion leadership
Serror
-0.25
0.31
0.16
Serror
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So for governments, it is important to communicate effectively, but also to determine who 
those opinion leaders are and how they can be reached, because this group of people that is 
characterized by a high level of influence on other social groups within society and an 
extensive information searching behaviour will feel the need to communicate about the 
financial and economical crisis. 
11.  Conclusion study financial economical crisis 
This third research report summarized the results of a large scaled quantitative survey study 
(n=1578) that had three main objectives. First we aimed at the validation and confirmation 
of the general measurement scales that have been developed to construct a risk perception 
‘methodology’ and deliver a full and comprehensive descriptive report on the descriptive of 
the central concepts in our risk management strategies in the context of the financial 
economical crisis, including risk perception, mental distance, fear levels, specific behavioural 
intentions, information seeking behaviour and trust in the government. Secondly, we 
wanted to confirm the information seeking segmentation and validation of the tool to 
identify opinion leaders in the context of the financial and economical crisis as a risk. We 
also wanted to know whether the initial set of segmentation concepts could be improved by 
adding some more items. The third objective was to scrutinize the multivariate relationships 
between the key concepts about risk perception.  
The descriptive statistics in the comprehensive report confirmed the assumptions that were 
made based on the first quantitative research studies. For the key concepts, the results 
indicate that on the one hand, risk perception levels are high and mental distances to the 
risk are low, but on the other hand, people are not very frightened and do not proceed to 
concrete protective behaviour (yet). This might indicate that the risk is perceived to be 
present but people do not think it will affect them personally, as in with the risk of terrorism 
and the bird flu. However, they need information so they look for information and talk to 
others about the risk to satisfy their need for information. Especially the people that have 
the highest involvement (mid of their careers) display these characteristics. When we took a 
closer look at the information seeking behaviour, the figures pointed out that people rather 
passively scan information concerning the financial economical crisis than actively search or 
look for information when there is a new item on the crisis. Still, the information seeking 
behaviour is much more present within the context of the financial economical crisis than 
with the risk of the bird flu and terrorism. We found some interesting gender and age 
differences: men have significantly higher scores on active, passive and event triggered 
information seeking than women and the people who are most involved and most 
vulnerable are again the most active information seekers (active, event-triggered and 
passive). Concerning the desired information type: top information categories are general 
information about the crisis, specific information about recent events followed by the 
probability information and information about the possible consequences. 
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For the other descriptive statistics, we compared opinion leaders with non-leaders, as we 
assumed significant and valuable differences between these groups.  
We decided to add some additional items that related to opinion leadership. The PCA factor 
analysis revealed an augmented opinion leadership factor (now 4 items instead of 1) and the 
convincer trait (4 items). We added these two factors to our list of segmentation variables to 
perform the cluster analysis. Again, our four group solution was very similar to the solutions 
in the previous studies in the context of terrorism and the bird flu. The analysis revealed that 
25% of the respondents are opinion leaders, a figure that is comparable to the results of the 
other studies. The classification matrix of the discriminant analysis stated that more than 
97% of the cases are correctly assigned to the predicted groups. For the most important 
group in our research, the opinion leaders, this percentage is 99%. The best predictors in the 
opinion leaders’ classification function were social behaviour, active and passive information 
seeking and the specific ‘convincer’ trait. For all further analyses about governmental 
communication efforts, we compared the results of the opinion leaders versus the non 
leaders (talking scanners, silent seekers and ignorants). Opinion leaders have a rather 
specific socio demographical and media profile. They are dominantly males with an average 
age of 45 years. Their risk perception is higher (and mental distance lower), they look for 
more information and talk more to people. They have a greater need for information. This 
need covers most of the types of information that were proposed. We have also gained 
specific knowledge about this group of people, through which media channels we can reach 
them and what kind of risk information they need. For governmental communication efforts, 
the most important perceived role remains protecting the population by taking concrete 
measures. However, the strong figures that confirm the importance of the government 
providing information and concrete guidelines in the context of the financial economical 
crisis indicate that the governments should live up to their role as a risk regulator but also as 
a risk communicator. When it comes to the communication as a process and the issue of 
source reliability, the most trusted source of risk information are the experts, followed by 
the media and the prime minister. People also perceive the government to be in control of 
the information that is being spread and they are rather critical about governmental 
information. Opinion leaders were also more critical than the other groups and they also 
have a higher need for active participation in the communication with the government. The 
general image of the government as a risk information broker is not positive or satisfactory 
at all. Especially for the fragile group of opinion leaders, there have to be concrete actions to 
jack up the satisfaction with the amount, quality and reliability of governmental information. 
The communication channels that are perceived to be most appropriate to communicate 
with the people are the media in general, experts and websites (official website). However, 
we might state that there are a lot of people who do not have a pronounced opinion about 
this matter. Opinion leaders prefer experts and websites (significantly higher scores) but 
condemn TV ads as communication tools.  
For the third research objective, we started with discussing the correlation matrices that 
included the linear relationships between the key concepts. They revealed reveal a strong 
negative relationship between trust and information need and mental distance and 
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information seeking behaviour and social behaviour. More important are the positive 
correlations between fear and behaviour and fear and information need. For opinion 
leaders, we have discovered a statistically significant negative linear relationship between 
fear and information sufficiency which means that the more opinion leaders have the feeling 
that they have achieved a satisfactory level of information about the risk, the less frightened 
they are. For the governmental risk communication, the correlation results make us 
conclude that it is absolutely necessary to provide enough and qualitative information 
because these concepts do not only correlate strongly with each other but also with the 
perceived reliability of the information and the general trust in the government. These 
correlations are even stronger for the opinion leaders than for non leaders. Again, we tested 
our three structural equation models with AMOS. The first, basic model that scrutinizes the 
relationship between the risk regulation and risk communication, showed very strong 
results. The total amount of explained variance in the perception of the government as a risk 
regulator by the perception of the government as a risk communicator is 78%, which is very 
high (beta=0.89, p<0.001). The second model that incorporated the concept of satisfaction 
with the possibility to communicate with the government about the financial and 
economical crisis was also proven to be statistically significant. The more people are satisfied 
with the government as a risk communicator, the less they will think that there is no 
possibility for bottom-up communication. The third model incorporated the concepts of 
opinion leadership and the need for active participation in the communication process 
between the government and the citizens. Again, the model was proven to be good. Opinion 
leadership and satisfaction of the government as a risk communicator together explain 16% 
of the variance within the variable that measures the need for bottom-up communication. 
The multivariate analyses also pointed out the importance of actively using the concept of 
opinion leaders in a risk communication strategy. Not only does this group of people have 
very specific risk perceptions and risk information needs, they also have a strong need to 
participate in a two way dialogue, that is partly determined by the general perception of the 
government as a risk communicator.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
TRUST AND SOURCE CREDIBILITY 
1. Introduction 
We have extensively discussed the issues of trust and credibilility in chapter three of the 
theoretical body. We have presented and confronted frameworks and theories of various 
scholars that scrutinize the concepts of trust and credibility in the context of risk 
communication and on various levels of analysis (L. Frewer, 2003; Löfstedt, 2005; R. Peters 
et al., 1997a; Renn & Levine, 1991; Slovic, 1993). We have already discussed the cumulative 
nature of the five levels of analysis of trust, as discussed by Renn and Levine (1991) by 
means of the subjoined schematic overview. 
 
 
Figure 58: Levels of analysis of trust (Renn & Levine, 1991 p.181)  
 
Renn and Levine concluded that the levels are ordered in terms of degree of abstraction and 
complexity. The overlap and order of levels integrates the principle that, when trust building 
efforts are implemented or violated on lower levels, this will affect the next higher level and 
even push trough to the highest level. We have already scrutinized information reliability, 
general levels of trust in institutions and institutional performances in the large scaled 
quantitative studies discussed above. One of the objectives of the two subsequent studies is 
to measure the variability of information and source credibility in relation to the specific 
style and tone of voice of the message. So these two studies are performed on the ‘lowest’ 
level of analysis, but as mentioned above, research on this level of analysis may also deliver 
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a valuable input for risk communication development and implementation as effects on trust 
and credibility will have its implications on higher levels as well.  
2. Source credibility and message style 
Pornpitakpan (2004) offers with ‘The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A Critical Review 
of Five Decades’ Evidence’ an extended review of researches and literature about the 
influence of source credibility on the persuasiveness of messages (Pornpitakpan, 2004). He 
categorizes the factors that interact with source credibility as source, message, channel, 
receiver, and destination variables.  He concludes that, in general, the message and receiver 
related variables are predominantly scrutinized. Pornpitakpan emphasizes in his 
recommendations for future research that too little research has been completed about the 
relationship about the amount of information and source credibility, and the possible 
interaction between these and related variables. Also Blair names source and information 
credibility, besides the difficulty in distinguishing between low and high risks and 
communicating information before it is fully understood, as one of the key issues that 
hamper effective risk communication. In the same handbook, A. Alm proposes that 
considerable attention should be paid to the institutional setting of risk communication. He 
suggests that neutral sources of information could improve the information credibility in risk 
communication programs. These neutral sources could be universities or other non-profit 
organizations that are knowledgeable but impartial and that have no own benefits in 
declaring certain statements about certain risks (Davies et al., 1987b). 
The subsequent two studies are an answer to this ‘call for research’, and will try to make a 
first attempt to fill up the gap in this area of expertise.  
The main research objectives of the two quasi experiments was to look at the relationship 
between source reliability and credibility of provided information about governmental policy 
in the context of terrorism and the bird flu and the source specificities. A possible interaction 
with content style was also scrutinized. Furthermore, there were some specific research 
questions about the relationship of information quantity and information credibility. 
The explorative studies scrutinized the influence of information quantity, information style 
and source of information on perceived credibility and reliability of communications about 
governmental initiatives regarding the antiterrorism policy (research report IV) and the bird 
flu (research report V). 
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RESEARCH REPORT IV 
 
COMMUNICATION STYLE IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM 
1. Experimental design and conditions 
We decided to use a factorial experimental design as we wanted to scrutinize the statistical 
interaction between certain source and message characteristics on the one hand and the 
information and source reliability and credibility on the other hand. This design is 
characterized by the fact that there are no control groups, but instead, the various 
experimental groups function as each other’s control groups (Hüttner et al., 1995 p. 425). 
The benefits of this research design is that it is possible to draw causal conclusions. It also 
allows us to manipulate the conditions. On the other hand, the external validity of 
experimental designs is very low, especially due to the small sample sizes that are used.  
The main research aim of this experiment was scrutinize the relationship between source 
credibility,  credibility of provided information about the governmental terrorism policy and 
the source specificities. A possible interaction with content style was also scrutinized. 
Furthermore, there were some specific research questions about the relationship of 
information quantity and information credibility. The experimental design included 6 
experimental conditions. In total, 120 respondents were assigned randomly to the 6 
conditions. The design included 2 factors: source type and message style. There were three 
source conditions: a press release from the ministry of internal affairs, a press report from a 
journalist of a current affairs magazine and an interview with an expert, more specifically a 
professor and advisor in antiterrorism policy. For every source condition we also had two 
specific text modes: a more emotional, non factual approach to the content and a very 
informative, factual representation of the content. There were no extra control groups as 
the different experimental conditions act as each other’s control groups. 
 
 Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 
 Content style Spokesperson internal affairs 
Format: press release 
Journalist 
Format: article 
Expert 
Format: interview 
Factual 20 20 20 
Emotional 20 20 20 
Table 118: Overview experimental conditions and allocation of respondents (N=120, 20/condition) 
The respondents were given one text, depending on the condition they were in. The text 
provided them with information about governmental initiatives to prevent terrorist attacks, 
and a short survey with some statements about perceived source reliability, perceived 
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knowledge of the source and credibility of the information. Six different texts were written. 
To prevent possible interaction effects with content related components, the text contents 
were written as conform as possible. Obviously, it was required to add or adjust some 
content related components. 
2. Items and constructs 
The subjoined table provides us with an overview of the key items / concepts were 
integrated into the small survey that had to be filled out by the respondents. 
 
Construct N Items α 
Source credibility 1 I think the source is credible  
Information credibility 1 The information that is offered in the text is credible  
Source knowledge 1 The source has much knowledge about the topic  
Information quantity 1 The text provides much information  
Information reliability 1 The offered information is reliable  
Attitude towards 
government 
3 In general, I think the information that comes from the 
government is reliable 
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of 
information about terrorism 
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of 
information about their initiatives and measures in the context 
of terrorism 
0.71 
Table 119: Overview of the general constructs integrated in the experiment 
 
The cronbach’s alpha of the attitude concept (measured by means of three items) exceeded 
the critical value of 0.65 and all items had an item to total score that was higher than 0.30. 
3. Results 
3.1. Pretesting of emotional versus factual text conditions 
For the first category, the emotional versus the informational text conditions, the difference 
between both texts was statistically confirmed. The mean score of the texts in the factual 
conditions was significantly higher than the mean score of the texts in the emotional text 
conditions (t (118)=-3.46). 
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The text is objective and factual 
(6 point Likert scale) 
Condition Mean St.Dev  
Emotional  3.8 1.23 
Factual  4.5 1.03 
t(118)=-3.46, p=0.001 
 
Table 120: T test results for the pretest of the emotional vs. factual text conditions 
 
3.2. General source credibility 
We first tested whether there are initial differences in source credibility between the three 
source conditions. The Anova test shows that there is a significant difference between the 
credibility of the source (F(2,116) = 5.99, p = 0.0033). The government is perceived as being 
the less credible source. The differences with the expert and journalist conditions are 
significant (resp. p = 0.022 and p = 0.008). The difference in perceived source credibility 
between the expert and journalist condition however is not significant (p=0.946). 
 
 
Figure 59: Output Anova (Oneway) for the credibility source / sources 
 
3.3. Emotional versus factual text conditions 
For both the information and source credibility, there were no statistically significant 
differences between the factual and the emotional text conditions (respectively t(116)=0.22, 
p=0.83) and t(117)=-1.06, p=0.29). 
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Figure 60: Output Anova information and source credibility for the emotional and factual text 
conditions 
3.4. Interaction between source and communication style 
When we look at the interaction effect of content style and source condition, we can 
confirm that there is a statistically significant interaction (F(2,112)=4.16, p=0.018). The 
observed power for this interaction, using an alpha of 0.05, is 0.724 so the chance of making 
a type II error is low. The factual governmental communication is perceived as more credible 
than the text in the emotional condition. On the opposite, the emotional version of the 
journalist article was perceived as more credible than the informative version. We did not 
find any significant differences in credibility for the expert interview.  
 
Figure 61: Output ANOVA (2-wayinteraction): credibility information / sources / content style 
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So in fact, we can carefully conclude that governments should communicate in a more 
factual and informative style about their anti terrorism initiatives in order to raise the 
credibility of the information they are spreading. 
3.5. Relationship information quantity, perceived knowledge source and information 
reliability 
When we consider the relationship between the perceived amount of information in the text 
and the information credibility, we can confirm the hypothesis that the the higher the 
perceived information quantity, the higher the information credibility will be. This is 
confirmed by means of the correlations, so we can state that there is a strong linear 
relationship between the amount of information provided and the information credibility 
(r=0.516, p<0.000). 
When we specify by source, we see that this linear relationship is much stronger in the 
governmental condition than in the journalist and expert condition. 
 
 
Source Correlation coëfficiënts 
Perceived information quantity*Information 
credibility 
Government 0.671 
p<0.000 
Expert 0.417 
p<0.008 
Journalist 0.413 
p<0.008 
Table 121: Correlations perceived information quantity * information credibility (by source) 
 
 
Peters, Covello en MacCallum (1997) confirm in an empirical study the relationship between 
the perceived knowledge of the source and its perceived reliability. We also checked this 
relationship by means of our data. We may also conclude that there is a strong positive 
linear relationship (r = 0.597, p<0.000) between the amount of perceived knowledge of the 
source and the credibility of the offered information.  When we compare the source 
conditions, we find that this relationship is stronger for the expert as a source as for the 
government and the journalist condition.  
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Source Correlation coëfficiënts 
Perceived knowledge*Reliability information 
Government  0.578 
p<0.000 
Expert 0.676 
p<0.000 
Journalist 0.535 
p<0.000 
Table 122: Correlations perceived knowledge source * information credibility (by source)  
 
3.6. Attitude towards the government 
The general attitude towards the government was measured by means of 4 items: the 
perceived preparedness of the government, the satisfaction with the amount of 
governmental information about terrorism, the satisfaction with quantity of information 
about terrorism and the reliability of governmental information. The scale reliability analysis 
for the 4 item scale provided us with a cronbach’s alpha value of 0,71. We divided the 
respondents into 3 groups: one group with a negative attitude towards the government in 
the context of terrorism, a group with a neutral attitude and a group with a positive attitude.  
 
 Correlationcoëfficiënts 
Perceived information quantity*Reliability 
information 
Negative 
attitude  
0.584 
P<0.005 
Neutral 
attitude 
0.547 
P<0.000 
Positive 
attitude 
0.461 
P<0.004 
Table 123: Correlations perceived information quantity * reliability information  
 
The table shows us that the perceived quantity of information is strongly correlated with the 
information credibility, especially for people with an initial negative attitude towards the 
government.  
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4. Conclusions  
From the results of this study, we can formulate some concrete rules for governmental risk 
communication. When we focus on some specific guidelines for governmental risk 
communication messages, we can state that these messages should primarily have an 
informative nature, providing the population with specific and tangible facts and figures. 
These kinds of messages seemed to have a strong positive relationship with the credibility of 
the offered information. This relationship seemed to be even stronger for the governmental 
text than for the article written by a journalist or an interview with an expert, especially 
when experts act as spokesmen. Especially the perceived amount of information provided in 
the text appeared to be a very important factor in the creation of reliable messages. The 
higher the perceived information quantity, the higher the credibility of this information. This 
linear relationship seemed to be the strongest for the governmental communication. When 
we take in account the initial attitude towards the government, especially the critical group 
of people with a negative attitude towards the government needs messages that strongly 
emphasize the provision of objective information. To conclude, it is important to raise the 
impression of a well informed source that has a lot of knowledge about the topic. It is still 
important to emphasize the need for further research concerning other content and receiver 
related characteristics in the context of the perceived reliability of the source and message.  
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RESEARCH REPORT V 
 
COMMUNICATION STYLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BIRD FLU 
1. Research objectives 
Being confronted with the bird flu as a possible threat to our personal and communal health, 
the issue of effective risk communication in this context seemed like a very interesting 
research topic. The bird flu as a risk and a threat has been extensively discussed in research 
report II that provided us with the results of the quantitative research study in the context of 
the avian influenza virus. On the other hand, we had already examined the interaction effect 
between message style and source type on information and source credibility in the context 
of terrorism. We thought that it would be useful to formulate some concrete communication 
guidelines that would be based on empirically proven interaction effects between certain 
message characteristics. So with this explorative study, we wanted to scrutinize the 
influence of information quantity, information style and source of information on perceived 
credibility and reliability of communications about governmental initiatives in the context of 
the bird flu as a risk. We added the concept of positive versus negative message style as in 
previous studies, positive risk messages had proven to be more effective (Marks, 1990). 
We combined the formats of a quantitative survey study with a factorial experimental 
design.  
2. Items and constructs 
The subjoined table provides us with an overview of the key items / concepts were 
integrated into the small survey that had to be filled out by the respondents. 
 
Construct N Items α 
Source credibility 1 I think the source is credible  
Information credibility 1 The information that is offered in the text is credible  
Source knowledge 1 The source has much knowledge about the topic  
Information quantity 1 The text provides much information  
Information reliability 1 The offered information is reliable  
Perceived positivism 1 The text is positive  
Attitude towards 
government 
8 In general, I think the information that comes from the government is 
reliable 
0.89 
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The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of 
information about the bird flu 
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient amount of 
information about their initiatives and measures in the context of the bird 
flu 
The government has provided us with information timely 
I have a positive attitude towards our current government 
I trust our current government in this current affair (bird flu) 
The Belgian government is sufficiently prepared for an outbreak of the 
bird flu with animals 
The Belgian government is sufficiently prepared for an outbreak of the 
bird flu with humans 
Table 124: Overview of the general constructs integrated in the experiment 
 
The cronbach’s alpha of the attitude concept (measured by means of eight items) exceeded 
the critical value of 0.65 and all items had an item to total score that was higher than 0.30. 
3. Sample 
In total, 28 students each had to select 15 respondents according to our selection criteria: 
gender, age categories and educational level. Eventually, questionnaires were distributed in 
the period of April 2006. From this sample, 417 surveys could be used for analysis after the 
data cleaning. The sample is a convenience sample (quota sample) and the distribution of 
age and gender are comparable to the distribution in the Flemish population, except for a 
slight overrepresentation of the respondents in the age category of 20-64 years. As the 
maximum difference was 4%, we did not weigh the data for these categories. However, as 
the sample size is restricted to 417 respondents, it is important to take into consideration 
that the descriptive statistics give a clear indication but should be interpreted with care.  
 
 
Figure 62: Age distribution sample bird flu study II 
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Figure 63: Gender distribution sample bird flu study II 
 
 
Terrorism I   
Age category Male Female 
Flanders Sample Flanders Sample 
20-64 
≥65 
 
39% 
10% 
43% 
11% 
38% 
13% 
42% 
13% 
NFlanders =6043161 
Nsample =417 
Table 125: Comparisons sample and population percentages sample bird flu study II 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
We will first provide a summary of the general descriptive statistics of the key concepts that 
were scrutinized by means of the small survey preceding the questions that were related to 
the text of the experimental condition. We have results for 417 respondents. Except for 
some missings, there were no significant missing data that could be labelled as non 
ignorable. As the final aim of the study was not to perform a full sized quantitative survey 
study in the context of the bird flu we only integrated the key items that measured risk 
perception, protective behaviour, information seeking behaviour and perceptions about 
governmental preparedness and communication efforts into the survey. The statements 
were measured on 6 point Likert scales so the means should be interpreted on a 6 point 
scale, ranging from 1 (totally do not agree) to 6 (Totally agree). Besides means, we also 
0%
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integrated the percentages of respondents that gave outspoken answers: % low represents 
the percentage of respondents that gave a rating of 1 or 2 on the scale and % high 
represents the percentage of respondents that gave a rating of 5 or 6. Again we assume that 
in some matters, the respondents do not have an outspoken opinion or attitude and they 
will answer rather neutrally. It is important to have an idea of these percentages. 
4.1.1. Risk perception 
Construct Mean St.Dev. % Low % High 
Perceived probability of outbreak of virus with birds in 
Belgium 
3.76 1.19 16 26 
Perceived probability that the variant of the virus that is 
transferrable between animals and humans will break out 
in Belgium 
3.39 1.10 21 15 
Perceived probability that the variant of the virus that is 
transferrable between humans will break out in Belgium 
3.07 1.14 34 10 
I already took protective measures in case there would be 
an outbreak of the bird flu in Belgium (medicines, etc.) 
2.36 1.43 67 13 
Table 126: Descriptive statistics risk perception in bird flu II 
 
For risk perception, we only considered the perceived probabilities of the risk of bird flu. The 
means, that vary between 3.07 and 3.76, indicate that the level of perceived probability is 
higher than the average of 3, but not really outspoken. We can retrieve more information 
from the percentages. Over the three categories of threats, the respondents answer quite 
neutrally (56% to 64%). As the proximity of the threat increases, the perceived probability 
level decreases: where 26% of the respondents have high probability scores for the outbreak 
of a virus with birds (16% has a low score), this percentage decreases to 15% for the 
probability of a virus that is transferrable between animals and humans (21% low) and even 
to 10% (34% low) for the outbreak of the virus that is transferrable between humans, which 
is the most threatening to the individual. Parallel to study II, we find some confirmation of 
the denial’ bias (Thompson, 1985). We also notice that 13% has already took protective 
measures to be prepared for an outbreak of the virus in Belgium, while 67% has not done 
this so far. The neutral category is limited to 20%.  There were no significant differences for 
gender or age categories.  
Besides the protective behaviour, we also scrutinized the basic information seeking 
behaviour: active and event triggered information seeking and passive information scanning. 
4.1.2. Information seeking behaviour 
The items of the information seeking behaviour scale that was used in the previous large 
scaled surveys were used again in this study. The statements had to be rated on 6 point 
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Likert scales. The chronbach’s alpha for the passive information seeking scale (3 items) was 
0.86 and all item total correlations exceeded 0.30 (minimum 0.59). 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. Gender Age % Low % High 
Active info 
seeking 
 
2.73 1.25  <35 year = 2.52 
35-44 year = 2.2.56 
45-64 year = 2.95 
>64 year = 3.00 
F(3,411)=4.35** 
48 11 
Event 
triggered info 
seeking 
2.76 1.12 Male = 2.64 
Female = 2.88 
t (414)=-2.15* 
<35 year = 2.40 
35-44 year = 2.58 
45-64 year = 3.08 
>64 year = 3.29 
F(3,410)=15.77*** 
43 9 
Passive info 
scanning 
3.56 1.10 Male = 3.42 
Female = 3.70 
t (415)=-2.65** 
<35 year = 3.24 
35-44 year = 3.56 
45-64 year = 3.81 
>64 year = 4.01 
F(3,411)=11.37** 
25 17 
Significance 
key 
* p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 127: Descriptive statistics information seeking behaviour bird flu II 
 
We can state that about 10% of the respondents look for information about the bird flu 
actively or when they are triggered by a news item but 43% to 48% has low scores for these 
types of information seeking. The means are 2.7 on the 6 point scale, so below average. For 
passive information scanning, the mean is higher (3.56) and so is the percentage of 
respondents that score high (17%). We also notice that 48% to 58% answered rather 
neutrally on these concepts. We can conclude that the information seeking behaviour in the 
context of the bird flu is rather weak, but that there is a large and non ignorable portion of 
people that do not have outspoken opinions. Should there ever be a more proximate threat 
or even an outbreak, the percentages could shift very rapidly and in large numbers. 
The next step is to describe the general perception of the government as a risk regulator and 
communicator. 
4.1.3. Perception of the government as risk regulator and communicator 
The perception of the government as a risk regulator was translated in terms of perceived 
preparedness of the government for an outbreak of the flu and in terms of trust in the 
government in the context of the bird flu.  
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4.1.3.1. Governmental preparedness 
 
Construct Mean St.Dev. % Low % High 
I trust the current government in this matter 3.70 1.11 15 21 
The Belgian government is sufficiently prepared for an 
outbreak of the bird flu with animals 
3.64 1.09 14 21 
The Belgian government is sufficiently prepared for an 
outbreak of the bird flu with humans 
3.18 1.12 25 11 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 128: Descriptive statistics perceptions governmental preparedness bird flu II 
 
We notice that the means for perceived preparedness vary from 3.18 to 3.70 and the 
percentages of respondents that rated high on the items vary from 11% to 21%. The lowest 
scores are for the perceived preparedness for an outbreak of the flu with humans, which is 
in fact the most threatening for the individuals. We could state that there is low trust in the 
government as a risk regulator, but it is also important to take a look at the number of 
respondents that answered neutrally: this percentage is about 65%, which is very high. So 
we can conclude by saying that there is not really an outspoken opinion about the perceived 
preparedness of the government for the bird flu in general. 
4.1.3.2. Governmental risk communication 
The subjoined table commences with the figures about the satisfaction with the quantity of 
information provided by the government about the bird flu. The means are above average 
(vary from 3.71 to 3.87) and 21% (info about protective measures) to 26% (info about bird 
flu in general) assign high scores. Only 13% and 8% has low scores for these items. Again, the 
vast majority (66%) is rather neutral. We find about the same figures for the statement 
about the possibility of active participation in the communication process with the 
government. The respondents have a somewhat more outspoken idea about the accuracy of 
the information provision. The mean is 4 on the 6 point scale and 34% assigned a high score 
to this statement. Even more respondents had an outspoken opinion about the role of the 
government as a risk communicator in this risk context, and more particularly in the positive 
sense: 89% of the respondents agree strongly with the statement that it is the obligation of 
the government to inform civilians as good as possible about the bird flu and only 1% does 
not agree.  
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Construct Mean St.Dev. % Low % High 
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient 
amount of information about the bird flu 
3.87 0.95 8 26 
The Belgian government provides us with a sufficient 
amount of information about their initiatives and 
measures in the context of the bird flu 
3.71 1.01 13 21 
The government has provided us with information timely 3.96 1.09 11 34 
Duty of government to inform civilians as good as 
possible (dispersion, prevention…) 
5.27 0.77 1 89 
Civilians do not get the opportunity to communicate 
with the government about the bird flu 
3.68 1.06 12 22 
Significance key * p≤0.05  ** p≤0.01  *** p≤0.001 
Table 129: Descriptive statistics perceptions government as a risk communicator bird flu study II 
 
 
From this section we can conclude that people do not really have an outspoken opinion 
about the specific governmental risk communication efforts (in terms of quantity and 
timeliness). On the other hand, almost the entire sample of respondents agreed with the 
proposed role of the government as the main risk communicator in the context of the bird 
flu. 
To conclude the previous paragraphs, we can state that there is not really an outspoken 
opinion about the perceived preparedness of the government for the bird flu in general. We 
could speculate about the reasons for this. The Belgian government does not really have a 
reputation of communicating a great deal about their initiatives and protective measures in 
the context of various risks. So we could assume that the community does not have a clear 
view on these initiatives and safety measures because of this lack of information. On the 
other hand, the expectations are very high and the potential role of the government as a risk 
communicator is non ignorable. These findings indicate that the governments will be 
challenged to construct solid risk communication programmes to meet the need for 
governmental risk communication. On the other hand, it is a challenge that can be leveraged 
to an opportunity because the image that can be constructed can induce a sense of trust and 
positive attiude towards the government and its initiatives. Ideally, this increase in trust 
could even be transmitted to a general positive attitude and high trust level in all domains.  
These results of the small additional questionnaire indicate and confirm the results of the 
previous quantitative survey studies that were performed in the context of risks. We will 
provide a clear overview and comparison of the key findings of the studies in the next 
chapter. We will now discuss the findings of the experimental study. 
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4.2. Results of the factorial experiment 
4.2.1. Confirmation of experimental conditions 
We first had to confirm our experimental conditions. 
4.2.1.1. Informative versus persuasive texts 
For the first category, the persuasive versus the informative text conditions, the difference 
between both texts was marginally acceptable (p values = 0.059) 
 
The provided information in the text plays in the advantage of the government 
(6 point Likert scale) 
Condition Mean St.Dev  
Persuasive 4.6 1.02 
Informative 4.2 1.08 
t(203)=1.9, p=0.059 
Table 130: T test output persuasive vs. informative text conditions and persuasive information 
 
The source communicates very objectively (provides us with pure facts) 
(6 point Likert scale) 
Condition Mean St.Dev  
Persuasive 3.5 1.09 
Informative 3.8 1.09 
t(203)=-1.9, p=0.059 
Table 131: T test output persuasive vs. informative text conditions and objectivity 
4.2.1.2. Positive versus negative texts 
For the second category of texts, the positive versus the negative texts, we found that the 
positive text had a significantly higher mean for the item (The text is positive) than the text 
in the negative condition. 
 
 The text is positive (6 point Likert scale) 
Condition Mean St.Dev  
Positive 4.6 0.91 
Negative 3.4 1.14 
t(191)=7.84, p<0.000 
Table 132: T test output positive versus negative text conditions and positivity  
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4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. General source credibility 
The Anova test shows that there is a significant difference between the credibility of the 
three sources (F(2,410) = 6.78, p = 0.001). The expert is perceived as the most credible 
source, the journalist is perceived as being the less credible source. The differences with the 
expert and journalist and government and journalist conditions are significant (resp. p = 
0.002 and p = 0.049). The difference in perceived source credibility between the government 
and expert condition however is not significant (p=0.523). 
 
 
Figure 64: Anova source credibility for the three sources 
 
Positive  versus negative text conditions 
 
We compared the mean source credibility and mean information credibility of the texts in 
the positive and negative conditions. We found statistically significant differences for both 
concepts. The information in the positive text is perceived as more credible than the 
information in the negative text condition (t(205)=3.52, p=0.001). Same accounts for 
perceived source credibility (t(206)=3.72, p=0.000). 
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Figure 65: Information and source credibility of the positive and negative text conditions 
 
This means that texts that have positively formulated contents have a higher credibility 
(both information and source) than negatively formulated contents. 
4.2.3. Information credibility 
When we look at the interaction effect of content style (positive and negative) and the 
source conditions, we can confirm that there is an interaction between information style and 
source (F(2,206)=3.75, p=0.025). The observed power for this interaction, using an alpha of 
0.05, is 0.68 so the chance of making a type II error is rather low. The analysis output shows 
the information in the positive text conditions is perceived equally credible for the three 
source conditions. On the other hand, for the negative text conditions, we notice that the 
information credibility is much lower, especially for the journalist text. For the governmental 
condition, the difference in information credibility between the positive and negative texts is 
not significant (t(67)=0.81, p=0.42) and same accounts for the expert condition (t(57)=1.27, 
p=0.21). Remarkably, the difference between the positive and negative texts in the journalist 
condition is statistically significant (t(67)=3.79, p=0.000). 
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Figure 66: Interaction effect of message style and source on information credibility -two way anova 
 
So we can conclude that there are no large differences in information credibility when the 
text that holds the information is formulated in a positive or a negative manner for the 
communication that comes from the government or from an expert. For journalists, 
however, it is very important to communicate positively as it will increase their information 
credibility. 
4.2.4. Source credibility 
For source credibility, we also found an interesting result. There was no interaction between 
information style (positive versus negative) and source (F(2,207)=0.60, p=0.548). 
The difference in source credibility scores for the positive and negative governmental texts 
was not significant (t(67)=1.32, p=0.193). On the other hand, the positive texts has higher 
source credibility means for both the expert as a source (t(67)=2.51, p=0.015) as the 
journalist as a source of information (t(68)=2.76, p=0.007). 
 
 
Figure 67: Interaction effect message style and source on source credibility – two way anova 
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Persuasive versus informative text conditions 
 
We did not find any significant difference in information (t(203)=1.002, p=0.317) and source 
credibility (t(203)=0.061, p=0.951) between the informative and persuasive texts. 
 
 
Figure 68: Information and source credibility for persuasive and informative text conditions 
4.2.5. Information credibility 
For information credibility, we can confirm a marginally acceptable (p slightly exceeds 0.05) 
significant interaction effect between communication style (persuasive and informative) and 
source (F(2, 204)=2.99, p=0.053), the observed power for the interaction effect is 0.58, 
which is rather low. 
 
Figure 69: Interaction effect message style and source on information credibility – two way anova 
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For the governmental texts and the texts of the expert, there were found no significant 
differences in information credibility (respectively t(66)=1.06, p=0.293 and t(66)=-1.163, 
p=0.249) between the persuasive and the informative version. For the journalist texts, we 
did find a significant result: the informative version had a higher mean for information 
credibility than the persuasive version (t(67)=2.264, p=0.027). 
4.2.6. Source credibility 
For source credibility, we did not find a significant interaction effect (F(2,204)=2.714, 
p=0.069). 
The only significant difference in means of source credibility was for the text in the expert 
condition. The informative text had a higher source credibility mean than the persuasive text 
(t(65)=-2.068, p=0.043). 
 
 
Figure 70: Interaction effect message style and source on source credibility – two way anova 
 
4.2.7. Relationship information quantity and reliability of the information 
When we consider the relationship between the perceived amount of information in the text 
and the information credibility, we can confirm the hypothesis that the more information is 
perceived to be offered, the higher the information credibility. This is confirmed by means of 
the correlations, so we can state that there is a moderate linear relationship between the 
amount of information provided and the information credibility (r = 0.31, p<0.000). 
When we specify by source, we see that this linear relationship is slightly stronger in the 
governmental condition than in the journalist condition and expert condition.  
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Source Correlation coëfficiënts 
 Quantity*Information credibility Quantity*source credibility 
Government 0.32 
p=0.000 
0.30 
p=0.001 
Expert 0.30 
p=0.000 
0.51 
p=0.000 
Journalist 0.30 
p=0.001 
0.43 
p=0.001 
Table 133: Correlations perceived information quantity * information and source credibility  
(by source) 
 
When we consider the relationship between perceived quantity of information and source 
credibility, the correlation coefficient of 0.41 (p=0.000) indicates a relatively strong positive 
linear relationship. This relationship is relatively stronger for the journalist condition and 
even stronger for the expert condition. 
4.2.8. Perceived degree of positivity text and information credibility 
For the relationship between the degree in which the text is perceived to be positive and the 
information and source credibility, we found moderate correlations (r=0.32 and r=0.31, 
p=0.000). On the other hand, when we split up the correlations for source, we can see that 
the correlation coefficient is moderately greater for the journalist condition. 
 
 
Source Correlation coëfficiënts 
 Positivism*Information credibility Positivism*source credibility 
Government 0.26 
p=0.002 
0.26 
p=0.002 
Expert 0.17 
p=0.045 
0.24 
p=0.006 
Journalist 0.45 
p=0.000 
0. 38 
p=0.000 
Table 134: Correlations perceived information positivism * information and source credibility  
(by source) 
 
These correlation coefficients confirm the previous finding in the ANOVA analysis that it is 
especially important for journalists to formulate their information in a positive way to 
increase the credibility of the information they are offering. 
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4.2.9. Perceived knowledge and source credibility 
As mentioned in the previous experiment in the context of terrorism, Peters, Covello en 
MacCallum (1997) confirmed in an empirical study the relationship between the perceived 
knowledge of the source and its perceived reliability. We may also conclude that there is a 
relatively strong positive linear relationship (r=0.49, p<0.000) between the amount of 
perceived knowledge of the source and the credibility of the offered information and even a 
stronger positive linear relationship between the perceived amount of knowledge and 
source credibility (r=0.60, p=0.000). When we compare the source conditions, we find that 
this relationship is stronger for the expert as a source as for the government and the 
journalist condition. 
 
Source Correlation coëfficiënts 
 Perceived knowledge*information 
credibility 
Perceived knowledge*source 
credibility 
Government 0.52 
p=0.000 
0.64 
p=0.000 
Expert 0.61 
p=0.000 
0.70 
p=0.000 
Journalist 0.28 
p=0.001 
0.44 
p=0.000 
Table 135: Correlations perceived knowledge * information and source credibility (by source) 
4.2.10. Attitude towards the government 
We decided to add some more items that can be good indicators for the general attitude of 
the respondents towards the government. The general attitude towards the government 
was measured by means of 8 items (mentioned in the table). The scale reliability analysis for 
the 4 item scale provided us with a cronbach’s alpha value of 0,89. We divided the 
respondents into 3 groups: one group with a negative attitude towards the government in 
the context of the bird flu, a group with a neutral attitude and a group with a positive 
attitude. 
Source Correlation coëfficiënts 
 Quantity*Information credibility Quantity*source credibility 
Negative attitude 0.36 
p=0.003 
0.45 
p=0.000 
Neutral attitude 0.21 
p=0.000 
0.32 
p=0.000 
Positive attitude 0.56 
p=0.046 
0.78 
p=0.001 
Table 136: Correlations perceived information quantity * information and source credibility  
(by attitude) 
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The figures point out that the correlation coefficients for the linear relationships between 
perceived quantity of information and information and source credibility are higher for 
respondents with an outspoken attitude (negative and positive) towards the government. 
People with outspoken attitudes will probably need more information to be convinced as 
the level of information and especially source credibility raises with the perceived quantity 
of information that is provided. People with neutral attitudes are probably not strongly 
involved with the issue and so the relationship is not that outspoken. It will be important to 
provide a sufficient amount information in order to address both people with negative as 
positive attitudes towards the government. 
5. Conclusions  
The first results of the small quantitative survey that was added revealed some interesting 
descriptive statistics. For risk perception, we only considered the perceived probabilities of 
the risk of bird flu. As the proximity of the threat increases, the perceived probability level 
decreases. So parallel to study II, we find some confirmation of the denial’ bias (Thompson, 
1985). We also noticed that only a small portion has already taken concrete protective 
measures. For information seeking behaviour, we can conclude that it is rather weak in the 
context of the bird flu, but that there is a large and non ignorable portion of people that 
does not have outspoken opinion. Should there ever be a more proximate threat or even an 
outbreak, the percentages could shift very rapidly and in large numbers. As for the 
perceptions about the government as a risk regulator, we could state that trust levels are 
low, but it is also important to take a look at the number of respondents that answered 
neutrally: this percentage is about 65%, which is very high. So we can conclude by saying 
that there is not really an outspoken opinion about the perceived preparedness of the 
government for the bird flu in general. We can speculate about the reasons for this. The 
Belgian government does not really have a reputation of communicating a great deal about 
their initiatives and protective measures in the context of various risks. So we could assume 
that the community does not have a clear view on these initiatives and safety measures 
because of this lack of information. On the other hand, the expectations are very high and 
the potential role of the government as a risk communicator is non ignorable. These findings 
indicate that the governments will be challenged to construct solid risk communication 
programs to meet the need for governmental risk communication. On the other hand, it is a 
challenge that can be leveraged to an opportunity because the image that can be 
constructed can induce a sense of trust and positive attitude towards the government and 
its initiatives. Ideally, this increase in trust could even be transmitted to a general positive 
attitude and high trust level in all domains.  
Concerning the experimental design, we will now discuss most important results and the 
general conclusions that can be drawn from the results. The ANOVA results pointed out that 
both source and information credibility were higher for positive texts than for negative texts. 
When we took a look at the interaction effect between the nature of the text (positive 
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versus negative) and the source, the data pointed out that there are no large differences in 
information credibility when the text that holds the information is formulated in a positive 
or a negative manner for the communication that comes from the government or from an 
expert. For journalists, however, it is very important to communicate positively as it will 
increase their information credibility. The positive texts also had higher source credibility 
means for both the expert as a source as the journalist as a source of information. So it is 
better to communicate information in a positive style. F 
We also included correlations between some key concepts that were already scrutinized in 
the previous studies in other risk contexts. Firstly, when we consider the relationship 
between the perceived amount of information in the text and the information credibility, we 
can confirm the hypothesis that perceived quantity of risk information about the bird flu 
correlates positively with the information credibility. The correlation coefficient was 
remarkably stronger for the expert condition. For the relationship between the degree in 
which the text is perceived to be positive and the information and source credibility, we 
found moderate correlations but when we split up the correlations for the source 
conditions, we noticed that the correlation is fairly stronger for the journalist condition. We 
may also conclude that there is a relatively strong positive linear relationship between the 
amount of perceived knowledge of the source and the credibility of the offered information 
and even a stronger positive linear relationship between the perceived amount of 
knowledge and source credibility. When we compare the source conditions, we find that this 
relationship is stronger for the expert as a source as for the government and the journalist 
condition. 
The last correlation table took into account the concept of attitude towards the government. 
People with outspoken attitudes need more information to be convinced as the level of 
information and especially source credibility raises with the perceived quantity of 
information that is provided. People with neutral attitudes are probably not strongly 
involved with the issue and so the relationship is not that outspoken. It will be important to 
provide a sufficient amount information in order to address both people with negative as 
positive attitudes towards the government. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
SUMMARIZING CHAPTER EMPIRICAL BODY 
1. Introduction 
This empirical body has offered five research reports that summarize the research that has 
been completed during the period of 2004-2009. The final aim of the reports was to provide 
a clear overview of the research topics, objectives, methodologies and results of the 8 
studies that have been performed in the broad context of risk perception and risk 
communication. This chapter will present an overall summary of the most remarkable results 
of the 8 studies. We will try to integrate conclusions that compare and confront research 
results. These conclusions will form the foundation of some general policy recommendations 
that can be used to construct effective and generic risk communication strategies in various 
risk contexts. 
2. Confrontation of the results with the research objectives 
2.1. Risk communication audit 
Our primary research objective was to construct and validate a methodology that allows us 
to scrutinize various elements of the strategic environmental audit in the context of risk. The 
concept of the environmental audit was proposed by William Leiss in 1996. He specified that 
the strategic environmental audit could be operationalized by the formulation of a code of 
good communication practice and that this code could be verified by a risk communication 
audit. Although these concepts in his proposed approach were very abstract, we decided to 
construct and validate a concrete methodology that incorporates various elements of the 
risk communication audit. The methodology was organically constructed and includes 
elements from the theoretical framework of risk communication and risk information 
processing (see theoretical body). Starting from the basic drivers, we decided to add more 
key driver concepts, based on the literature. We also wanted to validate the methodology in 
various risk contexts such as terrorism, the bird flu and the recent economical and financial 
crisis as our methodology should be applicable in most risk contexts. The eventual 
measurement tool can be used to describe current risk perception levels, risk information 
needs, fear levels etc.  and of course the interrelationships between these concepts. It offers 
us a clear audit of the risk perceptions and its related concepts, and it allows us to identify 
crucial elements for improvement. 
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The descriptive statistics allow us to draw some general conclusions that transcend the 
specific risk contexts. For the concepts of risk perception, mental distance, level of fear and 
behaviour (intentions), the descriptive figures indicate that, even though the majority of the 
respondents perceive the terrorist threat and the bird flu as a risk that is very near (low 
mental distance), the actual percentage of people who have a high probability level, who are 
affected in their fear levels and behavioural intentions, who talk a lot to others about the 
topic and who indicate that they look for information about the risks is rather low. For the 
financial crisis, the figures are more outspoken and indicate a higher degree of communal 
concern about the risk. For risk perception and mental distance in the context of the bird flu, 
it is remarkable that the data revealed levels that are rather high but decrease according as 
the threat is positioned in the near proximity of the respondents. So we can clearly see that 
the bird flu as a threat is a perceived risk that is near, but it will not affect the person 
himself. This is what is called the ‘personal invulnerability’ bias and especially the ‘denial’ 
bias (Thompson, 1985). These psychological defense mechanisms allow human beings not to 
be preoccupied with the evaluation of personal risk, which would only induce increased 
levels of chronic anxiety and stress (Handmer & Penning-Rowsell, 1990). 
Another remarkable finding is that a lot of people answer quite neutrally, which indicates 
that the majority does not really have an outspoken opinion, probably because the risk is not 
transparent and especially because the Belgian population have not (yet) been confronted 
with terror attacks or an outbreak of a variant of the H5N1 virus that affect the population 
personally. As for the financial crisis, the figures are much more polarized and the 
percentage of people that answers neutrally is remarkable smaller. This is probably due to 
the fact that the risk of the financial crisis has affected the people more directly and that the 
risk has turned into a more outspoken crisis situation. When a risk situation is defined and 
perceived as a crisis situation, information needs will increase, which will induce information 
seeking behaviour. Media coverage was also much higher during the period of data 
collection so the responses of the respondents might be slightly biased.  
Separate descriptive sections were written about the public perceptions of the government 
as a risk regulator and risk communicator. We might conclude that the government is 
primarily perceived as a risk regulator, carefully preventing risks to turn into crises. However, 
we can also state that its role as a crisis and risk communicator is perceived very important 
as well, especially because only negligible percentages of respondents stated that these 
roles are not important. For the specific trust in the government as a risk regulator, we 
assessed the perceived preparedness of the governments on various levels. We can conclude 
that it is important so set up the general objective to raise the general trust and perceived 
preparedness of local governments. This raise could contribute to the general construction 
of a communal resilience and a perceived preparedness climate so that risk and crisis 
guidelines will be taken at heart when they are communicated. The general trust in 
governmental institutions as risk communicators is strongly dominated by the public 
perceptions about the quantity and quality of the offered information and the perceived 
reliability of this risk information. In the context of terrorism and the bird flu, the perceived 
quality and reliability of governmental information is relatively high and stable.  
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In the context of the financial and economical crisis as a risk, the respondents were much 
more suspicious and dissatisfied with the information quality and there was a much greater 
lack of general trust in the government. A remarkable result that can be retrieved in all three 
risk contexts includes the fact that people are not satisfied with the amount of risk 
information that is offered by the government. When we confront the apparent and general 
conclusion that government has an important role to fulfill as a risk communicator (besides 
risk regulation) with the findings that there is a consistent need for more governmental risk 
information, we can conclude that governmental risk communication really has to be 
integrated in the top priorities for risk policy improvements. However, as the general 
perception of the quality and reliability of the offered information is rather positive, the 
weakness of the perceived information gap could be reformulated as an opportunity if risk 
(communication) managers are able to construct solid risk communication strategies that 
include the importance of communicating sufficiently. Naturally, the amount and the nature 
of the information that is offered will depend on the specific risk contexts. The most 
important managerial conclusion is that the presence of and accessibility to risk information 
is crucial, and that governments play a vital role as risk information generators and 
mediators in this process. The fact that the government is also perceived to be in control of 
most risk information flows strengthens this conclusion.  
For the usage of specific communication channels, we would suggest to compose the 
communication platforms based on the available resources, both in terms of time (some 
channels are more time-consuming than others) and money. The data revealed that the 
usage of experts as risk information sources is the best way to provide information.  
Our data confirmed the mechanism of rationalization. Rationalization can reach very simple 
to very complex levels. The psychological process can act as a kind of cognitive dissonance 
reduction. As Marks states: “Rationalizations of various ad hoc kinds invariably come to the 
rescue, and scientists are no exceptions” (Marks, 1990 p.21). Our empirical data will also 
provide evidence for the fact that experts are perceived as the most credible sources for 
certain risk information. In any case, it is advisable to set up a small database of experts that 
are specialized in a certain matter and that can be enlisted to provide information through 
various news sources (tv news, print media interviews etc.). A website and a hotline are also 
essential communication channels as they lend themselves perfectly for two way 
communication flows. Brochures and TV advertisements are very costly and time consuming 
and cannot be put on rapidly. They can however be useful for longer term informing 
communication campaigns. For the satisfaction of immediate risk information needs, the 
quick response communication platforms that offer two way interactive communication flow 
possibilities (e.g. website, hotline) are the best channels to use to appease the first 
information needs. These information needs will be countered by information seeking 
behaviour. We specified the risk information seeking behaviour by defining three types of 
information seeking. Passive information scanning includes recognizing and processing risk 
information that one encounters while consulting information sources (TV, newspaper etc.). 
In the three risk context, this type of information seeking is most performed by the 
respondents. The second type is event triggered information seeking. This type of 
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information seeking occurs when something important has happened that relates to the risk 
(e.g. new terrorist attack, first casualty of the bird flu virus, closure of an important company 
with major job losses). Event triggered information seeking could be compared to active risk 
information seeking, but it is not entirely the same as active information seeking is 
performed on a regular basis and it is not triggered by a specific event in the risk context. 
Active information seeking is very scarce in the context of terrorism and the bird flu but 
moderate in the context of the financial crisis. However, we must acknowledge that the 
percentages of people that answer neutrally to the information seeking items are much 
higher in the context of terrorism and the bird flu than in the context of the financial crisis. 
This could mean that people who are not really involved with the risk context (e.g. terrorism 
and the bird flu) will not have high information needs and have an outspoken information 
seeking behaviour. On the other hand, the answers of the respondents in the context of the 
financial crisis are much more outspoken and we notice that the risk information seeking 
behaviour is more outspoken as well. Concerning the type of information that is perceived 
by the population as most important to be communicated, the most successful are general 
and specific information about the risk situation, probability information and information 
about the potential consequences and guidelines about what to do in case the risk becomes 
a real threat or turns into a crisis. We interpret these concrete needs of information as a 
signal to provide information that can satisfy the need for personal information control as a 
substitute of personal risk control. As most risks cannot be controlled by the individual 
himself since the unpredictable and untransparent nature, it is assumable that the locus of 
risk control will shift to a locus of personal information control so that the individual is able 
to construct his own perceived risk reality.  
Our studies revealed that the proportion of people that are actually involved in the risk 
situations and confirm explicit behavioural intentions and concrete behaviour (protective, 
information seeking) is small. We could wonder why we should communicate more when 
these describing results are indicating that only a certain proportion of the population is 
actually looking for information risks. The answer is that we should especially communicate 
more effectively by creating customized target based risk communication strategies. We can 
only create these strategies when we have gained sufficient knowledge about the dynamics 
that play within the social structures of the society. How does risk information spread and 
what is the role of opinion leaders within these dynamic processes? We already formulated 
a theoretically based answer on this question in chapter four (3.) of this doctoral 
dissertation. It was of course one of our challenges to try to empirically confirm our 
theoretical propositions by means of our research studies. The need for customized and 
public oriented risk communication strategies inspired our second research objective.  
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2.2. Development and validation of a risk information seekers segmentation 
The second objective arose from the specific need to construct and implement public 
oriented and customized risk communication strategies. This need arose from the 
conclusions that could be drawn from both academic literature as policy documents about 
risk communication in various risk contexts, as discussed in the theoretical body. 
Based on our first study, we managed to confirm a primary empirically based classification of 
risk information seekers. In the first study, the best solution of the exploratory cluster 
analysis unveiled four main groups of information seekers: opinion leaders, talking scanners, 
silent seekers and ignorants. The clustering was based on the main dimensions that we 
defined on the basis of the literature: information seeking, split up in active seeking, passive 
scanning and even triggered information seeking, social behaviour and the presence of a 
specific opinion leadership trait. The four group solution was retrieved in all six quantitative 
studies. The results of the discriminant analyses confirmed the four group solution and in 
the four studies, the classification matrix showed that we could scientifically predict the 
group membership by means of the five predictors in the studies about terrorism and the 
bird flu. We added two more factors to our list of segmentation variables to perform the 
cluster analysis in the context of the financial and economical crisis: the convincer factor and 
the (improved) opinion leadership factor. The cluster analysis with six factors also provided 
us with a similar four group solution. The subjoined table provides us with an overview of 
the general characteristics of the four groups of information seekers. 
 
 Active 
information 
seeking 
Event triggered 
information 
seeking 
Passive 
information 
scanning  
Social 
behaviour 
Opinion 
leadership 
traits 
Convincer 
Opinion leaders High High High High High High* 
Silent Seekers Moderate High High Moderate Low Low* 
Talking scanners Low Moderate Moderate/High High High High* 
Ignorants Low Low Low Low Low Low* 
* factor only included in financial economical risk study 
Table 137: Comparison of the general characteristics of information seekers (clustering) 
 
 
These findings were consistent over the six quantitative studies that covered three specific 
risk situations (terrorism, bird flu and the financial and economical crisis). We extensively 
discussed the importance of opinion leaders as valuable sources of information in 
interpersonal communication processes in chapter four (theoretical body). We consider 
these opinion leaders as primary communication targets as their information seeking 
behaviour is high (active, passive and event triggered search), they consider themselves as 
opinion leaders and they talk more about risks to other people than the other groups. This is 
the most important group of people as it will also be our primary target group in our risk 
communication programs since the diffused information will reach them more accurately 
and they will talk to other people about the risks. The percentage of opinion leaders varies 
380 
 
from 15% (bird flu study) to 25% (terrorism and financial economical crisis), so this 
percentage is quite stable. This figure also corresponds with the percentage of opinion 
leaders that had been found in previous studies in various contexts: 21% in the ECS study 
and 22% in the Elmira study and 1 opinion leader for 3 or 4 persons (so 25 to 33%) in the 
field of political communication (Boone, 1971). The subjoined table provides us with an 
overview of the percentages of opinion leaders that we retrieved in the six survey studies.  
 
 Terrorism I 
N=1040 
Terrorism II 
N=160 
Terrorism III 
N=851 
Terrorism IV 
N=1558 
Bird flu 
N=320 
Fin/ec crisis 
N=1578 
Opinion leaders 21 21 21 25 15 25 
Silent Seekers 24 33 34 34 25 28 
Talking scanners 37 20 22 18 33 24 
Ignorants 19 26 23 23 26 24 
Table 138: Percentages of opinion leaders in the six survey studies 
 
 
We could consider talking scanners as secondary target groups as they have high scores on 
the social behaviour and the opinion leadership factors. The problem with talking scanners is 
that they interact much with others but they do not have an outspoken risk information 
seeking behaviour. We can expect their knowledge about certain risks to be moderate or 
even bad. They consider themselves as opinion leaders, but our methodology does not allow 
us to measure the exact and specific effects of the social interaction in risk contexts. We 
assume that opinion leaders will be perceived as the ‘risk experts’ in the personal 
environments of people and that people will consult this group to gain information and 
make well-informed decisions concerning behavioural intentions (protective behaviour etc.).  
We will compare the socio demographical profiles in the three research contexts in the 
subjoined overview. The socio demographical profiles were very specific in every risk 
context. Naturally, the concept of opinion leadership is stable in its roots (main opinion 
leadership characteristics) but very dynamical and flexible in its profiles for specific risk 
contexts. The socio demographical profiles of the opinion leaders were stable over the three 
studies in the context of terrorism. We decided only to use the data of the second study in 
the context of terrorism to validate the segmentation. We did not profile the opinion leaders 
because of the limited sample size (n=160, low external validity).  
 
 Terrorism I Terrorism III Terrorism IV Bird flu Fin/ec crisis 
Gender Male Male Male Female Male 
Age 40 44 44 47 45 
Educational level Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher 
Income level n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. Higher income 
Table 139: Comparison opinion leadership profiles in the five large scaled survey studies 
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The socio demographical profiles are interesting, but more important are the general 
descriptive statistics of the primary risk perception constructs. The four groups of 
information seekers had very specific results for the general concepts, indicating that the 
groups really had a specific profile concerning risk perception, mental distance, fear and 
behaviour. The opinion leaders differ significantly from the other groups on the main 
concepts that surround risk perception. They have significantly lower mental distances and 
higher risk perception levels, so their perception of terrorism as a potential threat is 
stronger.  Their fear level is higher as well. Higher fear levels are also accompanied with a 
higher level of behavioural intentions and concrete behaviour. Since we clustered the groups 
also on information seeking behaviour, it is obvious that their risk information seeking 
behaviour and social behaviour in the context of terrorism is higher than for the other 
groups. These results are very relevant as governments should now recognize the fact that 
opinion leaders, who are the most important risk communication target group since they 
look for information about the risks to are highly involved with. They talk to others about it, 
have leveraged risk perception and fear levels (and lower mental distance levels) and higher 
behavioural intentions. Compared with the risk information needs of the general public, the 
opinion leaders have much higher percentages for all types of risk information in the three 
risk contexts. The priorities in information desire are very similar, but both the frequency of 
risk information search as the perceived importance of all types of risk information are much 
higher for opinion leaders than for the other information seeking groups. Opinion leaders 
also have very distinct perceptions about the role of the government as a risk 
communicator. Their satisfaction with the quantity and quality of governmental information 
is as low as for the non opinion leaders. On the other hand, concerning the perceived 
suitability of the potential governmental communication channels to communicate about 
terrorism, the opinion leaders have significant higher scores on all channels, probably 
because their greater initial need for risk information. It is also essential to recognize the 
differences between opinion leaders and the general public in terms of this critical attitude, 
relating with the fact that they have a higher need to participate in the communication flow 
with the governments. The latter is another argument to set up and give concrete form to a 
two-way communication platform that lends the possibility to the opinion leaders to retrieve 
and contribute to the information pool. Another remarkable difference is their large need 
for risk information on the one hand but also their need for active participation to the risk 
communication process. Now we have discovered the four types of risk information seekers 
and identified our main communication target group, the opinion leaders, we have gained 
valuable knowledge to create a tangible risk communication strategy. We were able to 
create their socio demographical profile and to detect their specific risk information needs.  
Opinion leaders also have more outspoken needs to actively participate to the risk 
communication process and contribute to the risk policy discussion. They are the primary 
public stakeholders in risk policy debates. We extensively discussed the importance of 
stakeholder participation and more specifically the vital role of the public delegates in risk 
decision and risk management processes in chapters two and three. The active involvement 
of the public in these processes also stimulates a long term process to establish trust and 
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confidence in the risk managers (the governments). We propose to use the opinion leaders 
as primary potential participants in these risk policy debates. When the confidence in the 
government as a risk communicator is increased, the perception of the government as a 
competent risk regulator will be amplified as well. This assumption was empirically 
confirmed in the three risk contexts by means of multivariate data analyses and structural 
equation modeling. 
2.3. Discovering and proving statistically significant relationships between the key 
research concepts 
The third research objective included the analyses of the linear relationships between risk 
perception and the related concepts in the specific risk contexts and the validation of the 
SEM model that scrutinizes the relationship between risk regulation and risk communication. 
In all three risk contexts we found similar results regarding the linear relationships between 
the general concepts. The correlation matrices revealed that high levels of risk perception 
and low levels of mental distance correlate significantly with the need for information and 
some concrete behavioural efforts like information seeking, concrete behavioural actions (or 
plans) and social behaviour (talking to others). Fear is also correlated with risk perception of 
course (same as for fear and behaviour, but weaker linear relationship with social behaviour) 
and people who have higher fear levels will also look for information about the risk. So 
people who are more afraid will take more concrete actions and will have a greater need for 
information and vice versa. It is however remarkable that, in the three risk contexts, fear is 
highly correlated with risk perception, but not with mental distance. The results of the 
descriptive statistics stated that there are rather small percentages of people that have high 
risk perceptions but they also confirmed that the majority of the people have low mental 
distances towards the risks and do think that the risks are located in their immediate 
proximity. This contradiction may be an argument to state that many risks are medially and 
socially constructed. The media can bring the risks in the people’s personally constructed 
risk realities and amplify the risks. But on the other hand, when people are not really and 
directly confronted yet with the risks, their personal estimates of a direct confrontation with 
the risk and its consequences will be much lower. So even though the risks are perceived to 
be near, people are not really afraid to be involved. We allocated this to the denial and the 
invulnerability biases, as defined by Thompson (1985). 
The results in our correlation tables about the governmental communication indicate that it 
is absolutely necessary to provide enough and qualitative information because these 
concepts do not only correlate strongly with each other but also with the perceived 
reliability of the information and the general trust in the government. These strong and 
significant linear relationships were retrieved in the three risk contexts. 
Based on the descriptive statistics concerning the perceived and expected roles of the 
government in risk situations and based on the correlation outputs, we had reasons to 
assume that governmental risk communication plays a vital role in the general risk 
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management process. We wanted to explore and validate potential relationships between 
the concepts of risk communication and risk regulation. We assumed that effective 
governmental risk communication can raise the levels of trust in the government as a risk 
regulator. We tested some structural equation models in AMOS. The models provided us 
with statistical evidence that the better people perceive the government as a good risk 
communicator, the better the government will be perceived as a risk regulator. This 
evidence can be used to convince governments to put more efforts in creating efficient 
communication strategies that increase the public’s satisfaction with the amount, quality 
and reliability of the provided information. The gain of trust in the government as a risk 
communicator will result in an increase of trust in the government as a risk regulator, 
perceived to be able to prevent terrorist attacks. Besides this increase in trust, citizens will 
also be less critical about the statement that there is no room for bottom-up 
communication. Moreover, citizens will have a lower need to communicate with the 
government about risks, probably because they are confident in the fact that the 
government controls the risk by constructing and implementing concrete and solid risk 
management strategies. However, the opinion leaders are a special group of people that 
extensively search information about terrorism, talk about the topic to others and perceive 
themselves as opinion influencers. The results show us that this group of people will need to 
communicate for example to exchange knowledge. Governments should take initiatives to 
create communication platforms to provide enough, qualitative and reliable information to 
citizens. We also assume that especially the opinion leaders will normally quite rapidly seek 
access to these platforms to satisfy their need for risk information. The outcomes of the 
multivariate analyses in the three specific risk contexts have provided an answer to the third 
research objective. 
2.4. Concrete communication guidelines: source credibility and message style 
The last two studies were small scaled explorative studies that scrutinized the interaction 
effects between message characteristics (perceived quantity of offered information, 
informative versus emotional style, positive versus negative style) on source and information 
credibility.  The studies used a factorial experimental design to scrutinize these effects. From 
the results of these studies, we could formulate some concrete rules for governmental risk 
communication. We can state that risk messages should primarily have an informative 
nature, providing the population with specific and tangible facts and figures. These kinds of 
messages seemed to have a strong positive relationship with the credibility of the offered 
information. This relationship seemed to be even stronger for texts from governmental 
institutes (or governmental spokesmen) than for the article written by a journalist or an 
interview with an expert, especially when experts act as spokesmen. Especially the perceived 
amount of information provided in the text appeared to be a very important factor in the 
creation of messages that are perceived to be reliable. The higher the perceived information 
quantity, the higher the credibility of this information. This linear relationship seemed to be 
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the strongest for the governmental communication. We could also confirm this finding in the 
second study (bird flu).  
When we take in account the initial attitude towards the government, especially the critical 
group of people with a negative attitude towards the government needs messages that 
strongly emphasize the provision of objective information. To conclude, it is important to 
raise the impression of a well informed source that has a lot of knowledge about the topic as 
there was also retrieved a relatively strong linear relationship between the perceived 
amount of knowledge of the source and the source credibility (especially for experts as risk 
information sources). The last correlation table took into account the concept of attitude 
towards the government. People with outspoken attitudes need more information to be 
convinced as the level of information and especially source credibility raises with the 
perceived quantity of information that is provided. People with neutral attitudes are 
probably not strongly involved with the issue and so the relationship is not that outspoken. It 
will be important to provide a sufficient amount information in order to address both people 
with negative as positive attitudes towards the government. It is still important to emphasize 
the need for further research concerning other content and receiver related characteristics 
in the context of the perceived reliability of the source and message. 
3. Limitations , self-critique and recommendations 
The first important limitation of our quantitative studies relates to the sampling procedure. 
As our resources were limited, we could not select the respondents of our studies 
completely at random from a predefined sampling frame. We decided to follow the quota 
sampling procedure and let our interviewers (students) select respondents that yield the 
same proportions as the population proportions on the key identified variables: gender, age 
and educational level. The main limitations of this sampling procedure are the danger for 
selection bias as the interviewer selects its respondents subjectively, there is no waterproof 
method of estimating the standard error of a sample estimate because of the ill-defined 
procedure for selecting the sample and finally quota sampling could also be suspected to 
conceal the non-response (Stuart, 1984) as people who are not willing to participate will not 
be included in the study and results. It is important to bear these critical reflections in mind.  
 
The second limitation relates to the general constructs that are related to risk perception. 
We have selected some general constructs from the academic literature to relate to  
A next critical remark could be that our research results offer strong indications of the social 
or medial amplification of risks, but our data do not allow us to confirm the precise 
mechanisms of medial and social constructions of perceived risk realties statistically. We 
offer a methodology to describe the general concepts that are related to risk perception and 
risk communication in various risk contexts. We also confirmed some very relevant and 
apparent statistically significant linear relationships. However, our research designs do not 
allow us to pass empirically proven judgments about the causalities, about non linear 
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relationships or about other intervening variables that did were not integrated in the general 
methodology. In order to expose other potential intervening concepts, we should perform 
qualitative research that has a more profound character. The output of these qualitative 
studies would be very valuable, however this research track was not included in our initial 
research objectives.  
 
The next remark refers to the concept of opinion leadership. We decided to use the self-
designation method to identify opinion leaders. We integrated some specific items from 
existing opinion leadership scales and combined these items with some general risk 
information seeking items and social behaviour items as our definition of opinion leadership 
in the context of risk communication. The self designation technique has two main 
disadvantages. The fact that the respondents fill out the survey themselves induces a 
selection bias. We could also question the validity of self-reporting. On the other hand, we 
assume that people who do not perceive themselves as opinion leaders will not fulfill this 
role and influence other people. Our methodology does not allow us to draw conclusions 
about the specific information flows between opinion leaders and other groups or 
individuals nor about the specific degree of influence they have on others. In order to 
measure the specific impact of opinion leaders on attitudes and behavioural intentions or 
even concrete behaviour of other people, we should perform studies that integrate more 
specific research designs (qualitative research) and measurement instruments using expert 
identification or sociometric techniques. We can also propose an important suggestion for 
future research. It would be very useful to integrate a comparison of risks and their 
perceptions in one measurement instrument as this would allow us to set up a list of priority 
risk issues.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. Recapitulation 
This doctoral dissertation theoretically and empirically discussed risk as a multifaceted and 
complex concept. In this concluding chapter, we will recapitulate our most important 
findings and we will specify the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of 
this doctoral dissertation.  
The first challenge we faced was to clearly define the scope of our research topic and to 
provide a clear definition of ‘risk’. From the ‘taxonomy of disasters and risks’, developed by 
Wilkins and Patterson (1990), we could distillate that the core definition of risks in our 
approach to the matter, is closely related to concept of ‘opaque’ risks. We can state that 
opaque risks are largely defined by their political and social connotations. We find very 
strong similarities in the specific traits of opaque risks with the ‘new risks’ as defined by 
Ulrich Beck in his new risk society perspective. That is why we used Beck’s perspectives on 
the new risk society as one of the theoretical cornerstones that underlie our approach to the 
key concept of ‘risk’. His sociological perspective on the ‘new’ risk society is very valuable 
and has created new looking glasses that can be used to scrutinize risk perceptions on all 
levels of analysis: cognitive, socio-psychological and sociological. However we did agree with 
the main critique that his theoretical perspectives lack empirical foundations. Lupton and 
Tulloch mentioned that very little theoretical and empirical research has been established 
about the ways in which notions, narratives and knowledge about risks, and certainly the 
‘new’ risks are developed, understood and embedded in the social environments of people 
(Lupton & Tulloch, 2001). As a response, we concluded that there are many disciplines that 
scrutinize these issues, but they are all fragmented over several academic disciplines. One of 
the main objectives of this dissertation was to come to a holistic approach, integrating the 
most appropriate perspectives from the three core disciplines.  
Based on the insights that we had gained, we also added an attempt of a categorization of 
new risks with their specific traits. Because risk research comprises a very extensive and 
multidisciplinary offer of approaches, we incorporated and discussed the overview and 
classification of Renn (1992) and pointed out the fields that are incorporated within the 
scope of our dissertation. We concluded that the social amplification and attenuation of risk 
framework (SARF), as developed by Kasperson et al. (1996), is the perfect framework that 
can serve as a cornerstone for our theoretical and empirical objectives. We had already 
briefly introduced the ripple effects, as discussed by the SARF model, in the introduction by 
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applying the idea on the risk of the new ‘Mexican flu’ or H1N1 virus. However, we have 
discussed the framework more extensively by means of a concrete example: the risk of 
terrorism. As ‘contemporary’ or ‘new’ terrorism is primarily socially and medially 
constructed, it is a very nice example of a ‘new’ risk, as defined by Beck. We discussed the 
gap between the reality and the perceived reality, based on concrete facts and figures that 
illustrate that the ‘real’ threat of terrorism is overestimated. However, we do think that the 
effects of terrorism may be stronger when it comes to the ripple effects that are induced 
and amplified by various information agents and social stations, as defined by the SARF. We 
illustrated that governments are faced with the challenge to inform their population without 
alarming them. In any case, miscommunication and non communication should be avoided 
since an information vacuum induces uncertainty and provides the media opportunities to 
speculate and provide sensational but unrealistic information. Risk communication, 
especially when it has to be performed by our responsible institutes such as governments 
and large corporations, is very difficult. Informing the public is a delicate process that should 
take into consideration the community’s ‘right to know’, their need to know, the obligations 
to protect this public’s mental and physical health, the costs of unnecessarily alarming 
people versus the benefits of increasing communal awareness and preparedness and the 
possible repercussions of premature or delayed decisions and actions. The primary 
objectives of the governmental risk communication strategies will depend on the desired 
strategic outcomes of the risk managers or government officials on the one hand and on the 
specific information needs of the various stakeholders that are involved in the risk situation 
on the other hand. Depending on whether the government has to pick up an advisory, 
protective or redistributive role, the focus in the information strategy will be on information 
provision, (re)assurance or involvement. However, we assume that risk managers do not 
always have the capabilities and the skills to communicate effectively about risks since risk 
communication training programs are costly and time consuming and the added value of 
such programs is often underestimated. Risk communication is often perceived as one of the 
phases in the risk management process. That is why risk communication is mostly boarded 
out to professional communication organizations. On the one hand we think that is a good 
thing since these companies possess the knowledge and the skills to construct and 
implement solid communication strategies. On the other hand we doubt that this approach 
is satisfactory in the light of the construction and implementation of interactive and public 
oriented risk communication strategies. Scrutinizing and criticizing several risk management 
models in our theoretical body made us conclude that communication is a vital element that 
should be integrated in almost all stages of the risk management cycle. However, the nature, 
the objectives and the flow of the communication processes may vary according to the 
specific stage of the risk management cycle. We also clearly defined the differences between 
crisis communication and risk communication. Risk communication can be both pre-crisis 
communication in the context of emergency and crisis management processes as risk 
communication in its purest sense, which has a vital role to play in risk perception 
management processes. This doctoral dissertation primarily focused on risk perception 
management and risk communication processes. We mainly based ourselves on the dialogue 
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perspective on risk communication to formulate various definitions and discuss several risk 
communication models since this perspective forms a strong base for the receiver-oriented 
risk communication approach of this doctoral dissertation. We advocate that general risk 
management and risk communication strategies in particular need interactive and 
participatory approaches. Both directive (encouraging attitudinal and behavioural changes) 
as indirective (informational, explicatory) communication strategies can benefit from public 
participation. Cooperation by exchanging information can create new solutions. Effective 
interaction can cross time bridges and provide risk managers with information about risk 
perceptions, concerns and information needs. These beneficiary actions can lead to more 
efficient risk management strategies and in particular a more efficient and well-considered 
choice of the most appropriate risk communication strategies. That is why we would advice 
risk managers to take into consideration the clash between the micro-interests of the 
involved communities (including various stakeholders), who perceive the risk on a personal 
and more emotional level, and the macro-perspectives of the risk regulators, who perceive 
the risk in terms of societal repercussions on an aggregated, statistical data level. This clash 
often leads to divergent interests and a more difficult decision making process. Defining the 
public and drawing the profiles of the various stakeholders is a crucial element in drafting 
risk communication strategies as the dual construction of ‘public’ versus ‘regulators’ does 
not account anymore. The ‘public’ does not exist; neither does ‘the public’s need for one 
single type of information’. The diversity of public concerns and perceptions requires the 
development of special, customized and targeted forms of communication. We have also 
confirmed that risk management processes and risk communication strategies that integrate 
stakeholder participation strongly relate to the issues of trust and confidence. The difference 
between trust, confidence and credibility is not always clear so we had to consider the 
specific contexts and levels of analysis that we want to relate to these concepts. However, 
our extensive literature review about the concepts revealed that there is general agreement 
that trust is a complex and multidimensional concept that can be analyzed on various levels. 
We concluded that trust is vital on all levels of analysis and that it is a primary condition to 
establish and implement risk communication strategies with direct impacts as well as long 
term effects. But when we formulate it the other way round, we can state that effective risk 
communication may increase trust levels and mitigate the trust crisis in governmental 
institutes, primarily by involving the public and stimulating two-way and bottom-up 
communication. When we related the concept of trust to policy decision making in the 
context of opaque risks, we concluded that the relationship between risk perception and the 
attitude towards governmental policy construction is very fragile. The stability of short term 
and long term trust is undermined by a lack of knowledge about these opaque risks and also 
due to the uncertainties that are involved. Especially in these risk contexts, the involvement 
of various groups of stakeholders throughout the entire risk management process is crucial. 
The participation of the stakeholders can range from passive supervision of the interests of 
their own group interests to active participation and contribution to the risk management 
processes. Stakeholder participation can increase trust levels or in some cases, trust levels 
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are actually becoming less important as the stakeholders can influence the direction, the 
development or even the outcomes of certain decision processes themselves.  
As we have scrutinized the concept of risk from the viewpoint of a communication scientist, 
we have integrated an extensive palette of theoretical approaches with psychological, social 
psychological and sociological roots. It is our conviction that the art and science of 
communicating includes processes that can be allocated to these three main research 
disciplines. It was one of the main challenges to reconcile crucial theoretical paradigms of 
these three disciplines. The outcome of this reconciliation has served as a holistic theoretical 
foundation for our empirical research studies. The theoretical body incorporated elements 
of three levels of analysis: the individual level, the interpersonal and the sociological level. 
Bandura’s social cognitive theory was an important source of inspiration since his theory 
merges the cognitive and social perspectives and tries to link them to the behavioural 
component (Bandura, 2001). We commenced with discussing theories on the individual and 
cognitive perspectives. Individual risk perception theories such as the psychometric 
paradigm, the heuristic systematic information processing model and the experiential mode 
of risk perception clarified the mechanisms that underlie risk perception, but also the role of 
the media in the construction of risk perceptions was integrated to support our view on risk 
perception. On the second level, we switched to theories about concrete behaviours in the 
context of risk. One of the main conclusions was that preventive risk practices are stimulated 
better by a heightened self-efficacy than by elevating fear. We also focused on the three 
levels of information behaviour, information behaviour, information seeking behaviour and 
information search behaviour, and we discussed the framework of risk information seeking 
model as developed by E. Ter Huurne (2008). The FRIS model involves the particular 
perception of the risk, the perceived personal control and the involvement of the individual 
with the risk context. However, our main focus was on the specific types of risk information 
seeking behaviour as one of the objectives of our empirical studies was to create and 
validate an information seeker’s segmentation. We also discussed the importance of 
unveiling the specific risk information needs of people in the context of opaque risks. On the 
second level of analysis, interpersonal communication was considered to be one of the basic 
elements of the social construction of risk perceptions. The social construction of risks has 
also been elucidated by several theoretical viewpoints, such as the model of social and 
medial construction of risks and the social network contagion theory of risk perception. In 
this perspective, we developed a conceptual model that was a modification on the three 
basic perspectives on the individual differences perspective, the social relationship 
perspective and the social categories perspective, three basic perspectives on how individual 
audience members react on and interact with the mass media and their messages. Our 
modified model, the ‘multi step social interaction perspective’, added concepts of 
interactivity, non personal direct information flows, possibilities of new and interactive 
information sources and feedback loops. These additions should provide an answer to the 
needs of the contemporary, interactive information society. Within this model, opinion 
leaders take up a crucial role as information mediators. The concept of opinion leadership 
has been scrutinized in various contexts, which proofs its multidisciplinary character, but the 
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introduction in the context of risk and risk communication is new.  We decided to formulate 
a new definition of opinion leadership that was customized to the context of risk. We 
defined opinion leaders as ‘information transmission agents that seek, receive, interpret and 
transmit information to other individuals that are in personal (direct) or impersonal (through 
other channels such as the internet) contact with them. Depending on the specific 
personality traits and information needs of the people that receive information from or seek 
information with them, opinion leaders may have an influence on these information 
receivers’. Based on the outcome of the literature study, that integrated both theoretical as 
empirical studies, we were able to formulate three crucial dimensions that would allow us to 
differentiate leaders from non-leaders: information seeking behaviour, social behaviour and 
interpersonal influence. As we will discuss in the next section, one of the key objectives of 
our empirical research was to identify the opinion leaders in three different risk contexts and 
to construct their specific socio-demographical and media profiles. This output may 
contribute crucial information in the development of effective risk communication 
strategies.  
Our empirical body was partly inspired by William Leiss’s vision on the contemporary 
tradition of risk communication research (Leiss, 1996). In this new risk communication 
tradition, that was established since 1995, the key research objectives include the creation 
of tools that can serve effectively in the risk communication audit process. The concrete 
output of this audit can be stated in terms of good risk communication practices that can 
contribute to the risk management and risk communication policy developments. The new 
tradition incorporates a holistic approach to risk research, in which the various concepts that 
are related to risk, such as risk perception, fear, mental distance towards the risk, media 
exposure, trust etc. will be related to each other. Naturally, the specific nature of each risk 
context will lead to shifts in strengths and directions of the relationships between the 
concepts. So the codes of good communication practices will vary accordingly. 
Within this perspective, we developed our key research objectives. Our primary objective 
was to construct and validate a research methodology that would allow us to scrutinize the 
various elements of the ‘strategic environmental audit’, as proposed by Leiss (1996). We 
decided to define the key constructs that surround risk perception. These key constructs 
were derived from our extensive literature study, as discussed in the theoretical body. The 
methodology has also grown organically throughout the entire research process. This 
process included six quantitative survey studies. Besides the validation of the measurement 
scales, we also wanted to validate the methodology in various risk contexts as our 
methodology should be applicable in most risk contexts. The measurement tool offered us a 
clear audit of the risk perceptions and its related concepts, and it allowed us to identify 
crucial elements for improvement. As extensively discussed in the previous chapter, the 
descriptive statistics of these quantitative studies allowed us to draw some general 
conclusions that transcend the specific risk contexts. One of the main findings was that the 
proportion of people that are actually involved in the risk situations and confirm explicit 
behavioural intentions and concrete behaviour (protective, information seeking) is small. 
This accounted for the three risk contexts (terrorism, bird flu and financial economical crisis).  
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We posed ourselves the question why we should even consider investing resources into risk 
communication efforts since these results indicated that the percentage of people that is 
actually looking for risk information is that low. However, we were convinced that things 
were not as simple as we firstly assumed. The results of our descriptive analyses indicated 
that our general ‘public’ was not heterogeneous at all. This was our key motive to create a 
segmentation tool that would allow us to identify and profile the various groups of 
information seekers. The outcome of the segmentation studies would allow us to 
communicate more effectively by creating customized target based risk communication 
strategies. We can only create these strategies when we have gained sufficient knowledge 
about the dynamics that play within the social structures of the society. How does risk 
information spread and what is the role of opinion leaders within these dynamic processes? 
We already formulated a theoretically based answer on this question in the theoretical body, 
but it was one of our challenges to try to empirically confirm our theoretical propositions by 
means of our research studies. This need for customized and public oriented risk 
communication strategies inspired our second research objective. Our first study, which was 
performed in the context of terrorism as a risk, provided us with data for our explorative 
segmentation. We managed to confirm our classification of risk information seekers. The 
exploratory cluster analysis revealed four main groups of information seekers: opinion 
leaders, talking scanners, silent seekers and ignorants. This four group segmentation could 
be validated in the six quantitative research studies that covered three risk contexts. The 
results of the discriminant analyses confirmed the four group solution with the five key 
determinants: active information seeking, event triggered information seeking, passive 
information scanning, social behaviour and opinion leadership traits. We could also confirm 
the proposition that opinion leaders could be considered as our primary communication 
targets since the diffused information will reach them more accurately and they will talk to 
other people about the risks. The percentage of opinion leaders was confirmed to be rather 
stable (25%). The opinion leaders differed significantly as for their socio - demographical 
traits. However, the significant differences for the primary risk perception constructs 
between the four groups were even more important. These results indicated that opinion 
leaders consistently had more outspoken results for the general risk perception concepts 
and also for the specific information needs. The perceived importance of all types of risk 
information was much higher for opinion leaders than for the other information seeking 
groups. Besides these specific traits, opinion leaders also had more outspoken attitudes 
towards the government as a risk communicator. Opinion leaders were more critical in this 
matter, and they also had a higher need to actively participate in the risk communication 
process and contribute to the risk policy discussions.  
A third research objective was to scrutinize the relationship between risk regulation and risk 
communication. We used the data from the six quantitative studies to scrutinize the 
correlations between the key concepts. The results were extensively discussed in the 
research reports and in the concluding chapter of the empirical body.  
We developed three multivariate models that were tested with AMOS. The models provided 
us with statistical evidence that the better people perceive the government as a good risk 
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communicator, the better the government will be perceived as a risk regulator. We already 
strongly emphasized that governments should put more efforts in creating efficient 
communication strategies in order to increase the public’s trust in the government as a risk 
regulator. 
Besides the large scaled quantitative studies, we also performed two small scaled 
explorative studies that scrutinized the interaction effects between message characteristics 
and source and information credibility. The results of these studies provided us with some 
concrete communication guidelines in the specific contexts of terrorism and the bird flu. 
2. Concluding remarks 
The theoretical and empirical bodies of this dissertation had the primary aim to provide a 
clear overview of the processes and mechanisms that are involved in risk communication. 
We have the impression that Belgium does not have a strong risk communication tradition, 
unlike the Netherlands. The Netherlands have been confronted with several disasters the 
past decades. The North Sea flood in 1953, the fireworks disaster in Enschede in 2000 are 
only two disasters that have left strong traces in the collective consciousness of the Dutch 
population. That is probably the reason why, e.g. with the existence of the Expertise Center 
for Risk and Crisis Communication (ERC), there is a much stronger risk communication 
culture than in Belgium. Very often, risk communication is avoided in our country, or it is 
implemented ad hoc and treated stepmotherly, reducing the effectiveness of the risk 
communication campaigns.  
Our contemporary, western, society is characterized by the presence of many risks that are 
either very tangible or socially and medially constructed and amplified. We strongly 
emphasize that citizens have the right to be informed transparently and honestly. Risk 
communicators and especially governments should find the balance between informing the 
general population about the presence and severity of risks and avoiding general arousal and 
collective concern about risks that are objectively not even a real threat. They should 
educate the population about how to deal with their uncertainties, in the first place by 
satisfying their specific information needs.  
Even though we have not empirically confirmed that the media play an important role in the 
amplification and attenuation of risks, we can assume that their role should not be 
underestimated. The media are very useful instrumental tools to diffuse information, but as 
news media often focus on the sensational and dramatic aspects of certain issues, the reality 
that surrounds a certain risk is often blown out of proportion. We think that, besides risk 
regulation and risk prevention, governments should also pick up their role as risk 
communicators or at least as information mediators. In certain issues, such as terrorism, 
governments almost have an information monopoly and they decide what risk information 
can be spread. As the results of our empirical studies demonstrate, people perceive 
governments to possess this risk information monopoly in various risk contexts. On the other 
hand, people are not satisfied with the current risk information policy as they think that the 
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governments do not communicate about the risks enough. This can undermine short term 
credibility and long term trust in the government as a risk communicator, but also as a risk 
regulator, since we empirically confirmed this relationship in our six empirical studies. But 
also for risks that are much more uncertain and opaque, governments should try to actively 
communicate about these risks to undermine the monopoly of the media, who will very 
often address the information needs of the public by providing them with their own 
(sensational) views on these issues. 
To conclude, we want to stress the importance of developing tools that may offer us the 
possibilities to gain information from the population. Besides providing a general overview 
of the literature about risk perception and risk communication, it was also our aim to 
construe a tool that may gather this kind of information. Our methodology offers the 
potential to identify crucial issues to be improved, to assess the general perceptions, 
attitudes, and concrete behaviours. Our methodology also provides the option to identify 
the principal communication target groups and discover their specific socio demographical 
and medial profiles. To summarize, the methodology can serve as an auditing tool that can 
provide a reliable solution to monitor the crucial issues that are involved in construing 
effective and receiver oriented risk communication strategies. 
We have already mentioned the fact that gaining information about how citizens think about 
risks and how they actually deal with risks, in terms of protective behaviour or information 
seeking behaviour, is crucial for the success of the risk communication strategy but also for 
the entire risk management process. This information should be the starting point of every 
risk communication strategy. Risk perceptions are very often much more important than the 
risks as such, as these perceptions will influence the actual behaviour of people, and 
eventually have their impact on social, economical and political domains in the entire 
society. In the clash between the micro-perspective of the individuals (probabilities and how 
risks can affect me and my personal environment) and the macro perspective of the risk 
managers and analysts (what are the calculated probabilities and estimated consequences), 
the concrete and tangible approach to risk management and risk communication often gets 
the upper hand. However, we hope that this academic work has provided enough 
satisfactory arguments to promote the benefits and value of public oriented risk 
communication strategies. 
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- A folder with examples of the experimental conditions: text conditions and 
accompanying surveys for the bird flu study (study I) and the terrorism study (study 
II).  
- A folder with the three quantitative surveys in the context of terrorism (2006), the 
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- A folder with all crucial governmental documents, guidelines and handbooks for risk 
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All databases (available in spss and statistics format) and the outputs of the statistical 
analyses are available upon request.  
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